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Abstract  
 
This thesis looks at the question of impunity in the context of the International 
Criminal Court and is concerned with elucidating an important paradox: that despite 
the ICC’s explicit aim of ending impunity for the perpetrators of serious international 
crimes, it may also be seen to create, legitimise, and facilitate impunity in a variety 
of different ways. Whilst it creates and defines crimes, and empowers certain parties 
to act, it also immunises the acts of others from criminal judgment and enables the 
(almost) routine escape from judgment. The research presents a detailed analysis of 
the specific ways in which the ICC may give rise to situations of impunity.  
The thesis focuses on internal and external aspects of the relationship 
between the ICC and de jure and de facto impunity. Regarding the former, internal 
dimension, it is shown that impunity may arise in the Statute through the following 
ways: criminalisation, definition of new crimes, amnesties, immunities, defences, 
generic and particular procedural problems of the ICC, the nature of the 
complementarity of jurisdiction, and deficiencies in the institutional mechanisms of 
the ICC.  
In terms of the external dimension, the research explores the interaction 
between a number of external agencies and the ICC. It reports how the relationship 
between the Security Council and the ICC, together with the opposition of several 
powerful countries and states not party to the Statute, may also lead to a condition of 
de jure and de facto impunity in the Statute and the practice of the Court so far.  
The thesis finds that the ICC, similarly to previous international tribunals 
such as the ad hoc tribunals, inherited many issues concerning enforcement of 
international justice, but also has its own particular difficulties and weaknesses. The 
Court not only was not created as a mechanism of universal international justice, but 
its limited jurisdiction cannot be implemented in practice equally even regarding all 
states party to the Statute; thus, the ICC is a Court of partial justice, as justice has 
been differentiated via the different relative powers of states. From the very outset of 
the formation of the ICC, certain countries have aimed at its being created as a weak 
institution with very limited jurisdiction and sanctioning and enforcement power. 
This weakness, however, is also a source of power for those states that seek to 
maintain the unequal distribution of criminal justice. 
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Impunity and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Chapter I:  Introduction           
Impunity for international crimes and for systematic and widespread violations of 
human rights is one of the fundamental concerns of the international community in 
the new century. Some perpetrators are living freely and have never been brought to 
justice, and we have not yet seen many prosecutions of international crimes that have 
occurred on a very large scale. As, Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of 
United Nations, said: ‘Today, we live in a world where a man has more chances to be 
judged if he kills only one person than if he kills 100 000.’1  
The establishment of the first permanent international criminal court the 
(ICC) is the most significant event since the creation of the United Nation in 1945. It 
is the major effort to bring criminals to justice, which started at Nuremberg and 
continued through the creation of ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
 
 The 
ICC has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community, namely genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime of 
aggression, jurisdiction over which has been postponed.
2
 The Statute describes its 
aim as being ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes’.  3  
The aim of this study is, broadly, to concern itself with the question as to 
whether this stated rationale for the establishment of the ICC is a sound one, whereby 
the ICC will in fact contribute to an end to impunity. To what extent can the ICC be 
understood as a vehicle for overcoming the problem of impunity in international 
law? How realistic is that idea? Might it be argued, by contrast, that whatever merits 
it might have as a vehicle for the prevention of atrocities taking place, the ICC also 
may create the conditions for the perpetuation of impunity: that it is, in that sense, 
part of the problem? I should state here that the definition of impunity adopted in this 
thesis implies a broader understanding than simply a lack of retributive justice; I will 
argue that impunity is not always an awful thing, but may also be seen to be 
necessary and inevitable in some situations. The main concerns of this thesis, 
                                               
1 As quoted by Beigbeder, Y. Judging criminal leaders: the slow erosion of impunity (2002), at 207. 
2 See the Rome Statute Art. 15, in accordance with Art. 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute, the crime 
of aggression has finally been defined at the review Conference in Kampala (Uganda), but the Court 
will be able to exercise its jurisdiction over this crime only after 1, January 2017. See Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, Annex 1, (3), (31 May-
11 June 2010), Resolution RC/Res.6. Available at:  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf (Accessed 04/01/2012).  
3 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
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however, will be to explore the following: under what conditions the ICC may be 
said to create impunity, whether actually or potentially; how the ICC fosters, induces, 
encourages or tolerates impunity; and whether the ICC could effectively address the 
issue of impunity or has failed to do so. 
Why are these interesting questions? 
Standard accounts of the ICC, or explanations provided for its existence, 
begin with the proposition that there is a need to ‘bring to justice’ those accused of 
international crimes, and that the ICC provides thereby a mechanism by which this 
will be achieved. It starts, in other words, from the assumption a) that there are 
perpetrators of international crimes whose ‘criminality’ remains unpunished, and b) 
that the ICC will be a means of eradicating that impunity. The Statute emphasises, 
for example, that most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
must not go unpunished.
4
 
This is potentially problematic because the ICC does not simply provide a 
neutral mechanism for bringing to justice those who have committed crimes in 
international law, but actively inserts itself in the regulatory environment. In general, 
I will argue that the ICC creates, legitimises, and may potentially create or facilitate 
impunity. It creates and defines crimes, it empowers certain parties to act, and it 
immunises the acts of others from criminal judgment. Each and every part of the 
Statute contributes to the sum total of rights and obligations which we know to be 
international criminal law, and does so in various ways, in some cases it may 
increase the incidence of impunity, in others may legitimise criminal behaviour, in 
yet others it may contribute to the conditions under which a criminal may effectively 
escape the terms of international justice. That it may not do so in every case is 
certainly to be conceded, but the fact that it may do so in some, or at least has the 
potential for doing so, certainly changes, and indeed challenges, the way in which we 
are accustomed to think about the ICC as an initiative.  
Impunity in the ICC can be divided into de jure and de facto impunity. 
Concerning de jure impunity, the first instance to be considered is that the Statute 
may offer impunity via non-prosecution where prosecution is not in the interests of 
justice.
5
 The Statute provides for the possibility of the Prosecutor reaching such a 
decision; in particular, in the case of a conflict between peace and order on the one 
                                               
4 Id.  
5 Rome Statute 53 (1), (c). 
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hand and justice on the other hand in a society, rationally the priority should be with 
peace and order. The ICC may also potentially create impunity through new 
approaches to the definition of crimes, defences, and via its potential recognition of 
amnesties.
6
 In such cases, one may say that impunity is legitimised or given legal 
form. Not only does the Statute, paradoxically to the main objective of its existence, 
provide some room for the recognition and legitimisation of impunity, on some 
occasions impunity may also be taken to be positively desirable. In addition to de 
jure impunity, the ICC may also contribute to de facto impunity as a consequence of 
a range of procedural and institutional deficiencies such as the inadequacy of the 
mechanism of the jurisdiction and the enforcement power of the Court. This type of 
impunity is of various types; it may occur via problems of non-prosecution of certain 
individuals or groups of people; and extra-judicial factors impacting on the decisions 
of the judges, and the role of powerful states and external agencies such as the 
Security Council (SC) also fall into the category of de facto impunity.  
By way of introduction to this general argument, this chapter will be divided 
into four sections. The first will address the methodology and theory of the thesis, 
which is based upon certain insights drawn from American legal realism.
7
 The 
second section will examine the relationship between law and politics and the 
concept of this relationship in general and concerning the ICC in particular, from the 
standpoint of legal realism and as it pertains to the question of impunity. This will 
lead to the two core ideas of this thesis. The first is that the law in books is different 
from the law in practice;
8
 that law is a social creation, an instrument which should 
serve a social end,
9
 and the law is not a simple rule on paper, but a function of 
authoritative decision makers.
10
 Accordingly, when looking at the ICC we need to 
focus not merely on the Statute, but also on the ways in which the various different 
actors and institutions may act and behave pursuant to the objectives set out in the 
Rome Statute and the rules contained therein. The second core idea is related to the 
connection between law and politics, and observes that a certain legal rule in practice 
operates in a given social situation marked by disparities in wealth and power, that 
                                               
6 Id, Art. 53, e.g. where these are in the interests of justice. 
7 Herein after legal realism or realism.   
8 Pound R. ‘Law in Books and Law in Action,’ 44 American Law Review (1910),12, at 34.  
9 Holmes O.W. ‘The Path of the Law’, 8 Harvard Law Review (1897), 457, at 467; Holmes O.W. 
‘Privilege, Malice and Intent’, 8 Harvard Law Review (1894),1, at 9;  Tamanaha B. Z. ‘Understanding 
Legal Realism,’ 87 Texas Law Review (2008-9), 731, at 737. 
10 Cohen F. ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’, 35 Columbia Law Review 
(1935), 809, at 842. 
13 
 
the law cannot as a consequence apply equally to all. We may observe that the ICC is 
a nascent legal structure that is partly embedded in a functional social context, i.e. the 
context of unequal power; international law promises the sovereign equality of all 
states,
11
 but the reality is that states are unequal and the Statute cannot apply equally 
even to all state parties. Justice, if it is to be sought in such a context, may only be 
‘real’ as a form of partial justice. In order to elucidate these ideas further, the third 
section of this chapter will focus upon the definition of impunity and the concept of 
impunity in the Statute. The fourth, and final, section will consist of a chapter by 
chapter outline of the thesis.  
1.1. Methodology and theory      
The main concern of this thesis is to evaluate the ICC as an institution designed to 
combat and eliminate impunity.  For purposes of such an evaluation, it will not 
merely be asked whether the rules of the ICC are internally coherent, whether they 
conform, or depart from, existing precepts of international criminal law, or whether 
the definition of concepts and crimes leave gaps or ambiguities. Such analytical 
observations are necessary, but not sufficient. It will additionally be asked whether 
the ICC can in fact combat impunity, and to that extent, attention will be drawn 
towards how the rules operate in practice – both actual and potential. This demands a 
methodology which is, in part, analytical and linguistic, in part also ‘semi-empirical’ 
or ‘contextual’. On the one side will be an analysis of the terms of the Statute – what 
it provides on paper, how the rules are defined and determined, and the putative 
relationship between those rules and the pre-existing provisions of international 
criminal law and case law of relevant tribunals. On the other side, however, will be a 
contextual evaluation of the ICC as an institution, that looks at both how the ICC 
operates (or might operate) in practice, and at the practical constraints that impinge 
upon its work. This latter analysis, in a sense, is semi-empirical insofar as it is 
concerned with looking at the social and political context of judicial decision-
making, of the effective capacity of an institution such as the ICC to deliver justice in 
the context of international society, in which power differentials within international 
society as well as the resourcing and capacity of the ICC itself will be brought into 
                                               
11 Cassese A. International Law (2001), at 88; sovereign equality also has been defined, in 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970), UN G.A. Res. 
2625,  25 UN GAOR, SUPP. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1971). 
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consideration. It is, however, not empirical in the sense of concerning itself with the 
analysis of data-sets or statistical probabilities. 
To characterise the research methodology more exactly, I may note that, in 
order to address the research questions and problems, my research has mainly been 
based on library and archival research. I will engage in textual,
12
 doctrinal and 
qualitative analysis of situations or actors as appropriate. I also will investigate the 
different cases - or the stages reached by each case so far - in the ICC, via a series of 
related topics, each of which supports the main argument of the thesis.  
 In terms of theoretical standpoints, I will here examine: a) American legal 
realism; b) the relation between law and politics, or law in the social context; and c) 
the necessity for the re-examination and revision of the law. American legal realism 
dominated legal theory in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States
13
 
the predominant insight of which asserts that the law is what is decided by the courts 
- the law in action and rules made by judges, rather than paper rules.
14
 
 
This insight is 
central to this thesis the task of which is not merely to describe the content of the 
Rome Statute -the Court’s paper rules- but also to look at the law in action and 
understand how these rules may operate in particular contexts and cases. In fact, the 
distinction between the rules in the books (paper rules) and the real rules (the Court’s 
decisions) is not entirely straightforward in this context as there is no more than one 
case of a conviction in the ICC so far.
15
 In order to evaluate the Court's ‘real rules’, 
thus, I will focus on the procedural, evidentiary decisions and the Court's 
administrative decisions thus far. The realist, anti formalist analysis of the relation 
between law and politics, law as embedded in the social context, and finally the 
necessity for law to be assessed in terms of its outcomes will be considered in due 
course.  
                                               
12 Bryman  A. Social Research Method (2004), at 19-20.  
13 Ratner S.R. ‘Legal Realism’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011), Para 1; 
Tamanaha B. Z. Supra note 9, at 731-732; Yntema H. E. ‘American Legal Realism in Retrospect,’ 14 
Vanderbilt Law Review (1960-61), 317, at 317-31; see also generally, Horwitz. M. J. The 
Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (1994);  Kalman L. 
‘Review Essay, Legal Realism Now,’  Reviewed by J. W. Singer, 76 California Law Review (1988), 
465. 
14 Llewellyn K.N.  ‘Some Realism about the Realism- Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harvard Law 
Review (1931), 1222, at 1223 and 1236;  Pound R. Supra note 8, at 34;  Frank J. Law and the Modern 
Mind (1930), at 33; Radin M. ‘Legal Realism’, 31 Columbia Law Review (1931), 824, at 824;  Leiter 
B. ‘Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,’ 76 Texas Law Review (1997), 
267, at 268. 
15 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber 1 (10 July 2012), 
Lubanga found guilty for war crimes of enlisting of children under the age of 15, to a total of 14 years 
imprisonment, on 14 July 2012.  
15 
 
It is important to investigate the question of what legal realism implies and why 
this study has adopted this theoretical standpoint. Realism developed predominantly 
on the basis of domestic legal issues in America, and realist scholars did not 
generally extend their investigation into international law.
16
 In the 20th century a 
group of American scholars, as well as several European scholars, such as Georges 
Scelle and Max Huber, came to regard themselves as ‘new realists’ and attempted to 
integrate legal realism into international law. They were anti-formalist in their 
approach and attempted to modernise international law.
17
 They have been influential 
in changing the traditional concept of law into that of a social creation based on 
tangible rules. Thus, although legal realism was initially purely a domestic school in 
the US common law system, its effects continue to be felt nationally and 
internationally today. Realists tend not to accept that legal rules determine the results 
of legal disputes; they point instead to various other factors contributory to the 
process of making legal decisions.
18
 As Pound observed, ‘the dogma of a complete 
body of rules to be applied mechanically was quite out of line with reality.’19 
Accordingly, the investigation of the concept of law in realism, which has a 
significant impact on the jurisprudence, as a preliminary step would help towards a 
better understanding of the Rome Statute as a set of paper rules and of how it is 
actually applied in practice.  
1.2 .The concept of law in legal realism 
American legal realism explicitly rejected the idea of law as a body of established, 
logically connected rules, and instead characterised law as a production of decisions 
and behaviour by judges and – partly – by administrative agencies,20 within the 
limitations set by statutes and ‘public opinion’.21 Generally realism emphasises law 
in action, the social creation of law, and the predictability of law as it has been 
experienced.   
                                               
16 Ratner R.S. Supra note 13, Para 2. 
17 Id, at 2; Koskenniemi M. ‘Introduction: Alf Ross and Life Beyond Realism,’ 14, European Journal 
of International Law (2003), 653 at 656.  
18 Rathner R.S. Ibid. 
19 Pound R. ‘ The Call for a Realist jurisprudence,’ 44 Harvard Law Review (1930-31), 697, at 707.  
20 Llewellyn K.N. ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence Next Step,’ 30 Columbia Law Review (1930), 431, at 
453.  
21 Radin M. Supra note 14, 824; Ratner S.R. Ibid, Para 1. 
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Holmes, who is considered a father of the legal realism movement,
22
 in his 
earlier book The Common Law asserted that ‘[t]he life of the law has not been logic, 
it has been experience.’23 He insisted that the growth of the law is legislative in 
substance ‘in a deeper sense than that what the courts declare to have always been 
the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its grounds.’24 The grounds to which Holmes 
was referring he explained as ‘consideration of what is expedient for the community 
concerned.’25 In his later writing in ‘The Path of the Law’, in particular, Holmes 
asserted the social creation of the law.
26
 In a comparison between the implications of 
the rules and general principles and the significance of the court’s decision, Holmes 
stated that it was the virtue of common law that it decided on the case first and 
established the principle after that.
27
 The actual practice of the courts, then, provided 
the basis on which the principles are developed. On the definition of law, Pound 
came to differ slightly with Holmes and asserted that law is derived from both 
experience and, he added, reason: ‘law is experience developed by reason and reason 
tested by experience. For experience we turn to history. For reason we turn to 
philosophy.’28 
A central facet of realism thus is to assert that the law is a social creation, an 
instrument which should serve a social end and that there is an inevitable duty on the 
part of judges to realise the social advantages of their decisions.
29
 Holmes asserts that 
society and public policy sacrifice individual welfare to themselves and to universal 
good, maintaining that the law treats individuals as a means to an end, and uses them 
to increase the general welfare even at individuals’ own expense.30 Pound similarly 
asserts that a new jurisprudence should foster a ‘weighing of social interest’.31 Later, 
                                               
22 Horwitz. M. J. Supra note 13, at 110.  
23 Holmes O.W. The Common Law (1963), at 5; see also Cohen F. Supra note 10, at 826; he 
emphasises that ‘all concepts that cannot be defined in terms of the elements of actual experience are 
meaningless.’  
24 Id, at 31.  
25 Id. 
26 Holmes O.W. (1897), Supra note 9, at 467-469. He asserts ‘I think that the judges themselves have 
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.’ See also at 
467. 
27 Holmes O.W. ‘Codes, and Arrangement of the Law,’ 5 American Law Review (1870),1, at 1.   
28 Pound R.  New Paths of the Law (1950), at 12. 
29 Holmes O.W. (1897), Ibid, at 467;  and (1894), Supra note 9,  at 9. It should be noticed that 
Holme’s earlier view was different than what he said  here  for instance,  his  view law is as 
independent of  the human will in  his article on 1894 ,  he asserts ‘[t]he time has gone by when law is 
only an unconscious embodiment of the common will’.   
30 Holmes O.W. (1963), Supra note 23, at 37 and 40. 
31 Pound, R. ‘ A Survey of Social interests,’  57 Harvard Law Review (1943),1, at 7;  Pound R. ‘The 
Scope and Purpose of Social jurisprudence,’ 25 Harvard Law Review (1912),140, at 146. He asserts 
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Llewellyn characterised law as a means to a social end as a common point among 
realisms.
32
 Thus, law in realism’s view could be understood as more susceptible to 
change due to the demands of society.
33
 Hence, realism insists that legal rules more 
specifically and concretely, and contextually, could in fact fit reality.
34
 Pound, like 
many other realist scholars, was a critic of natural law theory, maintaining that the 
latter was highly individualist.
35
 It can be seen that realism’s scholars have been 
generally united on an understanding of law as a social fact,
36
 and consequently to 
have taken an anti-formalist position. They have not, however, been opposed to 
positivism, but regarded this as compatible with the realist position,
37
 as positivism 
has also regarded the law as a matter of social fact. Therefore, both realism and 
positivism share the same idea about the nature of law.  
Realism emphasises the predictability of the law and seeks to increase its 
predictability, but it considers the law to emanate from the courts and cases rather 
than the study of legal doctrine.
38
 Realists want to predict outcomes (of the courts) 
and appraise the law empirically based on the court outcomes.
39
 Considering the 
question of what constitutes the law, Holmes asserted that ‘[t]he prophecies of what 
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the 
law’.40 Felix Cohen also asserted that ‘actual experience does reveal a significant 
body of predictable uniformity in the behaviour of courts.’41 Llewellyn criticised 
Frank, who had become the leader of the so-called ‘fact sceptics’, who emphasised 
                                                                                                                                     
‘the conception of law as a means toward social ends, the doctrine that law exists to secure interests, 
social, public and private, requires the jurist to keep in touch with life.’  
32 Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1236.  
33 Pound R. (1912), Ibid, 140, at 146-47.  
34 Horwitz M.J. Supra note 13, at 201. 
35 Pound R. (1950), Supra note 28, at 12.  Pound asserts that the natural law theory is based upon the 
theory of general ideals that are binding upon all humans at all times and places, which can be 
established by reason and are inherent in man’s nature as a rational animal; Pound pointed out that 
this inherence was in each individual man, and that natural law theory thus assumed an  opposition 
between individual and society, with the law standing between the two in order to protect individuals. 
36 Ratner. S.R. Supra note 13, Para 7. 
37 Simpson G. ‘The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the 
Rule of Power,’ 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), 439 at 452.  
38 Holmes O.W. (1897), Supra note 9,  458;  Llewellyn K.N. (1930), Supra note 20, at 450; Llewellyn 
K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1237; Cohen M. ‘On Absolutisms in Legal Thought’, 84 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register (1936), 681, at 694; Tamanaha B.Z. Supra 
note 9,  at  767-8,   
39 Ratner S.R. Supra note 13, at 1; Kalman L. Supra note 13, at 467- 471, Kalman asserts realism 
‘hoped to make judicial decision making more predictable by focusing on both the specific facts of 
cases and social reality in general, rather than on legal doctrine.’ See at 469.  
40 Holmes O.W. (1897), Supra note 9, at 461. 
41 Cohen F. Supra note 10, at 843.   
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the role of personal psychology in judicial decision-making,
42
 on this point, arguing 
that his judgment was skewed and that the decisions of courts are in fact greatly more 
predictable than Frank’s treatment would indicate.43  
Realism insists on the distinction between the law in books and in practice, or 
between legal theory and judicial administration.
44
 Among those who emphasise the 
limitation of the application of law in practice I have selected Pound for a brief 
exposition of his views. Pound’s distinction between ‘legal theory and judicial 
administration’ was the most well-known academic formulation of this distinction, in 
which he emphasised the importance of the actual practice of the court
45
 and argued 
that the law in the statute books did not represent this actual court practice.
46
 One of 
the causes emphasised by Pound of this distinction is defective executive and judicial 
administration, which he considered to be responsible for a state of affairs in which 
‘legislations for the most part fail of effect’.47 He observed that ‘[a] great deal of the 
law in the books is not enforced in practice because our machinery of justice is too 
slow, too cumbersome and too expensive to make it effective.’48 The significant of 
such a division between the law in the books and the law in action is that ‘it is the 
work of lawyers to make the law in action conform to the law in the books’ via 
‘making the law in the books such that the law in action can conform to it, and 
providing a speedy, cheap and efficient legal mode of applying it.’49 
There are diverse views concerning the concept of law and the particular 
main interest of the study of law among realism’s scholars,50 as well as common 
ideas. For example, Holmes declared that the law’s boundaries make a clear 
distinction between it and morality.
51
 Llewellyn also conceded that ‘the heart and 
core of jurisprudence’ was the problem of ethical purpose in the law.52 Felix Cohen, 
                                               
42 Frank J. Supra note 14, at 100-104. 
43 Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra not 14, at 1242-1243; see also Book review from Llewellyn. ‘Law 
and Modern Mind: A Symposium,’ 31 Columbia Law Review (1931), 82, at 87. 
44 Pound R. (1910), Supra note 8, at15. 
45 Id, at 13, Pound asserts that the majority of the states court recently seems that ‘overturn all 
legislations, which they deems unwise’, this includes even constitutional law of America, he 
identified examples such as the US Supreme Court’s decision to regulate the hours of labor of bakers 
in case People v. Coler and upholding other in  People v. Lochner,  177 N. Y. 145.  
46 Id, at 34.  
47 Id, at 35.  
48 Id.           
49 Id, at 36.          
50 Cohen F. (1935), Supra note 10, at 823.  
51 Holmes O.W. (1897), Supra note 9,  at 459. 
52 Llewellyn K.N. ‘On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence’, 40 Columbia Law Review 
(1940), 581, at 603.  
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in contrast, criticised the positivist view of some of realism’s scholars (such as 
Llewellyn) and insisted on morality and ethics in law; he stated that all assessments 
of law are moral.
53
 These differences in ideas not only exist between the first and the 
second generations of realism, but also within the same generation. Pound, for 
instance, in his criticism of realists and in particular ‘fact sceptics’ stated that ‘[i]t is 
just as unreal to refuse to see the extent to which legal technique, with all its faults, 
applied to authoritative legal materials, with all their defects, keeps down the alogical 
or unrational element or holds it to tolerable limits in practice.’54 Realist scholars 
also disagree as to whether or not realism is a new school of thought and 
jurisprudence theory, or even whether or not the realists formed a ‘group’. For 
example, Llewellyn, in response to Pound, who considered realism as a school, 
insisted many times that realism was not a school of thought but a movement, a 
‘method or technology’ not founded on historical, political or ideological 
controversies.
55
 
Due to such inconsistency among the scholars of realism, Llewellyn identified 
twenty scholars as of undoubted significance in realism,
56
 and clarified the nine 
common points of the movement, beginning as follows: 
1) The conception of law in flux, of moving law, and judicial creation of law. 2) 
The conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an end itself… 
3) The conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the 
law, so that the probability is always given that any portion of law needs re-
examination to determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve.
57
 
It is clear that the law as social experience rather than logic, for Holmes, and 
law as a combination of experience and reason which should be directed towards the 
social interest, for Pound, both showcase the importance of the law as experience as 
compared with legal reasoning in realism. Realism in fact changed the conception of 
                                               
53 Cohen F. ‘The Ethnical basis of Legal Criticism,’ 41 Yale Law Journal (1931-32), 201, at 201, he 
asserts, ‘that all valuation of law are moral judgments, that the major part of legal philosophy is a 
branch of ethics, that the problem which the judge faces is, in the strictest sense, a moral problem, and 
that the law has no valid end or purpose other than the maintenance of the good life...’. 
54 Pound R. (1930-31), Supra note 19, at 707.  
55 Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1234- 1235; see also Horwitz  M. J. Supra note 13, at 
181. Although Pound is known as a famous legal realism thinker, but later Pound criticises the realism 
in ‘The Call for a Realist   Jurisprudence’ , supra note 19.  
56 Llewellyn K.N. Id, at 1226-27. He among them elected 20 scholars, such as Jerome Frank, 
Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, Herman Oliphant, Felix Cohen, Hessel Yntema, William 
Douglas, Thurman Arnold and etc. Horwitz argued that Llewellyn failed to elect other scholars to 
include in the list, see Horwitz. M. J Supra note 13, at 180-181.  
57 Id, at 1236-1238. Among these common points, the three points quoted above are much related to 
the current study. More recently Tamanaha has also attempted to clarify several such significant main 
points of departure of legal realism; see Tamanaha B. Z. Supra note 9, at 737. 
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legal reasoning and the relationship between the concepts of law and society.
58
 In the 
realist view the law is active, a live phenomenon, which reflects the demands of 
society. Hence, justice does not apply only via paper rules; judges’ eyes are not 
closed to social realities, but consider the reality and attempt to respond by judging 
with equity accordingly.  
Nevertheless, and pursuant to the concept of law in realism, the question may 
be raised as to whether, in insisting on the real law as court-made law, the realists 
completely dismissed the rules and their effects in the court, or rather wanted to 
reform the rules. I will argue that although realism has challenged formalism’s 
mechanically fitting cases to the rules, ‘mechanical jurisprudence’,59 they were also 
opposed to the dogma of the legal theology, which blocked law reform, and they 
simultaneously aimed to reform the law.
60
 In fact, the interpretation of the rules 
should be considered; as judges usually decide in accordance with statutes, which is 
indeed a major task for them, interpretation of rules also has been emphasised by 
realists.
61
  
Despite the views of realism’s scholars on the decisions of the courts being 
the ‘real’ rules, they – at least many of them – did not discard the effect of ‘paper’ 
rules and general principles, but did recognise the law-bound aspect of judging, and 
saw rules as tools. Cook, for instance, insisted that realism demands rules and 
general principles as tools for effective work.
62
 However, he added that this tool - the 
application of old rules to new cases - should not be done via merely mechanical and 
deductive reasoning, but considering other factors such as social and economic 
policy and ethics.
63
 Similarly, Pound asserted: 
Legislation must learn the same lesson as case law. It must deal chiefly with 
principles; it must not be over-ambitious to lay down universal rules. We need for a 
season to have principles from which to deduce, not rules, but decisions. Legislation 
                                               
58 Kalman L. Supra note 13, at 467. 
59 The Classical era called the era of formalism. Formalism sometimes known as ‘mechanical 
jurisprudence’; see Pound R. ‘ Mechanical Jurisprudence,’ 8 Columbia Law Review (1908), 605, at 
607;  Kalman L. Id, at 465;  Frank J.  Supra note 14, at 120.  
60 See ‘Round and ‘Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship’, 95 
Harvard Law Review (1982),1669, at1671 and 1674-1675; for anti-mechanical concept of judge see 
also K.N. Llewellyn (1940), Supra note 52, at 596;  Pound R. Supra note 8, at 20 and 26. 
61 Cohen F. (1931-32), Supra note 53, at 215-216; Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1225 and 
1253. 
62 Cook W.W. ‘The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,’ 33 Yale Law Journal (1924), 
457, at 487.   
63 Id.   
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which attempts to require cases to be fitted to rules instead of rules to cases will fare 
no better than judicial decisions which attempt the same feat.
64
   
 
Furthermore, after emphasising that a great deal of law in the books is not 
enforced in practice, he asserts that it is the labour of lawyers ‘to make the law in 
action conform to the law in the books....[i]n a conflict between the law in books and 
the national will there can be but one result. Let us not become legal monks.’65 
Llewellyn too proclaimed clearly his faith concerning the Good in law
66
 and insisted 
clearly that the main purpose of legal realism was not eliminating rules but setting 
words and paper into perspective.
67
 He asserted that realists believed in law as a 
vehicle to legitimise their decisions and wanted to reform the law and improve legal 
certainty.
68
  
The issue of legal certainty is important because the possibility exists of 
deriving different, even opposite and conflicting, interpretations of the same rule; 
given this, realism wants to make law predictable and more certain. Holmes asserted 
that ‘[t]he study upon which we have been engaged is necessary both for the 
knowledge and for the revision of the law...scrutiny and revision are justified’.69 As 
judges are usually engaged in the interpretation of law,
70
 definition of law can reduce 
uncertainty and will help the law to be implemented accurately. I argue that the civil 
and criminal contexts of law should be considered separately as the way of 
implementation of rules is different in each (many realist scholars have mixed the 
two together). In many criminal cases there is no leeway for an alternative decision 
for judges other than by reference to existing rules. If a crime has been committed 
and there is sufficient evidence, then the law applies - not mechanically, but with 
more restrictions on the judge than are present in civil cases. Similar considerations 
apply to the rules of criminal procedure. Furthermore, as will be examined in the 
following section, for international law and lawyers statutes and treaties are central.  
                                               
64 Pound R. Supra note 8, at 34. 
65 Id, at 36. 
66 Llewellyn K.N. ‘On the Good, the  True, the Beautiful in Law,’ 9 University of Chicago Law  
Review (1941-42), 224, at 264; he asserts ‘I can offer that this my own faith about the Good in this 
institution of our law,’  see also Llewellyn K.N. (1940), Supra note 52, at 589, he insists that ‘the job 
of a lawyer is to show how the goal of “justice” in his case can be attained within the framework of 
the law.’ 
67 Llewellyn K.N. (1930), Supra note 20, at 453.  
68 Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1242; Tamanaha B.Z. Supra note 9, at 764. 
69 Holmes O. W. (1963), Supra note 23, at 37. 
70 Tamanaha B.Z. Supra note 9, at 763. 
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Concerning the ICC specifically, I argue that the real rules are to be found in 
the practice of the Court and its administrative decisions; however, the Rome Statute 
and its rules of procedure should not be dismissed in practice. In addition, it is 
necessary to examine whether or not the content of the Statute is an appropriate 
instrument for the ICC’s main objectives and of its very existence, given the 
Statute’s fundamental importance to the ICC. The ICC’s jurisprudence is very 
significant, but it should not be exaggerated. Some scholars have indeed criticised 
realism for being too focused on judges,
71
 and it must be admitted that this has been 
true of many realist scholars. Indeed, speaking generally, over-emphasising judge-
made law could be contrary to democratic values, endangering the separation of 
power in a state and raising the issue of government by judges instead of elected 
politicians. 
It is also true that the examination of rules (the Statute in the case of the ICC) 
is necessary for reform because the law’s rules are not in a static state of consistency 
but are rather continually approaching consistency and can have different effects (via 
judicial interpretation) at one historical moment to another. Holmes asserts:  
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is 
forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones 
from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will 
become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.
72
 
 
Pound quoted from Wundt that the law is always ‘in a process of becoming.’ and 
must be ‘as variable as man himself.’73 Law should change, amend and develop as a 
necessity; otherwise it will cease to meet the demands of society. As law should also 
progress society, the Statute also should progress international justice globally. 
A further question which may be raised results from the acceptance of the 
social jurisprudence theory of realism: what should the connection be between law 
and society, and should law respond to social demands?
74
 As regards the ICC, the 
adoption of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the Court was necessary due 
to the demands of the international community, whose collective efforts manifested 
at the Rome Conference in 1998. Whether the ICC can meet the expectations and 
                                               
71 Jones H. W. ‘Law and Morality in the Perspective of legal realism,’ 61 Columbia Law Review 
(1961),799, at 805.  
72 Holmes O.W. (1963), Supra note 23, at 36. 
73 See Pound R. Supra note 8, at 22. 
74 Holmes O.W.  Ibid, at 36. He asserts ‘[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it 
should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.’  
See also Cohen F. (1931-32), Supra note 53, at 207.   
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demands of the international community in practice, and whether it would be 
possible to meet its main objective via the current instruments available to it, are 
questions which need to be examined. I hereby wish to clarify, in order to avoid any 
preconceived ideas to the contrary, that the concern of this thesis is with both the 
Statute itself and with the ICC’s cases and functioning so far. 
Following on from the above account, I have identified three major aspects of 
legal realism which will be directly applied in this thesis:   
The first is that of the law in practice rather than the law in books or in the 
Statute;
75
 thus, law understood in terms of action rather than in terms of literature, 
implying that it is not a question of internal coherence, but of external effect. Law 
should be understood from the standpoint of how the rules shape and orient decision-
makers in practice. The significance of the distinction between the law in books and 
in action should be considered via three perspectives. The first concerns the decisions 
of judges and administrative offices themselves, which are considered to be the real 
rules, regardless of the content of the rules in books; the real rules thus derive from 
concrete cases.
76
 The second is that many rules in books and statutes are not actually 
applied, due to many reasons such as defective executive and judicial administration, 
and legislation failing of effect due to the law being unable to be enforced in 
practice.
77
 The third perspective is that not only is not all of the provision in practice 
applicable, but also the portion of law that is to be applied in reality cannot be 
applied equally to all individuals, due to difficulties arising as a result of extra-
judicial influences and social impact and the consequences of implementation of the 
law in particular cases and situations, etc. This latter perspective has also a relation to 
the second aspect of realism, as will follow. 
The second aspect of realism which is important for this thesis is the idea of law 
as an instrument of social change, whereby law relates to a given social environment 
not in an abstract, but in a particular way - law being embedded in the social context. 
Llewellyn’s concept of law as social end and not an end in itself,78 and similarly the 
idea of the social creation of law by Holmes
79
 indicates the fact that law should 
reflect societies’ actual demands. Thus, for them, there is an inevitable duty on the 
                                               
75 Pound R. Supra note 8, at 34. 
76 Id, at 34.    
77 Id, at 35.  
78 Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1236.  
79 Holmes O.W. (1897), Supra note 9,  at 467;  Holmes O.W. (1894), Supra note 9,  at 9; Tamanaha B. 
Z. Supra note 9, at 737. 
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part of judges to realise the social advantages of their decisions. In addition, not only 
should rules contextually fit with reality,
80
 but, as Llewellyn insisted, the law should 
also be an instrument of social change. To clarify: assuredly the law should reflect 
the reality and the demands of society, but it should not stop in the past and present; 
it should also to some extent guide the society forward, for instance to common 
goods and values, in a practical way: law should progress society. In case of this 
study, the key question concerns whether or not the Rome Statute and the ICC meet 
or can meet the demands of the international community concerning criminalisation, 
mechanisms for exercising authority, and sufficient enforcement power for the 
prosecution of international crimes? If the ICC is embedded in a social context, what 
prospects are there for progressive social change?  How might this be furthered? 
The third major aspect of realism that will be applied in this thesis is the 
necessity for the re-examination and the revision of the law. Realism emphasises that 
the law ought to be assessed in terms of its outcomes and effects rather than in terms 
of its purpose. Law should be examined in a society via its effects, what its 
consequences were in society, whether the reaction of society to the implementation 
of the law was positive or not, whether or not, for example, it sustained peace and 
security or endangered it. Each part of the law needs such re-examination, in order to 
determine the extent to which it fits the society it ought to be serving.
81
 As realists 
aim to reform the law,
82
 such a revision of law is necessary and justifiable.
 83
 
Accordingly, the law is not an untouchable phenomenon, but should be changed and 
revised in order to respond to the demands of society,
 84
 its deficiencies amended and 
its ambiguities clarified. In this regard, when we look at the Rome Statute we can see 
several deficiencies
85
 and ambiguities, such as some of the definitions of crimes
86
 
that potentially may lead to impunity. The revision of law requires, in the first 
instance, a clear view as to its deficiencies. 
                                               
80 Horwitz M.J. Supra note 13, at 201. 
81 Llewellyn K.N. (1931), Supra note 14, at 1236. 
82 Id, at 1242; Tamanaha B. Z.  Supra note 9, at 764. 
83 Llewellyn K.N. Ibid, at 1242; Tamanaha B.Z. Id, at 764; Holmes O.W. (1963), Supra note 23, at 37. 
84 Pound R. ‘The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence’, 25 Harvard Law Review (1912), 
140, at 146-47.  
85 E.g. deficiencies such as existed issue regarding to the definition of aggression, the postponement 
of war crimes, Art. 124, and  the missing international crimes such as terrorism in the Statute, and etc. 
This will be discussed in the Chapter 5 and 6.  
86 E.g. the definition of defences in war crimes Art. 31, the defence of superior order Art. 33 and etc,. 
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1.2.1. Law and politics and the legal realism movement   
The question is whether and to what extent the nature of the law is affected by 
politics.
87
 Although the dichotomy between law and politics, or by contrast law as 
politics, is not a new concept, it remains a complex issue. A theory that asserts the 
rigidity of law toward politics – viewing the law and politics as two autonomous 
phenomena – was stressed by Kelsen.88 As for legal realism: it has been discussed 
that legal realism is a new way of perceiving of legal phenomena, and this also 
applies to the complex relationship between law and politics. It may be stated that 
legal realism is generally against the idea of separation between law and politics,
89
 
although some legal realist scholars have suggested a slightly different idea whereby 
law is related to politics in part and overlaps with it sometimes, but in which law is 
itself considered an autonomous concept.
90 
 
To examine this issue, I will return firstly to the definition of the law in legal 
realism, whereby it has been defined as the decisions of the body of courts in 
concrete cases, and not simply paper rules. This method of the understanding of the 
features of the legal phenomenon by realism leads to at least three significant 
consequences. 
The first is that as far as realism is concerned, law is a mixed structure of the 
decisions of the courts and their administrative organs
91
 (the normative element) and 
judicial behaviour (socio-psychological elements). The second is that realism, via 
this definition, has rejected affording any special ontological status to the law, and in 
                                               
87 I am not concerned in this thesis with political realism as this term is used in the field of 
international relations; political realism would certainly insist on the separation between law and 
politics, and in fact gives ontological priority to political decision-making, reducing all decisions 
(whether legal or otherwise), to questions of power or interest. 
88 See Kelsen, H. The Pure Theory of Law, University of California Press, Berkeley (1970), at 89-91; 
see also generally, Morgenthau H.J. Politics Among Nations, McGraw- Hill (1993), and Politics in 
International Law (1971); Gumanmal Lodha J. Law Morality and Politics (1981); Loughlin M. Sword 
& Scales, An Examination of the Relationship Between Law & Politics (2003).  
89 Horwitz M.J. Supra note 13, at 193, he asserts: ‘The creation of a system of legal thought that could 
separate law and politics has been the leading aspiration of American legal orthodoxy since the 
revolution.... ‘The most important legacy of Realism therefore was its challenge to the orthodox claim 
that legal thought was separate and autonomous from moral political discourse.’ 
90 Zamboni M. ‘Legal Realisms and the Dilemma of the Relationship of Contemporary Law and 
Politics’, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law (1957-2010), at 589-590. He believes that for 
some realisms a specific part of the nature of the law extends beyond the normative core of the law 
into the political world.  
91 Llewellyn added  ‘the action of other officials’ as law, see Llewellyn K.N. (1930), Supra note 20, at 
453; Pound also asserts administrative organ as a centre of the development of the law; see generally 
Pound R. Supra note 8. 
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this has differed from natural law theory.
92
 This latter theory is based upon the theory 
of general ideals that are binding on all humans at all times and places, as revealed 
by reason and intrinsic to man as a rational creature; it was accordingly viewed by 
Pound as being highly individualistic.
93
 
The third and most significant consequence is the rigidity and autonomy of 
law with respect to politics. Some assert that this rigidity of the law derives 
immediately from the definition of law by realism. They assert that as the law is not a 
simple rule in paper, but a function of judicial decisions,
94
 so the rule - which is 
assumed integrated into politics (as a fact) appears only in the paper and is not 
implemented in practice. Hence, for instance, the paper rules in the case of the Rome 
Statute are not what are actually applied. On the contrary, the functions of the Court 
and what that the Court decides in concrete cases are the real rules (judge-made 
rules). Accordingly, it could be assumed that at an initial stage the rigidity of the law 
- the court-made law - toward politics may exist to some extent as a result of the 
basic definition of the law. 
However, a point perhaps missed by those who insist upon this theory is the 
socio-psychological element of definition of the real rules, i.e. the judge-made rules. 
The effect of extra-judicial factors on judges when making decisions has failed to be 
considered properly by the theory; for example, the effect of personal interests and 
peripheral circumstances on the judicial decision process. Legal decisions should be 
understood as complex phenomena going beyond simple legal processes, and for 
consistency of predictability in the behaviour of courts, need to be understood as 
more than just the results of an analytical process of judicial decision. Cohen, for 
instance, emphasises the personal interests, studies and social interactions of judges:  
Law is not a mass of unrelated decisions nor a product of judicial bellyaches. Judges 
are human, but they are a peculiar breed of humans, selected to a type and held to 
service under a potent system of governmental controls.... It is more useful to analyze 
a judicial “hunch” in terms of the continued impact of a judge's study of precedents, 
his conversations with associates, his reading of newspapers, and his recollections of 
college courses, than in strictly physiological terms. A truly realistic theory of 
judicial decisions must conceive every decision as something more than an 
expression of individual personality, as concomitantly and even more importantly a 
function of social forces, that is to say, as a product of social determinants and an 
index of social consequences. A judicial decision is a social event.
95
 
                                               
92 Some argued that realism is close to the natural law and the natural law scholar’s  attack to realism 
was a ‘misidentification of enemy’. See Jones H. W. Supra note 71, at 800 and 808.  
93 Pound R. (1950), Supra note 28, at 12. 
94 Cohen F. (1935), at 842. 
95 Id, at 843.  
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Thus, among the factors influencing judges in making decisions, policy 
considerations, bias, personal prejudices, individual political ideas and beliefs, public 
interest, education, etc. need to be considered. The decisions of judges, therefore, are 
affected by such social and political dimensions, and exploring all such grounds of 
the courts’ decisions will increase the predictability of courts’ decisions. I do think 
the political factor or policy considerations could be viewed as paradoxical by those 
who interpret and support the formalist theory of the ‘autonomy of law’, as this does 
unavoidably separate law from politics.
96
 From a realist viewpoint, however, the role 
of politics in terms of its impact and influence on the function of the courts could be 
viewed in the way I have just described. It can be seen that various political factors 
will have different measures of influence in both domestic and international courts. 
In fact, realism in general does not support a clear distinction between law and 
politics, since it contests the idea of the autonomy of law from social factors.
97
 The 
Rome Statute during its enactment I will examine as a exact paradigm of the theory 
of the integration of politics into law (this will be examined further in the final 
Chapter) and furthermore, political influences and policy considerations exist as a 
reality at all different stages in the practice of the Court, whether before, during or 
after a judicial process.  
In addition to external factors such as the influence of social demands, social 
forces and interests, the personal preferences of judges - internal factors - on a 
decision process should be considered. As Cohen argued, concerning the notion of 
law as a complicated phenomenon: ‘Law is a social process, a complex of human 
activities, and an adequate legal science must deal with human activity, with cause 
and effect, with the past and the future.’98 This is the reason that he truly emphasises 
the function of human behaviour as an ultimate and deciding factor of the definition 
of law. The end road of any law would be found in the hands of the individual 
judges; legal systems, rules, establishments, ideas and decisions are only 
comprehensible when considered as dependent on of human behaviour.
99
 Hence, 
different judges in the same case may have totally different or opposing opinions. 
                                               
96 Horwitz  M. J. Supra note 13, at 193, 209.  
97 Id, at 209. 
98 Cohen F. (1935), Supra note 10, at 844.  
99 Id, at 845. Cohen asserts that:  ‘Concretely and specifically, we know that Judge so and- so, a 
former attorney for a non-union shop, has very definite ideas about labor injunctions, that another 
judge, who has had an unfortunate sex life, is parsimonious in the fixing of alimony; that another 
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Therefore, if we say that the law lacks autonomy, this means that there is no 
essential division between law and morals or between legal and political questions.
100
 
The idea of autonomy for the law is in fact not compatible with the idea of the social 
impact of the law and the theory of the social jurisprudence. For some realists the 
idea of the lack of legal autonomy means that law is fully dependent on society rather 
than there being a state of interdependence. The realists’ aim of bringing law ‘back in 
touch with life’ implies in this case that law ought to be a mirror of social relations. 
However, I argue that the law is in reality both descriptive and normative: both 
describing society as it is and attempting to lay down rules as to what it should be 
like. The law cannot simply be a mirror of society if it is to be ‘law-like’.  
The Rome Statute is a clear expression of the reality of the law-politics 
relation in the current system of the International Criminal Court, which is 
effectively surrounded by political reality. It will be examined further in this thesis 
that the Statute perfectly exemplifies the relation between law and politics, and that 
the ICC’s difficulties in practice to exercise its jurisdiction and compel enforcement 
of its arrest warrants, if not in their entirety, significantly relate to political will (the 
case of Darfur and the long standing arrest warrant against the Sudanese President 
Al-Bashir is an example of this reality). Bearing in mind the clarification of the 
decisions of judges as law and real rules, what I argue is that this complicated way of 
reaching a decision may include, among its outcomes, non-prosecution, failure to 
exercise jurisdiction over some individuals, and non-implementation of the paper 
rules of the Rome Statute; and that due to the aforementioned difficulties and 
realities, the Court’s decisions may result in inevitable impunity. 
Thus, this study supports realism’s idea concerning the role of rules in 
judging -rule-scepticism - in which many rules do not apply, or are impossible to be 
applied. Overall, it may be said that realists generally criticise the orthodox idea of 
separation between law and politics and instead believe that law and politics are 
related, although some disagreement always exists.  
As well as legal realism itself, it is worth considering briefly the new-stream 
and Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movements and the viewpoints that have been 
expressed within these movements on the question of the relation between law and 
                                                                                                                                     
judge can be “fixed” by a certain political “boss” that a series of notorious kidnappings will bring 
about a wave of maximum sentences in kid-napping cases.’ See at 845-846.   
100 Horwitz M.J. Supra note 13, at 209. 
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politics. The new-stream scholars’ approach to politics and international law is one in 
which they are integrated, in harmony with the realist approach. New-stream scholars 
believe that international law ‘should not and cannot be separated from politics. If 
politics were explicitly acknowledged, then doctrinal biases would be disclosed.’101 
For example, Kennedy (as one of the new-stream scholars) argues that international 
law should more explicitly consider political concerns.
102
 To emphasise this idea he 
claims that politics is ‘battling in the shadow of the law’ and that ‘we make war in 
the shadow of law, and law in the shadow of force’.103 
Scholars of the CLS movement have also insisted that law is politics.
104
 The 
CLS in fact took its inspiration on this point from realism, in particular from realist 
ideas of the significance of social context for legal action and intervention and the 
realist opposition to the (apparent) determinism of philosophical or analytical 
positivism. The scientific orientation of positivism was to seek to justify legal 
authority in its own, independent, terms – which in part meant separating it from 
other motives for, or descriptions of, social action (as provided by psychology, 
economics, anthropology or politics) and in part insisting upon its own self-
sufficiency, i.e. asserting that law was determinate and complete, that there were 
right and wrong answers. If realism was to insist upon the importance of the social 
and political context for legal action, then CLS merely continues this theme, but does 
so by integrating within the realist account: a) a structuralist/post-structuralist 
scepticism towards linguistic determinism, whereby the claim is made that the 
meaning of words is radically indeterminate; and b) the corresponding belief that the 
conventional categories of ‘law’ and ‘politics’ cannot be kept apart. According to 
CLS, then, the legal ‘decision’ over the meaning of a particular term is not a function 
of the term itself, but of the power of the decision-maker to make it stick – i.e., it is a 
political decision. 
                                               
101 Cass D. ‘Navigating the New-stream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law’, 65 Nordic 
Journal of International Law (1996), 341, at 377; Simpson G. The Nature of International Law 
(2001), at 377. 
102 Kennedy D. ‘New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, 4 Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems (1994), 329 at 374; see also Cass D.  Id. 
103 Kennedy D. Of War and Law (2006), at 34 and 165. 
104 See generally, Hutchinson A. C & Monahan P.J.  ‘Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: 
The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought’, 36 Stanford Law Review (1984), 199; Kennedy 
D. ‘ Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,’  89 Harvard Law Review (1976), 1685; Unger 
R.M. ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harvard Law Review (1983), 561. Kennedy, Unger 
and Horwitz are three of the leading scholars in CLS.  
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It is evident that contemporary legal theory suggests that law is shaped by 
political issues.
105
 Based on the above considerations, I would like to make the 
following observations on the relationship between the law or legal decisions and the 
political environment in which these take place. 
1) In both realism and CLS there is a general scepticism towards the autonomy 
of rules, or the belief that legal decisions can be made solely on the basis of 
the law itself. All decisions are, in this sense, ‘political’. 
2) Legal institutions thus become a medium through which political authority 
can be expressed. This may be such as to make them institutions for social 
change (as in realism) or institutions of domination (as in CLS). 
3) The critical point of difference between these two alternatives turns upon the 
extent to which the judiciary may be seen to stand outside the political 
structures in which they are embedded, or to be trapped within them. 
This thesis, in conducting its investigation of the relation between law and politics as 
worked out in the ICC, will tackle this crucial question of assessing the extent to 
which the judiciary of the ICC is bound within its surrounding political structures to 
the extent that it becomes an institution of domination (e.g. by the Security Council) 
or alternatively stands outside these political structures to the extent that the ICC may 
become an institution of social change.   
1.3. The definition of impunity 
It is undoubtedly difficult to offer a comprehensive definition of impunity, which 
encompasses all the different aspects implied in the term; this may due to the nature 
of impunity, which has become so ‘ubiquitous’.106 Etymologically 'impunity' comes 
from the Latin ‘impunitas’;107 as a term, it means exemption from penalty or 
punishment,
108
 but it has been described as a ‘vague term’109 which has been 
interpreted in different ways by scholars. Two particular distinctions are immediately 
                                               
105 Cotterrell R. Law’s Community, Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (1995), at 162-165; 
Hutchinson A. C & Monahan P. J. Ibid, at 206. 
106 Penrose M. ‘Impunity Inertia, Inaction, And Invalidity, 17 Boston University International Law 
Journal (1999), 269, at 273. 
107 Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, J. Morwood (eds), (1994), in Oxford Reference Online (SOAS 
Library), available at: 
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August 21012).  
108 Black Law Dictionary (1983), at 386. 
109 Vinuales J.E. ‘Impunity: Elements for an Empirical Concept’, 25 Law and Inequality (2007), 115, 
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apparent.  In the first place there are those who define impunity in terms of non-
prosecution, or escaping from prosecution in a system of retributive justice; others, 
however, define it more broadly, as connoting an escape from justice or a lack of 
accountability, where justice or accountability are conceived of as including the 
concept of restorative justice or methods not involving prosecution. A second, and 
associated distinction is that impunity may be conceived by some as always illegal, 
whereas others might perceive certain types of impunity as lawful (e.g. in cases of 
insanity) or as inevitable or necessary (cf. the ‘peace versus justice’ debate). 
Concerning such complexities as these, in this section firstly general definitions of 
impunity by scholars, and secondly what impunity means in terms of the Statute and 
how impunity is to be understood for purposes of this study.  
Whilst much has been written about the ICC, particularly by scholars such as 
Cassese, Bassiouni, Schabas, Christopher and Sadat, few scholars have worked on 
the question of impunity itself. Although some, including Susan Opotow, Bassiouni 
and Christopher, have sought to define it, such definitions are frequently limited. As 
a starting point, we may consider the definition of Opotow, who describes impunity 
as ‘the exemption from accountability, penalty, punishment, or legal sanction for 
perpetrators of illegal acts’.110 She adds that impunity ‘can occur before, during or 
after judicial process’.111 Many other authors utilise this broad definition.112  
There are three main aspects to this definition that are worth highlighting. 
First is the emphasis placed here upon the lack of ‘accountability’113 as opposed to 
                                               
110 Opotow S. ‘Reconciliation in Times of Impunity: Challenges for Social Justice’, 14 Social Justice 
Research (2001), 149, at149, and ‘Psychology of Impunity and Justice: Implications for Social 
Reconciliation’ in C. Bassiouni (eds), Post-conflict Justice (2002), 201, at 202. 
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of human rights law, impunity implies the lack of or failure to apply remedies for victims of human 
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Nordic Journal of International Law (2000), 27, at 28; Vinuales J.E. Supra note 109, at 115-117; 
Mattarollo P.R. ‘Impunity and International Law,’ 11 Revue qudbdcoise de droit international  
(1998), 81, at 89. 
113 Ellis M.S. ‘Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a Way to Promote Peace and 
Stability- The Role of International War Crimes Tribunals’, 2 Journal of National Security Law & 
Policy (2006), 111, at 112. Bassiouni C. Id, at 26; Hooper K. ‘The Ending of Impunity and the Fight 
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the absence of an effective remedy for victims.
114
 In this view, impunity is not 
simply a synonym for ‘non-punishment’; accountability is understood as the 
antithesis of impunity,
115
 where accountability has a wider meaning than retributive 
justice. In the case of non-retributive justice for instance, Richard Goldstone, former 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, believes that (conditional) amnesty applicants 
‘suffered a very real punishment’: shame through ‘public confessions’.116 This idea is 
also followed by Blumenson.
117
He emphasises punishment of the perpetrators by 
alternative methods such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) of 1995. It is clear, however, that some still believe that international serious 
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, etc. (jus cogens crimes) must be 
prosecuted
118
 and that justice is not achieved without formal trial or punishment.
119
 
Nevertheless, such an approach is far from universal. 
The second aspect of Opotow’s definition concerns the various moments in 
which impunity may arise. This is mirrored in Amnesty International’s account of 
impunity, in which it is stressed that:  
[T]he term conveys a sense of wrongdoers escaping justice or any serious form 
of accountability for their deeds. Impunity can arise at any stage before, during or 
after the judicial process: in not investigating the crimes; in not bringing the 
suspected culprits to trial; in not reaching a verdict or convicting them, despite the 
existence of convincing evidence which would establish their guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; in not sentencing those convicted, or sentencing them to derisory 
punishments out of all proportion to the gravity of their crimes; in not enforcing 
sentences.
120
  
 
The possibility of impunity, in other words, is associated here with the 
perceived adequacy or otherwise of the criminal justice system, and whether it 
achieves the purposes it sets itself. 
A third aspect of the definition concerns a matter which is not explicitly 
addressed in it, namely the question of the different sources of impunity. Many assert 
that impunity is the result of political considerations and compromise or 
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‘realpolitik’,121 and emphasise in the process the function impunity may have in 
legitimating falsehood or denying justice.
122
 Others, however, have suggested that 
impunity can occur either de jure or de facto.
123
 The UN Special Reporter, for 
instance, distinguishes between two types of impunity as follows: ‘the impossibility, 
de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account...’.124 This 
speaks of two different possible sources of impunity: one of which is concerned with 
the legitimisation of impunity at the hand of either a domestic or international court; 
the other of which is concerned with the general features of a court’s inability to 
prosecute, i.e. its procedural weakness, unwillingness to prosecute, etc.  
Regarding impunity in the Statute, it must first be remarked that, in the above 
definitions of impunity by scholars, just some aspects and characterisations of 
impunity have been explored. Impunity in the Statute has also become the subject of 
different approaches. One attitude is that impunity in the Statute means only non-
prosecution; this is evidenced by the fact that the Rome Statute does not include 
amnesty law.
125
 This may also understood from the language of the Statute, that ‘the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not 
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured…’.126 From this 
viewpoint, impunity is understood to relate only to retributive justice, and 
accordingly exemption from prosecution and punishment means impunity.  
The second approach to impunity in the Statue regards impunity as meaning the 
lack of accountability; in this broader view of the definition of impunity, 
accountability may comprise other methods of justice besides retributive, such as 
restorative justice, reparations, truth commissions, rehabilitative, or compensatory 
justice etc. Scholars holding to this viewpoint assert that the Statute also provides 
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some room for amnesties in it.
127
 As Pensky asserts, simply considering the concept 
of amnesty itself implies that absence of punishment cannot be a comprehensive 
account of impunity.
128
 The Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice has 
also expressed the idea that the interest of justice has a broader meaning in the 
Statute than retributive justice alone.
129
  
For purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary to decide whether the wider or 
narrower definition of impunity is to be preferred. At the outset, they may both be 
seen to work with different notions of justice: the wider definition appealing to those 
who focus upon ‘restorative justice’ who seek to resolve conflict via participation of 
both victims and perpetrators which results in the harmonisation of society,
130
 the 
narrower definition appealing to those who focus upon ‘retributive justice’ and the 
prosecution and punishment of criminals.  The Preamble of the Rome Statute, of 
course, does not resolve the issue one way or the other promising merely ‘the 
enforcement of international justice’.131 Yet it is clear that the wider and narrower 
definitions are not entirely incompatible with one another: the prosecution of a 
criminal may be as important for those advocating restorative justice as it is for those 
who adhere to the principles of retributive justice.  Where they principally differ, as 
we shall see, is in determining the point at which the demand for prosecution and 
punishment may be subordinated to other processes of conflict resolution (such as 
through the award of amnesties).  To decide, in such a context, whether one 
definition or the other is right or wrong would seem to foreclose an important 
discussion that was itself unresolved at the Rome conference. That, as a 
consequence, a certain semantic indeterminacy has to be tolerated is only such as to 
entail a more qualified form of evaluation.  It is still possible to point out where and 
how impunity may be created or fostered, just that at certain points recognition may 
have to be given to the fact that such a determination will depend upon the question 
whether the wider or narrower definition is preferred. 
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In either case, the starting point of impunity is the idea that, following the 
commission of crimes,
132
 criminals deserve to be brought to justice (whether or not 
punished) and generally held responsible for their unlawful conduct; hence, the 
deprivation of responsibility for unlawful conduct of criminals constitutes impunity. 
On this definition, any actions resulting in the escape of criminals from liability, 
whether accidental, i.e. procedural (via lack of evidence, which is not significant for 
this thesis) or intentional, via the possible exemption of some perpetrators, or legal 
lacunae allowing escape of perpetrators from justice (i.e. definitions of some crimes, 
etc.) constitute impunity. However, I argue that impunity may also be lawful and that 
such lawful impunity falls into three categories. The first is impunity which 
legitimises ‘unlawful’ conduct due to the personal character of some criminals,133 i.e. 
excuses, defences, insanity and intoxication.
134
 With this category of impunity, 
although the conduct comprises a crime and is ‘unlawful’ at least in abstract, the 
perpetrator is not held responsible and is unpunishable. The second, and associated, 
category is where unlawful conduct is held to be unpunishable, not by reason of the 
character of the perpetrator, but for extraneous reasons – such as in case of amnesties 
and immunities from prosecution in order to preserve peace or facilitate the conduct 
of government.  The third category of lawful impunity concerns cases where the 
conduct from the outset has been assessed as lawful, i.e. such as in cases of self-
defence.
135
 Here, of course, speaking of this as a form of ‘impunity’ is somewhat 
more problematic insofar as the defence will apparently determine what is required 
as a matter of justice.  It is, nevertheless, necessary to keep in mind particularly so far 
as the determination as to what constitutes a justifiable act is itself liable to be 
unstable. 
In addition to these forms of de jure impunity there is also the category of de 
facto impunity, de facto impunity in the Statute has two main aspects: i) It 
comprehends the impossibility of the prosecution and accountability of some 
individuals, some categories of crimes, or certain nationalities. It can be derived from 
extra-judicial factors and peripheral obstacles, such as powerful states’ relation to the 
ICC. This category of impunity, which will be discussed further in Chapter 6, is 
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likely to remain definitely beyond the reach of the ICC. ii) De facto impunity may 
also consist of procedural and structural impunity originating from the internal 
procedural hurdles, obstacles, difficulties and structural design of the ICC. These 
structural problems are related to the institutional problems and jurisdictional 
mechanism of the ICC (this variety of impunity will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
The ICC proclaimed that it was established to enforce international justice and 
‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes,’136 and that ‘the 
international crimes as a whole must not go unpunished’.137As a preliminary 
observation it may be seem that wholly idealistic objective.  Universal justice, even if 
aspirational, will never be realised. Yet at the same time, the declaration has a 
particular function, it raises the expectation that the ICC should have more 
capability, stronger enforcement power, and extensive jurisdictional mechanisms to 
combat impunity, in comparison with prior tribunals; in short, that it should be 
evaluated purely in terms of whether it is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’, coercive or timid.  The 
difficulty, however, is that such an understanding works on the supposition that the 
ICC stands outside the regulatory regime of justice within which it is located.  It 
assumes, in other words, that it is possible to think, act, and speak about impunity in 
relation to international crimes without, at the same time, examining the place of the 
ICC within that system, or contemplating its role in producing knowledge of what is, 
or is not, impunity (through the definition of crimes and defences etc) and 
legitimising the possibility of its avoidance (both de jure and de facto). 
Accordingly, rather than ‘externalise’ the problem of impunity this study 
attempts to identify some of the complexities of the ICC’s objectives and examine 
the various ways in which the ICC may itself be implicated in its production. There 
are two particular means by which one may bring this productive dimension into 
view.  In the first place through a comparative analysis of ICC with the previous 
international tribunals’ statutes and international criminal law instruments, the 
outcome of which may be to disclose the points at which the Rome Statute appeared 
to legitimise new forms of impunity (in the sense of providing more extensive 
defences or bars to prosecution). The second is by identifying those moments at 
which the ICC’s actual effects (may or do) deviate in considerable ways from its 
                                               
136 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
137 Id.  
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stated goal. One significant such deviation to be explored is the unequal availability 
and possibility of different states’ nationals to be prosecuted before the ICC.  
In general, there are five main different ways one could understand the 
relationship between the ICC and impunity. a) Firstly, the ICC may eliminate 
impunity; here the ICC is fulfilling its stated objective of being a means of 
combating impunity. By contrast, in some circumstances the ICC may: b) create 
impunity; c) create the potential for or facilitate impunity; d) recognise or legitimise 
existing impunity; e) fail to address existing categories of impunity. Thus, this thesis 
has adopted the hypothesis that the ICC is not only a means of combating impunity, 
but in different circumstances may work in the opposite way. 
a) The ICC as a means of combating impunity 
That the ICC may operate as a means of combating impunity is perhaps a fairly banal 
insight.  It was established to do so and in practice one may no doubt assume that it 
will operate at a certain level of effectiveness. Of course, this does not assume 
prosecution by the ICC itself, in part at least it was created as a device for 
encouraging effective prosecution on the national level bringing into play the 
principle of complementarity. This, of course, is to problematise any accurate 
‘measure’ of its effectiveness which, of course, would have to go some way beyond 
an observation as to how many cases were to come to the ICC, or indeed, how many 
prosecutions are undertaken by national authorities.  Its effect as a ‘deterrence’ must 
also be brought into account. 
b) The ICC effectively create new categories or new forms of impunity, 
That the ICC might create new categories and forms of impunity is perhaps the most 
alarming of alternatives, and certainly far from easy to establish.  The most obvious 
(potential) form in which this might take place is through the limitation of what is 
taken to be ‘criminal’ through the inclusion of new defences, or an extension of 
existing privileges from prosecution (through immunities or amnesties). In each case, 
it is not the fact that the Rome Statute defines the parameters of liability to 
prosecution that is problematic, but that it may do so in a way that limits the existing 
liability under customary international law.  In such a case, the Statute would purport 
to provide states parties with an excuse for not proceeding to prosecution under the 
terms of pre-existent international criminal law, creating a new form of impunity 
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under guise of re-defining what impunity might mean.  Two particular examples will 
be examined in this thesis, one of which concerns the defence of obedience to 
superior orders in Article 33(2) in the other being the defence of property necessary 
for a military mission in Article 31(c).   
c) The ICC creates the potential for or facilitates impunity  
If the Rome Statute may only rarely be said to give rise to a new form of impunity, 
far more frequently it may be said to create the potential for, or facilitate, impunity. 
The words ‘create’ or ‘facilitate’ are important here. Both imply an active component  
something which has been introduced by the ICC rather than something which would 
exist in any case without it.  In such cases, what one is looking for, therefore, is not 
merely the existence of certain weaknesses in the organisation and functioning of the 
ICC – albeit the case that such weaknesses are clearly relevant – but the introduction 
of something new into the field of international criminal law that might enable 
impunity to flourish.  It is one thing, for example, to say that the ICC is politically 
and organisationally weak, that it depends upon state cooperation, that it is 
subordinate to the authority of the Security Council, or that it will only rarely 
exercise its jurisdiction over perpetrators of international crimes.  This only speaks to 
the ICC failing to address impunity (see below).  It is something else, however, to 
suggest that the ICC provides new avenues through which those accused of crimes 
might effectively avoid the machinery of justice. 
There are various different ways in which this might occur, but for the most 
part, the key mechanism by which this takes place is through the creation of a regime 
which purports to address the problem of impunity, but which does not do so, or 
does so in a partial or defective manner.  This brings into play, the realist critique of 
formalism, and its differentiation between the law on paper and law in action, but 
adds to it a reminder that the paper rules themselves are not irrelevant, but provide in 
many instances a necessary ideological cover. Two particular exemplary categories 
might be cited here.  The first category concerns the creation of avenues, or forms of 
justification, that enable states to maintain that they are committed to the objectives 
of the Rome Statute, but allow them to shield their nationals (or indeed others) from 
prosecution.  The most obvious cases here being the provisions relating to the role of 
the Security Council (SC) and in particular the shield provided by article 16.  Of 
relevance also, however, is the principle of complementarity which, albeit designed 
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to promote the national administration of justice,
138
 also envisages the opening of 
new avenues by which prosecution might be avoided.  The second category concerns 
the creation of opportunities for those accused of crimes to avoid punishment 
through the exploitation of (both substantive and procedural) loopholes and gaps in 
the provisions of the Statute.  Examples here might be of the different thresholds of 
criminal responsibility for military and civilian commands as recognised in articles 
28 (a) and (b) the opportunities presented by amnesties and immunities and the 
questionable status of certain defences. 
A more general point might also be made here about the role of the ICC in 
fostering impunity which concerns its place within an international environment 
marked by vast disparities in wealth and power.  Formally speaking, the ICC treats 
all states parties alike.  No one state is more bound by the agreement than the other.  
By the same token, the ICC operates in an international environment which is 
profoundly divided in terms of the power and wealth of its parties, and that the kind 
of ‘justice’ that it purports to administer is likely to be equally partial (as indeed is 
already maintained).  To the extent that it purports to do otherwise is obviously to 
bring forward the idea that just as it delivers justice in a partial way, so also does it 
award the condition of impunity to a select few. (All of the above instances of 
possible creation of impunity will be discussed in chapter 5, 6 and 4). 
d) The possible recognition and legitimisation of impunity by the ICC 
In contrast to the above situations, this category concerns the possibility of 
recognition or legitimisation of (hence de jure) impunity. Firstly, the Statute may 
recognise impunity, through means such as the potential it offers for the recognition 
of amnesty and states’ immunity agreements. It will be discussed that amnesty may 
lead to impunity in some situations, in particular where amnesty is unconditional, 
and without investigation. The conflict between peace and justice is central 
concerning the debate over amnesties, and the question of retributive or restorative 
justice is crucial here. The Statute also may potentially recognise states’ immunity 
obligations under Article 98(1). The limitation of the obligation of states to extradite 
or surrender an accused to the ICC when they have a separate agreement has been 
recognised in this Article, which may thus provide impunity for some perpetrators. 
                                               
138 Bernhardt Observer for the European Court of Human Rights in the Rome Conferences, see the 
UN. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (15 June 17 July 1998), II,  UN DOC. A/CONF.183/SR.3, at 79, Para 100.  
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These two sub-categories of recognition of impunity will be discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
The second type of situation in this category is the legitimisation of impunity in 
the Statute: lawful impunity. In contrast to the above categories, impunity is not 
created or potentially facilitated in these situations, but is legitimised ex post facto. 
This encompasses cases of insanity or intoxication, which are recognised in Article 
31 as absolute defences, and cases of self-defence, which is codified in Article 31 (1) 
(c) as an absolute defence where there has been ‘a threat of imminent death or 
of…serious bodily harm’. The result of such non-punishment in these cases is not 
‘simply’ impunity, as the non-punishment results from the lack of mens rea139 in 
cases of insanity or intoxication and the blameless nature of the act in cases of self-
defence.
140
 The differences between these sub-categories in which defendants are not 
punishable will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
e) The failure to address existing categories of impunity 
This category differs from the above categories in that it covers situations in which 
impunity has not been created, facilitated or recognised/legitimised by the ICC, but 
where impunity has not been addressed or the ICC has not been able to deal with it 
effectively. This may occur in the following situations. Firstly, sometimes crimes are 
heinous and widespread but are completely ignored and unaddressed. This might 
happen for different reasons, such as difficulties in reaching a definition, as is the 
case for the crime of terrorism and missing crimes such as the use of nuclear 
weapons in the Statute. The latter was under broad negotiations at the Rome 
Conference.
141
 In the previous tribunals, for instance, priority was given, rightly or 
wrongly, to some types of international crime, and crimes of some other types were 
ignored. An example of this latter type would be the ‘comfort women’142 crimes 
during World War II, whose perpetrators have never faced prosecution.  
                                               
139 Gilbert J. ‘Justice not Revenge: The International Criminal Court and the ‘Grounds to Exclude 
Criminal Responsibility’-Defences or Negation of Criminality?’ 10 The International Journal of 
Human Rights (2006),143, at 145. 
140 Cassese A. International Criminal Law (2008), at 255-56; Eser A. ‘Justification and Excuse’, 24 
The American Journal of Comparative Law (1976), 621, 4, at 623;  Berman M, N. ‘Justification and 
Excuse, Law and Morality’, 53 Duke Law Journal (2003),1, at 7-8; Sliedregt E. V. ‘Defences in 
International Criminal Law’, Paper presented at the Conference, Convergence of Criminal Justice 
Systems (2003), 1, at 2.  
141 Lee R.S. ‘The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International Law,’ in R.S. Lee (eds), the 
International Criminal Court the Making of the Rome Statute (1999), 1, at 24. 
142 Penrose M. Supra note 106, at 300. 
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 Secondly, it is also out of the capacity of a court to address all international 
crimes and perpetrators and all impunity; it needs to focus on those individuals with 
the greatest degree of responsibility for these crimes. In fact, each previous tribunal 
on each occasion left certain things unaddressed. This was not simply a jurisdictional 
incident, but rather, a deliberate act in each case. Furthermore, the ICC has no 
retroactive jurisdiction for past international crimes.
143
 It is clear that addressing all 
existing impunity for international crimes is not, rationally and practically, within the 
capacity of the ICC, due to many practical limitations and barriers such as the limited 
number of judges, budget, etc. Additionally, and more significantly, the ICC cannot 
always even apply its existing capacity in order to exercise its jurisdiction over some 
perpetrators. This may happen in a case such as one involving a conflict of interests 
(Realpolitik) between the veto-wielding powers which prevents them reaching a 
consensus for a referral and subsequently the full support of the SC for the Court.
144
  
Concerning limitations to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, it should 
be noted that, although the crime of aggression has been defined at the ICC’s first 
review conference in Kampala, Uganda, the Court will not be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction over this crime until a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017.
145
 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute provides for state parties to issue a declaration of 
postponement of jurisdiction of the ICC over war crimes for the period of seven 
years after the Statute’s ratification and entering into force for that state, in Article 
124.
 146
 This Article has recently been extended for a further seven years at the ICC’s 
first review conference.
147
 The lack of trial in absentia and the universal jurisdiction 
are deficiency for the Court; I will argue that how the universal jurisdiction and trial 
in absentia may improve its function and jurisdiction over its subject-matter crimes. 
Although some of the aforementioned instances of impunity are out of the 
reach of the ICC, many of the possibilities of the creation of impunity are avoidable 
by the ICC’s judges in practice. However, this depends on the policy of the ICC, in 
                                               
143 See the Rome Statute Art. 11 (1). 
144 The obvious example of this concerns the current ongoing international crimes being committed in 
Syria; as this country is not a member state, the Security Council has failed so far to refer this 
situation to the ICC, while in the similar case of Libya, the Council responded promptly and the case 
has been referred to the ICC. See SC. Res. 1970 (26 February 2011); see also the Pre-Trial Chamber 
Arrest Warrant against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and others, in ICC-01/11-4-Red (16-05-2011). 
145 See the Rome Statute Art.15. 
146 Id, Art. 124. 
147 See the Resolutions and Declarations adopted by the Review Conference, part II, RC/Res.4 (8 June 
2010). 
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particular the role of the independent Prosecutor, and on the personal character of 
judges, their training, education, cultural background, etc., as to how far they can 
work independently and resist external pressures. As the ICC tries the cases, the 
cases also try the ICC. As Justice Jackson said, ‘Courts try cases but cases also try 
courts’.148 
1.4. Outline of the thesis  
The first Chapter of this thesis has addressed methodology and theory, the concept of 
law in legal realism, the relation between law and politics, the definition of impunity, 
and finally the different categories of impunity. The second Chapter provides an 
historical narrative of the development of individual criminal responsibility and 
impunity from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) up to the creation of the ICC, 
covering the first international tribunals (Leipzig, Nuremberg and Tokyo) as well as 
the UN ad hoc tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR and the role and struggles of the UN 
International Law Commission, NGOs and specific states in the chain of events 
which led to the creation of the ICC. The historical development of and the question 
of impunity concerning previous international tribunals will be discussed in this 
Chapter. 
Chapter Three concerns two forms of possible de jure impunity: amnesties 
and immunities. The first section of the Chapter addresses one of the main methods 
of the possible  creation of impunity by the ICC, i.e. through the possible recognition 
of amnesties. The second section addresses immunities, examining impunity via 
possible recognition of states’ immunity agreements which may exclude the 
extradition of the accused and may limit the cooperation of states. 
 Chapter Four explores the creation or possible creation of impunity through 
defences in the Statute. In the first section are the different doctrines of defences in 
international law; the distinctions between defences in various national legal 
systems; and finally the historical narrative of defences in international tribunals 
prior to the ICC. The second section explores defences in the Rome Statute, which 
encompasses absolute defences: insanity and intoxication; the defence of superior 
orders, and self-defence. In the third section the defence of duress will be discussed, 
                                               
148 Jackson H.R. ‘The Rule of Law Among Nations,’ 31 American Bar Association Journal (1945), 
290, at 292. 
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and in the fourth and final section military commanders' and civilian superiors’ 
responsibility and the different standards of liability between these two categories.  
Chapter Five examines the several internal practical problems within the 
Statute which present a situation which may create impunity. The first section 
investigates some generic problems of the ICC which are shared by all national and 
international courts, such as collecting evidence, identification and protection of 
victims and witnesses, etc. The second section focuses on the several specific 
procedural issues of the ICC with regards to its functioning. This section discusses 
the scope and the nature of the jurisdiction of the court, and the principle of 
complementarity and admissibility of cases and the possible creation of impunity via 
this principle. Furthermore, the second section deals with the cooperation of states 
and enforcement issues of the ICC, which have a bearing on the functioning of the 
Court. In the third section several deficiencies of the Statute are discussed, such as 
the lack of universal jurisdiction, lack of jurisdiction in absentia, and the possible 
postponement by states of the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes. This chapter 
attempts to highlight how the ICC was intentionally established to be a weak 
tribunal, and how it may be linked to situations in which impunity may be created. 
Chapter Six, by contrast, focuses on the several peripheral obstacles of the 
ICC, concentrating on the three most significant of these external issues. The first 
section of the Chapter concerns the role of the SC and its relationship with the Court. 
The second section addresses issues related to the role of certain powerful states, 
such as the US; it includes an appraisal of the US opposition to the ICC and its 
Bilateral Agreements with many state parties and non-parties to the Statute. The third 
section examines the issue of non-ratification of the Statute and its relation to the 
creation of impunity, the application of the Statute to state non-parties, and the main 
reasons for non-ratification of the Statute. Chapter Seven comprises the conclusion 
of the thesis; several recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of the Court 
are offered. 
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Chapter II: An Historical Background to the International Criminal Court (ICC)  
Introduction  
The establishment of the ICC in the late twentieth century was the major significant 
historical event toward the development of international criminal law (ICL) and the 
enhancement of individual criminal liability; it was known as major victory for the 
international community. The accumulated efforts of governments and international 
lawyers as well as non-governmental organisations culminated in the 1998 Rome 
Treaty and the establishment of the ICC as an independent and permanent body 
committed to judging crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crimes of 
aggression.
1
 The major concern of the ICC is to put an end to the impunity of 
perpetrators of serious international crimes and make them accountable for their 
actions.
2
 The ICC of course was not the first initiative of its kind; the concern of the 
international criminal justice system as a whole is to promote the accountability of 
individuals and the prosecution of individuals who have violated international law. 
The majority of international legal norms are concerned with placing behavioural 
constraints upon states, and holding states accountable to these; international 
criminal law’s focus on individual responsibility has thus been regarded as a novel 
innovation.
3
 
This Chapter contains a brief historical narrative of the previous international 
tribunals, leading up to the creation of the ICC. The necessity for the creation of the 
international tribunals and what the reasons were behind their establishment will be 
examined. There are several accounts of the history of ICL by various scholars;
4
 this 
chapter is not a comprehensive historical narrative of ICL as the author is not an 
historian. However, the endeavour has been made firstly to draw a brief narrative of 
                                               
1 The Rome Statute, Art. 5. The crime of aggression has recently been defined at the ICC’s first 
review conference in Kampala, Uganda, by the ASP, but the Court will only begin to exercise its 
jurisdiction if the amendment is passed on 1 January 2017 by the majority of States Parties. See ICC. 
RC/Res.6 (11 June 2010). 
2 See the Preamble of the Statute. 
3 Simpson G. Law, War & Crime (2007), at 55. 
4 E.g. Cryer R. Prosecuting International Crimes Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime (2005) ; Simpson G. ‘ War Crimes: A Critical Introduction,’ in T. McCormack & G. Simpson 
(eds),  The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches (1997), 1; Bassiouni M.C. 
‘From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish an International Criminal 
Court’, 10 Harvard Human Right Law Journal (1997), 11;  Cassese A.  International Criminal Law 
(2003),  Kerb C. ‘International Criminal Law,’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2011), and etc. 
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the creation of the prior international tribunals and of the ICC, and the reasons 
behind their establishment, which was significant for the development of ICL. 
Secondly, I attempt to advance the theory that the development of ICL has always 
been coincident with non-prosecution of some criminals, categories of crimes or 
categories of people. Accordingly, the emphasis has been made on the major cases of 
non-prosecution of individuals in the prior international tribunals, with a brief review 
of the stages in the development of the ICL, in order to create a picture comprising 
several aspects of the improvements in ICL as well as its newer problems and 
deficiencies. The chapter will proceed to show that the ICC in fact continues this 
same historical narrative, whereby a step forward in the development of individual 
criminal responsibility is taken and, concomitantly, further opportunities are created 
for the non-prosecution and politicisation which may be taken as inherent to 
international criminal law.  
The chapter will also examine criticisms of the post-World War tribunals as 
‘victor’s justice’,5 which has also been an issue for the ICTY and ICTR and for ICL 
in general. It will be discussed that the exemption of some individuals or some 
categories of crimes is not new; and that the ICC on the one hand inherited some of 
these issues, and on the other hand has its own historical narrative and ambiguities, 
resulting from the historical politico-legal context in which the Rome Statue was 
drafted and in which the ICC has operated since then. The chapter will examine how 
impunity for some people or some categories of crimes is a common issue among the 
previous tribunals. Impunity in connection with past tribunals and with the ICC does 
not refer simply to procedural incidents in the course of due process; impunity in 
these tribunals is and has been a matter of very complicated political, legal, etc., 
issues. On some occasions, impunity via non-prosecution may be granted inevitably 
to some individuals, in cases in which prosecution could threaten peace and increase 
national unrest;
6
 or there may be from the outset one side of a conflict or some 
                                               
5 Bass. G. J. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (2003), at 8-16; 
Wright Q.  ‘The Law of the Nuremberg Trial’, 41 American Journal of International Law (1947), 38 , 
at 45; Tomuschat C. ‘The Legacy of Nuremberg’, 4 Journal of international Criminal Justice (2006), 
830, at 832; Simpson G. ‘Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance’ in D. McGoldrick P. Rowe & E. 
Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court Legal and Policy Issue (2004), 47, at 
48-50; Cryer R. Id, at 199-202.  
6 E.g. the case for the non-prosecution of the Japanese Emperor, see  Maga M. Judgement at Tokyo, 
the Japanese War Crimes Trials (2001), at 35, he asserts ‘[d]estroying the Emperor would destroy 
Japan,...’, Minear R.H. Victor’s Justice: the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971), at 113, he also asserts 
non- prosecution of Emperor based on legal evidences, that he might would have been found not 
guilty;  Cryer R & Boister N. The Tokyo International Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), at 65-69.  
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individuals or category of crimes which are exempt from prosecution.
7
 Impunity may 
also occur due to lack of political will, inaction or inability to prosecute, etc.;
8
 all 
these issues will be examined in connection with the previous international tribunals, 
in order to illustrate the complexity of the issue of impunity. In fact, impunity has 
been seen as an innate feature of the past tribunals, and in this they were not very 
different from the ICC. 
In making a comparison between the previous, ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, 
it may be stated that, despite the fact that the later establishment is a momentous 
development of the ICL, it also has its own difficulties and greater ambiguities 
insofar for the enforcement of the individual criminal responsibility. In particular, as 
will be examined, the ICC’s structure and the politico-legal environment in which 
operates lead it to shape impunity in an ambivalent or counterintuitive way. The 
ICC’s unique treaty nature causes two opposite effects; firstly, because of its treaty-
based nature, in contrast to the previous international tribunals it is widely agreed 
upon via the ratification of many states;
9
 secondly, however, it has faced the greater 
problem of non-compliance with the treaty on the part of other states and the lack of 
sufficient coercive power.  
This chapter is intended to serve as historical background covering the 
evolutionary advances made in international criminal law in the modern era
10
 of the 
institutionalisation of international law, in particular from the World War I to the 
establishment of the permanent international criminal court (the ICC). There are six 
sections, the first section examines historical instances of international tribunals and 
the idea of establishing the first international criminal court prior to World War I; the 
second looks at the Leipzig tribunal and non-prosecution of individuals after World 
War I; the third appraises the revolution in international law after the World War II 
and the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals in this period; and the fourth 
                                               
7 E.g. the Allies were  in the military tribunals after the Second World War, see Final Report to the 
Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10, by 
Telford Taylor, in The Military Legal Resources (15 August 1949), at 145 and 228-229. 
8 Bass G. J. Supra note 5, at 6; see also Bassiouni C. ‘Combating Impunity for International Crimes’, 
71 University of Colorado Law Review (2000), 409, at 410. 
9 The number of the ratification are 121 states until 02 April 2012; see the ICC website at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (Accessed 17/08 /2012). 
10 Kennedy D. ‘A new stream of International Law Scholarship’, 7 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal (1998), 1, at 12. He divided the history of public international law into three stages: the pre-
modern era before 1648; the era of traditional philosophical and doctrinal development (1648-1900), 
which saw a slight displacement of naturalism by positivism; and the modern era of institutionalised 
pragmatism since the First World War. 
 
47 
 
section addresses the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, 
prior to the creation of the ICC. The fifth section provides an account of the creation 
of the ICC itself, and seeks to analyse the various factors and influences that shaped 
the formation of the ICC and individual criminal responsibility in the ICC’s Statute. 
The final section examines the relationship between the historical development of 
individual criminal responsibility and the question of impunity; it seeks to analyse 
how and under what conditions the development of individual criminal responsibility 
under international criminal law and tribunals may coincide with the creation or 
recognition of new forms of impunity. 
The problem is that creation of legal catetories of offences in and of itself 
creates the conditions for impunity. It is the creation of impunity that justifies or 
warrants the creation of institutions to prosecute and punish. 
2.1. The international tribunal prior to World War I   
The idea of the establishment of an international criminal court is not new. Some 
assert that the first tribunal with an arguably international character convened in 
Breisach, Germany, in 1474. It involved the Holy Roman Empire conducting the trial 
of Peter von Hagenbach with 28 judges, appointed from the members of the coalition 
who had fought von Hagenbach. Eight judges were selected by the town of Breisach 
and two by each of the allied towns, which included Alsatian and Upper Rhenanian 
towns, as well as Berne and Solothurn of the Swiss Confederation; each town 
represented a political entity within the Holy Roman Empire.
11
 Von Hagenbach was 
charged with murder, rape, torture, perjury, and giving orders to the non-German 
‘mercenaries’ whom he had brought to Breisach that they should kill men in their 
houses. The defendant was found guilty by the tribunal and put to death for the 
crimes he had committed against the laws of God and the laws of men.
12
 
Some have questioned whether the form of tribunal in von Hagenbach’s trial 
can be defined as an international tribunal.
13
 Many commentators have drawn 
attention to the fact that one of the most important analogous aspects of the von 
Hagenbach trial to modern trials of international crimes is that of the superior orders 
                                               
11 Schwarzenberger G. International Courts and Tribunals, the Law of Armed Conflict (1968), Vol,  II, 
at 462-463.  
12 Id, at 465; see also Cryer R. (2005), supra note 4, at17. 
13 McCormack T. ‘From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee: The Evolution of an International Criminal 
Law Regime’, in T. McCormack and G Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes National and 
International Approaches (1997), 31, at 38. 
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defence.
14
Although the absolute defence of superior orders was rejected in von 
Hagenbach’s trial,15 it remains a controversial element of contemporary international 
criminal law and in the ICC Statute as well; this controversy -defence of superior 
orders in war crimes-will be discussed in the fourth Chapter of this thesis. 
It appears that for almost four centuries after the trial of Peter von Hagenbach 
in 1474 (until 1872) there was no serious consideration of the idea of establishing an 
international court. On 3 January 1872, one of the founders of the Red Cross 
movement, Gustav Moynier of Switzerland, proposed the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court by treaty at a meeting of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.
16
 He drafted a proposal for a permanent court to 
prosecute individuals for the breach of the Geneva Convention of 1864; in 
developing his proposal, he considered the legislative, judicial and executive powers 
connected with criminal law before coming to the conclusion that an international 
organisation was required in place of national courts. He contended that it was 
necessary to establish international criminal law on the basis that the state parties to 
the Geneva Convention had been disinclined to pass the criminal legislation needed 
to prevent violations; he thought it inappropriate to leave judicial remedies to 
belligerents because the judges could be placed under pressure at any time, whereas 
an international court could offer better assurances of neutrality. This, in turn would 
make belligerents more likely to use it.
17
 Governments themselves, he said, would 
not have anything to fear from such a court, because they would not be implicated 
directly in the crimes dealt with by it; he thought it absurd to envisage a superior 
order in contempt of formally established international obligations. His conception 
did, however, leave the executive function of enforcing sentences to states and it was 
inadequate to compel criminal responsibility.
18
 In fact, no serious attempt was taken 
to establish the international court following Moynier’s proposal. The next attempt at 
the establishment of an international tribunal occurred after World War I.  
 
 
 
                                               
14 Cryer R.  Ibid, at 20.   
15 Schwarzenberger G.  Ibid, at 465. 
16 Keith Hall C. ‘The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court’, 322 International 
Review of Red Cross (1998), 57, at 58. 
17 Id, at 57-59.  
18 Id.            
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2.2. The establishment of the Leipzig Court after World War 1 and its deficiencies 
in the prosecution of individuals   
In the aftermath of World War I, the victorious Allies decided to prosecute Germans 
responsible for aggression and other war crimes. There was outrage concerning war 
crimes on the part of Allied states, against Germany’s war crimes, and also on the 
part of foreigners, such as against the Ottoman Empire for the Armenian 
massacres.
19
During the war the Allies repeatedly expressed their strict determination 
to bring to justice all Germans who had committed acts
20
 which violated the laws and 
the customs of war.
21
 Hence, shortly after World War I, the Allies set up a 
commission in 1919 in order to ‘investigate the responsibility for the start of war 
crimes’ and which type of tribunal would be adequate for trials.22 The commission 
reported the responsibility of the Central Powers for initiating the war, and made a 
number of recommendations, such as the prosecution of high authorities such as the 
Kaiser and establishing an Allied ‘High Tribunal’ among the Allied member states.23 
The Report’s suggestions were largely followed by the Allies, and led to the Treaty 
of Versailles being signed between the Allied and Associated Powers.
24
 The Treaty 
provided the legal grounds for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II and other war 
criminals before a military tribunal which would be established by the Allied 
powers.
25
 It seems that the first serious initiative to implement the individual 
responsibility of holders of high positions of state was concerned with the case of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany. 
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles described the crimes of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II as ‘a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of 
                                               
19 Bass. J. B. Supra note 5, at 58; for the Armenian genocide see generally Dadrian V. The History of 
the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (2003), and 
The Armenian genocide and the legal and political issues in the failure to prevent or punish the crime 
(1998). 
20 Battle G.G. ‘The Trials before the Leipzig Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War Crimes’, 8 
Virginia Law Review (1921), 1, at 1.  
21 Violations against the customs of war included in  ‘[m]assacres, torture, the arrest and execution of 
hostages, artillery and aerial bombardments of open towns… the use of shields formed of living 
human beings, attacks on hospitals, [and] disregard of the rights of the wounded, prisoners of war, 
and women and children.’  
22 See ‘The Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the 
Enforcement of penalties’, 14 American Journal of International Law (Jan-Apr 1920), 95, at 95.  
23 Id, see generally 107-120. 
24 Id, at 95-98;  see also Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1, (1950), Vol, II,  Para 7. 
25 See the Treaty of Versailles Art. 229. 
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treaties’ before an international tribunal.26 In addition, Articles 228 and 229 
empowered tribunals to put on trial other persons who perpetrated acts in breach of 
the laws and customs of war.
27
 However, none of these international tribunal were 
established,
28
 due to Germany’s resistance to the trial: the German government 
immediately announced that it would not recognise the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
and argued that the trial of its military and marine elite could jeopardise the existence 
of its government.
29
 The Allied powers were afraid of the public reaction to the trial 
taking place outside Germany, and eventually agreed to a compromise whereby 
national tribunals in Leipzig, Germany, would be set up to prosecute those accused. 
In addition to this reluctant concession, the Allies also agreed to reduce the number 
of the accused to face trial;
30
 the number of accused was brought down from around 
3000 to 896 German Officers, and this was again reduced to 46 persons to be 
prosecuted before Germany’s national court.31 Consequently the conditions of 
prosecution meant that many escaped from justice. Despite the opposition and the 
Allies’ reluctance, the Leipzig tribunal was set up in 1919 on the basis of the 
Versailles Treaty, and the accused were tried before the German Supreme Court.   
The Kaiser was escaped to the Netherlands; the Dutch government rejected 
an official request by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference to surrender 
him, as he had been offered asylum in the Netherlands.
32
 The government’s 
statement of broad refusal was accepted by the Allied powers in March 1920, and no 
further efforts were made in order to extradite the Kaiser.
33
 As a result, the Kaiser 
was effectively immunised from prosecution and was never brought to justice. 
There are several reasons for the non-prosecution of the Kaiser. Firstly, there 
were legal issues, such as the issue of retroactivity; there were discussions among the 
Allies as to whether or not aggression was a crime at the time. Article 227 of the 
Treaty of Versailles specified that the Kaiser’s committed ‘offence against 
international morality’; this dubious term was enough to justify the constitution of 
                                               
26 Id. Art. 227.     
27 Id, Art. 228 & 229. 
28 Cassese A. (2003), Supra note 4, at 40. 
29 German War Trials: Report of Proceedings before the Supreme Court in Leipzig, London. His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office (1921),16, at 19; see also, Report on the Question of International 
Criminal Jurisdiction by, Ricardo J. Alfaro. Supra not 24,  Para 9 and 11. 
30 Cryer R. (2005), Supra note 4, at 34.  
31 See Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur. Supra note 24, Para, 11; see Also Battle G.G 
Supra note 20, at 6-12. 
32 See Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro. Id.  
33 Bantekas L & Susan N.  International Criminal Law (2007), at 496. 
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special tribunal to try him, but was not specific about the crime.
34
 Bassiouni has 
argued that the failure of the Leipzig tribunal may be attributed to ‘realpolitik’, with 
the impunity for the Kaiser following as a result of an ambiguous agreement and a 
lack of political will which prevented the application of the legal norm. It may also 
be attributed to questionable status of the crime.
35
 
The Leipzig court was not, in fact, an effective mechanism for war crimes 
trials of individuals after World War I. It accepted, for instance, that obedience to 
superior orders could be used as an absolute defence
36
in the trial of Lieutenant Karl 
Neumann, the commander of a German submarine that had sunk the British hospital 
ship ‘Dover Castle’.37 A consequence of the availability of this defence was the 
exoneration of the officer (Karl Neumann) under orders, as well as the acquittal of 
other defendants who participated in the sinking of the hospital ship. Even though the 
court held the view that their actions were a violation of international law, they were 
acting under superior orders and hence were found not guilty.
38
  Judgment in  ‘Dover 
Castle’ by standards would have been a clear case of impunity, for Karl Neumann  
and other accused of sinking of the hospital ship, but also there is no clear law at that 
time to be applied. Another important case before the Leipzig court was that of a 
famous German officer, General Stenger, who was charged with the murder of 
prisoners of war.
39
 Despite overwhelming evidence, the court found him not guilty, 
even though Crusius, a lower officer, was convicted and sentenced to two years’ 
imprisonment.
40
 In the Leipzig trials even when the accused was found guilty, 
generally the punishment was lenient. The results of the trials unsurprisingly raised 
huge indignation among the Allied Powers, in particular in France. Gordon writing in 
1947 for example argued that the trial of General Stenger was a ‘miscarriage of 
justice’,41 and this acquittal demonstrated the inadequacy of the court, which had 
accorded impunity to criminals through the process of exoneration. 
The agreement between the Allies and Germany allowing prosecutions in the 
national court in Germany, as opposed to via international tribunals, was the first step 
                                               
34 Bass. J. B.  Supra note 5, at 58, 71 and 76. 
35 Bassiouni C. (2000), Supra note 8, at 410.  
36  Battle G.G. Supra note 20, at 11. 
37 ‘German War Trial, Report of Proceedings before the Supreme Court in Leipzig.  Supra note 29, at 
630-631. 
38 Battle G.G. Ibid,  at 15.  
39 Id.    
40 Id, at 12. 
41 Id, at14. 
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in that direction for those who regard Leipzig as giving rise to impunity. For the 
failure of the Leipzig trials some have argued that other factors were also significant, 
such as the fact that the Germany as a defeated state was not occupied and thus could 
still resist the Allied demands for prosecution of those who had committed war 
crimes.
42
 Legacy of Leipzig is to encourage as many suggested the necessary for 
international tribunals, and for matters related to war crimes, national judges might 
not be independent,
43
impartial and unwillingness, to prosecute, thus national 
prosecution might not be always appropriate for such crimes. The experience of the 
Leipzig trial may have affected calls for the creation of an international tribunal after 
the Second World War.
44
 
Another issue which was discussed by the Allies at that time was the 
Armenian massacres of 1915 in Turkey.
45
 The Allied powers accused the Turkish 
state (Caliphate) of either implicitly adopting a policy of genocide or giving consent 
to the killing of over 200,000 people during the War.
46
 The 1919 Commission, 
established by the Allied powers to investigate war crimes, reported that systematic 
killing of Armenians had occurred in Turkey in violation of the ‘laws of humanity’ 
as stated in the Preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention, and accordingly that the 
Turkish officials concerned should be punished. It was the first time that an 
international legal body considered the individual criminal responsibility under 
international law of those who committed crimes against citizens of their own 
nations.
47
 Although the Allied powers agreed to establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal 
to try the perpetrators of mass killings, no further action was taken against the 
Turkish officials.
48
 
Although a few low-ranking perpetrators of the Armenian massacres, such as 
Kemal Bay and Tevfik,
49
had been prosecuted and punished before the Ottoman 
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43 Keith Hall C. Supra note 16, at 59.   
44 See generally Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal by Justice Jackson, in 
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 
November 1945- 1 October 1946 (1947), Vol, II, 98-155.  
45 Penrose M. ‘Impunity-Inertia, Inaction, and Invalidity: A Literature Review’, 17 Boston University 
International Law Journal (1999), 269, at 292. 
46 Bassiouni C. ‘The International Criminal Court in Historical Context’, Saint Louis-Warsaw 
Transatlantic Law Journal (1999), 55,  at 57.  
47 Id.  
48 Penrose M. Supra note 45, at 293. 
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Court in Constantinople, many perpetrators escaped; young leaders who had had a 
significant role in the massacres such as Talaat and Enver fled to Germany.
50
 The 
administration of justice at the Ottoman trials was so incompetent that many 
perpetrators who were arrested escaped from prison and were never rearrested. The 
government was also frightened to pursue major criminals; the prosecutions caused a 
wave of nationalist unrest and the government feared causing further nationalist 
backlash. This was the reason that Kemal was hanged secretly; at his funeral a 
thousand people gathered in order to pay their respects to him.
51
If Leipzig had shown 
the possibility that national Tribunals may not be impartial, the Ottoman trials also 
showed: a) national tribunals may be incompetent whether impartial or not; and b) 
domestic political pressure may affect such tribunals, rendering them ineffective. 
Nonetheless, as Bass argues, ‘liberal states have mostly pursued international justice 
when their citizens had been the victims of war crimes’.52 As the UK response to the 
Ottoman war crimes showed, few was among the authorities were willing to pursue 
prosecution in cases not involving British citizens: ‘British officials tried to hold onto 
Turks accused of crimes against Britons to the end, showing more solicitude for 
Britons than for Armenians.’53 The non-prosecution of those responsible for the 
Armenian massacres, whatever the reason, remains an issue today; the yearly 
observance of the anniversary of the start of the massacres shows that people are 
unlikely to forget such atrocities, yet the Turkish government still refuses to make an 
official apology for the atrocities in 1915. 
However, despite the major failure to punish those accused of international 
crimes after World War I, in Constantinople and in Leipzig, the most significant 
legacy of Leipzig, as Cryer asserts, was that it had been clearly shown that a state is 
unlikely to undertake effective prosecution of its own citizens before its own courts 
for war crimes, and hence that international supervision of proceedings is 
undoubtedly required.
54
 The other significant result of the Versailles Treaty was that 
it signified the point at which the modern international law of institutions begins, and 
                                                                                                                                     
Military Court Tries the Principle Genocidists of the District of Yozgat,’ 25 The Armenian Review 
(1972), 34, at 36.  
50 Bass G. J. Supra note 5, at 118. Talaat was assassinated in Berlin in 1921. 
51 Id, at 125-126.  
52 Id, at 278.  
53 Id.  
54 Cryer R. Supra note 4, at35.  
54 
 
thus the prospect of placing entire nations under the scrutiny of institutional 
mechanisms.
55
 
2.3. Post First World War era tribunals and the revolution in the subject of  
                                       international Law  
After the First World War the idea of the creation of the international criminal court 
found some support, the League of Nations Advisory Committee in 1921provided a 
proposal for the creation of an international criminal court to prosecute war crimes.
56
 
However, the effort by the League was not successful for the creation of an 
international criminal court despite the fact that the League drafted and adopted a 
statute for such an international criminal court.
57
  It was only after the Second World 
War that international tribunals were established. By creation of Tokyo and 
Nuremberg tribunals, international law had begun to accept that individuals have 
both rights and duties under international law.   
2.3.1. The creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals after World War II  
Due to the widespread brutality and war crimes committed by the Nazis during the 
Second World War, after the war several Allied leaders such as Churchill and Stalin 
were pressing for the summary execution of Axis leaders and trial for the lower 
ranks, but because of repeated arguments to the contrary by Henry Stimson of the US 
they were persuaded to accept the establishment of an international tribunal .
58
 The 
Allied states, under Control Council Law Number 10, agreed to the prosecution of 
the major Nazi and Japanese war criminals in the Nuremberg (IMT) and Tokyo 
(IMTFE) tribunals.
59
 Through the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, 
direct individual criminal responsibility for international crimes was stipulated for 
the first time.
60
 However, whilst the (IMT) in Nuremberg became the centre of media 
attention, the IMTFE trials passed largely unnoticed.
61
 Because of its novelty and the 
widespread attention given to the Nuremberg tribunal, it quickly became recognised 
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as establishing a legal precedent.
62
 In fact, there are many similarities between these 
two tribunals regarding individual responsibility and subject-matter jurisdiction over 
crimes.  
The Nuremberg had jurisdiction over three categories of crimes: crimes 
against peace,
63
war crimes,
64
 and crimes against humanity.
65
Crimes against humanity 
were distinguished from war crimes and were codified for the first time.
66
 The major 
advancement was that even crimes committed against the state’s own population 
were included under crimes against humanity, referring to ‘any civilian population’ 
in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. Meanwhile prior to the Nuremberg Charter 
international law was largely concerned with regulating inter-state conduct rather 
than the treatment of state’s own citizens.67 In fact, the criminalisation of crimes 
against humanity, as Goldstone asserts, was the most significant legacy of 
Nuremberg.
68
 
Crimes against peace included ‘planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of 
a war of aggression’.69 War crimes were defined via an incorporation of the 1907 
Hague Convention and other customary international laws of war.
70
 Most 
importantly, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters not only criminalised war crimes, 
but, in codifying the concept of ‘war against peace’ or aggressive war, also 
criminalised the crime of waging an illegal war.
71
 It had previously been recognised 
                                               
62 Id. 
63 The Nuremberg Charter, Art. 6 (a). 
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that to wage a war was an absolute right of every state in its sovereignty.
72
 The 6
th
 
edition of Oppenheim, which was revised by Lauterpacht in 1944, states that:  
    …So long as war was a recognized instrument of national policy both for giving effect 
to existing rights and for changing the law, the justice or otherwise of the cause of war 
was not of legal relevance. The right of war, for whatever purposes, was a prerogative 
of national sovereignty. Thus conceived every war was just.
73
 
 
The 1926 edition of Oppenheim had asserted that: ‘[T]his conception of war 
as lacking illegality includes an absolute right of every State to make war, whenever, 
and for whatever reason, it chooses.’74Even if a distinction had been maintained 
between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, neither just nor unjust wars had been considered 
crimes under international law before the Nuremberg Charter.
75
 
The Nuremberg judgment clearly indicated that ‘crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities’.76 It was the first time that civil 
and military leaders were prosecuted for war crimes; and, moreover, the Allies took 
what Lauterpacht considered ‘the more difficult and the wiser course’ and 
determined that the enforcement of international law must cover not only war crimes 
proper but also ‘the crime of war - which is the cause and the parent of war 
crimes.’77The Nuremberg Charter explicitly rejected the defence of sovereign 
immunity for official authorities and military leaders and made it clear that 
individuals at any position are responsible for international crimes committed under 
their directions.
78
 The Nuremberg Charter in fact, was the acknowledgment that the 
individual’s having rights and duties under international law tends to lessen the need 
for, and the compass for, collective punishment of states.
79
 Thus, as Simpson asserts, 
the development of modern international criminal law can be seen as a series of 
shifts away from collective guilt and towards individual responsibility.
80
 The IMT 
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Charter also recognised criminal responsibility for organisations for the first time and 
in practice several organisations were found guilty.
81
 
In practice, in the Nuremberg Tribunal twenty-four defendants, including 
political and senior military leaders, were tried from 14 November 1945 to 1 October 
1946.
82
 Twelve of them were sentenced to death, three to life imprisonment, and four 
to limited imprisonment; three were acquitted.
83
 In addition to the number of 
defendants who were tried in Nuremberg and Tokyo, many other ‘subsidiary’ 
tribunals were held before the US military tribunal at Nuremberg and over 800 
Japanese defendants in the Australian military tribunal.
84
 
The Tokyo tribunal (IMTFE) similarly to the Nuremberg, was established by 
the Allies; the crimes within the jurisdiction of the two courts were almost the same, 
but in the Tokyo Tribunal General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers, followed a different procedure from the Nuremberg Tribunal.
85
 He 
issued a military declaration, specifying the framework of the Charter of the IMTFE 
(which was, to a large degree, modelled on the Nuremberg Charter)
86
 and appointed 
a judge from each of the eleven Allied countries for this tribunal. The structure of the 
tribunal was different from the Nuremberg Tribunal, as was the number of countries 
that took part in each one (eleven countries in Tokyo versus four countries in 
Nuremberg). Also unlike Nuremberg, the Tokyo Tribunal did not characterise any 
organisations as criminal; yet like Nuremberg, the Tokyo Trials neither accepted the 
defence of superior orders nor that government officials were protected through ‘acts 
of State’.87 In contrast to the Nuremberg Charter, however, in the Tokyo Trials the 
‘official position of an accused could be treated as a circumstance in mitigation of 
punishment if this was required in the interest of Justice.
88
In the Tokyo tribunal,  28 
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defendants, all class A criminals – who were distinguished from all other, so-called 
minor, class B and C criminals – were found guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war, war crimes, and other atrocities (i.e. crimes against humanity) and were 
convicted at Tokyo.
89
 This was in addition to 5,700 persons who had been tried in 
various military courts in the Far East, administrated by the nineteen Allied countries 
in their respective zones.
90
 In the Tokyo trials, which lasted from 3 May 1946 to 
November 1948, seven were convicted to death by hanging, and others were 
sentenced to terms ranging from life imprisonment to seven years.
91
 Most 
importantly, the Japanese state submitted to the jurisdiction of this court.
92
 
Impunity arose as an issue in the IMT tribunals in several different ways. The 
first aspect of this matter is the facilitation of impunity at Nuremberg and Tokyo via 
non-prosecution or exemption. Although the atrocities committed by the Nazi state 
were unbelievable in scale in comparison with the alleged crimes committed by the 
Allies, there was no reason why those latter crimes should have been ignored and not 
prosecuted in either an international or a domestic court. Both the Nuremberg Trials 
and the Tokyo Tribunal were set up only for the prosecution and punishment of the 
major war criminals from the Axis Powers, from Europe and the Far East 
respectively.
93
 This had the effect of the tribunals being regarded as ‘one-sided 
trials’,94 and the impartiality and jurisdiction of these tribunals being subject to 
criticism. In particular, exemption from jurisdiction of the direct attacks of the Allies 
on German civilians, as occurred at Hamburg and Dresden, and the US atomic bomb 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were obvious examples.
95
 Simpson notes that 
the principle of tu quoque that was invoked by the defence attorney in the 
Nuremberg trials rested on the fact that the Allies had not appeared before the court 
with ‘clean hands’.96 The problem is not simply that certain people escaped justice, 
but that the simultaneous invocation of universal crimes went together with a partial 
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jurisdiction that made clear their real relationship. Universality of jurisdiction was 
never intended to be universal. The crimes were only crimes for some. Impunity was 
an innate feature of justice.  
Both tribunals have been subject to enormous criticism. Most importantly, 
they were condemned as victor’s justice97 without an international tribunal 
character.
98
 The Allied powers that established these tribunals also committed similar 
crimes; hence, there was an argument tu quoque.
99
 Even Pal, one of the judges of the 
Tokyo tribunal, criticised the trial as victor’s justice.100 Justice Jackson also raised 
this issue in his opening speech at the Nuremberg Trial, stating that it was not the 
ideal situation to have the victors prosecuting the defeated side. He insisted: 
         Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution 
and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The 
worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but 
few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we 
must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the first World War, 
we learned the futility of the latter course.
101
 
 
It seems the criticism of ‘victor’s justice’ is one which also may also apply to 
the majority of the later ad hoc international tribunals. However, one may argue that 
the Allies, via the establishing of these historic tribunals, were interested in justice, 
however partial. In this regard, Bass insisted that once the IMT and IMTFE were 
operating, ‘critics could shake their heads at the show of victors’ justice, but at least 
the victors took an interest in justice’.102 Nevertheless, the prosecutors and judges did 
all come from Allied countries and some have criticised them for a lack of 
impartiality.
103
 
The second aspect of impunity was that which arose via non- prosecution or 
by inaction in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals (i.e. via practical and procedural 
problems). Although many individuals faced trial and were convicted at the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and by the Allied Zone courts, many others were never 
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prosecuted in those tribunals. Concerning the Nuremberg trial for instance, two 
major figures in the Holocaust and the chief managers of genocide, the Gestapo 
chief, Heinrich Muller, and his deputy Adolf Eichmann, were never brought to trial. 
Eichmann was later abducted and taken from Argentina to Israel, where he was tried 
in Jerusalem in May 1960.
104
 Although the Holocaust was included in the Nuremberg 
trials, Allies states such as the US and Britain had not paid enough attention to the 
Holocaust; instead, they tended to focus on the aggressive war.
105
 In the Moscow 
declaration for instance, the Holocaust was mentioned as ‘slaughters inflicted on the 
people of Poland’106without any reference to the Jewish people. This lack of enough 
concern for or interest in the Holocaust motivated the Israelis to bring Eichmann to 
trial in the Israeli court.
107
 
  In the Tokyo tribunal also there were several significant instances of non-
prosecution of individuals, which should be considered. The first concerns one of the 
main issues that was debated at that time: whether the tribunal would ask to put the 
Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, on trial or not.
108
 Despite overwhelming demand by the 
American public, General Douglas MacArthur issued a statement arguing that the 
Emperor’s trial would further undermine the country. Accordingly, the US 
government accepted that Hirohito should not be prosecuted.
109
 The clear rationale 
for this was that a potentially sensitive trial could endanger peace and security in 
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Japan. As a symptom of this effort, the Emperor was not included in the list of the 
defendants at Tokyo, as he was more a symbol of the nation as opposed to an 
individual who had committed a crime.
110
 In one sense this was the same kind of 
issue that affected the Ottoman trials, but there in addition the question of collective 
guilt also impinged the question of prosecution.  
The second significant instance of non-prosecution concerns the de facto 
impunity accorded to the Japanese government and those responsible for pursuing 
the policy of ‘comfort women’ during World War II. The term refers to more than 
200,000 Asian women who were enslaved and forced into prostitution for the 
Japanese military between 1937 and 1945.
111
 The case of ‘comfort women’ only 
surfaced in 1987 when a work appeared by a Japanese writer, Sena Kako, in which 
she describes vividly the scope and brutality that these women were subjected to.
112
 
Initially, the Japanese government denied the existence of ‘comfort women’ but 
when presented with documents and witnesses, it eventually accepted the existence 
of this practice in 1993,
113
 and allocated one billion dollars to be spent on cultural 
projects as an act of apology. However, no direct action was taken to compensate the 
victims of sexual enslavement, nor was any action taken to bring the surviving 
perpetrators to justice.
114
 This is an example of what one might call prosecutional 
blindness, in the sense that whilst it would have been clearly plausible to say an 
offence had been committed, the Allies did not pay any particular attention to the 
events concerned. 
The third instance of impunity which the Tokyo tribunal stands out for is the 
de jure impunity after trial which was accorded to the convicted criminals. Despite 
Japan’s initial acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IMTFE,115 after the trial the 
Japanese government opposed the legality of the Tribunal and insisted that all 
Japanese prisoners who had been convicted should be transferred to the main Tokyo 
prison. Even more remarkable is that in 1953, Japan released almost all the prisoners, 
regardless of outstanding sentences.
116
 Not surprisingly, several individuals who had 
been detained as war crimes suspects by the Allies, and in some cases tried and 
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imprisoned by the IMTFE, soon after re-entered the political arena. Nobusuke Kishi 
became Prime Minister and the convicted criminal Shigemitsu was appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1954.
117
 
The third way in which impunity arose at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
was in connection with their seeking to codify crimes. In creating ’new crimes’, the 
tribunals also created new conditions for impunity insofar as the mechanisms did not 
provide for justice and all offences. The IMT tribunals raised the possibility that the 
actual form of codification may not have perfectly reflected the pre-existing 
customary international law. Had that been the case they would have created a new 
form of impunity. This is a problem that potentially faces all international tribunals. 
In addition to the criticisms of these tribunals as victors’ justice, as just 
discussed in the above, another significant criticism was the ex post facto nature of 
the judgments; because of the legislative characters of their charters, some have 
criticised the tribunals on the issue of legality
118
 on the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege, stating that the ‘crime of aggression’119 was not a crime at the time of 
commission. In particular, the accusation of ex post facto judgment was true about 
the ‘crime’ of war against peace.120 In fact, the IMT itself was aware of the legal 
weakness of the trial. One solution, proposed by Judge Jackson and the US 
prosecution team themselves, was based on the theory of conspiracy. Aside from the 
innovative statue of the employment of the theory of conspiracy, this development 
was to have a certain significance regarding the question of impunity. The crime of 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war was both simple and expansive enough to include 
everything the regime had done in the previous eleven years.
121
 Conspiracy caught 
everyone in the net, regardless of their actual responsibility for specific acts, but it 
had to be combined with a criminal purpose (e.g. a common plan as a member of a 
criminal organisation).
122
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Despite the shortcomings of the IMT and IMTFE, their trials and judgments 
made a huge contribution to the development of international criminal law and the 
creation of customary international law. On December 11, 1946 the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 95 (1) known as the ‘Affirmation of the Nuremberg 
Principles’.123 This affirmation was significant in that the General Assembly showed 
adherence to those principles as codified by the International Law Commission (ILC) 
as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.
124
 In 1950 the ILC issued a report 
based on these principles, recognising the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of 
the tribunal.
125
 The enhancement of ICL following the Nuremberg Trial was 
continued through various multilateral treaties and conventions
126
 and via the 
establishment of ad hoc tribunals. Additionally, international human rights 
instruments have affirmed the principle known as ‘extradite or prosecute’, with a 
view to making criminal offenders responsible for their acts.
127
 One of the most 
important conventions has been, and indeed still is, the Genocide Convention of 
1948.
128
 This Convention gave explicit treaty recognition to crimes against humanity, 
as defined in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. Most importantly, Article VI of the 
Convention provided that trial for the crime of genocide was to take place before ‘a 
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by 
such international penal tribunal as many have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’.129 Conventions 
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generally imposed the obligation on state parties to criminalise grave breaches of 
each of the Conventions in their national criminal system. States that become party to 
these conventions are obligated to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) 
any persons found within their territories who are believed to have been responsible 
for prohibited acts, under the principle of the ‘vicarious administration of justice’.130 
According to this principle, a state obligates itself either to try a criminal in its court 
or to extradite perpetrators to a state requesting such extradition.
131
 
2.4. Efforts for the establishment of international courts after the IMT tribunals 
                                  (during and after the Cold War era) 
 
Following the hugely important influence of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, in 
1948 UN Convention of the Crime of Genocide prepared bases for the establishment 
of an international criminal court.
132
The General Assembly adopted the Genocide 
Convention’s definition of genocide and its statement, in Article VI, that the 
genocide trials may take place before ‘a competent tribunal of the State..., or by such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties’...133 
Accordingly, the UN General Assembly invited the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to prepare a report on the possibility of establishing an 
international court to try individuals charged with the crime of genocide.
134
 The ILC 
was already working on the codification and development of international law. The 
Commission was also given the duty to provide a draft statute of an international 
criminal court under Article VI of the Genocide Convention, framed within the 
‘Nuremberg Principle’.135 In 1950 the UN GA recalled Resolution 206 b (III) of nine 
December 1948, as a necessary for ‘an international judicial organ’.136 The ILC, as 
regards the first task, concluded that the establishment of an international court was 
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desirable and possible.
137
The ILC then established a seventeen member-state 
committee to study the feasibility of establishing an international court. The 
committee submitted a draft statute and an annexed report to the General Assembly 
in 1952.
138
 However, the establishment of a court was postponed until the adoption 
of a commonly agreed definition on ‘aggression’.139 
The General Assembly finally agreed on a definition for the crime of 
aggression in 1974,
140
 but it did not directly address the proposal relating to the 
creation of the international court. In 1981, the General Assembly asked the 
International Law Commission to reconsider its earlier draft code of crimes (1954)
141
 
and prepare a revised version, in light of international political changes. The revised 
version was then adopted by the General Assembly in 1991. 
Despite some periodic discussions on this matter, it was only after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 that once again the establishment of the court 
became a political priority in international politics. The long delay is attributed to the 
political tension during the Cold War, state sovereignty, lack of political will and 
difficulties relating to agreeing on a common definition of the crime of aggression.
142
 
We can see that many atrocities, mainly with impunity, were committed during the 
Cold War period around the world, such as the killing and disappearance of two 
hundred thousand people in Guatemala between 1966 and 1986, Pinochet’s 
brutalities in Chile, the repression in East Timor in 1975 to 1979, and the crimes of 
Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda to name but a few.143 Those atrocities which were 
committed with impunity increased the demand for the establishment of an 
international criminal court which might act as a possible deterrent for perpetrators. 
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In fact, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals served as a fundamental legal 
and judicial basis for the creation of the later ad hoc international tribunals,
144
 as well 
as for the establishment of the ICC. Importantly, all three groups of international 
crimes in the Nuremberg Charter have now become customary international law.  
2.4.1. The creation of the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the end of cold very little 
progress was for the creation of international criminal courts. It may be said that after 
the Cold War the institutionalisation of modern international criminal law appeared 
through the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR by the SC in 1993 and 1994 
respectively.  
The creation of the ICTY and its history, like other tribunals, reflected 
contemporary events. The conflicts in former Yugoslavia started in June 1991, with 
independence movements by Croatia and Slovenia. At this time these two republics 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia and their intention to establish 
sovereign states.
145
This national liberation movement then spread to Bosnia, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo and led to internal armed conflict. The news of the massive 
atrocities and violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, and in particular 
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ conducted against Moslems in Bosnia, gripped the world and 
led to demands from the international community that such criminals should not go 
unpunished. The role of the media was thus highly significant in developments. At 
this time the international community decided to act. Due to such widespread 
violations of the laws of war and basic human rights, and the inadequacy of the 
national jurisdiction for prosecuting the high state authorities in the former 
Yugoslavia,
146
 the idea arose that an international court and judge should prosecute 
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international offences.
147
 The establishment of this tribunal was ‘a judicial response 
to the demands posed by the situation in the former Yugoslavia’.148 
The armed conflict among different rival ethnic groups and widespread human 
rights violations in the Former Yugoslavia promoted the SC to describe the situation 
as a threat to international peace and security.
149
Accordingly, Resolution 780 
empowered the UN to establish a Commission of Experts under the SC in 1992. The 
Security Council, under resolution 808, gave discretionary power to the Secretary 
General to examine whether there was a need for establishing a criminal tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia. In February 1993, the report was submitted to the UN 
Secretary General, who subsequently affirmed the necessity for a tribunal and 
annexed an appropriate statute based on customary international criminal law.
150
 
Consequently, an international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was 
established by the SC via Resolution 827, on 2 May 1993.Cassese, the head of the 
Court, asserted that ‘unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the Tribunal is truly 
international’.151 This tribunal was the first ad hoc tribunal with multiple judges from 
different countries who were appointed by the SC and had the authority to try both 
sides of the conflict.
152
 However, some defendants challenged the legality of the 
establishment of the ICTY by the Security Council; its supremacy and subject matter 
jurisdiction, they argued that the SC had no mandate to establish the Tribunal and 
that Chapter VII of the Charter does not expressly mention the creation of a criminal 
tribunal.
153
The position to them by the Court in the Tadic  case was  Among such 
critics, the Appeal Chamber also pursuant to the Articles 24and 39 of the UN 
Charter
154
 which provides the duty of the SC  for maintenance of the peace,  argued 
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that the situation justifies resort to the power  under Chapter VII as ‘threat to 
peace’155 on the bases and reason that: 
    ‘[A]n armed conflict (or a series of armed conflicts) has been taking place in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since long before the decision of the Security 
Council to establish this International Tribunal. If it is considered an international 
armed conflict, there is no doubt that it falls within the literal sense of the words 
“breach of the peace” (between the parties or, at the very least, would be a as a 
“threat to the peace” of others). But even if it were considered merely as an “internal 
armed conflict”, it would still constitute a “threat to the peace” according to the 
settled practice of the Security Council and the common understanding of the United 
Nations membership in general.
156
 
 
However and despite of  such argument , it seems that the UN Charter under 
Chapter VII, with a broad definition, has been granted the authority to establish such 
a Tribunal if the situation is a threat to international peace and security
157
 
Regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the ICTY has jurisdiction over all 
serious violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
158
 The 
massive violations have given rise to the concept of ‘ethnic cleansing’.159The 
Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals who have committed or ordered 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949, crimes against humanity (a part 
of Nuremberg law) violation of the law of war committed in armed conflicts with 
national or international character, and persons who have committed genocide.
160
 
However, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to a specific period and to crimes 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as an ad hoc temporary tribunal. 
In contrast to the ICC, the ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction with domestic courts 
with primacy in any stage over the national courts.
161
  Thus national courts should 
defer any cases to ICTY if this is formally requested. The ICTY has captured many 
individuals and authorities of the former Yugoslavia, such as Milosevic, former 
president of Yugoslavia, who died in prison, and the former Serbian president 
Radovan Karadzic who was arrested in 2008.
162
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Despite its achievements, the non-prosecution of some individuals also exists 
in the ICTY. The ICTY has jurisdiction over all parties;
163
 yet some have criticised 
the actions of the other party in the conflict, namely NATO, and hold that the charge 
of ‘victor’s justice’ may also apply to NATO in the former Yugoslavia in 
1999.
164
The NATO bombing from 24 March 1999 to 9 June 1999 led to numerous 
civilian casualties (deaths were estimated at 1,200)
165
 and arguably constituted a 
violation of international humanitarian Law. It was also subjected to legal action in 
the ECHR in the Bankovic case
166
 and to inter-state proceedings before the ICJ.
167
 As 
a consequence of criticisms and various complaints against NATO’s senior leaders, 
the Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte prepared indictments pursuant to Article 18(1) & (4) 
of the ICTY Statute.
168
 However, she did not open a formal investigation against 
NATO, and on 2 June 2000 she concluded that there was no basis for criminal 
investigation against the NATO air campaign.
169
 The Prosecutor insisted that ‘there 
was no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO during 
the campaign’.170The NATO operation and the decision by the ICTY Prosecutor not 
to open an investigation despite ‘compelling evidence’ have become the subject of 
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criticism concerning the ‘neutrality and objectivity’171 or otherwise of the ICTY. The 
political pressure on the Prosecutor should also not be dismissed; as Anghie et al 
observed, for some scholars ‘the ICTY’s decision unhappily tends to confirm the 
suspicion that justice is selective’.172 The decision not to commence investigation of 
NATO’s alleged crimes might have been reflective of the fact that it was NATO 
countries that were also financially supporting the ICTY. 
The question is again one of ‘victor’s justice’: if the ICTY is a truly 
international court, how could such things happen? It may thus be said that ‘victor’s 
justice’ is an issue even in the case of the international tribunals, and the exemption 
of the NATO crimes from investigation provides evidence for regarding the tribunals 
as administering ‘justice’ of this sort. 
2.4.2. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Similarly to the ICTY, the ICTR has been established by the SC.
173
 The tribunals 
have many similarities: both tribunals are subsidiary organs of the SC under Article 
29 of the Charter; both have a limited time and jurisdiction and are specific to a 
particular country; both have individual jurisdiction over natural persons; both have 
primacy of jurisdiction over national courts; and both have the same structure of one 
prosecutor and one appeal chamber. The single appeal chamber is intended to reduce 
expenses when invoking the right to appeal.
174
 Judges are elected by the General 
Assembly from a list which is confirmed by the Security Council. The enforcement 
mechanisms of these trials are provided by the Security Council, and all states are 
obligated to cooperate with the tribunals and enforce the decisions arrived at.
175
 
Because of their affinity they are often called twin tribunals. 
The only significant difference between the two tribunals is the definition of 
crimes against humanity in their respective statutes. Article 3 of the ICTR does not 
require a link with an armed conflict, since the conflict in Rwanda had a largely 
internal character, whereas the ICTY tribunal is empowered to prosecute persons 
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who have violated the customs of war or breached the 1994 Geneva Conventions, 
which apply to international armed conflicts.
176
 
Furthermore, the ICTR has its own narrative and reasons for existence; its 
creation was precipitated by events in Rwanda in 1994. Atrocities on a scale many 
times wider than those committed in the former Yugoslavia were taking place in 
Rwanda in a type of genocide against the Tutsi minority. The Rwanda situation arose 
following the plane clash and death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and 
their high-ranking officials at Kigali airport on April 6, 1994. Hidden tribal tensions 
surfaced in genocidal killing, whereby members of the Hutu majority tribe tried to 
eliminate the minority Tutsi tribe.
177
 The number of deaths as a result of the genocide 
is estimated at between 500,000 and one million.
178
 The genocide in Rwanda was 
unarguably one of the worst events in modern history, and despite numerous 
warnings from the UN peacekeepers about the dangerous situation in Rwanda, the 
United Nations failed to act and apply preventative action while the genocide was 
going on.
179
 Eventually, and after the experience of the creation of the ICTY, the SC 
took action, but not before hundreds of thousands of people had already been killed. 
Similarly to the case of the ICTY, the SC decided that the situation in Rwanda 
constituted a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.
180
 Hence, in comparison to the ICTY on the issue of the legality of the 
establishment of this Tribunal by the SC, it seems that this issue was less 
controversial in the case of the ICTR, since the power of the SC to establish such a 
tribunal under Chapter VII had been confirmed.
181
 
 The ICTR has jurisdiction for the prosecution of persons responsible for 
genocide or other serious violations of human rights committed in Rwanda between 
January 1 and December 31, 1994.
182
 Many Hutu authorities were accused of inciting 
the crime of genocide in Rwanda. For example, Jean Kambanda, who was the prime 
minister at the time of the genocide, was found guilty of the crime of genocide.
183
 He 
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was not only planning in advance widespread genocide and systematic attacks 
against Tutsi civilians, but also directly and publicity ordered the committing of 
genocide.
184
It was immediately recognised, however, that the prosecution of all the 
accused was impossible. Efforts are therefore being made to use the Rwandan 
community courts named ‘Gacaca Courts’,185 which are traditional and popular 
courts, to do the work of a truth commission in promoting justice and the prospect of 
reconciliation.
186
 
Thus, during the creation of these tribunals there was a continuing sense that 
domestic legal systems are inadequately equipped and inappropriate for such trials.
187
 
Municipal tribunals mainly face difficulties such as bias and partiality, and prove 
‘unsatisfactory, subjective and selective’ in their definition of international crimes, 
whereas, as Simpson has mentioned, international tribunals have been considered 
synonymous with impartiality.
188
 Hence, history again turns towards the creation of 
an international tribunal as a means of maintaining justice and global humanity.
189
 
Since the creation of these ad hoc tribunals after the Cold War, and alongside 
the growth of a culture of impunity in some societies, the idea of, and demand for, 
the creation of a permanent international court started to increase. 
2.4.3. The efforts made towards the establishment of the permanent international  
      court in the post-Cold War era; and the establishment of the ICC 
The most significant progress towards the establishment of a permanent international 
court occurred in 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the Cold 
War.
190
 In December 1989, a letter issued by Trinidad and Tobago requested the 
establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over the illicit trafficking in 
drugs. In response to this letter the UN Security General again asked the ILC to 
restart its work on the draft code of crime.
191
 It was only in 1993 that under the 
guidance of James Crawford, as the Special Rapporteur, that the ILC provided a draft 
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statute of the International Criminal Court which was submitted to the General 
Assembly in 1994.
192
 
Increasing armed conflict and the shocking reports of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia once again focused 
the attention of the international community on the necessity of establishing an 
international court. The efforts of many NGOs and reports of widespread human 
suffering around the world forced the UN SC to establish ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In fact, the events in the 
Balkans and Rwanda and the establishment of these two ad hoc tribunals prompted 
the notion of a permanent international criminal court.
193
 By then, the ILC had 
completed the first draft Statute, consisting of sixty Articles, in 1994 and submitted 
to the 49
th
 Session of the General Assembly.
194
 After the submission of the draft in 
1994 many issues and questions were raised in conjunction with the structure and 
procedural processes required for an international court. An intercessional meeting 
was therefore convened by the Committee to choose six specialised sub-committees. 
Simultaneously, the General Assembly established a preparatory committee on the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court in November 1995. The General 
Assembly passed a resolution asking a preparatory committee to hold a meeting for 
the preparation of a draft statute.
195
 In 1996 the Commission finally accepted the last 
draft of the ‘Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’. The draft 
Statute of 1994 and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace in 1996 played a 
significant role in the arrangement of the ICC’s Statute.196 The remit of the 
Preparatory Committee was to formulate a widely acceptable draft text for final 
submission to a diplomatic conference. The Preparatory Committee, after extensive 
discussion lasting from 1996 to 1998, prepared a draft text and asked the General 
Assembly to set up a diplomatic conference for the purpose of finalising the draft 
Statute in treaty form. 
Subsequently, the General Assembly decided to convene a meeting of the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of 
an International Criminal Court. A conference of plenipotentiaries was then held in 
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Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998, and after intense negotiation and compromise in 
many areas, ultimately the ICC Statute, consisting of 128 Articles, and largely 
resembling the ILC proposal, was signed on 17 July 1998.
197
 Among one hundred 
and forty-eight states who participated in the Rome Conference, one hundred and 
twenty of them voted in favour of the treaty, 21 states abstained and seven voted 
against it, namely the US, China, Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar, and Yemen.
198
 
The establishment of the first international criminal court with jurisdiction to 
try individuals who had committed the most serious international crimes was the 
culmination of a challenge which started almost a century ago.
199
 The creation of this 
tribunal indicates the continuing trend in the international sphere towards the 
institutionalisation of international criminal law at the end of the twentieth century. It 
entailed overcoming many obstacles in its creation and highlights the growing 
consensus among states that the establishment of a permanent international justice 
system is desirable and necessary, most notably as a response to the twentieth 
century, which has been labelled the ‘century of violence’.200 
Although the ICC is an independent judicial institution, Article II of the 
Statute stated clearly that it has a close relationship with the UN. After protracted 
negotiations between the two institutions, an agreement on the nature of the 
relationship was signed between the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and 
the President of the ICC Philippe Kirsch, and the agreement came into force on 4
th
 
October 2004. Article 18 of the agreement provides the terms of cooperation between 
the UN and the Prosecutor of the ICC.
201
 
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, which were created by the SC for a limited time 
and jurisdiction, the ICC is the first permanent international criminal court based on 
a multilateral treaty.
202
 The ICC has jurisdiction over four core crimes, namely 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.
203
 The first three 
core crimes are defined in the Statute and the last one was defined in the ICC’s first 
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review conference in Kampala, Uganda in 2010 by the Assembly of States Parties.
204
 
However, the Court will only begin to exercise its jurisdiction over these crimes once 
the amendment has been passed by the majority of States Parties; the vote will take 
place on 1 January 2017.
205
 
The ICC’s Statute emphasises that the Court will exercise its jurisdiction over 
individuals on the basis of the principle of complementarity. Complementarity means 
that if one of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC happens in the territory of 
a state party to the Statute or against a citizen of a state party, the priority of 
jurisdiction will always belong to the state in question, and the ICC’s Prosecutor 
would only be allowed to initiate any investigation in cases where states are unable 
or unwilling to prosecute. Accordingly, the Court will not have primary jurisdiction 
and will not compete with national courts’ jurisdiction.206 
The ICC is located at The Hague
207
 and its judges and prosecutor are elected 
by the States Assembly under Article 35 and 43 of the Statute. To date, 121 countries 
have become party to the Statute and 139 countries have signed the Statute.
208
The 
Court has opened 16 cases in seven situations so far.
209
 
The crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC apply to individuals 
regardless of their official position. The definition of individual criminal 
responsibility stipulated in Article 25 of the Rome Statute is the most comprehensive 
one to date.
210
 This Article gives a wide scope to individual criminal responsibility, 
covering all persons who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided 
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime. Generally the ICC 
has contributed to the development of customary international law by referring to the 
customary law in its jurisprudence over individuals.
211
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The main progress in the jurisdiction of the ICC, as reflected in Article 7, has 
taken place with respect to crimes against humanity.
212
The Statute provides a 
comprehensive definition of crimes against humanity as comprising acts ‘committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack’.213 The origin of this definition lies in general 
customary international law and in the Nuremberg Charter.
214
 It takes into account 
the experience of both previous ad hoc tribunals and of domestic conflicts over the 
last 50 years.
215
 For Example, Article 7 provides for an extensive number of crimes 
with a sexual nature.
216
 Regarding war crimes, the list of 26 acts as war crimes in 
Article 8
217
 is derived from the four Geneva Conventions and Protocols and previous 
international tribunals’ statutes, yet with many new categories of war crimes, such as 
the protection of the natural environment.  
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC has permanent jurisdiction after July 1, 
2002 when it came into force.
218
 The jurisdiction of the ICC was first developed by 
codifying serious crimes, and then extending these codified crimes to individual 
responsibility. Thus, the ICC, by criminalisation of a new code of crimes, promoted 
individual liability at large. However, the Statute in several instances differed from 
the customary international law, which may create impunity, i.e. concerning the 
issues related to obedience to superior orders for war crimes – the distinction 
between the command and civilian superior responsibility, and etc.  
The rule of enforcement for the ICC is different from that of the previous 
international tribunals. Enforcement of decisions of the ICTY and ICTR is based on 
mandatory obligation and cooperation by states.
219
 In contrast, because of the treaty-
based nature of the Statute, the operation and success of the ICC mainly depends on 
the support of the SC and the voluntary cooperation of states, which are relied on for 
matters such as surrendering of fugitives,
220
 collecting and securing evidence,
221
 and 
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other aspects of international cooperation.
222
 Furthermore, there is no mandatory 
obligation for non-party states. However, an exception is made when a case is 
referred by the SC to the ICC. Some scholars have criticised the ICC for not having 
adequate power to exercise its jurisdiction.
223
 This may give rise to impunity due to 
the lack of adequate cooperation by state parties and non-parties. 
2.5. Historical development of the post war tribunals and the question of  
                                    impunity 
The different aspects of impunity in the ICC will be examined in the following 
chapters of this thesis. In the present section a brief historical account and analysis of 
the common aspects of impunity in the post war tribunals will be examined.  
As we have seen in the above sections, the establishment of each tribunal has 
been affected by the situation of other tribunals which came before it. Whilst 
international tribunals are undoubtedly trying to create something new and positive, 
they have also created certain problems, in particular, various forms of impunity that 
have emerged in these tribunals. This reflects the fact that each tribunal on each 
occasion left certain things unaddressed. This was not simply a procedural incident, 
but rather, a deliberate act in each case. In examining historical background of these 
tribunals and the question of impunity, the relation between the forms of impunity, 
impunity as a deliberate act, and the widespread examples of impunity that occurred 
in these tribunals, are all issues which merit discussion.   
The first point to be considered is the relationship between the forms of 
impunity among previous international tribunals. An initial observation is that clearly 
one form of impunity rests on the relation between a tribunal and its historical 
background. Impunity in the ICTY is connected to what happened before it, and thus 
to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials; Nuremberg and Tokyo, in turn, perhaps relate 
back to the Leipzig trials. The understanding of what constitutes impunity, and how 
the institutions may recognise, create, or foster impunity, arises through an 
understanding of the legal history of the relations between what these institutions are 
doing and what has already being established.  This is evident in two different 
                                                                                                                                     
221 Id, Art. 93 (1). 
222 Id, Art. 86. 
223 Burke-Whit W. A. ‘The International Criminal Court and the Future of Legal Accountability’, 10 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (2003), 195, at 198, he states ‘[t]here is probably no 
weaker court in the world -including the local traffic court down the street- than the International 
Criminal Court. The ICC was designed to be weak’, at 196.  
78 
 
respects: in one respect it is exemplified by the retrospective character of many such 
tribunals, the jurisdiction of which was consistently premised upon the idea that the 
behaviour in question had already been criminalised.  Reliance, therefore, upon the 
experience of earlier tribunals or efforts at the codification of international criminal 
law, was the only way of avoiding the obvious moral and political problems of 
retrospective criminalisation.  In another respect, however, the turn to historical 
precedents was not merely to bring with it the possibility of criminalisation, but also 
the possibility of the exclusion of criminal liability. The connection between the non-
punishment of the Japanese Emperor by MacArthur in Tokyo,
224
 the Allied atrocities 
that were not prosecuted in the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the NATO atrocities
225
 that 
went unpunished in the former Yugoslavia is not to be missed. 
The second point is that impunity occurred as a deliberate act. The historical 
backgrounds of these tribunals show that the impunity did not just happen as an 
accident or as a result of jurisdictional deficiencies that led to perpetrators not getting 
captured, escaping from prosecution, or being found but then exonerated, identified 
but not prosecuted. This kind of accidental procedural impunity of course occurs, but 
it is not the main point of significance, which is that the decision is deliberately made 
that some categories of crimes or certain people are not to be punished and are 
instead exempted prior to or during the creation of these tribunals. The purposes of 
these tribunals are officially announced in the name of humanity and universality: 
international crimes, whenever, wherever, and by whomever they are committed, 
must be punishable. Despite such announcements the punishments are not to be 
equally applied for all. On the one hand, universality is proclaimed in relation to 
international crimes, and on other hand there is a lack of universality observable 
when these institutions are set up and when they operate. One might therefore 
suggest that proclamations of universality of this kind are always understood to have 
their exemptions.  
The third point that needs to be considered is the pervasiveness of non-
prosecution and impunity in the post-war tribunals. All of these historical cases show 
the constant feature of the exoneration or exemption of certain classes or individual 
criminals from the jurisdiction of these tribunals. In all cases the tribunals were set 
up and proclamations were issued in which the heinous crimes were declared to be in 
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existence and the intention was stated that perpetrators should not go unpunished. 
Yet significant exceptions or exemption from prosecution arose and impunity 
occurred in different ways and for different reasons, as follows: 
a) Non-prosecution because of the law, whether the lack of law at the time or 
actually due to the implementation of the law. As Bass has pointed out, Allied 
attempts to punish German and Turkish war criminals after World War 1 ended in 
debacle mainly due to the law. Without ‘definite proof against him’, as the British 
High Commissioner in Constantinople complained regarding a top Ottoman official 
whose guilt he was confident of, the latter might escape justice; and the Allies’ 
demonstrated difficulty in obtaining convictions in the respective courts made the 
expectation of acquittals into a reason for non-prosecution of German and Turkish 
war criminals.
226
 
b) Impunity because of the lack of military victory and occupation and resultant lack 
of power to enforce prosecution on the former officials of the defeated state.
227
 The 
Leipzig trial is an example of this issue in that the Allies could not compel their 
demands for the prosecution of war criminals. However, sometimes war crimes 
tribunals do seem to be effective even where there has been no military victory, 
which suggests that norms may possess a degree of independent power even when 
they are not fully supported by states power. For example, the ICTR cannot be easily 
explained as victor’s justice; there was a victory in Rwanda, but the attempt at 
international justice was mainly set up to allay the excesses of this same victory.
228
 
c) Impunity through political fears. This refers to situations in which prosecution was 
deliberately avoided for fear of negative political consequences, rather than through 
incidental and jurisdictional procedural factors. Examples of this would be the case 
of Kaiser Wilhelm II after World War I and the Japanese Emperor after the World 
War II. Regarding the former, despite the fact that the Versailles treaty explicitly 
accused Kaiser Wilhelm II
229
 and the Court had power to prosecute him, he never 
faced trial.  
d) Impunity through exemption of a party by Statutes or Charters. The exemption 
may be either explicitly or implicitly recognised in the Statutes and practice of the 
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post-war tribunals. For example, the Allied states were explicitly exempted from 
prosecution in the IMT Tribunals, which were established solely to exercise 
jurisdiction over Axis countries.
230
 Examples of implicit, non-visible exceptions 
might include amnesty laws or what happened to Kaiser Wilhelm II after World War 
I.
231
 Such exceptions are not written in the text of these tribunals, but are written in 
the context of when these tribunals emerge.  
The universality of the criminalisation, the prosecution and punishment of 
certain individuals, was always dependent on something else. In the case of the 
Emperor of Japan, for example, the prosecution and punishment was always seen to 
be dependent not only on the American and Allied side, but also on the Japanese 
people, and that in this case it seemed not to be in their interest to punish him. What 
must be emphasised is that it was a part of the logic of this tribunal that the Emperor 
was not going to be prosecuted; it was an understanding that his trial might danger 
the security of the Japanese people, so he was exempted from prosecution and the 
universal crimes under investigation did not apply to him. A key point is that these 
exemptions were routine in these tribunals and existed in all of them.  
e) Impunity through criminalisation. The central part of the story of the international 
criminal justice system is that it is always the case when criminalising certain 
behaviour that new conditions of impunity are also recognised, as a paradoxical 
function. This is a common feature of all tribunals prior to the ICC, and was 
examined in this chapter concerning the IMT and the IMTFE. The necessity of 
defining the parameters of criminal liability not only brings with it the possibility of 
extending criminal liability into new arenas, but also its limitation.  
f) Impunity through lack of political will. Sometimes an act is criminalised, the 
decision has been made to prosecute, and there is a mechanism for prosecution, but 
there is no political will to act. This situation is similar to that of c) above, but here 
the issue is not fear of negative consequences but rather a lack of consensus or 
certainty over what possible positive outcomes might result from exercising the law, 
because of political interests of a victorious side, because of ignorance, or simply as 
a result of neglect. As Bass insists, war crimes tribunals depend on military force and 
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the political will of foreign powers.
232
An example of impunity through lack of 
political will was what happened following the Armenian massacres in 1915 in 
Turkey. The treaty of Versailles provided for the Allies’ purpose of trying those who 
were most responsible for crimes.
233
 However the prosecution never happened and 
no further action has ever been taken against Turkey in connection with these 
massacres.  
g) Impunity through inaction or failure to address such crimes. Sometimes the crimes 
are heinous and widespread but are completely ignored and unaddressed. This might 
happen for different reasons: for instance, priority is given, rightly or wrongly, to 
some other types of international crime and crimes of some types are ignored. An 
example of this would be the “comfort women”234 crimes during World War II, 
whose perpetrators have never faced prosecution.  
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Chapter III: Amnesties and Immunities in the Rome Statute     
Introduction 
The main concern of this Chapter is to examine two forms of the possible recognition 
of impunity in the Rome Statute: amnesty and immunity. This Chapter is not a 
complete analytical approach to amnesty and immunity under international law or the 
relationship between peace and justice, as these topics have been addressed 
abundantly in the legal literature.
1
 The purpose of this chapter is instead to shed light 
on the policy of the ICC in theory – under the Statute – and in the practice of the 
Court and examine the relationship between that practice and the self-proclaimed 
goal of the ICC to ‘end impunity’, and prosecuting international crimes.2  
The first major section is concerned with question of amnesties and the extent 
to which the Statute admits or prohibits the granting of amnesties. Amnesty was the 
subject of a controversial debate during the drafting of the Statute at the Rome 
Conference, many delegations asserting that retributive justice should be the sole 
response to international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC due to their 
heinousness.
3
 In the end, the adopted Statute and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, in contrast to the situation with regard to immunities, do not deal with 
amnesty explicitly. However, many scholars assert that the Rome Statute is broad 
enough to potentially allow for several instances of leeway for amnesties,
4
 such as 
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Law (2004), 407; Dinstein Y. ‘Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae’, 15 
International and Comparative Quarterly (1996),76 ; Cassese A. ‘When may Senior State Officials be 
tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 European Journal 
of International Law (2002), 853; McGregor L. ‘State immunity and jus cogens’, 55 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2006),437; Yitiha, S. Immunity and International Criminal Law (2004), 
and etc. 
2 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
3 Preparatory Committee  for Establishment of the international Criminal Court ( 4-15August 1997), 
UN Doc. A/AC/.249/1997/L8/Rev.1. The US Delegation Draft, State Practice Regarding Amnesties 
and Pardons. 
4 Scharf M. P. ‘The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’, 32 
Cornell International Law Journal (1999), 507, at 521-27;  Stahn C. ‘Complementarity, Amnesties 
and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal 
83 
 
non-prosecution on the basis of the ‘interests of justice’.5 In contrast, some insist 
that, due to the treaty nature of the Statute and the fact that it is pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention,
6
 the Statute should be interpreted in accordance with its main 
objective as proclaimed in its Preamble; one such scholar suggests that amnesty cannot 
be read into the Statute in light of its silence on this matter plus the nature and purpose of the 
Statute.
7
 Regardless of such opposing arguments, in order to explore whether or not 
national amnesties may bar the Court’s prosecution and what the real rules are, this 
study will look at the practice of the Court and how it has addressed this issue so far.  
The discussion of amnesty is divided into four sub-sections. The first of these 
sheds light on some of the difficulties regarding the debate concerning amnesties in 
the Statute, insofar as this concerns the idea of peace versus justice. There is no 
consensus or clear definitive answer that amnesty for core international crimes runs 
contrary to international law;
8
 but it does seem that there is strong though 
inconclusive support for the argument that international law is in fact violated by it.
9
 
It is not my intention to analyse in depth the concept of amnesty in terms of whether 
or not it should be granted for international crimes, but the question will be examined 
in brief in order to indicate its complexities. In the second sub-section the possibility 
of the recognition of amnesties in the Statute will be discussed. In this sub-section 
the attempt will be made to develop and highlight the argument concerning the 
conditions in which the ICC may recognise amnesties and how the Statute provides 
some room for amnesties in the theory and the practice of the Court. The theoretical 
aspect will be examined in the third sub-section, in which the arguments at the Rome 
                                                                                                                                     
Court’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 695,at 719-720;  Robinson D. ‘Serving the 
Interest of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court’, 14 
European Journal of International Law ( 2003), 481, at 488; Angermaier C. ‘The ICC and Amnesty: 
Can the Court Accommodate Model of Restorative Justice?’ Eyes on the ICC (2004), 131, at 144;  
Majzub D. ‘Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’, 3 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law (2002), 247, at 263-71;  Hafner G & et al. ‘A Response to the American View as 
Presented by Ruth Wedgwood’, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999), 108, at 108; Kerr 
R & E. Mobekk. Peace and Justice, Seeking Accountability after War (2007), at 71; Pensky M. 
‘Amnesty on Trial: impunity, accountability, and the norms of international law’, 1 Ethnics & Global 
Politics (2008),1, at 1; O’brien R. Supra note 1, at 270-271. 
5 Rome Statute Art. 53(1), (c), and 53(2), (c). 
6 See Art. 31 of the  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  UNTS. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2. (1969),   
(23 May 1969). 
7 Kourabas M. Kourabas M. ‘A Vienna Convention Interpretation of the “Interest of Justice” 
Provision of the Rome Statute, The Legality of Domestic Amnesty Agreements, and the Situation in 
Northern Uganda: A “Great Qualitative step forward,” or a Normative Retreat?’, 14 University of 
California, Davis (2008), 59 at 69.  
8 Pensky M.  Supra note 4, at 8.  
9 Cryer R.  Prosecuting International Crimes, Selectivity and the International Law Regime (2005), at 
108. 
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Conference concerning amnesty and the possible interpretations by scholars of the 
Articles which might be interpreted to allow for amnesty will be discussed. Particular 
attention will be paid to the fact that the Statute is silent on the issue and does not 
‘prohibit, discourage or encourage amnesties’,10 and the conclusions that may be 
drawn therefrom. 
In the fourth sub-section, which covers the practice of the Court, among the 
seven different situations so far being investigated by the ICC the Ugandan situation, 
which is most relevant to the question of amnesty, will be discussed. The Prosecutor 
in the Uganda case has stated that the national amnesty will not bar him from 
prosecution,
11
 so the question is raised as to whether this would be applicable to all 
similar cases or the decision of the Prosecutor could be different under different 
circumstances. The issue is whether the interpretation of the concept of the ‘interests 
of justice’ by the Prosecutor should concern justice as an abstract principle or should 
be one which allows the Prosecutor to recognise genuine amnesties which would 
help the peace building in a transnational society.  
The second major section of this Chapter deals with immunity in the Statute 
and the practice of the Court so far concerning immunity. Immunity in general has 
been regarded as a part of positive international law;
12
 immunity, whether ratione 
personae or ratione materiae, has also in particular been laid down in the Vienna 
Convention
13
 as a necessity for international relations and a protection for state 
officials, regardless of the relative strength of their respective states. However, the 
doctrine of state immunity has been restricted since the 19
th
 century onwards; in 
particular, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
14
 and the later ad hoc ICTY and 
ICTR,
15
 immunity for international crimes has been rejected absolutely.
16
 The Rome 
Statute, pursuant to the previous international tribunals and to customary 
international law, has rejected official immunity in Article 27, but in Article 98 
provides leeway for immunity agreements between states. The arguments concerning 
                                               
10 Freeman M. Supra note 1, at 75. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for instance, in Article 10 
precluded consideration of amnesty for the crimes within its jurisdiction. 
11  See below supra notes 119-121. 
12 Gardiner R. International Law (2003), at 34; Akande D. (2004), Supra note 1, at 409.  
13 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, UNTS 500 / 95 (1961). 
14 The Nuremberg Charter Art. 7. 
15 See Art. 7(1), and 23(1), of the ICTY’s and Art. 6(1), and 22(1), of the ICTR. 
16 Although in the Congo v. Belgium the ICJ has been divided between an office and out of office 
minister, but previous international tribunals rejected the immunity absolutely for the state’s officials, 
see generally Congo v. Belgium, Judgment (14 February 2012).     
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the possible conflict between Article 27 and Article 98 on this point will be discussed 
in this Chapter. 
I will attempt to shed some light on the possibility of recognition of immunity 
in the Statute. This does not mean that the ICC creates new forms of immunity in the 
Statute, but that it provides significant leeway for the recognition of immunity 
agreements which may bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over state 
officials.
17
 This study will then look at the practice of the Court so far. In this section 
the situation of Sudan in the ICC and the case of President Al-Bashir will be 
discussed. This case in fact indicates the complexities involved in the enforcement of 
ICL; on the one hand it exemplifies the most obvious non-recognition of the 
immunity of heads of state in the Statute by the Trial Chamber,
18
 and on the other 
hand it showcases the difficulties inherent in such prosecution of high authorities in 
practice, which has resulted in de facto impunity for Al-Bashir. Concerning his arrest 
warrant issued by the ICC, the question is why many states party and non-party to 
the Statute have been so reluctant to co-operate with the Court, and what the reason 
is for their non-compliance with the ICC.
19
 It will be argued that, although the trend 
of the international criminal law, in particular in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, 
has been towards the non-recognition or limitation of officials’ immunity from 
prosecution for international crimes, it is still a complicated issue involving in 
practice a conflict between the general principle of international law of respecting the 
immunity of state officials, on the one hand, and the principle of international 
criminal law rejecting immunity, on the other. The dilemmas and challenges 
confronting the Court Prosecutor are ongoing in this case. 
The first part of this section will consider, as preliminary matters, a brief 
definition of states’ national immunity legislation and the different types of 
immunities under customary international law. In the second part, immunity in 
theory under the Rome Statute and the possible contradiction between Article 27, 
and Article 98 (1) which may lead to impunity, will be examined; while an 
                                               
17 Paulus A L. ‘Legalist Groundwork for the International Criminal Court: Commentaries on the 
Statute of the International Criminal Courts’, 14 European Journal of International Law (2003), 843, 
at 856. 
18 Pre‐Trial Chamber I, found that the current position of Omar Al Bashir as Head of a State not a 
party to the Statute has no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction over this case. 
19 Malawi, which is a state party, in order to justify its non-cooperation in the case of Al-Bashir, 
officially declared to the ICC that the Article 27 of the Statute is not applicable for non-party heads of 
state (i.e. Al-Bashir). Article 98 (1), has also been raised in connection with this case; see the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09-139 (12/12/ 2011), at 11 Para 17.  
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assessment of immunity in the practice of the Court will be made in the third and 
final section, which will highlight the case of most relevant to immunity in the 
practice of the Court, i.e. that concerning the situation in Sudan and President Al-
Bashir.  
3.1. General discussion concerning amnesties for international crimes   
There is a controversial debate as to whether or not granting amnesty for 
international crimes is compatible with international law much of which concerns the 
apparently competing demands of ‘peace’ and ‘justice’. To balance between the 
demands of retributive justice and ‘restorative justice’ such as amnesties in cases in 
which prosecution may threaten the peace and reconciliation process or exacerbate 
the dangers of military or other force being used is a real dilemma, and there are 
forceful arguments being made by scholars on both sides of the debate.  
Proponents of criminal prosecutions argue that granting amnesty to those 
who have committed heinous international crimes or violated human rights law is 
not compatible with the objective of world order.
20
 They use variety of arguments, 
including ethical, moral and policy approaches, to contend that trials must be 
conducted by transitional societies seeking to address a legacy of human rights 
abuses.
21
 They affirm that such trials would provide intrinsic benefits to a 
democratic government because they enhance and promote the rule of law and 
enhance the intrinsic dignity of individuals.
22
 This is because the rule of law is 
integral to democracy itself; some supporters of retributive justice argue that 
criminal trials are essential in order to reinforce democratic governments and 
maintain popular support for them.
23
 Failure to prosecute may result in the 
devaluation of the rule of law in that society.  
The second major argument made by advocates of prosecution is this may act as 
a deterrent against future violations and helps to prevent a repetition of those 
                                               
20 See Joinet L. & Guisse H. Study on the Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Violation of Human 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/1993/6 (19 July 1993), they considered that amnesty should not be 
granted for crimes against humanity. See Also, Committee on Human rights, concerning prohibition 
of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7), CCPR, General Comment No. 20 (1992), 
declared that: ‘The Committee has noted that some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of 
torture. Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts;…’. See 
also Sterio M. Supra note 1, at 373. 
21 Id. See also Landsman S.  ‘Alternative Response to Serious Human Rights Abuse: Of Prosecution 
and Truth Commission’,  59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996), 81 at 83. 
22 Orentlicher D.  Supra note 1, at 2542. 
23 Id, at 2543; see also Majzub D. Supra note 4, at 250. 
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crimes.
24
 This acts as a specific deterrent for perpetrators and a general deterrent for 
society, sending a strong message to society that perpetrators of crimes will face 
punishment.
25
 Orentlicher notes that, if the law is not able to punish pervasive recent 
brutality, it will not be able to compel the exercise of restraint in the future.
26
 The 
failure to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses brings about contempt 
for the rule of law and promotes future criminal actions.
27
 Prosecution can also 
improve the development of international norms.
28
 Additionally, prosecution’s 
importance as a public forum where the facts can be determined cannot be 
underestimated. It is true that the fact-finding nature of these trials helps to educate 
the public as to the extent of the wrongdoing.
29
 Generally, investigation, prosecution, 
and a fair trial help to find the reality of atrocities and to place those who had 
principal roles in the commission of crimes or in supporting, aiding and abetting 
criminals in front of the public.   
The third major advantage given for prosecution is that trials provide for the 
accountability of the criminals before their victims. This provides the victims of 
abuse and their families with a sense of justice, so that their grievances can be put to 
rest. This sense of justice will help to dissipate the desire for revenge on the part of 
victims, and their calls for retribution.
30
 As Landsman notes, ‘society cannot forgive 
what it cannot punish.’31 In addition, they insist that prosecuting violations of human 
rights abuses has become an affirmative obligation for states by customary 
international law and a variety of international instruments, including treaties and 
conventions.
32
 The prosecution may also facilitate the rehabilitation of victims and 
the social shame or stigmatisation of perpetrators in society.
33
 
                                               
24 Correa G. Supra note 1, at 1456. See Roht-Arriaza N. ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and 
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 California Law Review 
(1990),449, at 482;  Landsman S. Supra not 21, at 83. 
25 Freeman M. Supra note 1, at 21. 
26 Orentlicher D. Supra note 1, at 2537. 
27 Scharf Michael P. Supra note 4, at 513. 
28 Sterio M.  Supra note 1, at 376-377. 
29 Koskenniemi M. ‘Between Impunity and Show Trial’, Max Plank UNYB (2002), 6, at 3, 4, 18 and 
31; see also generally, Shapira A. ‘The Eichmann Trial: Changing Perspectives’, 23 The Journal of 
Israeli History (2004),18; Daniel Han S.W. ‘The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty’, 
12 Auckland University Law Review (2006), 97. 
30 Cassese A. ‘On the Current Trend towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998), 2 at 6.  
31 Landsman S. Supra note 21, at 84. 
32 E.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UNTS78 / 
277(1948); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, UNTS 1465/ 85 (1984), also international treaties which, although not referring directly 
to a state’s duty to prosecute, do recognise for individuals the right of remedy when their rights have 
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However, through the development of restorative justice in the form of 
conditional amnesties, truth commissions and redress towards the end of the 
twentieth century, it has become increasingly clear that retributive justice is not a 
natural or inevitable response, but a social choice in the national judiciary system of 
national courts.
34
 Insofar as alternative ways of confronting human rights abuses are 
concerned, some nations have employed an approach which has often been described 
as the ‘truth commission’,35 or ‘truth and reconciliation commission’. Such 
commissions have been used many times in the last two decades, and played an 
important role as an alternative form of justice in countries such as South Africa, 
Uruguay, and Chad.
36
 In South Africa, for instance, conditional amnesty, which was 
based on public confession, comprised a very real punishment of the criminals.
37
 
The advocates of amnesties argue that punishment may be viewed as a backward-
looking exercise in retribution, rather than as the renewal of the rule of law.
38
 They 
have preferred to forego prosecutions because of practical considerations, issues of 
legitimacy, and questions concerning the utility of prosecutions, as follows. 
Firstly, practical considerations which may dissuade judicial authorities, whether 
national or international, from prosecution include the inability of the judicial system 
to bring a powerful defendant to justice who is often an integral part of an intact 
military, capable of bringing down the government if threatened.
39
At other times, 
there has been a lack of popular national or international support for the pursuit of 
the criminals, which may lead to the continuation of conflict, as happened in Uganda 
after intervention by the ICC.
40
 There are often difficulties with evidence gathering, 
or the prosecution may be rendered impossible because of the broad range of 
criminals who participated in the crimes committed.
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
been infringed; for examples of these latter, see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNTS 999/171(1966), and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No.11 and 14 
(1950).    
33 Freeman M. Supra note 1, at 21. 
34 Johnstone G. Restorative Justice, Ideas, Values, Debates (2002), at 7.  
35 Landsman S. Supra note 21, at 82. 
36 Id.  
37 Blumenson E. ‘The Challenge of the Global Standard of Justice: Peace Pluralism, and Punishment 
in the International Criminal Court’, 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2006), 801, at 869. 
38 Majzub D. Supra note 4, at 250. 
39 Correa G. Supra note 1, at 1463. The Chile case after Pinochet is one of the clearly example of this 
point.  
40 Allen, T. Trial Justice (2006), at 3 and 87. 
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Secondly, there may be issues related to the legitimacy and impartiality of the 
body or persons prosecuting the crimes. There are often questions of the neutrality of 
the prosecutors and their bias, particularly in international conflicts, but also in intra-
state conflicts; and these can mean, in some circumstances, that the prosecution 
would be viewed as a form of ‘victor’s justice’ or one-sided court.41 It might further 
cause problems in fully reintegrating the society, if it would destroy a fragile 
compromise.
42
  
Thirdly, there may be policy reasons against proceeding with prosecutions. 
Many of the great religions of the world have accepted that ‘an eye for an eye’ is an 
unacceptable type of justice as it creates a continuous and never-ending cycle of 
violence. In contrast, ‘turning the other cheek’ may help to break that cycle and aid 
in establishing lasting peace.
43
 
The advocates of amnesties see this as a matter of ‘balancing’ one against the 
other, and in the process are forced to demarcate between, on the one hand, ‘normal’ 
(or alternatively ‘egregious’) criminal behaviour for which punishment is deserved, 
and the ‘special’ criminal behaviour that is deserving of amnesties for the promotion 
of social harmony.
44
 The advocates of prosecution, by contrast, are forced to equate 
social harmony with peace and good order, blinding themselves to the partial 
character of the justice that might arise as a consequence. How to balance between 
the demands of justice and amnesty when prosecution may threaten the peace and 
reconciliation process or exacerbate the dangers of military or other force comprises 
an issue to which no one has been able to provide an overall acceptable solution, and 
perhaps there is no perfect solution and it is in fact impossible to balance the one 
against the other.
45
 Certainly, these problems appear to be extremely awkward in 
some societies. As Pensky also rightly argued, there is no clear, definitive answer to 
the question as to whether amnesty for international crimes runs contrary to 
international law;
46
 yet it seems that there is strong, albeit not conclusive, support for 
the argument that it does in fact violate international law.
47
  
                                               
41 The ‘victor justice’ has been discussed in Chapter II. 
42 Landsman S. Supra note 21, at 85. 
43 Id,  at 87.  
44 Orentlicher D. Supra note 1, at 2537.  
45 Id, at 2539. 
46 Pensky M. Supra note 4, at 1.  
47 Cryer R. (2005), Supra note 9, at 108. 
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 Those on each side of the debate on justice versus peace (or, alternatively, no 
justice and no peace) have argued that reconciliation can only be attained through 
their own particular approach.
48
 What is evident, however, is that amnesties may 
come to represent a form of impunity – a way of exonerating certain individuals from 
punishment for criminal acts – and, to that extent, represent an exception to the rule 
of prosecution which appears to be the mainstay of international criminal law and the 
explicit rationale for the creation of an International Criminal Court. With regard to 
the ICC, such debates crystallise around the issue as to whether or not it should 
recognise domestic amnesties.    
3.2. Arguments regarding amnesty and prosecution under the Rome Statute 
The debate regarding the possible recognition of amnesties for the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Statute is also a controversial one. Although the issue of how the 
ICC should deal with national amnesties and reconciliation efforts was raised in the 
Preparatory Committee
49
 and at the Rome Conference,
50
 it was not explicitly dealt 
with in the Rome Statute.
51
During the preparatory meeting some delegations 
expressed the strong view that prosecution was the sole appropriate response for 
perpetrators of international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction; many NGOs and 
advocates of human rights such as Amnesty International also asserted strongly that 
amnesty should not be granted to perpetrators of international crimes.
52
Other 
delegations, however, such as the US delegation, expressed concern that the ICC 
would hinder efforts to put a stop to human rights violations and reinstate peace and 
democracy in countries like South Africa, Guatemala, and Haiti.
53
   
                                               
48 Majzub D. Supra note 4, at 250.  
49 See the Preparatory Committee August 1997, the US Delegation Draft, State Practice Regarding 
Amnesties and Pardons. Supra note 3, at 2-5.  
50 Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (15June-17July1998),Vol, II, at 168, Para 101 and at 216 Para 38.The UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/13. 
51 Roht-Arriaza N. (2000), Supra note 1, at 79; Robinson D. ‘Serving the Interest of Justice: 
Amnesties, Truth Commissions, and the International Criminal Court’, in J. Harrington, M. Milde, 
and R. Vernon (eds), Bringing Power to Justice? The Prospects of the International Criminal Court 
(2006), 210 at 211; Gropengieber H. ‘Amnesties and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court’, 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005), 267, at 280-290. 
52 See Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: Comments on the 
concept of the interests of justice, Amnesty International (17 June 2005), AI Index: IOR 40/023/2005. 
53 Preparatory Committee for Establishment of the international Criminal Court (1997), Supra note 3, 
The US Delegation Draft, State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons.  
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Accordingly, the issue was not ultimately resolved during the Rome 
Conference.
54 
Some have stated that during the Preparatory Committee on the 
Statute, the issue of how to deal with amnesties was never seriously discussed 
because of pressure from human rights groups.
55
 Rather than an explicit reference to 
amnesty, the adopted provisions bear evidence of creative ambiguity via their silence 
on this issue; Philippe Kirsch, the chair of the Preparatory Commission who became 
the ICC’s first president, asserted that the Rome Statute deliberately reflects a 
‘creative ambiguity that could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of the ICC 
to interpret the Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty or asylum 
exception to the jurisdiction of the court.’56  
One author suggests that the ambiguity may have been deliberate in order that 
the Court be able to respect national amnesties.
57
 But it is equally clear that the 
absence of explicit recognition may also be construed as a general prohibition. The 
literature on the subject, indeed, demonstrates this interpretive ambiguity. Scholars 
such as Scharf and Stahn insist that the Statute provides some leeway for the judges 
of the ICC to recognise amnesties;
58
 Scharf asserts that this is an exception to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
59
 On this view, it is significant for the ICC to be able to 
balance the needs of a society in a transitional situation with the requirement of 
prosecution under international law.
60
 
Others, however, insist that the Statute does not recognise amnesties and that the 
Statute, as a treaty pursuant to the Vienna Convention, should be interpreted in the 
light of its main objective, which is the prosecution of international crimes.
61
 On this 
view, it is argued that the states party to the Statute have the obligation to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators who have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
                                               
54  See the UN Diplomatic Conference, supra not 50, at 214-217, 71 Para, 117, and at 168, Para 101. 
55 Arsanjani M H. ‘The International Court and National Amnesty Law’, 93 American Society of 
International Law (1999), 65, at 67. Also, the daily debate during the Rome Conference indicates that 
the issue of amnesties was never independently discussed at the Conference, see Id.  
56 Scharf M. Supra note 4, at 522. Professor Scharf in this Article states that he discussed this issue 
with Philippe Kirsch over dinner during an international conference in Strasbourg, France, on 
November 19, 1998.   
57 Angermaier C. Supra note 4, at 144. 
58 Scharf M. P. Ibid, at 521-27; Stahn C. Supra note 4, at 719-720; Robinson D. (2003), Supra note 4, 
at 488; Angermaier C. Ibid, at 144; Majzub D. Supra note 4, at 263-71; Newman D.G. ‘The Rome 
Statute Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Reform’, 20 American 
University International Law Review (2004-5), 293, at 316-320, and etc.  
59 Scharf M.P.  Ibid. 
60 Stahn C. Supra note 4, at 718.  
61 Kourabas M. Supra note 7, at 69.  
92 
 
Court.
62
 It is stated that the Rome Statute not only affirmed states’ duty to prosecute 
such perpetrators, but also established their initial duty, with primacy over the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, to prosecute criminals in their own national courts.
63
 Furthermore, it is 
occasionally argued that there are also duties under customary international law to 
prosecute, which apply to states whether party or non-party to the Statute.
64
 
By contrast to the above arguments regarding the obligation of state parties to 
prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Statute, Freeman addresses this 
ambiguity as regards amnesty in considering the question as to ‘whether the treaty 
creates an obligation on states parties to prosecute the crimes falling under its 
jurisdiction.’ In response to this he states that ‘there is no explicit aut dedere aut 
judicare requirement in the treaty’.65 Freeman concludes that, because of the ‘gravity 
threshold’ and the rules on the admissibility of cases in the Statute, it in fact ‘limits 
the obligation imposed on states parties’.66 It would appear that this argument rightly 
indicates the fact that the ICC was not designed to prosecute all crimes within its 
jurisdiction, but that the rules on the admissibility of cases limit the cases which can 
be brought before the Court. This limitation is one of the reasons, as I will discuss 
later on in this Chapter, for the inevitability of the possibility of domestic amnesties 
being offered not in good in practice. However, I think a point missing from 
Freeman’s analysis is related to the ‘gravity threshold’, as this is ambiguous too; the 
Statute did not define the required gravity, or even what sort of measure would 
determine the gravity (whether the number of victims is significant or the nature of 
the crimes). In this regard, the ICC’s Prosecutor’s proprio moto investigation in 
Kenya raises criticism regarding the number of victims. However, in the practice of 
the ICC, neither the Office of the Prosecutor nor the judges have indicated that the 
number of victims would determine the gravity. Concerning such ambiguity in the 
Statute, the Prosecutor’s policy paper defines the gravity,67 and in one sense this 
could be seen as indicating the ‘real rule’ on the matter, although from another point 
of view one could rightly argue that the judges of the Court’s Chambers are not 
obliged to follow such a definition as given by the Office of the Prosecutor. 
                                               
62 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
63 Rome Statute Art. 1 and 17. 
64 Angermaier C. Supra note 4, at 140-145.  
65 Freeman M. Supra note 1, at 76. 
66 Id. 
67 Policy Paper on the Interest of justice, ICC-OTP-Interests Of Justice (2007), at 5, it provides ‘[i]n 
determining whether the situation is of sufficient gravity, the Office considers the scale of the crimes, 
the nature of the crimes, the manner of their commission and their impact.’ 
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It should be noted that the Statute is silent about amnesties, however, concerning 
the possibility that the ICC may admit national amnesties.
68
 Concerning amnesties, 
then, the overall question is how amnesties for international crimes are related to 
impunity and whether amnesties provide impunity; if the answer is yes, the question 
then becomes one as to whether granting amnesties for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Statute is consistent with the Statute or whether amnesties represent an 
exception.  
At the outset, it has to be noted that the extent to which amnesties are consistent 
with the prohibition of impunity depends initially upon the construction given to 
impunity itself.  If, as has already been noted, impunity is to be conceived strictly-
speaking as an ‘escape from punishment’ then any grant of amnesty would 
presumably constitute an authorisation of impunity. If, however, impunity were to be 
conceived more broadly as an ‘escape from justice’ and justice, in turn, understood 
to be capable of being delivered by non-judicial forms of accountability, then it does 
not necessarily follow that the granting of an amnesty would be inconsistent with the 
prohibition on impunity. Much would depend, in that sense, upon the circumstances 
in which the amnesty was granted. In that context, the granting of a conditional 
amnesty such as that provided by the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) after confession might well be construed as a real punishment 
and hence not a violation of the prohibition on impunity.
69
 But yet in other cases, if 
the amnesty were simply granted without any accompanying process of truth-finding 
or confession, an accusation of impunity would be difficult to avoid. 
3.3. Potential for the consistency of some amnesties with the Rome Statute 
There are three principal situations indicated in the Statute in which the grant of an 
amnesty might serve to exempt prosecution.  These are: i) in the case of a decision 
not to initiate an investigation by the Prosecutor under Articles 53(1) and 53(2) in 
order to serve the interests of justice; ii) in the case of a decision of non-admissibility 
in view of the principle of complementary jurisdiction under Article 17(1) (a) and 
(b) and iii) when  a person who has received an amnesty from a national court might 
also be in a position to claim the principle of ne bis in idem before the ICC.
70
  
                                               
68 Id; see also the section below.  
69 Blumenson E. Supra note 37, at 869. 
70 The Rome Statute Art. 20. 
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3.3.1. Not prosecuting (granting amnesty) in order to serve the interests of  
  justice in Article 53(1) (c) and 53(2) (c) 
The concept of ‘interests of justice’ in Article 53 is one of the most complex aspects 
of the Statute; it potentially provides room for the evaluation of amnesties and 
alternative forms of justice by the ICC’s Prosecutor.71 Article 53(1) (c) provides that 
the Prosecutor should consider whether ‘taking into account the gravity of the crime 
and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that 
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice’. The same consideration 
arises again under Article 53(2) (c) which provides for the case in which 
‘prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age 
or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime’.72 
Although the exact content of the ‘interests of justice’ has not been defined in the 
Rome Statute
73
 the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper in 2007 highlighted some of the 
complexities involved. It provides that even when the jurisdiction and admissibility 
requirements have been satisfied, the Prosecutor may nevertheless not prosecute on 
the basis of the interests of justice.
74
 However, the paper insists ‘that the exercise of 
the Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c ) is exceptional in its 
nature and that there is a presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution…the 
criteria for its exercise will naturally be guided by the objects and purposes of the 
Statute’,75 which are prosecution and ending impunity.  
A fundamental question in the above Article is whether the notion of ‘interests of 
justice’ is bound up only with the interests of criminal justice or whether the broader 
concerns of ‘justice’ can also be considered. The Prosecutor’s policy paper of 2007 
explicitly states that the concept of justice implied is broader than criminal justice 
and may countenance mechanisms such as truth seeking and reparations 
                                               
71 The Prosecutor can investigate on three different bases. Firstly, on the basis of a referral of a 
situation to Prosecutor by a State Party, in accordance with Art. 13(a), and 14. Secondly, on a referral 
of a situation by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, under 
Art. 13(b), and thirdly, the investigation may be based on an independent initiation of an investigation 
by the Prosecutor, which has been authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court under Art. 13(3), 
and (15). 
72 Rome Statute Art.  53 (2), (c).  
73 Bergsmo M & Kruger P. ‘Investigation and Prosecution’, in O. Triffterer and C.H. Beck (eds), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Court (2008),1065, at 1072.                                           
74 See the Policy Paper on the Interest of justice. Supra note 67, at 2-3. 
75 Id, at 1.   
95 
 
programmes.
76
  Freeman argues that ‘the interest-of-justice test reads like an escape 
clause for the OTP. It is a guarantee of prosecutorial diplomacy, built into the Rome 
Statute.’77 
Although the Prosecutor’s paper did not explicitly mention amnesty, I would 
argue that, via non-exclusion of concepts of justice beyond criminal justice, the 
Prosecutor has in fact recognised it. In particular, the paper addresses the role of the 
ICC as part of a comprehensive solution which also includes political and security 
elements.
78
 It might be said that amnesties in a peace and reconciliation process may 
fall into this comprehensive solution. Concerning the political power to suspend an 
investigation pursuant to Article 53 where that investigation might interfere with 
political negotiations between different parties in an armed conflict, Amnesty 
International warned the Prosecutor that he does not have the political power to do 
so: ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ and ‘it would demoralize and endanger victims 
and witnesses; seriously undermine any resumed investigation and the morale of 
investigators and prosecutors…’79 Amnesty International added that any political 
decision to suspend an investigation on the grounds that it could hinder international 
peace and security is a matter for the SC and not the ICC’s Prosecutor.80 
In actual fact, there is no case so far in which the Prosecutor has decided on non-
prosecution based on the interests of justice. Nevertheless, since the meaning of the 
‘interests of justice’ in the above Article not only may involve criminal justice, but 
justice in a broader sense, the Prosecutor ‘might invoke the concept of interests to 
justify departures from classical prosecution based on both amnesties and alternative 
methods of providing justice.’81 It is, however, true that, for such a substantial 
decision, the Statute provides for a review of the decision of the Prosecutor by Pre-
Trial Chamber, which, ‘on its own initiative’, may even obligate the Prosecutor to 
pursue the investigations or prosecutions.
82
 A decision not to prosecute by the 
Prosecutor (under the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber) on the grounds of the 
‘interests of justice’, when this is given a broad interpretation that includes non-
retributive forms of justice and even amnesties when such are granted by the State 
                                               
76 Id, at 8.  
77  Freeman M. Supra note 1, at 86. 
78 The Policy Paper. Ibid, at 8.  
79 Amnesty International, Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: 
Comments on the concept of the interests of justice, AI Index: IOR 40/023/2005 (17 June 2005). 
80 Id.  
81 Stahn C. Supra note 4, at 596. 
82 Rome Statute Art. 53(3), (b). 
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Parties, implies that an exception from criminal prosecution would take place in 
those situations. The ICC may thereby recognise an exception or exemption from 
prosecution, and Article 53 (1) (c) Rome Statute has provided for such exceptions.   
The ‘interests of justice’ has not been defined in the Statute; the phrase was used 
by various drafters of the Rome Statute at the Rome Conference, but with various 
intended meanings. Some delegations at the Rome Conference intended the ‘interests 
of justice’ to refer to the interests of victims;83 others, who expressed reservations 
about including the phrase in the Rome Statute, perceived it as giving the Prosecutor 
an arbitrary right to stop or suspend a case whenever he or she determined that this 
‘would serve the interest of justice’.84 The Office of the Prosecutor, in definition of 
the ‘interests of justice’, has provided as follows in a policy paper: ‘[t]he 
interpretation of the concept of “interests of justice” should be guided by the ordinary 
meaning of the words in the light of their context and the objects and purpose of the 
Statute’.85 The policy paper mentions the preamble of the Statute in reference to the 
main purpose of the ICC, which is the prosecution of perpetrators; however, it does 
not limit the ‘interests of justice’ to retributive justice alone, but declares that the 
‘justice’ referred to in the Rome Statute is ‘broader than criminal justice in a narrow 
sense’.86 Thus, it seems that although amnesties do not explicitly appear in the text of 
the Statute, the Prosecutor may recognise national amnesties. This policy paper from 
the Prosecutor’s Office suggests a different approach is being taken than that of those 
who assert that retributive justice for the international crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC should be only the possible response by the Court. 
3.3.2. Amnesty in relation to the complementarity principle 
The principle of complementarity, as spelt out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute may 
also provide grounds for the exemption from prosecution by way of amnesty. In the 
first place, it is clear that complementarity in the Rome Statute means that national 
courts effectively have priority of jurisdiction over that of the ICC.
87
 The ICC has to 
defer to the jurisdiction of national courts and may step in only in case of inability or 
                                               
83 Rome Conference Vol, II, supra note 50, at 99, Para 48 and Vol, III, at 43, Para 6.   
84 Id, Vol, II, at 302, Para 137 and at 359, Para 45, for instance Mr Al-Sheikh from Syria insisted that 
‘his delegation’s reservations regarding the provisions in article 54 allowing the Prosecutor to stop an 
investigation in the supposed interests of justice’, and Vol, III, at 241, Para 3. 
85 See Policy Paper on the Interest of justice. Supra note 67, at4. 
86 Id, at 8.  
87 See Art. 1, 17(1), (a), and the Preamble of the Statute. 
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unwillingness to prosecute.
88
 By this principle governing the non-admissibility of a 
case, therefore, a State Party can raise the issue in accordance with Article 17(1) (a) 
of the Statute and claim that a case has already been investigated or prosecuted in the 
national courts. The critical issue is in the meaning of the term ‘investigation’ in this 
Article. The Article requires an investigation, but it does not explicitly declare that it 
must be a ‘criminal investigation’.89 The term could also be interpreted by the ICC’s 
Prosecutor to include a non-criminal investigation.
90
 Thus a concerned State Party 
could argue that a non-criminal investigation such as a truth commission also 
amounts to a genuine investigation.
91
 
A significant issue regarding Article 17 is the conditions under which a decision 
by a national court not to prosecute may be taken to have been made on legitimate 
grounds on the one hand or as a consequence of unwillingness or inability to 
prosecute on the other hand. In cases where a state shows inability or unwillingness 
to prosecute, the ICC would thereby have jurisdiction over the case; but the practical 
issue is one of how the ICC should go about assessing whether a given instance of 
non-prosecution was on legitimate grounds or not, given that the ICC does not have 
any observers national trials who could assess national decisions. In making such 
assessments the ICC needs to consider, inter alia, whether the concerned state had 
intent to shield perpetrators from justice
92
 by granting amnesties or using other 
means of non-prosecution. This test is a rigorous one for the ICC, especially where 
alternative forms of justice such as reconciliation are accompanied by amnesties. 
Altogether there are three different possible scenarios with regard to the question of 
whether a state will prosecute or will grant an amnesty: a state may commit itself to 
genuine prosecutions; it may offer a blanket amnesty; or it may offer a conditional 
amnesty.
93
   
The first of these, genuine targeted prosecution by a state, is not completely 
relevant to this section. However, the court should ensure that such prosecutions 
include those who are most responsible, and do not deal only with low-ranking 
perpetrators; otherwise the situation would definitely lead to impunity, which will be 
                                               
88 Id, Art. 17. 
89 Id, Art. 17. 
90 Robinson  D. (2006), Supra note 51, at 226; Scharf M. P. Supra note 4, at 525; Majzub D. Supra 
note 4, at 267-268; Stahn C. Supra note 4, at 696. 
91 A state E.g. could refer such decision to the Art.17 of the Rome Statute. 
92 See the Rome Statute Art. 17 (2), and (3). 
93 Id, Art. 17 (2). 
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examined later on in this thesis. The second situation is the blanket amnesty: it is 
hard to see how states granting blanket amnesties would ever satisfy the 
complementarity test of the Court. These kinds of amnesties may be offered without 
investigation; in some instances the investigations would be done by a truth 
commission, without any prosecuting authority under the enabling legislation. 
Moreover, such legislation may be enacted as a result of unwillingness or inability to 
prosecute, thus tending to shield perpetrators from prosecutions and justice. That this 
kind of amnesty clearly leads to impunity means that the ICC has a responsibility to 
distinguish between acceptable amnesties from mere non-prosecutions by State 
Parties – a task which would be fraught with difficulties. The third instance is that of 
the conditional amnesty: this is where a truth and reconciliation commission is 
authorised to grant amnesties on a case-by-case basis. To the extent that the process 
for granting this kind of amnesty retains the authority of the state to exercise the 
option to prosecute where appropriate, it would easily satisfy the complementarity 
test.
94
 Indeed, it might be argued that through conditional amnesty the perpetrator 
suffers real punishment.
95
 South Africa modelled this kind of amnesty, through 
confession by perpetrators. Consequently, it would be open to the Prosecutor to 
conclude that a conditional amnesty combined with a truth and reconciliation 
procedure conforms to the requirement of a state investigation stipulated under 
Article 17(1) (a) thereby excluding the need for concomitant ICC proceedings. The 
Pre-Trial Chamber may, in this situation, review the admissibility standards applied 
by the Prosecutor in its judgment concerning the acceptability of alternative forms of 
justice if it had been requested by a state making a referral under Article 14 or upon 
request by the Security Council.  
3.3.3. Amnesty related to the principle of ne bis in idem before the ICC 
During the preliminary negotiations leading to the establishment of the Statute of the 
ICC, a proposal was put forward as follows:  
Without prejudice to article 18, a person who has been tried by another court for 
conduct also proscribed under article 5 may be tried by the Court if a manifestly 
unfounded decision on the suspension of the enforcement of a sentence or on a 
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95 Blumenson E. Supra note 37, at 869. 
99 
 
pardon, a parole or a commutation of the sentence excludes the application of any 
appropriate form of penalty.
 96
 (Emphasis added) 
 
The question here was whether the granting of an amnesty or pardon by a 
national court would be such as to give rise to the application of the principle ne bis 
in idem for purposes of international criminal liability
97
 This proposal was one of the 
most controversial parts of the negotiations about the ne bis in idem principle.
98
 The 
proposal was finally abandoned, but a consequence of these negotiations was the fact 
that the participators (‘like-minded countries’) in the Rome Conference were aware 
that the principle of ne bis in idem had a relationship to amnesty proceedings.  
Some delegations who related the ne bis in idem principle to the pardons and 
amnesties suggested the court be allowed to try a person previously convicted if that 
person was subsequently pardoned and paroled.
99
 In contrast, many delegations from 
the so-called ‘like-minded countries’100 argued that the Statute should not allow the 
Court to intervene in the administrative processes (i.e. the granting of parole) or the 
political decision-making process (i.e. pardons and amnesties) of a state.
101
 On the 
other hand, some argued that the proposal was not absolutely necessary, because the 
Court, due to the provisions on admissibility and the complementarity principle, 
already had sufficient power to examine those cases of pardons or amnesties which 
were made in bad faith by state parties. 
In the end, the participants in the Rome Conference agreed on the ne bis idem 
principle in the Rome Statute without explicitly referring to the pardons and 
amnesties in Article 20 (2) and (3) which provide:  
No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for 
which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court. 3. No 
person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 
6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct… 
 
As the above Article stipulates, no one should be tried and punished twice for 
‘the same conduct’ by ‘another court’. The question then arises as to what the 
                                               
96 See Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
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97 Holmes T. J. ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, in Roy S Lee (eds), The International Criminal 
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98 See Diplomatic Conference. Ibid, at 240, and Vol, II, at 102-115. 
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meaning is of the same conviction or punishment. As far as some proponents were 
concerned, a confession before a truth commission, for example, might be construed 
as a form of penalty, redress or reparation by a national court, such that it would 
constitute the functional equivalent of having been tried and convicted for the same 
offence were they to be charged by the ICC.
102
 The question arises also as to how the 
Court should deal with such situations. It is apparent that there are at least two 
dimensions to such a question. The first is that Article 20 of the Statute speaks about 
a trial by ‘another court’, in which circumstances it is arguable that such truth 
commissions are not the equivalent of a ‘court’ for such purposes. The second 
dimension is that the principle ne bis in idem in the Statute should not apply to a 
prosecution where it is ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice’.103 This problem would become greater where the granting of amnesties 
under cover of national legislation took an unconditional form and where the intent 
was such as to shield the accused from international prosecution. Generally, the 
ICC’s prosecutor has the right to either reject or accept those amnesties; but the 
question still remains as to whether the ICC can deal in the same way with amnesties 
that are the product of national legislation rather than as a matter of prosecutorial 
discretion. In either case the ne bis in idem principle provides a right for the accused 
to claim these amnesties, and it would not be easy for the ICC to make a decision in 
order to distinguish between an inadequate amnesty and an amnesty arranged to 
serve both the interest of justice and peace.   
3.4. Amnesty in the practice of the ICC 
The ICC has opened investigations into situations in seven different countries so 
far,
104
 and the Uganda situation is the one that is the most relevant to this section.
105
 
As was discussed in Chapter One regarding legal realism, the real rules are to be 
found in the practice and decisions of the Court and its administrative body. Hence, 
the jurisprudence of the Court in the Uganda situation will clarify what the policy of 
the ICC concerning amnesties has been in practice so far.  
                                               
102 Scharf  Michael P. Supra note 4, at 525; Gropengieber H. Supra note 43, at 285-286. 
103 Rome Statute Art. 20. 
104 It includes situations in Uganda, Congo, Darfur Sudan, Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya 
and Cote d’Ivoire. See the ICC’s website at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/(Acessed 28/02/2012).  
105 It should be considered that this section is not a complete case study, I seek here merely to 
integrate the current policy of the Court into the controversial debates on amnesties.  
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The Uganda situation was the first referral of a situation to the ICC; the referral 
was made by the president Yoweri Museveni in 2003.
106
 The conflict in Uganda had 
persisted for almost two decades, and civilians in northern Uganda had been attacked 
regularly by the LRA insurgent group.
107
 The ICC, in its summary of the background 
situation in Uganda, provides:   
[The LRA has been directing attacks against both the [Uganda People’s Defence 
Force] UPDF and [defence units] LDUs and against the civilian population; that, in 
pursuing its goals, the LRA has engaged in a cycle of violence and established a 
pattern of “brutalization of civilians” by acts including murder, abduction, sexual 
enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp 
settlements and that abducted civilians, including children, are said to have been 
forcibly “recruited” as fighters, porters and sex slaves to serve the LRA and to 
contribute to attacks against the Ugandan army and civilian communities.
108
 
 
After the referral by President Museveni in January 2004,
109
 the Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno de Ocampo in a press conference at Kampala, Uganda, announced the 
initiation of a formal investigation in Northern Uganda.
110
Pursuant to the 
Prosecutor’s investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants against 
five top members of the LRA, including the alleged Commander in Chief, Joseph 
Kony, in 2005.
111
Kony is still at large and devastating the Ugandan people and 
neighbouring countries, such as the DRC; in fact, four suspects’ arrest warrants are 
outstanding to date.
112
 The Prosecutor has been clear that he has no intention of 
withdrawing the arrest warrant against the LRA leaders or negotiating with their 
representatives.
113
In 2011 the SC condemned the ongoing attacks by the LRA and 
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112 The Statement by the Office of the Prosecutor, LRA warrants now outstanding for four years, Press 
releases ICC-OTP-20090708-PR434 (08/07/2009). 
113 The Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor on Uganda ICC-OTP-ST20080304 (4 March 2008).  
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encouraged all states to cooperate with the ICC in implementing its arrest warrants 
against the LRA leaders.
114
 
The Ugandan president, notwithstanding his referral to the ICC, has several 
times publicly offered a general amnesty for the LRA. The decision by the Court not 
to respect such an amnesty after the issuing of the arrest warrants became 
problematic. The Ugandans passed a law and provided that the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC should be prosecuted before the International Crimes Division 
(ICD) of the High Court in Uganda.
115
The establishment of the ICD attracted human 
rights advocates and it was a novel development of the ICC’s positive 
complementarity, which is ostensibly intended to encourage domestic prosecution of 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thomas Kwoyelo was the first LRA officer 
who was prosecuted before the Ugandan Court (ICD) and charged for counts of 
crimes such as wilful killing, hostage-taking, etc.; he was arrested in 2009. 
Kwoyelo’s defence lawyers referred his case to the Ugandan Constitutional Court 
and protested that, under the amnesty act, his amnesty has been denied, which 
violates his equal treatment under the Constitution. In September 2011 the 
Constitutional Court held that he is eligible for amnesty and ordered his release from 
the ICD. Although Kwoyelo is (as of August 2012) still under detention, according to 
the high court’s decision he should be freed. The ICC’s position of non-recognition 
of the Ugandan national amnesty law, then, raises the questions of whether or not 
such a stance taken by the ICC would be applicable to other cases, and how amnesty 
and prosecution should be related to each other before the ICC; discussion of these 
points will follow briefly. 
Intervention by the ICC in Uganda has been the subject of controversies, 
hesitation and speculations. Some assert that intervention by the ICC may provide an 
incentive for states either to engage in or refuse negotiations with powerful 
perpetrators, since if states show that they are unwilling or unable to prosecute they 
can refer the situation to the ICC.
116
 Furthermore, some have argued that the arrest 
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warrant against the LRA leaders was a major factor in increasing accountability
117
 
and ‘in convincing the LRA to enter a cease-fire agreement and engage in peace talks 
with the government’.118By contrasts, other scholars have insisted that ‘it jeopardizes 
the concept of amnesty’ and reduced the hopes for the peace agreement.119In 2008 
the government of Uganda and the LRA seemed about to reach a peace agreement, 
but it was never signed; the OTP refused to withdraw the arrest warrant, and 
consequently the LRA has returned to the conflict.
120
 With national and international 
actors engaging forcefully on either side of the argument, the tension between 
‘justice’ and ‘peace’ is plain and likely to continue until the situation is finally 
resolved.
121
  
As has been mentioned, the ICC has so far refused to recognise the national 
amnesty act in Uganda 
122
 as a bar to its own prosecution of the LRA leaders. It 
should also be borne in mind that if the ICC were to withdraw its arrest warrants it 
would risk losing international perception of its legitimacy. An opposing and 
stronger argument might be that such a threat of the loss of legitimacy might be 
necessary for the ICC to endure in order to maximise the chances of peace 
negotiations taking place and the continuation of conflict in Uganda, with the 
attendant loss of more life, being prevented. The question is whether this decision of 
the OTP indicates the emergence of an ‘anti amnesty norm’123 in the practice of the 
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ICC, a real rule which does not appear in the Rome Statute;
124
 or whether it merely 
represents a decision regarding a specific case resulting from certain specific reasons, 
such as the issuing of the arrest warrants against the indicted perpetrators. It is 
impossible to answer this question decisively at this stage, due to the lack of 
sufficient jurisprudence in the ICC regarding various amnesties. What is clear is that 
not only does the Statute potentially provide discretionary authority for the Court 
concerning national amnesties, and in particular concerning the influence of 
prosecution on national security and the ‘interests of justice’ in a society with 
ongoing conflict; but also that, logistically and financially, it would be impossible for 
the ICC to prosecute all of the crimes for which states grant amnesty, or to force 
states to prosecute and/or cooperate with the Court in opposition to their own 
national amnesty laws. Therefore, I think the outcome of this argument should be 
balanced between being pro- and anti-amnesty; the ICC is not an abstract entity and 
purely punitive mechanism with can act without considering the consequences of its 
actions, but needs to work in a flexible way recognising national amnesties in certain 
cases.
125
This is justifiable when prosecution imposes extreme costs via the 
continuation of conflict, although it is unpalatable.  
3.5. Immunities under customary international law and the Rome Statute 
In this section I attempt to highlight a possible bar to a request for the surrendering 
of an accused to the ICC, i.e. immunity agreements, and how these relate to the 
question of impunity. As was indicated earlier, a comprehensive analytical approach 
concerning state immunity is beyond the scope of this section; however, the question 
will be discussed as to under what circumstances the rules of immunity in the Rome 
Statute may effectively lead to impunity. The section will focus on Article 98(1) 
which explicitly refers to immunity. Article 98(2) which provides that the Court 
cannot compel states to violate their own agreements with other states in order to 
surrender accused persons of those states to the Court, could also give rise to 
immunity if it were used to protect a state’s representatives; however, Article 98 (2) 
and its related treaties will be discussed in Chapter 6 under the rubric of the 
opposition of the US to the ICC. 
 
                                               
124 Pound R. ‘Law in Books and Law in Action,’ 44  American Law Review (1910), 12, at 34. 
125 O’brien R. Supra note1, at 271. 
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3.5.1. State immunity and different types of immunity under international  
                                               customary law 
It is generally accepted that state authorities are immune in certain circumstances 
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
126
Immunities derive through state 
constitutions, regular legislations, customary international law, and applicable 
international treaties.
127
 The Institut de Droit International (IDI) resolution on 
immunity provides ‘[i]mmunities are conferred to ensure an orderly allocation and 
exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with international law...., to respect the 
sovereign equality of States and to permit the effective performance of the functions 
of persons who act on behalf of States.’128Immunity of state officials is a 
fundamental feature of the way in which the international community is 
constituted.
129
 Heads of state and officials enjoy immunity from the criminal and 
civil jurisdiction of a foreign state when they are in office or as to acts performed in 
their official capacity.
130
Immunity under international law is based upon two 
principles: the sovereign equality of all states and the need to ensure the effective 
conduct of international relations.
131
 Immunity is thus necessary both to preserve 
state autonomy and promote or maintain a system of peaceful ‘cooperation and 
coexistence’ between nations.132 Traditionally, immunity has been divided into 
                                               
126 Fox H. The Law of State Immunity (2004), at 503;  Gardiner R. Supra note 12, at 34; Akande D. 
Supra note 1, at 409; Hohfeld N. W. Functional Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
in  D. Campbell, & P. Thomas (eds), (2001), at 28, he defined immunity as ‘one’s freedom from the 
legal power or “control” of another as regards some legal relation’; see also generally Simbeye Y. 
Immunity and International Criminal Law (2004), Bellal A. ‘The 2009 Resolution of the Institute of 
International Law on Immunity and International Crimes’, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2011), 227. 
127 Fox H. Id, at 425-426; Cassese A. International Law (2005), at 114; Schabas W. An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court (2008), at 71-72;  Akande D, Supra note 1, at 409. 
128 See Institute of De Droit International (IDI), Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the 
State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in case of International Crimes, Napoli Session 
(2009), at 1, Art. 2(1), it available at: http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf 
(Accessed 20/08/2012). 
129 Fox H. (2004), Ibid, at 442; Fox H. ‘The First Pinochet Case:  Immunity of a former head of 
State’, 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1999), 207, at 215.  
130 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations UNTS 500 / 95 (1961), Bantekas I. International 
Criminal Law (2010), at 127. 
131 Cassese A. (2005), Supra note 127, at 112; Bantekas I. Id, at 127; Werle G. Principle of 
International Criminal Law (2005), at 173.   
132 Fox H. Ibid, at 1; Akande D. (2004), Supra note 1, at 410; see also Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ 
Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium, the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal, Para 75. 
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ratione personae (personal immunity) and ratione materiae (functional immunity) 
which are available to state officials.
133
  
Immunity ratione personae does not prevent criminal responsibility; it only 
creates an obstacle to prosecution by a foreign state for a temporary time (while the 
person concerned is in office) even if he has violated the jus cogens norm, and even 
for private acts.
134
 Personal immunity is absolute, but its cover is limited to a state’s 
currently-serving high-level officials; a former official may be tried by their 
domestic court or certain international criminal courts after having left office.
135
 The 
most famous case of this kind of immunity has been exemplified in the ICJ 
Judgment in the Arrest Warrant Case in April 2002 (Congo v. Belgium) despite fact 
that Yerodia was alleged to have perpetrated international crimes, the Court finally 
found that the Belgian Court was obliged to respect the immunity of the incumbent 
Minster for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, under international law.
136
  
Under immunity ratione materiae, or immunity related to official acts, state 
officials are immune from the jurisdiction of other states in relation to acts exercised 
in their official capacity.
137
 In other words, officials who do not remain in office still 
enjoy immunity from foreign domestic criminal jurisdiction with respect to acts 
exercised in their official capacity while they were in office.
138
 It may also apply to 
persons who are not officials but have acted on behalf of the state; ‘functional 
immunity does not provide complete protection of the person, it only covers 
                                               
133 Werle G. Ibid, at 173; Cassese A. (2005), Supra note 127, at 114-115; Brownlie I. Principles of 
Public International Law (2008), at 326-327.  
134 See generally the Congo v. Belgium. Supra note 16. 
135 Cryer R & et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2010), at 533; 
Cassese A. (2002), Supra note 1, at 853 and 875; see also Congo v. Belgium. Id, it states in summery 
Para, 47-55 that ‘[t]he Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by 
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any 
crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity….Accordingly, the immunities 
enjoyed under international law by an incumbent… do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in 
certain circumstances. The Court refers to circumstances where such persons are tried in their own 
countries,…and where such persons are subject to criminal proceedings before certain international 
criminal courts,’ see also Para 61. 
136 Congo v. Belgium. Id, Para 61 and in Para 55 the ICJ ‘confirmed that the absolute nature of the 
immunity from criminal process accorded to a serving foreign minister subsists even when it is 
alleged that he or she has committed an international crime and applies even when the foreign 
minister is abroad on a private visit’.  
137 Dinstein Yoram. Supra note 1, at 77-78; Werle G. Supra  note 131, at 174; Cassese A. (2005), 
Supra note 127, at 116. 
138 See the Vienna Convention, Id, Art. 39(2), it provides: ‘with respect to acts performed by such a 
person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to 
subsist.’ 
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[limited] conduct that was an official act of a State.’139 Consequently, in comparison 
with personal immunity, functional immunity is not absolute, and hence an official 
may be brought to domestic or foreign courts for private acts.
140
 The House of Lords 
decision in the Pinochet case rejected immunity ratione materiae for Pinochet. He 
was detained in London because of a request from the Spanish court to extradite him 
for international crimes such as torture during his office in Chile, on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction. The core question in the Pinochet case in the House of Lords 
was whether international crimes were excluded from immunity ratione materiae or 
not. One view, which was represented by Lords Lloyd and Slynn, etc., was that 
immunity from criminal proceedings is maintained for all acts in foreign states when 
these acts were undertaken as official functions of the heads of state, and that, 
therefore, immunity should continue even though Pinochet was out of office.
141
 
However, the House of Lords in majority held that certain international crimes were 
forbidden by jus cogens, such that even officials in office can not enjoy immunity 
(ratione materiae) for these crimes in foreign courts; thus, Pinochet’s plea of 
immunity was rejected.
142
 The main attention of the House of Lords majority 
decision was on the Torture Convention of 1984, which provides that: 
[B]y Article 1 as the person liable for the commission of the international crime of 
torture; and that this definition of the offence of torture and the obligation in the 
Convention to extradite or prosecute offenders is inconsistent with the retention of 
an immunity for a former Head of State for such crimes.
143
   
 
In fact, in the decision by the House of Lords, immunity ratione materiae was 
restricted to applying to official acts other than the commission of international 
crimes. Fox asserts that the same logic should be applicable to a serving head of state 
(i.e. that immunity ratione personae should also be restricted to acts other than the 
                                               
139 Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 135, at 533. 
140 Id.  
141 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p, Pinochet Ugarte, No. 3, (2000), AC 
151; (1999), 2 AII ER 97, at 119,146-147, and 179. 
142 See Pinochet case No. 3, referenced on 9th November 2008. Lords Millet and Phillips of Worth 
Matravers in the House of Lords’ decision of 24 March 1999 on Pinochet took the view, with regard 
to any senior State agent, that functional immunity can not excuse international crimes. Lord Hope of 
Craighead stated that Pinochet lost his immunity ratione materiae only because of Chile’s ratification 
of the Torture Convention. In other words, for him the unavailability of functional immunity did not 
derive from customary law; it stemmed from treaty law.  Despite the House of Lords’ decision, 
Pinochet was never extradited to Spain. 
143 Pinochet, No. 3, (2000), AC 151, per Browne-Wilkinson at 112-14, the torture was not a criminal 
offence in English law until 28 September 1988, when the Criminal Justice Act 1988 implemented the 
1948 Torture Convention. 
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commission of international crimes).
144
 The IDI resolution insists that ‘[i]mmunities 
should not constitute an obstacle to the appropriate reparation to which victims of 
[international] crimes addressed by this Resolution are entitled.’145 Others, however, 
argue against this stance and state that serving state officials enjoy (personal) 
immunity even if they have violated jus cogens norms; this viewpoint has been 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice,
146
 the European Court of Human 
Rights,
147
 and the majority of national courts which have considered the question.
148
 
This view was followed in the ICJ decision on Congo v. Belgium, and means that 
there is no customary law exception to immunity for international crimes in domestic 
courts.
149
    
It should be noted that personal immunity of officials from criminal jurisdiction 
is not the equivalent of impunity in domestic courts. This is because this 
jurisdictional immunity of state officials in foreign courts is procedural in nature, but 
criminal liability is a matter of substantive law.
150
 Jurisdictional immunity can bar 
prosecution for a certain time or for certain offences and officials in foreign national 
courts; it cannot absolve the accused from al1 criminal responsibility.
151
 Thus, such 
state officials firstly might be prosecuted while they are in office in their own 
country; secondly, if their immunity has been waived by the competent national 
authorities; thirdly, they may be prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal, if 
that tribunal has been given the requisite authority; and finally, personal immunity 
only bars prosecution for a limited time, while a person is in office. In contrast, 
functional immunity, which might continue after office, is related to substantive law 
                                               
144 Fox H. (2004), Supra note 126, at 447. 
145 See the  IDI, Resolution. Supra note 128, at 2 Art. 2(2).     
146 Cong V. Belgium. Supra note 16, at 23 Para 56. 
147 E.g. the Case of Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom ( 2001), Application No. 35763/97, Para 63.  
148 E.g.  Bouzari v.  Iran,  the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Goudge, Maccpherson and Cronk JJ.A. 
2004 Can LII 871 (ON C.A.), in Canada; Al-Adsani v  Kuwait, 107 ILR 536 (1996), in the U.K, and 
Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1997), in the US All of these 
cases indicated that the violation of jus cogens norms - fundamental international norms of conduct - 
could not imply the waiver of sovereign state immunity. Spanish, French, and Belgian courts have 
issued judgements making it abundantly clear that personal immunity will apply to all state officials 
regarding international crimes while they remain in office; see also Cassese A. (2005), Supra note 
127, at 119.  
149 Cassese A. ‘The Belgian Court of Cassation v. the International Court of Justice: the Sharon and 
others Case’, 1  Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), 437 at 442. 
150 See Congo v. Belgium. Supra note 16, Para 60. 
151 Id, Para 60.  
109 
 
and is, as such, a substantive defence.
152
 The violation of the law, for example, might 
be imputed to the state (Act of state doctrine) but not to individuals.  
Functional immunity (ratione materiae)
153
 then, may give rise to impunity – it 
admits the criminal nature of the action, the need for prosecution, but bars 
prosecution taking place.
154
 For example, a foreign minister, while he is in office, 
enjoys both personal and functional immunity; in this case two types of immunity 
coexist, or intersect somewhat, while an official is in office. When the foreign 
minister leaves office he or she continues to enjoy functional immunity only, with 
the exception (for functional immunity) of international crimes.
155
 Since this kind of 
immunity attaches to official acts, it might apply to both serving state officials and 
former officials in respect of official acts which they exercised when they were in 
office. Thus, these officials might enjoy impunity via such as immunity legislation, 
either national or constitutional, which may shield former officials when they are out 
of office, and as a result cause them to enjoy impunity. Functional immunity has a 
broader scope than personal immunity.
156
  
Nevertheless, immunity under international law in foreign national courts is 
different than immunity under international tribunals. Officials who could enjoy 
personal immunity or inviolability while they are in office before foreign courts – 
under customary international law – may nevertheless have their personal immunity 
waived according to the statutes of international tribunals. Officials’ immunity has 
been restricted from the end of the nineteenth century onward;
157
 in particular, this 
tendency increased significantly following World War II, in the military tribunals
158
 
and afterwards in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals and of the ICC.
159
 
The ICTY rejected the pleadings for immunity of Slobodan Milosevic
160
 and has 
                                               
152 Cassese A. (2002), Supra note 1, at 862.  
153 E.g. Art. 39(2), of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,  provides for subsisting 
immunity for diplomats after leaving  post ‘with respect to acts performed ... in the exercise of his 
functions as a member of the mission.’ 
154 See the Vienna Convention Art. 39(2), see also Congo v. Belgium. Supra note 16. 
155 Cassese A. (2002), Supra note 1, at 864. 
156 King H. ‘Immunities and Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Issues Arising from Art. 27 and 98 of 
the Rome Statute’, 4 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law (2006), 269, at 272. 
157 Brownlie  I. Supra note 133, at 325; Gardiner A. Supra note 12, at 343; Cassese A. (2005), Supra 
note 127, at 100. 
158 See Art. 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, it provides: ‘The official position of defendants, whether as 
Heads of State or… shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating 
punishment’. The same position was repeated in Article II (4), (a), of Control Council Law No. 10; 
and Tokyo Charter Art. 5. 
159 See Art. 7(2), 6(2), of the ICTY, ICTR, and Art. 27 Statute of the ICC. 
160 See generally, the Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, ICTY, IT-02-54-T (25 JULY 2005).  
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recently started proceedings against Radovan Karadzic for crimes including 
genocide and crimes against humanity
161
 after he was finally arrested by the Serb 
authorities. The Sierra Leone Special Courts’ Appeals Chamber’s tribunals have also 
rejected the claim of the immunity of serving state officials from prosecution for 
international crimes, on 31 May 2004, by Charles Taylor.
162
 In its summary of its 
judgement, the court stated that ‘the principle seems now established that the 
sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted 
before an international criminal tribunal or court.’163 How to reconcile the tension 
between immunity under customary international law and immunity under 
international tribunals has become a complex issue in the current practice of the ICC.  
3.5.2. Immunity under the Rome Statute 
Article 27 (1) of the Statute has followed the prior international tribunals, which have 
abolished immunity for state officials.
164
 Article 27(2) of the Statute is novel
165
 and 
eliminates personal immunity for state officials;
166
 it provides that, ‘[i]mmunities or 
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising 
its jurisdiction over such a person.’167 Some insist that Article 27(2) also applies to 
both immunity ratione materiae and ratione persone. Summers asserts that this 
seems unlikely from the language of the Statute, because ‘Article 27(1) makes a 
specific reference to exemption from “criminal responsibility,” the theoretical basis 
of immunity ratione materiae, whereas Article 27(2) refers to exercise of the Court’s 
“jurisdiction,” the concept behind immunity ratione personae.’168 Some have also 
argued that Article 27 waives all immunities of state officials before their domestic 
                                               
161 See the Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, ICTY, IT-95-5/18-PT (27 February 2009). 
162 See Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, ‘Summary of Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction,’ 
The Special Court for Sierra Leon, Case No.  2003-01-1 (31 May 2003). 
163 Id. 
164 Rome Statute Art. 27 (1), provides, ‘ …official capacity as a Head of State or Government,… shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.’ 
165 Akande D. (2004), Supra note 1, at 420; he observes that, by this Article, state parties relinquish 
any immunity which their officials would otherwise enjoy before the ICC.  
166 Summers M.A. ‘Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecution of State Officials for 
Core International Crimes in States like the United States that are not Parties to the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’, 31 Brook Journal of International Law (2005),463, at 489.   
167 See the Rome Statute Art. 27(2). 
168 Summers M.A.  Ibid, at 490. 
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courts and in the ICC, when states have become party to the Statute and their 
officials are accused of the international crimes.
169
 
Regardless of such arguments, the main issue concerns the possible tension 
between Article 27(2) and Article 98(1) and the different interpretations that appear 
when they are examined in conjunction with each other. Article 98 (1) provides:  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third 
State for the waiver of the immunity.
170
 
 
As we can see, in contrast to Article 27, Article 98(1) recognises state international 
obligations under international law and respects states’ obligations to respect 
diplomatic immunity agreements which they have made. Thus, explicit denial of 
immunity in Article 27 has been excluded by this Article, which provides significant 
room for the recognition of officials’ immunity. Akande, concerning Article 98 (1) 
asserts: ‘[i]f it were always the case that Article 27 removes the international law 
immunity of officials of states even with respect to national authorities of other 
states, then Article 98 would, in turn, be deprived of all meaning.’171 The question 
then arises as to whether Article 98 (1) will apply only to officials of states non-party 
to the Statute or to officials of all states whether party or non-party to the Statute. 
One view asserts that Article 98 (1) applies only to the officials of non-party states; 
according to this view, the term ‘third State’ in the Article refers to non-party states, 
as is standard in treaties. The Article thus provides that the ICC cannot demand non–
party states’ officials to be surrendered to the ICC without a waiver of immunity 
from such states; it may also be understood that demanding the surrender of non-
party states’ officials to the ICC (without waiver of immunity) would be contrary to 
states’ obligations under customary international law to respect the immunity of 
officials of non-party states.
172
 This view has been declared by many scholars
173
 and 
                                               
169 Cassese A. (2003), Supra note 150, at 442; Akande D. Supra note 1, at 420.  
170 Rome Statute Art. 98 (1). 
171 Akande D. ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al 
Bashir’s Immunities’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), 333, at 336.  
172 Broomhall B. International Justice & the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and 
the Rule of Law (2003), at 145;  Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 135, at 555; Schabas W.(2008), 
Supra note 127, at 72-73.  
173 Broomhall B. Id, at 145; Wirth S. ‘Immunities related problems, and Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute’, 12 Criminal law Forum (2001), 429, at 440; Akande D. (2004), Supra note 1, at 420-423; 
Gaeta P. ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’ 7 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2009), 315, at 323. 
112 
 
it has also been reflected in the practice of some state parties,
174
 which have adopted 
new provisions that make it possible for non-party states’ officials not to be entitled 
to immunity from arrest under international law, when a request for arrest has been 
made by the ICC. It seems that this approach may be identical to that of the Statute, 
which otherwise could result in complete impunity from prosecution for non-party 
state officials.  
Another view of the matter is that individuals whether from states party or non-
party to the Statute should not rely on international law immunities in proceedings 
concerning the ICC’s requests. Thus, Cryer et al. argue that the first view overlooks, 
in referring the term ‘third State’ to non-party states only, the fact that the term ‘third 
State’ ‘is routinely used in cooperation treaties to refer to a State other than the 
requesting and requested States’.175However, they go on to argue that it is 
nevertheless not necessary for a requested state to obtain any explicit ‘waiver of 
immunity’ from a state which is party to the Statute, on the grounds that all such 
immunities have already been relinquished by such states through ratification of the 
Statute and hence being constrained by Articles 27 and 88. The situation where 
Article 98 (1) applies thus still occurs only in the case where the ‘third State’ is a 
non-party state.
176
It will be discussed in the final section of this Chapter that this 
situation has arisen in practice with regard to the views of several member states 
concerning the Al-Bashir case before the ICC, whereby these states have not 
complied with the request of the Court to arrest Al-Bashir, explicitly and implicitly 
on the bases of Articles 27 and 91(1). 
Article 98 (2) concerns obligations to a sending state under international 
agreements. It may confirm existing immunities and has a capacity to be interpreted 
in a way so as to countenance the establishment of treaties between state and non-
state parties, as was done in the case of the US Bilateral Agreements
177
 (to be 
discussed further in the final Chapter) granting impunity through immunity to US 
                                               
174 Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000), inserted a new paragraph 6.1 into 
the Extradition Act (1999), Swiss, Federal Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court 
(2001), which provides for arrest despite any question of immunity; UK International Criminal Act of 
2000, whereby Art. 23 (2), provides that the arrest and surrender of non-party states’ officials will 
continue where non-party states have waived the immunity of their officials, and Art. 23(1), provides 
that: ‘Any state or diplomatic immunity attaching to a person by reason of a connection with a state 
party to the ICC Statute’ does not prevent such individuals from being arrested in the UK and 
surrendered to the ICC. 
175 Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 135, at 555. 
176 Akande D. Supra note 1, at 422. Summers M.A. Supra note 166, at 490-91. 
177 See the US Bilateral Agreement (April 2003). 
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military and civilian personnel. The Article does not tackle the question of when 
such obligations under international law arise. It is unclear, for example, whether the 
Article applies only to obligations that pre-existed the entry into force of the Statute, 
or those that might have been procured after that time. It is arguable that the 
intention was to limit it to the former not the latter, but so far as the matter remains 
unclear, the possibility remains that this provision might be extensively exploited by 
states wishing to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, if this Article is to be 
interpreted in such a way that it is consistent with the objectives of the ICC, it must 
be seen as limited to the existing agreements between state and non-state parties. 
Some scholars insist that Article 98 has become a significant exception to the 
rule described by Article 27. Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones have written that ‘the 
exclusion of immunity for core crimes constitutes the exception rather than the 
rule.’178 Schabas also states that Article 98 of the Rome Statute is a significant 
practical exception that can be applied to shield certain individuals from prosecution 
before the ICC.
179
 Although all may not agree with these scholars, what is clear first 
of all is that the Statute provides significant leeway for the recognition of state 
immunity agreements between state parties and non -parties to the Statute. Therefore, 
immunity regulations in the Statute can be a significant bar to surrender of state 
officials to the ICC, by state parties and non-parties to the Statute; and this may lead 
to impunity from prosecution of state officials, since the Court, without surrender of 
the accused, can not exercise its jurisdiction. As has been indicated, not all immunity 
leads to impunity; yet when officials are accused of international crimes, it is 
unlikely their own domestic courts would be able or willing to prosecute them, and 
when they claim immunity under customary international law, thus preventing states 
from surrendering them, this may lead to impunity. This has been exemplified in the 
case of Al-Bashir before the ICC, which is examined in the next section.  
The other important point is that the Statute’s denial of immunity in general 
in Article 27,  followed by the exclusion of immunity agreements from this denial in 
Article 98, reflect the reality that traditional immunity under customary international 
law for state officials cannot simply be ignored. Even it may lead to impunity, but it 
                                               
178 Gaeta A. ‘Legalist groundwork for the International Criminal Court: commentaries on the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court’, 14 European Journal of International Law (2003), 843, at 850; 
see also ‘Official Capacity and Immunity’, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a 
commentary in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and R.W. D, Jones (eds), (2002), 975, Vol, I, B, 975-976.  
179 Schabas W. (2008), Supra note 127, at 73. 
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may be known as legal or inevitable impunity for functions of states officials, which 
derives from states’ international obligations. The tension between Articles 27 and 
98
180
 have had significant effects and caused controversies in the practice of the 
Court so far. 
3.6. Immunity in the practice of the ICC: the case of Al-Bashir 
Some of the key challenges to prosecution of heads of state in the ICC have been 
discussed above, such as the tension between Articles 27 and 98 (1). These issues 
have been played out in practice and have led to both legal and practical barriers to 
the prosecution of President Al-Bashir of the Sudan. His case, in fact, indicates the 
different aims of international law and the international justice system on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the complexities and controversies involved in the 
prosecution of an incumbent head of state despite the general denial of immunity for 
international crimes in the Statute. 
One of the world’s greatest humanitarian atrocities has occurred as a result of 
conflict between the Sudanese Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement 
and Sudanese government and Janjaweed militia forces; since 2002 more than three 
hundred thousand have been killed and about 1.65 million have been forcefully 
displaced.
181
The Security Council (SC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 2004 
adopted resolution 1564, requesting that the Secretary-General quickly establish an 
international commission of inquiry in order to investigate the atrocities and violation 
of human rights in Darfur.
182
 Then, pursuant to the Report of the Commission,
183
 the 
SC recognised the situation as a threat to international peace and security under 
resolution 1593, and in 2005 referred it to the ICC.
184
 After the referral, the Sudanese 
authorities refused to cooperate with the Court, instead establishing the Special 
Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED) that proclaim their own 
                                               
180 Rome Statute Art. 98 (1), see also Akande D. Supra note 171, at 339.  
181 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), of 18 September 2004, UN Doc. S/2005/60 (1 
February 2005), at 3; Sudan: Greatest Humanitarian Crisis, New York Times  (20 March 2004). 
182 SC Res. 1564 (18 September 2004). 
183 See UN Doc. S/2005/60 (1 February 2005). 
184 SC Res. 1593 (31 March 2005). 
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complimentary domestic proceedings and their ability to handle prosecutions 
nationally.
185
 
The Court has since indicted six defendants, most importantly sitting head of state 
Al-Bashir. Two arrest warrants for him have been issued, in 2008 and 2010,
186
 
charging him with crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide,
187
 and the Pre-
Trial Chamber 1 has granted the prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant.188 The 
arrest warrant against him was despite accepted conceptions of international 
customary law of immunity; the Pre-Trial Chamber has concluded that ‘the current 
position of Omar Al Bashir as head of a state which is not a party to the Statute, has 
no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction over the present case.’189  
The significant thing is that, for the first time, a head of state has been targeted by 
the ICC, though it is not the first time that a head of state has been targeted by an 
international tribunal.
190
 Notwithstanding the SC calls to the Sudanese government 
and the international community to cooperate with the Court,
191
 the warrants of arrest 
for Al-Bashir are outstanding and he remains in power to date; in fact, he travels 
frequently to several state parties
192
 and non-party states, including SC permanent 
member China, freely.
193
 What is the reason for his de facto and de jure impunity and 
why have states not complied with the ICC’s arrest warrant?  
In fact, the ICC very soon after the referral faced significant obstacles in 
investigation in Darfur and, due to the lack of cooperation by the Sudanese 
                                               
185 See generally, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur Human 
Rights Watch Briefing Paper (June 2006), available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/ij/sudan0606/ (Accessed 13/03/2012). 
186 Press Release, ICC Prosecutor presents case against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al-
Bashir, for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur, ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341 
(14 July 2008), the second Warrant of Arrest for him has been issued on 4 March 2009 and was 
authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 on July 12, 2010; see ICC-02/05-01/09-95 (12 July 2010). 
187 Id.   
188 Press Release, ICC Issues a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan (4 March 
2009), ICC-CPI-20090304-PR394, and ICC-02/05-01/09 (12 July 2010). 
189 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 04-03-2009 1/146,  Pre-Trial Chamber I (4 March 2009), at 
Para 41. 
190 E.g., the ICTY issued a warrant for Milosevic when he was head of the former Yugoslavia, or the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone indicted Charles Taylor when he was the President of Liberia. 
191 SC Res. 1593 (31 March 2005), para 2.  
192 President Bashir freely visited Chad, Kenya, Malawi and Djibouti; all are state parties to the 
Statute, but they refused to cooperate with the ICC and to enforce the ICC arrest warrant. However, 
recently the national court of Kenya issued an arrest warrant for him for alleged war crimes and will 
arrest him if he travels again to Kenya; see BBC News Africa, ‘Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir : Kenya issues 
arrest warrant’ (28 November 2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15918027 (Accessed 
20/03/2012). 
193 See BBC News Africa, ‘Delayed Sudan leader Omar al-Bashir arrives in China’ (22 June 2011), available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13929867 (accessed 20/ 03/2012). 
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authorities, in implementing the warrants of arrest. Due to the treaty nature of the 
Statute, the cooperation of states is essential in the exercising of the jurisdiction of 
the Court; it is thus significant to analyse the main obstacles the Court has 
encountered and which entities are obliged to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir to the 
ICC: state parties, non-party states, or the SC.   
The first overall argument is that all state parties to the Statute are obliged to 
cooperate with the Court through surrender of persons on request of the court, taking 
evidence, questioning of persons, etc.
194
 However, under the Statute, other, 
conflicting obligations under international law bar the cooperation.
195
 Nevertheless, 
Cryer insists that the respect given to immunities under Article 98(1) ‘does not mean 
there can be no prospect for surrender’: non-party states can agree to waive 
immunity; immunity can be lost if the SC has ordered the investigation under 
Chapter VII of the Charter; and finally, when officials are no longer serving office, 
their personal immunity will be removed and these officials can be surrendered to the 
Court.   
Another view, presented by Akanke and Gaeta, represents Article 98 as allowing 
immunity obligations: Akanke asserts that ‘Article 98 expressly allows parties to 
give effect to immunity obligations they owe to non-parties.’196 State parties are thus 
not compelled to surrender officials of non-party states to the ICC, and consequently 
the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction over such officials. However, a distinction is 
made between state parties and non-party states. Immunities of officials as amongst 
state parties to the Statute are removed by Article 27, and so a state party, on being 
requested by the ICC to arrest and surrender an official of another state party, at least 
in theory could not, under Article 98 (1) claim that to do so would be ‘act[ing] 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the state or 
diplomatic immunity’.197 Therefore, a requested state party should surrender officials 
of other state parties to the Court. The ICC is also free to proceed with such requests 
to a state party for arresting and surrendering a ruling head of state.
198
 When the 
Court insists on the request to surrender, e.g., Al-Bashir, in the conflict between the 
Court and a state party (claiming it cannot do so because of immunity under 
                                               
194 See the Rome Statute Art. 87 and 93.   
195 Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 135, at 512-513. 
196 Akande D. (2009), Supra note 171, at 334; Gaeta P. (2009), Supra note 173, at 323. 
197 Rome Statute Art. 98(1). 
198 Akande D.  Ibid, at 334.  
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international law) such as Kenya, Article 98 (1) cannot in fact be a ground for refusal 
of state parties under the Rome Statute.
199
 
 However, in practice, several states
200
 have raised Article 98(1) as grounds 
for such refusal; for example, Malawi, which is a state party to the Statute, implicitly 
referred their non-cooperation to Article 98(1) of the Statute. Al-Bashir had travelled 
to this state, and Malawi, in order to justify its failure to comply with the 
Prosecutor’s request to surrender him to the ICC, submitted the ’Observations from 
the Republic of Malawi’ to the ICC, arguing therein for the immunity of Al-Bashir 
on the grounds that Article 27 of the Statute is not applicable to non-party heads of 
state.
201
 In connection with this incident, the Pre-Trial Chamber I in 2011 provided as 
follows: ‘[t]he Chamber considers that, although not expressly referred to in the 
Observations from the Republic of Malawi, article 98(1) of the Statute is the 
applicable article in this respect...’.202 In the end, the Chamber rejected the argument 
by Malawi for the immunity of the heads of non-party states; it found that the 
immunity of the heads of states either party or non-party to the Statute can not be 
invoked before international prosecutions, that Article 98 (1) does not apply in this 
case, and thus that Malawi has failed to comply and cooperate with the Court under 
Article 86(7) and 89.
203
  
Accordingly, the Prosecutor has reported Kenya, Chad, Malawi, and Djibouti, all 
of which are state parties,
204
 and Sudan, which is a non-party state, to both the 
                                               
199 Rome Statute Art, 119 (1), it provides ‘[a]ny dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court 
shall be settled by the direction of the Court’. 
200 The African Union raised Article 98(1), as grounds for non-cooperation on 3 July 2009; see AU 
Decision, Para. 10, 30 June- 1 July 2011 AU Decision, Para 5. 
201 The  Pre- Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09-139  (12-12-2011), at 7; see also Press Release,  Pre-
Trial Chamber I informs the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties 
about Malawi’s non-cooperation in the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir, ICC-CPI-20111212-
PR755 ( 12-12-2011). 
202 Id, at 11 Para 17. 
203 Id, at 17 Para 36, at 20 Para 43.  However, the Court did admit inherent tension between Article 27 
and 98(1), see Para 37, where the Court orders that the non-cooperation by Malawi should be reported 
to the UN SC and ASPS. 
204 For state parties to the Statute, see the ICC website, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (accessed 24/03/2012), the Prosecutor should report non-
cooperation of states under the Rome Statute Art. 87(b), and (7). 
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Assembly of State Party (ASP) and the SC for their lack of cooperation.
205
 
Nevertheless, it is unclear what action will be taken by the SC to respond to these 
reports, and the ASP has few options available since it has no enforcement power 
over states.
206
 Given the composition of the ASP, any disciplinary action would have 
to come from the Security Council. This indicates the overall challenge to 
prosecution of state officials due to the ICC’s treaty nature and its lack of 
enforcement power. 
The second overall argument is that non-party states are also obliged to cooperate 
with the Court because of the referral by the SC. From the outset, it may be argued 
that in the case of Sudan, as it is not a state party to the Statute, there is no direct 
obligation for other states to cooperate with the Court,
207
 but the situation does 
change if there is a referral by the SC, for Sudan itself and other non-party states. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber I has stated that, although Sudan is not a party to the Statute 
and has not issued a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the Court,
208
 ‘the 
Chamber emphasises that the State of Sudan has the obligation to fully cooperate 
with the Court.’209 A supporting argument is that, when a situation is a referral by the 
SC, as is the case in the Sudan situation, all states are obliged to cooperate with the 
Court under Article 25 of the UN Charter and the SC resolutions; thus, non-party 
states are obliged to arrest and surrender the Sudanese President Al-Bashir. 
Furthermore, Article 103 affirms the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter; it 
was, in fact, drafted to reconcile such competing obligations.
210
 Nevertheless, non-
state parties are not all obliged to cooperate in the terms of the referral by the SC 
Resolution 1593 provides:  
[T]he Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate 
fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to 
this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no 
                                               
205 Press Release, Pre-Trial Chamber I, informs the Security Council and the Assembly of States 
Parties about Omar Al Bashir’s visits to Kenya and Chad, ICC-CPI-20100827-PR568 (27/08/2012), 
Pre-Trial Chamber I informs the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties 
about Malawi’s non-cooperation in the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir,  ICC-CPI-20111212-
PR755 (12/12/2011), The Pre-Trial Chamber I, reported again to the SC and the Assembly of States 
Parties Chad’s non-cooperation in 2012, see ICC-CPI-20111213-PR756(13/12/2012), see the Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Report for non –cooperation of the Sudan, ICC-CPI-20100526-PR528, 
(26/05/2010), and for  Djibouti, see ICC-CPI-20110512-PR665 (12/05/2011). 
206 See the Rome Statute Art. 87(7). 
207 Vienna Convention Law of Treaty, Art. 34.  
208 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Al Bashir. Supra note 
189, Para 240; Rome Statute Art. 12  (3).  
209 Pre-Trial Chamber I. Id, Para 241. 
210 See the UN Charter Art. 103. 
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obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international 
organizations to cooperate fully;211 [emphasis added] 
 
As we can see, the resolution does not explicitly make the Statute binding on 
states, nor does it explicitly deal with the issue of national immunity of the head of 
state (Al-Bashir). It provides limited guidance in terms of the weak language of 
‘urging’ and not ‘requiring’ all states to cooperate under the terms of Resolution 
1593. Although non-party states can voluntarily enter into agreement with the Court 
to provide cooperation,
212
 when a non-party state has not made such an agreement 
with the ICC it is clear that there is no obligation to cooperate, unless a Resolution 
has imposed an explicit obligation on a non-party state - e.g. Sudan in this case- to 
cooperate. Although Sudan’s cooperation is thus in theory obligatory, the voluntary 
surrender of Al-Bashir by Sudan is unlikely to happen,
213
 while the voluntary arrest 
and surrender of him by other non-party states might cause tensions and could be 
against a state’s national interest, etc; in general, states may be reluctant to cooperate 
with the Court in such cases, as such cooperation could impose a heavy cost on them. 
If a non-party state fails to cooperate, the ICC can report this to the SC, but there is a 
question as to what the SC in reality can do in order to bind such non-party states.  
Therefore, the Statute cannot remove the immunity granted to non-parties to the 
Statute, since it, as a treaty, cannot impose obligations on ‘third states’. It is arguable 
that in the case of Al-Bashir, his national immunity has not been removed in Sudan 
and the ICC cannot itself remove a national immunity; the SC also did not expressly 
remove his immunity in its referral resolution.  
The third overall argument concerning the question of the immunity of Al-Bashir 
after the referral holds that the SC has authority to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir 
and, in general, to act with force in any case where it has referred a situation to the 
ICC. As has been mentioned, Resolution 1593 did not bind all states to cooperate 
with the ICC, and it did not clearly make binding the Rome Statute on Sudan.
214
 
However, one may argue that, in a referral situation, the practice of the Court 
indicates that, similar to the case of state parties under Article 27, immunity of a head 
                                               
211 See SC Res. 1593 (31 March 2005), Para 2. 
212 See the Rome Statute Art. 87(5). 
213 Needham J.  ‘Protection or Prosecution for Omar Al Bashir? The Changing State of Immunity in 
International Criminal Law’,  17 Auckland University Law Review (2011), 219, at 223.  
214 Gaeta P. (2009), Supra note 173, at 324;  Akande D. (2009), Supra note 171, at 335; see generally 
Cryer R. ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’, 19 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2006), 195. 
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of state will be removed when the Court exercise its jurisdiction; thus, the immunity 
of Al-Bashir, for instance, has been removed and the rule of the Statute applies for 
him. The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) has followed this view; it has expressed that the 
Court will apply the Statute and the elements of crimes and the Rules in a referral 
situation.
215
 It is true that, theoretically, the ICC will be governed only by the 
provisions of the Rome Statute;
216
 Akande asserts that ‘a decision to confer 
jurisdiction [by the SC] is a decision to confer it in accordance with the Statute’.217 If 
the SC provides otherwise, it is unlikely the Court would have such competence,
218
 
as the ICC is an independent body and the SC cannot bind it. Nevertheless, the ICC 
must apply its own provisions; it cannot remove a national immunity or immunity 
under agreement by state parties with non-party states; states themselves usually 
remove national immunity. Akande and Gaeta have criticised that the PTC did not 
respect immunity on the national level for Al-Bashir; the PTC have completely 
ignored the obligations of state parties under Article 98(1) of the Statute. They assert 
that, for non-party states, the ICC should apply Article 27 only in conjunction with 
Article 98, and should thus respect state immunity agreements.
219
  
Although the above view presented by these scholars and others who generally 
support immunity under customary international law is strong and may be 
compatible with the Rome Statute, I nevertheless think that in a case of a referral the 
ICC’s provisions should be applied, and the application of the Statute cannot be 
selective; a core principle is Article 27, which removes immunity for state parties, so 
in a situation which is a referral the immunity of state officials in question would be 
removed via implementing of the Rome Statute and exercising of the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Otherwise the Court is prevented from exercising its jurisdiction. In this 
regard Gosnell, Defence Counsel of the ICTY, for instance, rightly asserts that 
Resolution 1593 ‘disables Sudan from asserting any immunity against an ICC arrest 
warrant’.220 Additionally, the PTC decision may be understood as the policy of the 
                                               
215 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Al Bashir. Supra note 
189, at Para 45. 
216 Rome Statute Art. 1. 
217 Akande D. (2009), Supra note 171, at 335. 
218 Id, at 335.   
219 Gaeta P. (2009), Supra note 173, at 320; Akande D. Ibid, at 333, Akande insists ‘[i]t is regrettable 
that the PTC chose to ignore Article 98 in its analysis because the PTC proceeded to make a request 
for arrest and surrender in circumstances where immunity is in issue. ... the PTC was unaware that 
Article 98 appears to apply in precisely this sort of case.’ 
220 Gosnell C. ‘The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al Bashir, Idealistic Posturing or Calculated 
Plan?’ 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), 841, at 843.  
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Court that in practice does not respect immunity of the heads of states non-party to 
the Statute in a case of referral by the SC for the crimes within its jurisdiction. With 
respect to these great scholars, in opposition to what Akande has argued I think that 
the decision of the PTC cannot be attributed to ignorance of Article 98 (1) of the 
Statute. The evidence of my argument is that, looking carefully at the PTC decision, 
it does reference the main objective of the establishment of the ICC - putting an end 
to impunity-
221
 and the pursuance of this goal, and has thereby disregarded the 
immunity of a ruling head of state (Al-Bashir).
222
 This type of interpretation is also 
compatible with the main purpose of the treaty under the Vienna convention. 
Accordingly, I believe that, although the previously-mentioned approaches would 
support the main argument of my thesis (whereby the ICC may create impunity) the 
adoption of these approaches would make Article 27 almost impractical when 
considered along with Article 98(1) the practice of the Court indicates that Article 27 
is, in fact, the core principle. (This could be understood as indicating the real rule in 
the practice of the Court.)  
One view is that the PTC and the Prosecutor can lawfully issue a circulated 
arrest warrant against Al-Bashir, but that the Rome Statute, via Article 98(1) also 
makes it possible for states, including state parties, legally to disregard it, when it 
issued against states non-party to the Statute. Gaeta voiced this argument when she 
stated that parties to the Statute are not obliged to carry out the ICC’s request for 
surrender of Al Bashir, because he, as serving head of a state non-party to the 
Statute, enjoys personal immunity under customary international law, and a state 
party can thus lawfully, under Article 98(1) decide not to comply with the request of 
the Court.
223
  
One may argue that, whenever a competent Court has issued, as it is legally 
entitled to do, the warrant of arrest for a head of state not party to the Statute, there is 
a duty at least for states party to a conflict, SC members, and state parties to 
cooperate. The SC was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter when it referred this 
situation to the ICC, and under Article 25 the UN members ‘accept and carry out the 
                                               
221 See the Preamble of the Statute. 
222 See Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Al Bashir. Supra 
note 189, Para 42. 
223 Gaeta P. Supra not 173, at 323-324. 
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decisions of the Security Council’.224 At the least, the SC Resolution binds Sudan 
and Chad,
225
 as conflicting states and the latter is also a party state; nevertheless, 
Sudan and many other states do not cooperate with the Court. The SC seems 
unwilling to prosecute Al-Bashir; although it rejected the African Union request for 
deferring implementation of its binding order pursuant to Article 16 of the Statute, 
Resolution 1828, in 2008, provides to the ICC concerning the warrant of arrest for 
Al-Bashir ‘their intention to consider these matters further’,226 and this appeared to 
be an impunity signal to the Sudanese officials.
227
 Al-Bashir’s warrant of arrest 
remains outstanding, due to the many aforementioned legal and political constraints 
and limitations, insufficient will, political considerations, etc., and the ICC has no 
power to enforce its demands. Some have also lobbied the SC for a deferral of the 
Sudan situation from the ICC.
228
 As will be explored further in Chapter Six, it would 
not be possible, realistically, for the SC to exercise its enforcement power for all 
international humanitarian crises; the use of force is generally unpalatable for most 
states.
229
  
One scholar has suggested that  ‘[s]ince Sudan is to be treated as bound by 
the Statute and as if it were a party to it, then the tension between Articles 27 and 98 
becomes easier to resolve.’230However, I think, though of course the ICC should 
apply its provisions and Sudan can be bound by the Statute, the referral by the SC 
cannot change the treatment of Sudan by other states from that of a non-party state to 
that of a state party, and it is thus unlikely that other states will treat Sudan as a state 
party. As has been mentioned, state parties, via ratification of the Statute, have 
accepted the removal of their national immunities (for alleged crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC) but non-party states such as Sudan have not, and the ICC 
cannot remove national immunities in non-party states. This is evidenced by the 
                                               
224 See SC Res. 1593 (2005), Para 1; the UN Charter Art. 25, which provides‘The Members of the 
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with 
the present Charter.’; see also Happold M. ‘Darfur the Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court’, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2006), 226, at 230.  
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Criminal Justice (2008),871, at 871 and 878. 
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229 Craven M. ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions’, 13 European Journal of 
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230 Akande D. (2009), Supra note 171, at 336.  
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recent practice of states both party and non-party to Statute which Al-Bashir has 
travelled to, whereby these states treated him as an official of a non-party state and 
respected his immunity.  
Given that the Prosecutor indicted Al-Bashir for the crime of genocide
231
 and 
that the ICJ has implicitly recognised a universal obligation for all states to cooperate 
with a court which has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide,
232
 one may argue that 
the Prosecutor’s use of the term ‘genocide’ may automatically trigger cooperation 
obligations for all states. This is true for state parties to the Statute; however, for non-
party states the obligation only exists when the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
accepted, otherwise there is no obligation for non-party states.
233
 Furthermore, not all 
states have ratified the Genocide Convention to be obliged by it. One may argue that 
states are nevertheless obliged to prosecute or extradite under jus cogens norms, but 
there are not sufficient sanctions to be applied against a non-compliant state. In 
summary, it may be stated that the Rome Statute provides conditions making 
impunity possible in theory, i.e. the tension between Articles 27 and 98; and 
secondly that SC Resolution 1593 excluded non-party states, and Resolution 1828 
seems to show insufficient cooperation and will among the SC members and other 
states both party and non-party to the Statute for the prosecution of Al-Bashir. There 
are of course the complicated issues of states and regional lack of cooperation with 
the Court as well (on the part of, e.g., the African Union and the Arab League). 
Nevertheless, pursuant to the ICC’s Statute and the SC resolutions, at least the acts of 
non-cooperation by Sudan and Chad – as states party to a conflict and bound by the 
resolutions – are international wrongful acts.  
The ICC, being treaty-based, is mainly reliant on cooperation by states; 
indeed, Cryer asserts that the international justice system is ‘completely dependent’ 
on states for the arrest, detention and surrender of defendants.
234
 The regime of 
cooperation in the Statute is based on requests in the Statute rather than orders, and 
                                               
231 See the second arrest of warrant for Al-Bashir (2010). Supra note 186. 
232 The ICJ recognised that the Genocide Convention implicitly contains such a duty to cooperate with 
a competent court; see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, (Bosnia Herzegovina V. Serbia & Montenegro), 2007 ICJ Report; and ICJ Report of 
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see Convention on the Crime of Genocide. Supra note 32, Art. IV. 
233 Akande D. (2009), Supra note 171, at 341.  
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ICC can not enforce states’ cooperation with the Court.235 Cassese asserts the ICC is 
‘a giant without arms and legs – it needs artificial limbs to walk and work. And those 
artificial limbs are state authorities.’236 The Statute forbids trial in absentia,237 thus 
the Court before trial must obtain his custody. Therefore, it has become almost 
impossible for the ICC to proceed with the prosecution of Al-Bashir to date, and it is 
unlikely that this would happen in the near future. In particular, even if the ICC’s 
Prosecution could overcome some of the obstacles, the legal leeway for the non-
surrendering of Al- Bashir, which has made Article 27 almost inoperative, and 
political and practical constraints due to conflicts of interest and problems of regional 
cooperation, would remain. As a result of all the aforementioned legal and practical 
issues and the lack of enforcement power, the arrest of warrant for Al-Bashir remains 
at large and is currently enjoying impunity. 
3.7. Conclusion 
As has been suggested above, the question whether amnesties constitute a form of 
impunity is largely indeterminate in the sense that it is dependent upon a resolution of 
the definitional question as to whether the granting of an amnesty involves an 
exemption from justice, and that may be seen to depend, in addition, upon the 
circumstances surrounding the granting of such an amnesty.  That being said, it is 
clear that insofar as the Rome Statute does not expressly exclude the possibility of 
granting amnesties by way of an exemption from prosecution – whether in the 
broader ‘interests of justice’, or pursuant to the principle of complementarity or of ne 
bis in idem – this does at least create the possibility of impunity resulting.  At the very 
least, however, it is such as to make clear the difficult relationship between the 
provisions of the Rome Statute that purport to determine what do or do not constitute 
the ‘interests of justice’, and its overt rationale which is to combat ‘impunity’, read as 
something which is somehow extrinsic to the Statute itself. However, the ICC in 
practice did not recognise the national amnesty law in Uganda; yet this does not mean 
that this is a policy to be applied to all similar future cases. As the Prosecutor’s Policy 
Paper on the interests of justice considers non-retributive forms of justice, I have 
argued that there is a possibility for the ICC that national amnesties may be admitted.   
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There is increasingly a trend whereby the validity of immunity as a shield for 
international crimes should be limited for state officials; hence, the Statute rejected 
the immunity of high officials for the commission of international crimes within its 
jurisdiction. In practice, also, several states party to the Statute have, via new 
provisions, made possible the surrender of nationals of states non-party to the ICC. 
However, the law of immunity retains its significance for states’ high officials for the 
proper functioning of international relations and remains the subject of controversial 
debate. Article 98 (1) does not, in fact, create new immunity, but it may bar states’ 
officials from being surrendered to the ICC, and consequently may lead to non-
prosecution before the ICC and thence impunity; and Article 98(1) in practice has 
been raised in connection with the non-compliance by member state Malawi in the 
case of Al-Bashir. 
Customary law on the immunity of serving heads of state stipulates that a 
head of state is granted personal immunity. The Rome Statute therefore constitutes a 
break from traditional international law, in theory, through the adoption of Article 27 
for states party to the Statute. However, in practice and in light of the traditional 
immunity under customary international law, the yet-to-be-enforced Al-Bashir arrest 
warrants have sparked intensive opposing arguments on the obligation of state parties 
to comply with the Court’s requests. For the Al-Bashir case, I have endeavoured to 
show its legal and practical complexities and the barriers faced by the Court in 
practice in attempting to commence prosecution of the incumbent head of state under 
the Rome Statute. As the first case involving an incumbent head of state before the 
ICC, it showcases many such legal and practical issues; along with the lack of 
cooperation by states and the lack of enforcement power of the ICC, insufficient will 
and political considerations on the part of the SC have ensured that the ICC’s 
warrants of arrest remain outstanding to date, and Al-Bashir is thus enjoying de jure 
and de facto impunity so far.  
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Chapter IV: Impunity through defences in the Rome Statute          
Introduction                             
The availability of defences is integral to the right of the human to a fair and just 
trial,
1
 as has been recognised in most major law systems and in the prior international 
criminal courts.
2
 During the Rome Conference there were vigorous debates relating 
to defences and the exclusion from criminal responsibility of the accused.
3
 Some 
NGOs at the Rome Conference even proposed that international crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Statute ought not to be subject to defences;
4
 this viewpoint was 
likely due to the most heinous nature of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
which made it difficult to invoke possible defences for such crimes.
5
 The drafters of 
the Rome Statute, however, finally agreed upon a set of codified defences, and the 
Statute.
6
  
 The different procedural defences,
7
 and all types of substantive defence,
8
 
which may lead to the exoneration of accused in a due process, are not the subject of 
this Chapter. Rather, the concern is merely to highlight the link between several 
definitions of defences and how they may give raise to impunity. The significance of 
defences in a criminal procedure is to ensure defendants are either guilty or 
acquitted, with the degree to which the defendant has participated in the commission 
of crimes resulting in a corresponding degree and type of liability, and for the 
defence of superior orders to ensure that  the liability falls on the ‘real criminal’, etc.9   
                                               
1 Bowett D.W. Self-Defence in International Law (1958), at 3-4;  Gilbert J. ‘Justice not Revenge: The 
International Criminal Court and the ‘Grounds to Exclude Criminal Responsibility’ - Defences or 
Negation of Criminality?’, 10 The International Journal of Human Rights (2006), 143, at 143.  
2 See the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Art. 227 and 228; the Nuremberg Charter Art. 8 and 16 
(b), (d), and (e), and the right to counsel in the Tokyo Charter Art. 9; E.g. in civil law systems; see the 
French Penal Code, 22 July 1992, Art. 122-2, and the Belgian Penal Code of 1868, Art. 71; for a 
common law system see section 17 of the Canadian Criminal Code.  
3 See the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the an International 
Criminal Court in Rome (15 June -17 July 1998),Vol, II at 132-133, Para 26-28, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/13; see also the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), at 57.   
4 E.g. Human Rights Watch, Comments on the Draft International Criminal Court Bill 2000.    
5 Gilbert J. Supra note 1, at 143; Gaeta P. ‘The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Versus Customary International Law’, 10 European Journal of 
international Law (1999), 172, at 188-189. 
6 Rome Statute Art. 31, 32, and 33. 
7 E.g. ne bis in idem, non –retroactivity, ratione personae, etc.,  Rome Statute, Art. 20 and 24. 
8 E.g. insanity, intoxication, etc., see Rome Statute, Art. 26 and 31, (1), (b). 
9 Cryer R. ‘Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court’, R. Burchill et al (eds), in 
International Conflict and Security Law (July 2009), 49 at 53, Cambridge online available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511495137.006 . 
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In most legal systems
10
 defences have been divided into two forms: those that 
serve as justification (considering an unlawful act to be lawful)
11
 and those that 
excuse (recognising the unlawful nature of an act but removing the perpetrator from 
blame).
12
 I will argue that, in contrast to the ‘justification’ category of defences, there 
is link between the ‘excuse’ defences and impunity, as the conduct is unlawful but 
not punishable. However, the Rome Statute does not categorise approaches to 
defences; instead, the section on defences in the Statute is simply entitled ‘Grounds 
excluding from criminal responsibility’.13  
As a preliminary analysis, this chapter will examine the different doctrines of 
defences and the different defences in national and international law. Some specific 
issues regarding defences will then be examined: firstly, the defences of insanity and 
intoxication; secondly, the defence of superior orders in Article 33(2) thirdly, the 
self-defence of property which is essential for a military mission in Article 31(1) (c). 
The fourth section will deal with the plea of duress under Article 31 (d) and the final 
section deals with Article 28, which concerns military and civilian superiors’ 
responsibility. Concerning the categorisations, the first leads to the recognition of 
impunity; the second and third issues would give rise to impunity; and the fourth and 
final issues may facilitate impunity. 
Considering briefly each of the above issues, it should be noted that, in the 
defences of insanity and intoxication in the Rome Statute. I will argue that, there is 
link between these defences and impunity, but such defendants are morally blameless 
and not legally punishable and these defences have accordingly been recognised as 
absolute defences. The Chapter, then, focuses on the very intricate issues of defences 
in the Rome Statute in relation to war crimes, and how they may give rise to 
impunity. In practice, the main area in which defences play an important role is in 
relation to war crimes, because of the broad range of crimes included therein; in 
                                               
10 E.g. for a common law system, see the Criminal Code of Canada, 1985, C-46, Art. 8 (3), and 17; as 
to a civil law system, the penal code of Germany (1871), also distinguished between justification and 
excuse; see the German Penal Code of 1871, translated by Gerhard O.W. Mueller and Thomas 
Buergenthal (1961), at 6 and 8; see also Art.52 and 53. 
11 E.g. self-defence has been categorised as a defence of justification, see Cassese A. International 
Criminal Law (2008), at 255-56; Eser A.‘Justification and Excuse’, 24 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1976), 621, at 623.  
12 E.g. Dressler J. ‘Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature,’ 33 
The Wayne Law Review, (1987), 1155, at 1166; Eser A . Id, at 635. 
13 See the Rome Statute Art. 31. 
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contrast, for genocide and crimes against humanity, the exclusion of criminal 
responsibility through defences may be a rare and extraordinary situation.
 14
 
The second type of defence in the Statute that will be discussed is the defence 
of superior orders for war crimes in Article 33(2). One of the most controversial 
topics at the Rome Conference was whether or not the defence of superior orders for 
war crimes should be included in the Statute.
15
 I will argue that the inclusion of 
superior orders as a defence in the Statute has departed from customary international 
law,
16
 in which superior orders may only be considered a mitigating factor. Although 
the Statute adopted the defence of superior orders only under certain conditions
17
 and 
in relation to the limited scope of war crimes, it recognised superior orders as a 
defence, which signifies that liability can be excluded completely.  
The third defence to be examined is the extension of the defence of self-
defence to include defence of property essential for a military mission in Article 
31(1) (c). This is a very controversial issue,
18
 and ‘self-defence’ of military property 
has never been recognised as a defence before;
19
 it will be discussed that this Article 
hereby goes beyond lex lata (the law as it exists).
20
  
The fourth defence will be the plea of duress, which has been recognised as a 
complete defence for all crimes in the Statute,
21
 but could also act as a mitigating 
factor under the Rules of Procedure.
22
 There are different and opposing approaches 
regarding the scope and nature of duress and as to whether it should be adopted as a 
defence or a mitigating factor among scholars.
23
 The plea of superior orders usually 
                                               
14 Kress C. ‘War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System 
of International Criminal Justice’, 30  Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2001),103, at 151;  Schabas 
W. ‘General Principles of Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute’, 6 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal law, and Criminal Justice (1998),84, at 105. 
15 Garraway C. ‘Superior Orders and International Criminal Court: Justice delivered or justice 
denied’, 863 International Review of the Red Cross (1999),1, at 1. 
16 Cassese A. ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 
European Journal of International Law (1999),144, at 156;  Frulli  M. ‘Are Crimes Against Humanity 
more serious than War Crimes?’, 12 European Journal of International Law (2001),329, at 340; 
Gaeta P. (1999), Supra note 5, at 187.  
17 Rome Statute Art. 33(1). 
18 Frulli M. Ibid, at 339; Cassese A.(1999), Supra note 16, at 154-155 
19 Cryer R. ‘The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal Law’, 6 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2001),3, at 17. 
20 Cassese A. (1999), Supra note 16, at 154.  
21 Rome Statute Art. 31. 
22 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First session (3-
10 September 2002), Official Records ICC-ASP/1/3, Art. 145, (2), (a), (i), see also Berman M.N. 
Supra note 40, at 4.   
23 Newman M.S.C. ‘Duress as Defense to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Prosecutor v. 
Drazen  Erdemovic’, 166  Military Law Review (2000),158, at 168; E.g. Cryer R. (2001), Supra note 
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overlaps with the plea of duress.
24
 I will argue that, generally, the availability of the 
plea of duress as a defence for all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC may 
reduce the role of deterrence of the ICC, and may facilitate a situation in which some 
perpetrators may escape punishment. The defence of duress was rejected as an 
absolute defence in the Erdemovic case in the ICTY,
25
 which became a highly 
controversial issue among scholars,
26
 but those who support the judgment argue that 
this is a policy approach which will enhance the role of deterrence of the Court for 
future crimes.
27
  
The fifth issue regarding defences to be considered concerns the dichotomy 
of the standard of liability between military commanders and civilian superiors in 
Article 28 (a) and (b). The Article has recognised a higher threshold of liability for 
civilian superiors, and many scholars have argued that this distinction concerning 
liability was unnecessary.
28
 I will argue that this distinction is also problematic in 
practice, as it is not always easy to distinguish between de jure and de facto military 
superiors. The recent practice of the ICC in Bemba Gombo case
29
 indicated such 
theoretical and practical difficulties which may lead to the delay of prosecution. This 
case has also indicated the fact that the judges of the ICC in practice have desired to 
eliminate the double threshold of liability. I will argue that this distinction of liability 
may give rise to impunity for civilian superiors. 
4.1. The different doctrines of defences in international law 
Systems of national law have endeavoured to tackle the difficult dilemma regarding 
defences through one of three main approaches, although they have not always met 
                                                                                                                                     
19, at 17; see also generally Sliedregt E.V. ‘Defences in International Criminal Law’, paper presented 
at the Conference, Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems (2003), 1. 
24 Cryer R. (2009),  Supra note 9, at 55; see also  Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Cassese ICTY, IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997), Para 15. 
25 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Judgment, ICTY, IT-96-22-A, (7 October 1997), Para 19.   
26 Rua W. I. ‘Duress, International Law and Literature’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2006), 724, at 724; Cryer R. (2001), Supra note 19, at 17, footnote 94; and see generally Newman 
M.S.C. Supra note 23.  
27 McDonald G. k. ‘The Elleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing Nature of the 
Laws of War,’ 156 Military Law Review (1998), 30 at 49. 
28 Cryer R. ‘General Principles of Liability in International Criminal Law’, in D. McGoldrick, P. 
Rowe & E. Donnelly(eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court- Legal and Policy Issues 
(2004), 233, at 259; Vetter G. R. ‘Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)’, 25 Yale Journal of International Law (2000), 89, at 110 and 120. 
29 It has qualified Bemba as a military commander, see Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II (15 June 2009). 
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with great success.
30
 The first and traditional doctrine was the act of State doctrine, 
which was propounded actively by Hans Kelsen, in which individuals have no direct 
responsibility for violations of international law. Rather, their acts lead to 
responsibility only by way of being attributed by imputation to their State. Since one 
State has no jurisdiction over another State no criminal liability can be established 
over the individuals concerned other than by the state of nationality itself.
31
 
However, Kelsen also asserted that individual criminal liability signified justice to a 
greater extent than collective responsibility did.
32
 Nevertheless, the individual can 
not be tried in a court of a foreign State and thus state immunity was accepted as a 
complete defence. The second approach, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or 
Befehl ist Befehl (‘order is order’) theory, is one which accepts much of Kelsen’s 
thesis, but also admits some scope for individual criminal liability. According to this 
theory, individual criminal liability depends upon the question as to whether or not 
the soldier has committed a crime in obedience to superior orders.
33
 This theory was 
asserted by Oppenheim at the beginning of the twentieth century as follows:  
[v]iolations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when committed without 
an order of the belligerent Government concerned. If members of the armed forces 
commit violations by order of their Government, they are not war criminals and 
cannot be punished by the enemy; the latter can however, resort to reprisals. In case 
members of forces commit violations ordered by their commanders, the members 
may not be punished, for the commanders are alone responsible, and the latter may, 
therefore, be punished as war criminals on their capture by the enemy.
34
        
 
Although the above doctrines are different in starting points, conclusions, and 
applicability, both of them lead to impunity through the assertion of immunity on the 
part of individuals.
35
 However, the Nuremberg Tribunal put an end to these doctrines 
in the aftermath of World War II, and for the first time individuals became fully 
                                               
30 Dinstein Y. The Defence of ‘Obedience to Superior Orders’ in International Law (1965), at 8; see 
also Sliedregt E.V.(2003), Supra note 23, at 1-2. 
31 Kelsen H. General Theory of Law and State, translated by A. Wedberg (1961), at 191, he asserts: 
Certain actions of individual human being are considered as actions of the State… Not every 
individual is capable of performing actions which have the character of acts of the State; …The 
judgment by which we refer a human action to the State, as to an invisible person, means an 
imputation of a human action to the State. The problem of the State is a problem of imputation. The 
State is, so to speak, a common point into which various human actions are projected, a common point 
of imputation for different human actions. The individuals, whose actions are imputed to the State, are 
designated as “organ” of the State. See also Kelsen H. ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial 
Constitute a Precedent in International Law?’ 1 International Law Quarterly (1947),153, at 159. 
32 Id, at 165.  
33 Dinstein Y. Ibid, at 8.            
34 Oppenheim L.  International Law (1906),Vol, II , at 264-265. 
35 Dinstein Y.  Ibid, at 59, he asserts, ‘both of them lend international offenders a mantle of immunity 
from responsibility’. 
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subjects of international law quite independently of the question of State 
responsibility.
36
 After that, those approaches (act of State doctrine and respondeat 
superior) were no longer available as defences for international crimes.  
The third theory is the doctrine of absolute liability, which dictates that a 
soldier must consider every superior order that is given to him; if it is evidently an 
order to commit a crime, he must disobey and he may not be punished for this. If he 
chooses to obey he does so at his own risk, as his obedience to superior orders will 
not prevent him from being convicted.
37
 
 As a matter of fact, these doctrines are dangerous if applied separately, and 
are also opposite to each other and may not help to solve the dilemma mentioned 
above. For example, the act of State doctrine cannot be reconciled with the interests 
of criminal law, and absolute liability is inconsistent with the requirements of 
military discipline. It seems that the better solution for solving the dilemma in a 
national legal system is not to select one of those doctrines but to consider both, 
‘inter alia’, in a legal procedure. A suggested solution is that, in general if a soldier 
commits an offence in obedience to superior orders this removes the responsibility 
for his illegal behaviour. However, if the illegality of an order is clear, the soldier 
must manifestly refuse to obey the superior orders; otherwise he will be legally liable 
and will face punishment for his actions.
38
 This solution is designed to recognise and 
deal with the potential conflicts arising for soldiers who are obliged to obey the rules 
of military discipline but at the same time act within the law, ‘the manifest illegality 
principle’.39 The manifest illegality principle was applied for war criminals after 
World War 1 at the Leipzig trials in Germany.
 40
 It appears that in the case of war 
                                               
36 See Chapter II, the first section. 
37 Dinstein Y Ibid, at 8. 
38 Id, at 8. 
39 Id, at 9.  
40 See e.g. the LIandovery Castle Case:  Helmut Brummer-Patzig, the commander of a German 
submarine attacked the LIandovery Castle, despite being fully aware that it was a hospital-ship. His 
subordinates- Dithmar and Boldt- who participated in the attack and massacre of the survivors sought 
to rely on a defence of following Patzig’s orders before the court in Leipzig. However, the Court held 
that: ‘the firing on the boats was an offence against the law of nations... the subordinate obeying such 
an order is liable to punishment, if it was known to him that the order of the superior involved the 
infringement of civil or military law.’ The Court finally held that such orders are known universally to 
be illegal and thus found them guilty. Nonetheless, the court acknowledged the defence of superior 
orders in this case as a mitigation factor and sentenced them to just four years imprisonment. For 
LIandovery Castle case, see ‘Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, Crime War 
Trials I, Supreme Court at Leipzig, Judgment in the Case of Kart Heynen, rendered May 26, 1921’ 16 
American Journal of International Law (1922), 674, at 721- 22; see also The Laws of Armed Conflict, 
A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, in D. Schindler (eds), at 868 to 882; 
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crimes in the Leipzig Trial the illegality of such orders was clear and respondeat 
superior was not acceptable as a defence.  
4.1.1. The distinction between defences among national legal systems   
In this section, I will argue that the distinction between defences of justification and 
excuse is theoretically and practically important. In particular, it is significant for the 
basic understanding of how defences operate in a criminal process. I will also argue 
that a link exists between the ‘excuse’ defences and impunity.  
Generally, defences have been considered a justification or excuse in most 
national criminal law systems.
41
 In the Canadian Criminal Code, for instance, self-
defence and necessity are categorised as justifications.
42
 In the amendment of the 
German penal code, defences are classified into justifications and excuses, but some 
defences such as necessity are categorised in both - justification and excuse.
43
 The 
German penal code of 1871 had already distinguished between justification and 
excuse.
44
 The distinction between justification and excuse is also well established in 
the Italian Criminal Code. In Italy, claims of legitimate defence, necessity and duress 
are justifications.
45
 In the US Model Penal Code a ground of defence is divided also 
into justification and excuse. It provides that a ground of defence is affirmative when 
it involves a matter of excuse or justification within the defendant’s knowledge on 
which he can fairly be expected to supply supporting evidence.
46
 
a) Justification is normally due to an individual’s situation,47 in which the 
action under consideration is not in fact a crime but lawful.
48
 The justification is 
related to the assessment of the conduct in an objective way; the situation which has 
                                                                                                                                     
Mullins C. The Leipzig trials: An Account of the War Criminals Trials and a Study of German 
Mentality (1921), at 27-31. 
41 Eser  A. (1976), Supra note 11, at 621-622; see also generally Alexander L. ‘Self Defense, 
Justification and Excuse’, 22 Philosophy and Public Affairs (1993),53;  McAuley F. ‘The Theory of 
Justification and Excuse: Some Italian Lessons’, 35 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
(1987),35; Berman M, N. ‘Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality’, 53 Duke Law Journal 
(2003),1, at 7-8; Sliedregt E.V. (2003), Supra note 23, at 2; Dressler J. Supra note 12, at 1164. It is 
also theorised based on the rights theory of moral interest, the theory of lesser harm, and justification 
based on ‘public benefit’; see Greenawalt K. ‘The perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse’, 84 
Colombia Law Review (1984), 8, 1897, at 1915. He asserts that: ‘Justifications typically arise out of 
the nature of the actor’s situation, excuses out of the actor’s personal characteristics.’ 
42 The Criminal Code of Canada 1985, C-46, Art. 35 and 612(1). 
43 The German Criminal Code of  1998, Art. 34 and 35. Also in its amendment on 5 November 2008 
duress categorised as excuse in Art.35 (2). 
44 The German Penal Code of 1871. Supra note 9, at 5-8. 
45 See the Italian Criminal Code (Codice Penale), Art. 52. 
46 The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1962), section 1.12. (3), (c), at 20. 
47 Greenawalt K. (1984), Supra note 40, at 1915.  
48 Berman M.N. Supra note 40, at 4.  
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led to the justification is considered to oblige the evaluation in moral and/or legal 
terms of an act which would otherwise be wrongful and unlawful.
49
 Justification is 
based on several theories; the first, moral interest theory, considers that self defence, 
for instance, may be justified on the grounds that individuals have an innate right to 
personal autonomy and that when that right is compromised in an unlawful manner, 
the innocent individual may safeguard her interest as required by the circumstances, 
including killing the one threatening her autonomy.
50
 The second theory of 
justification is based on the idea of ‘lesser harm’, in which certain conduct may be 
permitted when the interests of the defendant prevail over those that are protected by 
criminal law.
51
 For example, trespass on other people’s land or private property 
usually are unlawful conduct, but are justifiable if an incident occurs in the interest of 
protecting the life of human who is threatened by a natural disaster. The third theory 
concerns justification on the basis of ‘public interest’, in which unlawful conduct is 
justified where it is performed for the benefit of society. For example, the action of 
an executioner in killing a convicted criminal is justified because of his public 
duties.
52
 The significance of these considerations is that the justification category of 
defences, denies the legal liability of the accused from the beginning if it has been 
reasonably approved during the judicial process. The justificatory conditions ensure 
that what would be deemed an offence under other circumstances is now considered 
morally right and legally permissible.
53
  
b) An excuse defence is normally due to the personal character of an 
individual;
54
 the action is still considered a crime, but the defendant (such as in a 
case of insanity) is not punishable.
55
 Excuses are also advocated based on utilitarian 
value in certain theories of punishment, especially that of deterrence. It should be 
noted that, for instance, an insane or coerced actor is excused because she is 
‘undeterrable’. The deontological ‘moral theories’ concerning penal law imply that 
the punishment is inefficient, and most advocates of these theories suggest that, 
                                               
49 Mousourakis G. ‘Justification and Excuse’, 7 Tilburg Foreign Law Review (1998-1999), 35, at 37. 
50 Dressler J. Supra note 12, at 1164.  
51 Id, at 1164; Mousourakis G. Ibid, at 38.  
52 Eser, A. (1976), Supra note 11, at 629-30; Dressler, J. Supra note 12, at 1164-65. 
53 Mousourakis G. Ibid, at 37.  
54 Greenawalt K. (1984), Supra note 40, at 1915 
55 Berman M.N. Supra note 40, at 4. 
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though the excused actors are often dangerous persons, they are not morally blameful 
for their actions. 
56
 
The second advantage of the categorisation of defences as excuse and 
justification appears in practice in terms of the punishment for some crimes. 
Concerning complicity for instance, the US Model Penal Code
57
 provides that each 
actor is subject to punishment regardless of the question of the guilt of the others, but 
an accessory before or in the act is punishable only if the act is unlawful. An 
accessory is not to be punished if he has facilitated an action which is justified by 
‘justifying necessity’, whereas he is merely excused in the case of ‘excusing 
necessity’. This applies also in the case of accessories after the fact and to receiving 
stolen goods.
58
 The point is that in the offence of complicity, the guilt of the principal 
offender determines the validity of the charges against any accessories. For example, 
where a charge of theft has not been established, then one can not be convicted of 
receiving stolen property. Hence the acquittal of the principal becomes the 
“justifying necessity” that exonerates the accessory. Another practical advantage of 
this distinction is that a successfully excused defendant might be liable to pay 
compensation for any damage resulting from his criminal action.
59
 For example, in a 
case of murder by an insane person or a minor, he/she will not be punished, but their 
parents or relatives may have to pay compensation to the victim’s family.60 
The question arises as to how this distinction may relate to the question of 
impunity in general. In this regard, it should be remembered that in the justification 
category of defences, the defendant’s action is not considered a crime, but lawful. 
For example, in the defence of self-defence, if the defendant used reasonable force to 
defend herself from an imminent attack, and successfully raises the defence of self-
defence in court, she denies the crime from the beginning and she is not liable. In 
contrast, a defendant raising a defence in the excuse category, such as insanity, in 
fact is someone who has committed a crime; but due to (e.g.) mental disease, lack of 
                                               
56 Dressler, J. Supra note 12, at 1164.   
57 See the US Model Penal Code Section 2(7). It provides: ‘An accomplice may be convicted on proof 
of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have 
committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different 
offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.’ A 
similar regulation is also codified in the Iranian Criminal Code, Art.42. 
58 Eser, A. (1976), Supra note 11, at 622. 
59 Cassese A. (2008), Supra note 11, at 257. 
60 Some national criminal codes make such provisions for criminals with mental disorders; see e.g. 
the Iranian Criminal Code Art.50. 
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mens rea, she is not punishable, and is morally blameless. Since such a defendant in 
fact has no capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of her actions, there is 
no advantage for society to punish her since she is not deterrable. Therefore, there is 
a link between the excuse defences (whereby the actions under consideration are still 
criminal) and impunity; excuses do give rise to impunity, but this impunity is 
acceptable. Hence, in a broader definition of impunity, it may be said that impunity is 
not always illegal or immoral, but may be recognised by the law. Thus, the 
categorisation of defences into justifications and excuses can have serious practical 
and theoretical implications. 
The prior international tribunals did not, however, make such a division of 
defences.
61
 The Rome Statute has also not distinguished between the two types of 
defence; although the ad hoc Committee made reference to both excuses and 
justifications, this was not accepted in the final draft of the Statute.
62
 It has 
nevertheless become clear that there are fundamental differences between excuse and 
justification defences; accordingly, if the Statute had codified defences in such as 
way as to adopt such a distinction, the aforementioned basic theoretical and practical 
advantages could also have been applicable to the ICC. 
4.1.2. Historical narrative of defences in prior international tribunals  
The prior international tribunals recognised the right to defence as a requirement of a 
fair and just trial in their statutes and recognised different types of defences in 
practice.
63
 In particular, it appeared among the war crimes trials in the aftermath of 
the first and second World Wars and the right continued to be guaranteed later on in 
the procedures of the ad hoc tribunals. The first outline of a procedure for the 
defence of a prisoner of war in “judicial proceedings” is found in the 1929 Geneva 
                                               
61 The only exception is in the Statute of the ICTY, which makes mention of ‘military necessity’ as a 
ground of justification; see the Statute of the ICTY Art. 2(d), and 3 (b). 
62 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
GAOR, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No.22, A/50/22 (1995). 
63 Kopel D. B. Gallanr P & Eisen J.D. ‘The Human Rights of Self-Defense’, 22 BYU Journal of 
Public Law (2008), 43, at 58; Brownlie I. The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law 
at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1998), (Hague Academy of International Law 
Monographs), at 65; see also the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), UN 
GA, Res. 2200A (XXI), (16 December 1966), Art.14; the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also called the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
ETS No.5 (4 November 1950), Art. 6. 
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Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
64
 This treaty declares that 
a prisoner must be advised that he is “entitled to assistance by a qualified counsel of 
his choice,” and if he fails to choose a counsel, “the protecting power may obtain a 
counsel for him”.65 The Leipzig war trials also recognised for defendants a right to 
defence and a right to counsel.
66
 The same provision can be found in the 1937 
League of Nations proposed convention for the creation of an international criminal 
court.
67
 The Nuremberg Charter also guaranteed that a defendant ‘shall have the right 
to conduct his own defence before the Tribunal or to have assistance of counsel’68 
and the Tokyo Tribunal with slightly more detail provided the same right for 
defendants.
69
  
As to legal defences which enable a defendant to avoid or limit her liability: 
none of the prior international tribunals codified different defences independently in 
their Statutes and Charters. However, different types of defences, such as the defence 
of self-defence, insanity,
70
 and the plea of superior order were respected in the post-
World War II tribunals in practice.
71
 Similarly, the current ad hoc international 
tribunals have respected self-defence, though neither the ICTY nor the ICTR have 
codified the defence of self-defence in their Statutes; instead, their Statutes have 
emphasised that the conduct of fair trials is ‘[a] right of accused’,72 thus leaving 
decisions regarding defences' applicability to the tribunals.
73
 In practice, in the 
Kordic & Cerkez case, for instance, where the defendant in a meritless defence 
argued that the Bosnian Croats were victims of Muslim aggression in Central Bosnia 
                                               
64 Convention between the United States of America and other powers, relating to Prisoner of War, 
signed at Geneva (July 27, 1929), Art. 42,60-67, in the Laws of  Armed Conflict, A Collection of 
Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, in D. Schindler(eds), at 350 and 354-355. 
65 Id, Art. 61-62. 
66 See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 Art.227and 229. 
67 See the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, League of Nations, (16 
Nov1937), Art.29, in Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction - 
Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1 ; the UN. Charter also 
has recognised the right of individuals or collectives to use force in self-defence, as an exception to its 
prohibition on the use of such force when there is a military attack against a state. See the UN. Charter 
Art. 51. It provides: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’ 
68 See the IMT Charter Art. 16 (d). 
69 The IMTFE Charter, Art. 9(d). 
70 E.g. defendants Rudolf Hess and  Julius Streicher were resorted to the plea of insanity at IMT, see 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945- 1 October 1946, Official Documents (1947),Vol, II, at  24, 156, 481-7. 
71 See Nuremberg Charter Art. 8 and  IMTFE Charter Art. 6. 
72 See the ICTY Statute Art.20 and 21 and the ICTR Statute Art. 19 and 20. 
73 Cryer R. Supra note 19, at 16.   
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and that they were fighting a war of self-defence,
74
 the ICTY's Trial Chamber held 
that:  
     [T]he Statute of the International Tribunal does not provide for self-defence as a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility. “Defences” however form part of the 
general principles of criminal law which the International Tribunal must take into 
account in deciding the cases before it.
 75
 
 
However, and in contrast to the previous international tribunals, the Rome Statute 
codified defences in more detail.
76
  
Therefore, both the basic right to defence and the different types of legal 
defences available under different systems of national law and international tribunals 
are significant and necessary requirements of a fair and just trial; this is accepted as a 
matter of humanitarian law. Furthermore, legal defences are necessary for a due 
process trial, in order to find the defendant guilty or not appropriately; and it is 
advantageous to identify different categories of defences which have different 
consequences, etc. In particular, the defence of superior orders makes it possible for 
the real criminal, who was actually responsible for the commission of crimes, to be 
punished.
77
 Thus, the inclusion of defences in the Rome Statute has been a necessary 
development in the progress of humanitarian law. As has been mentioned, generally 
there is a link between excuse defences and impunity, as the defendant pleading an 
excuse defence has committed crimes but is unpunishable; in contrast, there is no 
direct link between justification defences (such as self-defence) and impunity. 
However, some parts of the codification of defences in the Statute are controversial 
and either depart from customary rules or are new codifications. Therefore, in this 
Chapter I seek to focus on the most controversial parts of these provisions, in order 
to explore how some of these definitions of defences may facilitate or create 
impunity. 
4.2. Defences in the Rome Statute 
The approach of referring to ‘grounds for excluding criminal responsibility’ in the 
Rome Statute, Article 31, was finally accepted instead of defences at the Rome 
Conference. This Article considers defences all together, including self-defence, 
                                               
74 See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez , ICTY, Trial Chamber Judgement, IT-95-14/2, (26 February 
2001), Para, 448. 
75 Id,  Para 449.  
76 See Rome Statute Art.  31 to 33. 
77 Cryer R. (2009), Supra note 9, at 53. 
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which is often regarded as a justification, and intoxication, insanity and duress, 
which are usually categorised as excuses.
78 ‘Mistake of fact or mistake of law’ and 
‘superior orders’ have also been codified as defences in the statute.79This section of 
the present paper seeks to focus mainly on the most controversial parts of these 
provisions; however, before doing so I wish first briefly to examine the two type of 
absolute defence in the Statute, namely insanity and intoxication. Defences in the 
Statute have been the subject of a vast literature by scholars.
80
 I attempt to discuss 
which types of defences in the Statute may or do give rise to impunity and how this 
takes place. The various sub-sections focus on the most controversial aspects of 
defences in the Statute, i.e. the defence of superior orders, the defence of property 
which is essential for a military mission, duress, and the different thresholds of 
liability for military and non-military superiors. 
4.2.1. Absolute defences in the Rome Statute: insanity and intoxication 
In both insanity and involuntary intoxication defences, defendants have committed 
unlawful acts but they are not punishable. The first of these, insanity (at the time of 
committing the crime) is a complete defence in both common law and civil law 
systems.
81
 The Statute provides: 
[A] person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s 
conduct: (a)The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that 
person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, 
or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law;
82
  
 
The Rome Statute does not address itself to the situation of an accused person 
who is found to be insane; in consequence, Amnesty International has highlighted 
that rules will need to be established providing procedures consistent with 
international law and standards for dealing with this situation when the acquitted 
person continues to suffer from mental illness.
83
 According to Schabas, the Statute 
neither provides a consequence of the plea of insanity other than acquittal, nor should 
it provide any other consequence. If an individual who was insane at the time the 
                                               
78 The Rome Statute, Art.31. 
79 Id, Art. 32 and 33. 
80 In addition to the above see, McCoubrey H. ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring the Defence of 
Superior Orders’, 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2001), 386; see also below note 
90. 
81 Gilbert J. Supra note 1, at 45; Schabas W. Supra note 14, at 107. 
82 Rome Statute Art. 31(1), (a). 
83 Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: 16 fundamental principles for a just, fair 
and effective international criminal court, Doc: IOR 40/012/1998 (29 April 1998). 
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crime was committed poses no threat either to him- or herself or to others by the time 
of trial, this person ought simply to be released; should a danger still be posed,....
84
 
However, the excluding of criminal responsibility due to insanity is linked with the 
lack of mens rea as an essential element of a crime and could be as an absolute 
defence in the Rome Statute.  
The second of these two defences, intoxication, is also provided for by the 
Rome Statute in Article 31,
85
 and again this is linked with the element of mens rea of 
the accused at the time he/she committed crimes.
86
 Article 31 refers to ‘intoxication 
that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or 
her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements 
of law…’.87  
Some suggest that voluntary intoxication might be a mitigating factor, while 
other delegates in the Rome Conference completely denied it should be a defence for 
international crimes.
88
 In discussion it was pointed out that acceptance of voluntary 
intoxication as a defence could lead to a great number of crimes going unpunished 
and hence lead either to impunity or, in case of its being accepted as a mitigating 
factor, to individuals not receiving the appropriate punishment. Accordingly, it was 
finally decided by the drafters of the Rome Statute to exclude the defence for those in 
a state of voluntary intoxication, who should be held criminally responsible. 
However, the problem is that in practice it will not always be easy to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. It is of course possible that an 
individual might become intentionally intoxicated in order to commit a crime but 
subsequently claim involuntary intoxication. It was on this basis that several Arab 
countries at the Rome Conference objected to this provision.
89
 However, as Schabas 
argued, this plea is one that rarely occurs in the case law. He argues that codifying an 
uncontroversial definition of the intoxication defence is absurd, as the ICC is not 
                                               
84 Schabas W. Supra note 14, at 107. 
85 A comparison between insanity and intoxication was made by Preparatory Committee in 1997 that 
intoxication ‘was thought to be the person’s inability to distinguish between right and wrong,’ while 
the insanity ‘was the loss of a person’s judgment.’  See Initial Summary Reports on December 1-12 
Meetings of the United Nations Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court (December 18, 1997), at 10. Available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/5PrepCmtSummaryCICC.pdf (Accessed 22/08/2012).       
86 Gilbert J. Supra not 1, at 145. 
87 Rome Statute Art. 31(b). 
88Report of the working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law, UN Doc.  
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.1/Rev.1 (2 July 1998), at 4 and 8. 
89Id. 
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intended to deal with low-level war crimes but leaders, organisers and planners of 
crimes on a large scale. 
Both the insanity and the intoxication defences can be categorised as excuses, 
whereby the conduct of a defendant comprises a crime and is unlawful but the 
defendant is not responsible. Thus, there is link between these defences and 
impunity; however, these individuals are not morally responsible as they cannot 
distinguish between right and wrong action and lack mens rea. It might accordingly 
be said that this type of impunity is positive and acceptable; impunity such as this, 
however, is not the main concern of this thesis. 
4.2.2. Defence of superior orders in the Rome Statute    
The defence of obedience to superior orders in international law and in the ICC has 
been the subject of a vast literature among scholars.
90
 The arguments concerning the 
plea of superior orders in the Statute firstly concern the question of whether or not 
the Statute should include the defence of superior orders as a defence. The second 
argument is concerning the scope of defence, in which it is considered as to whether 
or not it should include all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The third 
argument is related to the question of whether the plea of superior orders should be 
accepted as a defence or as a mitigating factor; and finally, there is an argument 
regarding the question of the manifest illegality of war crimes in the Statute and 
whether or not the Statute has followed the customary rule concerning the defence of 
superior orders. I will argue that the Statute has here departed from customary law 
and provides a situation in which the plea of superior orders, under the conditions 
stipulated in Article 33, can be accepted as complete defence at the ICC. Prior to the 
above different arguments, it is worthwhile to examine the plea of superior orders in 
the prior international tribunals briefly.  
                                               
90 In addition to the above, see Cryer R. ‘Superior scholarship on superior orders: an appreciation of 
Yoram Dinstein’s “The Defence of  “Obedience to Superior Orders” in International Law”, 9 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2011),959; Eser A. ‘Grounds for Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility’, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the   International Criminal Court. O. Triffterer 
(eds), (2008), 863; Grayson J.W. ‘Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court’, 64 Nordic 
Journal of International Law (1995), 243;  Lippman M. R. ‘Humanitarian Law: The Development and 
Scope of the Superior Orders Defense,’ 20 Penn State International Law Review ( 2001-2), 153; Sato 
H. ‘The Defense of Superior Orders in International Law: Some Implications for the Codification of 
International Criminal Law,’ 9 International criminal Law Review (2009), 117;  Harris L. ‘The 
International Criminal Court and the Superior Orders Defence,’ 22 University of Tasmania Law 
Review (2003), 200; Wilner M.A. ‘Superior Orders as a Defense to Violations of International 
Criminal Law,’ 26 Maryland Law Review (1966),127.   
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Prior to the Nuremberg trial in 1945, the plea of superior orders was a defence if 
an order was not manifestly illegal.
91
 As a corollary to that doctrine, Oppenheim also 
recognised the possibility of a defence of superior orders. As outlined in the volume 
edited by Lauterpacht, it is noted that: 
Undoubtedly, a court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in 
justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that 
obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of every member 
of the armed forces and that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be 
expected to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order received; that rules 
of warfare are often controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to a war 
crime may have been executed in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of 
reprisal.
92
   
 
According to his doctrine obedience to ‘military orders’ only constitutes a defence 
when they are not manifestly unlawful; thus, in the case of a soldier who obeyed an 
order of a superior which at that time appeared lawful, the soldier was not 
responsible.
93
 However, this doctrine has not been followed by the post-war 
tribunals; in the Leipzig Trials after World War I also, superior orders as a defence 
was rejected in the Llandovery Castle case.
94
 After World War II, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal flatly rejected the existence of a defence of superior orders on the basis that, 
almost by definition, any order to commit a war crime must be manifestly unlawful. 
According to article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter: 
    The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of this Government or of a 
superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation 
of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
95
  
 
As this Article makes clear, a defence of superior orders is not admissible as such, 
but only as a mitigating factor in the assessment of the severity of the punishment to 
be meted out. The case law also rejected such a plea in the case of Keitle at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal; Nelte, who was one of the counsels for the defence, argued that 
his client Keitle had been merely a tool of an overwhelming will, but the Tribunal 
dismissed this argument and held that is not acceptable that Hitler made use of 
individuals if they were aware of what they were doing and that the relationship 
between leaders and followers does not obviate responsibility.
96
 Consequently, a plea 
                                               
91 McCoubrey H. (2001), Supra note 80, at 386. 
92 Oppenheim L. International Law, War and Neutrality, in H. Lauterpacht (ed), (1944),Vol, II, at 454. 
93 McCoubrey H. Ibid, at 386. 
94 See LIandovery Castle case. Supra note 40. 
95 See the Nuremberg Charter Art. 8. 
96 See Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1947), Supra note 
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of superior orders, which was a defence prior to the Nuremberg trial, was changed to 
a potential plea in mitigation of sentence rather than as a defence in the military 
tribunals after World War II.
97
 Similarly, the plea of superior orders was allowed as a 
mitigation factor by Control Council Law No 10, Article 2 (4) of 1945.
98
 The same 
approach has been followed more recently in the ICTY
99
 and ICTR
100
 Statutes. 
Therefore, the plea of superior orders is a mitigating factor under customary 
international law rather than a defence; but the Rome Statute adopted a different 
approach. 
The first, controversial argument, which has been an issue both under international 
law and at the Rome Conference, concerns whether or not the defence of superior 
orders should be included in the Statute.
101
 In fact, during the Rome Conference there 
were vigorous debates relating to defences in general, and in particular for the 
exclusion of criminal responsibility for the defence of superior orders.
102
 This may be 
a function of the discord between military discipline’s requirement of obedience and 
justice’s requirement that crimes be punished.103The defence of obedience to superior 
orders is mainly characteristic of war crimes trials, but it could be invoked wherever 
there exists a hierarchical system of authority.
104
 Many human rights NGOs also have 
expressed view against the inclusion of the superior orders as defence in the 
Statute.
105
 
The second argument is concerned with the scope of the defences in the 
Rome Statute. In the 1994 draft Statute prepared by the International Law 
                                               
97 See the Nuremberg and IMTFE Charters Art.8 and Art.6 respectively. 
98 See Allied Control Council Law No. 10, (20 Dec 1945), see also Final Report to the Secretary of 
the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10, by Telford Taylor, 
in The Military Legal Resources (15 August 1949). 
99 The ICTY Statute Art.7 (4). 
100 The ICTR Statute Art.6 (4). A similar approach was also taken by the International Law 
Commission in 1996 in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.522, and Corr.1 Art. 5. 
101 Garraway C. (1999), Supra note 15, at 1. 
102 See the UN Conference on the Establishment of the ICC. Supra note 3, Vol, II, at 107, 1017 and 
132-133; see also the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), at 57; Garraway C. Ibid, at 1. 
103 Garraway C. Id, at 1.  
104 Dinstein Y. ‘Defences’, in G. K MacDonald & O. Swaak-Goldman (eds), Substantive and 
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National 
Courts (2000),367, at 379.  
105 E.g. Human Rights Watch, Comments on the Draft International Criminal Court Bill 2000, it 
provides: “The principle that there can be no defense of superior orders is well established under 
international law. This principle was incorporated into Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter, which 
explicitly prohibited the application of superior orders as a defense.…The draft Bill should be 
amended to explicitly provide that the defense of superior orders is not available for the crimes set out 
in the Bill.” 
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Commission, the admissibility of defences for each crime within the Jurisdiction of 
the Court, including the defence of the superior orders, was suggested.
106
 However, 
at the Rome Conference, after a long and difficult discussion concerning defences, in 
order to reconcile between the aforementioned different approaches the defence of 
superior orders was limited to war crimes in Article 33.
107
 The most controversial 
debate is related to this exclusion, in Article 33(2) of the superior orders defence 
from cases of genocide and crimes against humanity.
108
 Scholars’ views have been 
divided into two main schools concerning the defence of superior orders and the 
manifest illegality test under Article 33 of the Statute. The first view belongs to those 
scholars who have argued that the defence of superior orders should be recognised, 
as it is in Article 33, for war crimes, and possibly for the other two core crimes of 
crimes against humanity and genocide.
109
 Some of these scholars argue that Article 
33 has the balance right and that the superior orders defence should be allowed for 
war crimes but not for the other two core crimes.
110
 Other scholars criticise Article 
33 (2) and affirm that its position does not exist in customary law; Cryer, for 
instance, is of the view that the superior orders defence should not be automatically 
excluded even for cases of crimes against humanity or genocide.
111
  
The third argument relates to whether superior orders should be accepted as a 
defence or as a mitigating factor. The Preparatory Committee on the 18th of 
December 1997 suggested that a superior order should not relieve an individual from 
criminal responsibility, as a defence, but that the Statute should follow the standard 
established by customary international law, in particular as codified by the 
Nuremberg Charter, the ICTY and ICTR, and the Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind,
112
 and such an order should be accepted as a 
mitigating factor. In the final draft the Preparatory Committee provides ‘there seems 
                                               
106 See the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the ILC on the work of its 
forty-sixth session (2 May - 22 July 1994), GA, Official Records, forty-ninth session, supplement No. 
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107 See Rome Statute Article 33. 
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to be an agreement on seeing certain superior orders as a mitigating circumstance.’113 
There were in fact two main approaches at the Rome Conference regarding the 
defence of superior orders.
114
 Many insisted on maintaining the Nuremberg standard; 
they argued that the Statute should follow the two ad hoc (ICTY and ICTR) tribunals 
in regard to superior orders. However, other delegations were more cautious 
concerning superior orders defences.
115
 Ultimately, however, according to the Chair 
of the Working Group, after a series of long and difficult debates at the 
Conference
116
 the two opposing positions found a compromise
117
 and agreed on 
Article 33, whereby superior orders were adopted as a defence for war crimes only. 
This Article provides that:  
  1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by 
a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military 
or civilian shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:       
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government 
or the Superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the order was 
unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
  2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful.
118
 
 
This Article has adopted a conditional liability approach and required for the 
defence of superior orders three conditions. The first is that the accused should be 
under a legal obligation to obey the instruction; some interpreters have suggested that 
this requires the accused to be legally compelled to obey, and not for instance under 
threat of loss of his or her job if obedience is refused.
119
 The second condition is that 
the accused ‘did not know that the order was unlawful’, and the third that the order 
was not manifestly unlawful. The uncertainty in this Article concerns the location of 
the burden of proof. Garraway suggests in regard to Article 67(1) (i) of the Statute 
that the burden of proof ‘can be placed on accused’,120 but this view has not been 
                                               
113 Id. 
114 See generally UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the an International 
Criminal Court Supra note 3.  
115 Id, see the original proposal of the United States, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C,1/WGCP/L.2 (16 June 
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116 Cryer R. (2009), Supra note 9, at 52; he quotes Saland, who was the head of the Working Group at 
the Rome Conference; see also the Rome Conference, Id, Vol,  II. Ibid, at 132, Para, 28. 
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compromise on the inclusion of superior orders in the Rome Statute’.  
118 See the Rome Statute Art. 33. 
119 Garraway C. (1999), Supra note 15, at 4.   
120 Id.   
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specified in the Statute nor in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
121
 Cryer argues 
that ‘Article 33(2) is unclear on whether the relevant awareness of the context for 
crimes against humanity or specific intent for genocide is that of the superior or the 
subordinate.’122 Furthermore, the Article does not prevent the accused from raising 
superior orders as a part of another defence such as duress.
123
 
The fourth argument pertains to the question of the manifest illegality of war 
crimes; on this issue also scholars has been divided into two schools. The first view 
advocates the approach taken in Article 33; for example, McCoubrey asserts that 
cases reaching the ICC will most likely involve ‘manifest illegality’ in most 
instances anyway, and that the requirements of Article 33 are actually quite strict for 
the availability of a superior orders defence. He opines that Article 33 ‘is very far 
from being a carte-blanche for the commission of war crimes under the shelter of 
“orders”; it is on the contrary a protection for personnel who have been led 
unwittingly into unlawful conduct which they neither comprehended nor 
intended.’124 Similarly, Garraway insists that ‘[t]he majority of [war] crimes [as 
listed under Article 8 of the Statute] are so manifestly illegal that the issue [of non-
manifest unlawfulness as per Article 33] would never arise.’125However, one may 
question, if it is truly the case that such a defence (of superior orders in the case of 
non-manifest illegality of orders) would never happen, why this Article, after very 
difficult discussions and compromises, has been adopted in the Statute. It might have 
been extensively limited, but there is a possibility in practice for a defence to be 
raised by defendants accused of war crimes that they followed orders which did not 
seem illegal for them at that time. 
Scholars such as Frulli, in order to justify the distinction made in Article 33 
(2) between war crimes on the one hand and crimes against humanity and genocide 
on the other, have raised the idea that war crimes are less serious than the other two 
core crimes.
126
 Frulli asserts that the exception of the recognition of self–defence for 
war crimes in Article 31(1) (c) for defence of a property which is essential for a 
                                               
121 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First session (3-
10 September 2002), Official Records ICC-ASP/1/3. 
122 Cryer R. (2009), Supra note 9, at 64. 
123 Garraway C. Ibid, at 4. 
124 McCoubrey H. (2001), Supra note 80, at 392.    
125 Garraway C. (1999), Ibid, at 4.   
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military purpose, as well as Article 33(2) affirm this argument.
127
 Initially, such a 
contention might seem appropriate, but in fact I argue that it is not. Firstly, the 
Statute and its negotiation history at the Rome Conference have not articulated any 
such hierarchy. Secondly, the idea that crimes against humanity or genocide possess 
more seriousness than war crimes is debatable and is in contrast to the current 
practice of the ICTY. The Tadic case provides ‘[a] prohibited act committed as a 
crime against humanity, that is with an awareness that the act formed part of a 
widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population, is, all else being equal, a 
more serious offence than an ordinary war crime.(...)’.128Thirdly, it is hard to 
distinguish which of these international heinous crimes are more serious than the 
others; in fact, all international crimes are very serious, and war crimes, for instance, 
may be committed against an enormous number of victims. It seems that the policy 
of the Statute is one of showing a soft approach towards jurisdiction over war crimes 
in comparison with the other core crimes. There are several indications of this fact. 
On the one hand, Articles 33 and 31(as will be discussed in the next section) have 
departed from customary international law concerning war crimes, and on the other 
hand Article 124 provides that a state party, after the ratification of the Statute, can 
postpone the jurisdiction of the Court over war crimes for a period of seven years.
129
 
One may argue that this distinction between war crimes (non-manifestly illegal) and 
the other two core crimes (manifestly illegal) in Article 33 (2) might be because of 
political reasons.
130
 Indeed, it might appear that the war crime provisions in the 
Statute are believed to have been essential in enticing some states to join the ICC. 
Regardless of the reasons behind this, these considerations confirm that the approach 
taken by the Rome Statute is a softening of the international legal approach to war 
crimes, despite such violations currently being increasingly displayed before the 
international community’s scrutiny in the modern age.131In fact I would argue that 
this soft policy toward war crimes was a significant ground for the distinction being 
made in Article 33 (2) and that this distinction was also a result of polit ical 
                                               
127 Frulli M. Id.   
128 Prosecutor v. Tadic,  ICTY, IT-94-1-A, Sentencing Judgment (14 July 1997), at 7. 
129 See the Rome Statute Art. 124; this Article has been extended for the next seven years in the ICC’s 
first review conference in 2010 in Uganda.  
130 Frulli  M.  Supra note 16, at 340, she also accepts the political reason as a matter of concern, but 
she attempts to justify the distinction based on the idea of the greater seriousness of the crimes of 
genocide and crimes against humanity. 
131 McCoubrey H. (2001), Supra note 80, at 386, he argues (incorrectly, in my view), that such a 
softening is only apparent and not real. 
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considerations in the form of compromises concerning including the superior orders 
defence in the Statute
132
 at the Rome Conference.  
In addition to the aforementioned arguments, scholars such as Garraway have 
asserted that Article 33 is not at all a withdrawal from the position of the prior 
international tribunals and the Nuremberg Charter (i.e. from customary international 
law). He has argued that, due to the fact that the alleged crimes at Nuremberg were 
so heinous, ‘the absolute nature of the denial of the superiors defence made little or 
no difference’.133 However, I argue that the Statute has departed from customary 
international law both in the recognition of superior orders as defence and on the 
issue of the non-manifest illegality of war crimes. The inclusion of the superior 
orders defence in Article 33 is a ‘regression’ in the progress of international criminal 
justice, since it was generally rejected in the post-war tribunals. As many scholars, 
such as Cassese and Gaeta for instance, have argued, superior orders never was a 
defence in customary international law even for war crimes, though it appeared as a 
mitigation factor; and given the manifest list of war crimes in Article 8, the 
circumstances of Article 33’s applicability seem unclear.134 Assuming a case meeting 
Article 33’s requirements, however, an accused would be in possession of an 
absolute defence that would warrant an acquittal. 
       This conclusion is first of all at odds with lex lata, under which any order to 
commit an international crime — regardless of its classification — is illegal and 
therefore may not be urged in defence by the subordinate who obeys the order. 
Secondly, it is all the more surprising because Article 8 of the Rome Statute is 
intended to specify and enumerate through an exhaustive list the war crimes falling 
under the ICC jurisdiction...it would be ‘manifest’ in the text of the Rome Statute 
itself....Article 33 must be faulted as marking a retrogression with respect to 
existing customary law.
135
 
 
It is true that, as noted in the above quote, with such specifications of war crimes 
as are found in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, any crime there enumerated would be 
nothing less than ‘manifest’ in the text of the Statute. Therefore, Article 33 (2) 
recognises a complete defence 
136
 of superior orders, through a claim of obedience to 
superior orders, where the order was not manifestly unlawful, in the case of war 
crimes, while it was mitigation factor in customary law. Given the fact that war 
                                               
132 E.g. see Cryer R. (2009), Supra note 9, at 63; he argues that the adoption of Article 33(2), was 
‘based on a compromise on the inclusion of superior orders in the Rome Statute’.  
133 Garraway C. (1999), Supra note 15, at 1. 
134 Cassese A. (1999), Supra note 16, at 156; Gaeta P. (1999), Supra note 5, at 187; Frulli  M. Supra 
note 16, at 340. 
135 Cassese A. (1999), Id, at 156-157. 
136 Id.  
148 
 
crimes have been codified in more detail in Article 8 of the Statute, such a claim may 
be difficult to justify before the Court, but the claim has been provided as a defence 
instead of a mitigating factor, and so criminal responsibility may be excluded. Where 
a subordinate has met the other requirements of Article 33 (1) such as being under 
obligation to obey orders, superior orders could be used as defence, or the accused 
could raise other defences, such as duress, mistake of fact, etc.,
137
 which are 
recognised as defences under the Statute.
138
 Given the Statute’s proclamation in its 
preamble, it seems that, instead of softening its approach, it should have followed a 
restrictive approach concerning the defence of superior orders and followed 
customary international law in order better to achieve its main objective of 
combating impunity and deterring such crimes. However, what remains is the 
question of the liability of superiors; it is not easy to bring them to trial.
139
The 
difficulties surrounding the case of President Al-Bashir (discussed in Chapter III) 
have proved the importance of such practical issues.  
Therefore, it may be stated that the drafters of the Rome Statute ’restored’ 
superior orders as a defence in Article 33 through their adoption of a different 
approach to the international tribunals following World War II and the statutes of the 
ad hoc tribunals on this matter. In fact, Article 33(2) through the recognition of the 
complete defence of obedience to superior orders for subordinates, who may claim 
that their orders were not manifestly illegal in order to escape from liability, does 
creates impunity, or can at least facilitate impunity. 
4.2.3. Self-defence 
The principle of self–defence and defence of others, with its conditions of application 
such as a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm, is recognised in most 
national criminal procedures. The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights, for example, has recognised self-defence as removing the obligation of 
respecting the right to life.
140
 Self-defence is codified in the Rome Statute in Article 
                                               
137 With a mistake of fact there is no direct link with impunity as there is no means rea, e.g. the case 
of a soldier who obeyed an order and attacked civilians, when he had been told he was attacking a 
military base. 
138 See the Rome Statute, Art. 31 and 32. 
139 McCoubrey H. (2001), Supra note 80, at 393. 
140 See Art. 2(2), (a), the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950), Supra note 63. It states: ‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention 
of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:(a), in 
defence of any person from unlawful violence;...’ 
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31. Similarly to other Articles concerning defences, this Article was a difficult and 
controversial topic at the Rome Conference and was attended by lengthy discussion 
as to the conceptual differences in various legal systems involved in defining such 
terms as ‘self-defence’.141 Article 31(1) and (c) provide as follows:  
[A] person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s 
conduct:...The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person 
or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person 
or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, 
against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the 
degree of danger to the person or the other person or property protected. The fact that 
the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in 
itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this 
subparagraph;
142
 
 
We can gather from this the requirements needed for self-defence to be acceptable 
under Article 31(1) (c). First, the accused must have been acting ‘reasonably’; 
second, his or her reaction should be proportional; third, it should be against an 
imminent attack or force; and finally, their action must be unlawful. The most 
controversial aspect of Article 31(c) concerns the inclusion within the grounds of 
self-defence a reference to defence of property necessary or a military mission; and 
this question prompted extended discussion in both the Preparatory Committee
143
 
and at the Rome Diplomatic Conference.
144
  
The working group provided five footnotes to accompany the Article. The first of 
these specified that this provision only applied to individuals and would not apply to 
the use of force by states. ‘This provision only applies to action by individuals during 
an armed conflict. It is not intended to apply to the use of force by States, which is 
governed by applicable international law’.145  
Furthermore, footnote 2 was applied to the word ‘imminent’ in line 4 and 
stated: ‘This provision is not intended to apply to international rules applicable to the 
                                               
141 See Summary Records of the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole’ UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.I. (20 November 1998), Para 26 and 28; see also United Nation Official records, 
supra note 3, Vol, II , at 132; see also Schabas W. Supra note 14, at 108. 
142 Rome Statute Art. 31 (1), and (c). 
143 See the Preparatory Committee of the Establishment of the International Criminal Court. Supra 
note, at 11, e. 
144 See Diplomatic Conference Committee of the Whole Summary Record of the 24 Meeting, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/C.1/SR. 24 (20 November 1998), and Report of the Working Group on General 
Principles of Criminal Law, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.3 (7 July 1998). 
145 Id, Vol, II, supra note 3, at 274, some delegations were of the view that this was applicable only in 
the context of a lawful operation, referred to the whole paragraph. Footnote 5 contained the important 
interpretative statement that cases of voluntary exposure were understood to be dealt with under Art. 
31, Para, 2.  
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use of force by States’. Therefore, it seems that the new doctrine of pre-emptive 
defence (which is based on the existence of a mere threat to the security of a state) 
has no place in the Rome Statute. Neither has it been accepted among the 
international community yet.
146
  
There are at least two issues that arise concerning the recognition of the right of 
self-defence for essential property in war crimes. First, there is a practical issue, 
namely how it is possible to imagine what kind of property would be so important 
and essential to ‘accomplishing a military mission’ that it would be justifiable for 
those who committed widespread war crimes to go unpunished (or how their defence 
should be recognised). Although in practice it would be very hard to identify such 
essential property,
147
 if found or exemplified the question then arises as to how it 
could be acceptable to commit war crimes in defence of such property. Second, there 
is the issue of principle. It might be quite legitimate, for example, to target enemy 
personnel in defence of military installations, but that, of course, is not what is 
contemplated by this article. What is suggested is that there may be certain instances 
in which the commission of a war crime may be excused because of the need to 
defend that installation or equipment. To the extent, furthermore, that this particular 
defence was an entirely novel one, the provisions of Article 31(1) (c) have never 
been recognised as constituting a defence before.
148
 It would appear to increase 
greatly the available scope of ‘self-defence’ for war crimes.149 Cassese asserts that ‘it 
is highly questionable to extend the notion at issue to the need to protect [such 
property]. This extension is manifestly outside the lex lata and may generate quite a 
few misgivings’.150 
As argued by Cassese, this Article goes beyond lex lata (the law as it exists) and 
clearly the extension of the notion of self-defence to include protecting a ‘property 
which is essential to accomplish a military mission’ is highly controversial. The 
recognition of such defences for military property in this Article once again indicates 
the soft approach of the ICC in the jurisdiction of war crimes, and it may run 
                                               
146 The new doctrine of pre-emptive  defence has been theorised by the US President George W. Bush 
in 2002; see also  Ronzitti N. ‘The Expanding Law of Self-Defence’, 11 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2006), 343, at 343; see also  the UN Nations General Assembly Fifty-ninth Session 
Report, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2 December 2004), 
Para 189 and 191, 2 December 2004.   
147 See Gilbert J. Supra note 1, at 149. 
148 Cryer R. (2001), Supra note 19, at 17.  
149 Frulli M. Supra note 16, at 339; Cassese A. (1999), Supra note 16, at 154-155. 
150 Cassese A.  Id, at 154.  
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contrary to the main purpose of the ICC. It does raise the obvious question as to 
whether, in excluding criminal responsibility for purposes of the Statute (but not 
necessarily for purposes of customary international law) it might facilitate impunity 
through its absolution of such acts from criminal liability. If, for example, a person 
were to be brought to trial before the ICC, and with reasonable grounds assert that he 
killed civilians in order to protect some property which was essential for a military 
purpose, the Court should accept this as a complete defence and such an accused 
would not be held responsible for his wrongdoing.  
4.3. The defence of duress                                                      
Another defence that is commonly raised in conjunction with superior orders is the 
defence of duress, which has been listed in Article 31 of the Rome Statute as one of 
the grounds which exclude criminal liability. There are several arguments concerning 
duress in connection with the Statute. The first argument is concerned with the 
duress regulations in the ICC and the question of whether it was adopted as a defence 
or a mitigating factor. The second argument concerns the scope of duress, i.e. 
whether or not duress should be applicable to all crimes in the ICC. I argue that 
despite the ICC’s Rule of Procedure, which state the possibility of a plea of duress 
acting in mitigation, the Statute also make it possible that duress be available as a 
defence for all crimes, and in the latter situation it may facilitate impunity. Prior to 
these arguments, it is worthwhile knowing what the situation regarding duress has 
been in the different criminal justice systems and in the post-war tribunals. 
Duress in many national criminal systems has been recognised either as a 
defence or as a mitigating factor which may cause the criminal responsibility of 
individuals to vanish as the result of a threat of coercion or in circumstances which 
have effectively removed his or her free will. However, in most legal systems duress 
is not acceptable for all types of crime; for instance, if B murdered C because of a 
serious threat to his body by A (third party) this would not be recognised as an 
absolute defence. Some legal systems, such as common law countries, exclude this 
defence for the most serious crimes, such as murder, treason, piracy or sexual 
assault.
151
 The logic of this position is based on the fact that the defence of duress 
assumes that the accused has avoided a greater harm, which does not apply when an 
                                               
151 E.g. the Criminal Code of Canada, C 46, Art. 17. In the UK the House of Lords has held in (R v 
Howe [1987] AC 417, that duress does not apply as a defence to charges of murder and attempted 
murder in (R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412). 
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individual has killed another person in order to save his or her own life.
152
A similar 
principle is found in Sharia law behind the exclusion of the defence of duress in case 
of murder. According to the Sharia law, it is unacceptable to kill people simply 
because of a threat to one’s own body.153A further reason for this may be found in 
the principle of non-discrimination: if both murderer and victim are recognised as 
having equal value no preference can be made between them and the murderer’s 
defence of duress must therefore be rejected. In some civil-law countries duress is 
also excluded for serious crimes such as murder. For example, in Iran, according to 
the Iranian Criminal Code, duress is excluded for murder, although in some 
circumstances it may be acceptable as a mitigating factor.
154
  
Prior to the Rome Statute the defence of duress was more often seen as a 
mitigating factor than as an absolute defence,
155
and often it was linked with the 
superior orders defence.
156
Although the plea of necessity was often rejected in the 
Military Tribunals after World War II, duress, by contrast, was accepted as a defence 
as part of the plea of superior orders.
157
The Rome Statute codified duress in Article 
31. Although duress and necessity are generally distinguished as two distinct 
defences in the common law system,
158
 the Rome Statute in its final draft, in contrast 
to the pre-Rome Conference proposal, does not distinguish between necessity and 
duress, but mixes them together.
159
  
Concerning the first argument mentioned above, regarding whether duress is 
to be considered as defence or a mitigating factor: duress has been listed under 
‘[g]rounds for excluding criminal responsibility’ in Article 31 (1) (d) of the Rome 
Statute, and could thus comprise a complete defence, and it is also available for all 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
160
Some believe that this is a revolution in 
international law.
161However, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide: ‘the 
                                               
152 Gilbert J. Supra note 1, at 151. 
153 Jafari  Langroudi M. J. Alfaregh (2006), Vol, I, at 350-352, in Farsi. 
154 Iranian Criminal Code Art. 211. 
155 Gilbert J. Ibid, at 151. 
156 E.g. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Selected and prepared by the UN. War Crimes 
Commission, The German High Command Trial London Publisher for the UN. War Crimes 
Commission by the Majesty’s Stationery Office (1949), XII, ‘the plea of superior orders and military 
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157 Id, at 127, and Vol, X at 54-57.   
158 Werle G. Principle of International Criminal Law (2005), at 144; it could be said that necessity is a 
justification and duress is a mere excuse. 
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160 See the Rome Statute Art. 31 (d).  
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Court shall take into account, as appropriate: (a) Mitigating circumstances such as: 
(i) The circumstances falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of criminal 
responsibility, such as substantially diminished mental capacity or duress’.162 This is 
only rule that states that duress is adopted as a mitigating factor in the ICC.  One may 
argue that this Rule of Procedure, which is procedural in nature, cannot be 
interpreted in a contrary fashion to the substantive law - the Rome Statute - and deny 
the complete exclusion of liability - duress as a defence - which has been clearly 
stated in Article 31. I think it may be said that the judge of the ICC either can decide 
to allow duress as a defence under the Statute or as a mitigating factor pursuant to the 
Rules of Procedure.  
It has been mentioned that the plea of duress is usually mixed with the 
defence of superior orders.
163
 In fact, superior orders has also adopted as a defence in 
the Statute in cases of war crimes, so it is clear that the plea of duress in conjunction 
with superior orders can be accepted as defence at the ICC. It is significant to 
imagine different scenarios in this connection. The first scenario is one in which a 
military commander in a war orders soldiers to kill civilians when he is behind the 
soldiers and says to them that they will be shot to death if they refuse the order; this 
is obviously coercive and this should be recognised as a defence due to the absence 
of moral choice available to the soldiers and the fact that there is no other option for 
the soldiers enabling them to escape from the situation. Duress should here be treated 
as a defence on the basis of ‘coercion or lack of moral choice’, 164 or perhaps extreme 
necessity, which is broader than duress.
165
The second scenario is where a 
commander in the above example says to the soldiers that if they do not follow the 
orders they will be put on military trial or may be hanged or may lose their jobs; 
duress here should not be accepted as a defence, but it may be justifiable for it to be 
                                               
162 See the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Art.145 (2), (a), (i).  
163 Cryer R. (2009),  Supra note 9, at 55; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Cassese, supra note 24, Para 15; see also this case’s Trial Chamber, IT-96-22-T (29 
November 1996), Para 20. This Case in the ICTY tribunal is an example of the accompaniment of 
duress with superior orders. The Sentencing Judgment states: ‘20. On the basis of the case-by-case 
approach and in light of all the elements before it, the Trial Chamber is of the view that proof of the 
specific circumstances which would fully exonerate the accused of his responsibility has not been 
provided. Thus, the defence of duress accompanying the superior order will, as the Secretary-General 
seems to suggest in his report, be taken into account at the same time as other factors in the 
consideration of mitigating circumstances.’  
164 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 
UN Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), Para 57.   
165 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,  Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese. Ibid, Para 14. 
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accepted as mitigating circumstances. This is due to the fact that the degree of duress 
does not comprise a strong and immediate threat.  
In practice the ICC has not dealt with the plea of duress so far. As has been 
mentioned, duress was a mitigating factor under previous international tribunals and 
not a complete defence. However, in the ICTY in the Erdemovic case, one of the 
primary issues of the case in both the Trial and the Appeal Chambers concerned the 
question as to whether or not duress affords a complete defence to a soldier who has 
killed innocent people. Erdemovic stated that he was under military hierarchy 
obligation to obey his commander’s orders and affirmed that his actions were 
undertaken under duress, as if he had refused the order he would have been killed.
166
 
The Trial Chamber found that his duty was nevertheless to disobey and provided that 
the defence of duress would be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance 
only.
167
The majority in the Appeals Chamber rejected duress as a complete 
defence;
168
 the Chamber found that no customary rule exists in international law on 
the question of duress as a defence to a charge of killing innocent persons,
169
 and 
accordingly looked to the ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ 
for guidance on this issue. The majority in the Appeals Chamber concluded: 
[D]uress cannot afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with crimes against 
humanity or war crimes in international law involving the taking of innocent 
lives...In the result, we do not consider the plea of the Appellant was equivocal as 
duress does not afford a complete defence in international law to a charge of a crime 
against humanity or a war crime which involves the killing of innocent human 
beings.
170
 
 
The ICTY Appeal Chamber, in the above citation, in its majority decision denied 
the availability of duress as absolute defence for all crimes; however, it seems that 
                                               
166 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, ICTY, Transcript of Proceedings, (20 Nov 1996), at 828-29; see also 
Appeal Chamber, IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997), at 6, Para 7, he claims that ‘he received the order 
from Brano Gojkovi and he told him “If you don’t wish to do it, stand in the line with the rest of them 
and give others your rifle so that they can shoot you.” 
167 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, ICTY,  IT-96-22-T, (29 Nov 1996), Para. 18-20. 
168 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Judgement, ICTY, IT-96-22-A, (7 October 1997), Para 19, and Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Para. 88-91. In the Judgement it is stated 
that: ‘For the reasons set out in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah and 
in the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, the majority of the Appeals Chamber finds that 
duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or a 
war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings. Consequently, the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber finds that the guilty plea of the Appellant was not equivocal. Judge Cassese and Judge 
Stephen dissent from this view for the reasons set out in their Separate and Dissenting Opinions.  
Erdemovic had claimed that he was under threat of being shot to death (see Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 
Sentencing Judgment, ICTY, IT-96-22-T, (29 November 1996), Para. 80, but the Court did not 
confirm this, see Ibid. Para. 91. 
169 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, ICTY, Appeals Chamber. Id, Para 55. 
170 Id, Para 88-89.  
155 
 
the duress has been rejected on evidentiary grounds. The Appeals Chamber provided 
that the appellant ‘Erdemovic’s claims regarding extreme necessity and duress via 
order and threat from his hierarchical military superiors had not been proved.
171
 
‘[T]he Trial Chamber considered that these were insufficiently proven since the 
Appellant’s testimony in this regard had not been corroborated by independent 
evidence’.172 As to the first issue, (unavailability of duress as defence) it seems that 
the evidentiary ground was not necessary; it only would be applicable where the 
Court was examining the availability of duress as a mitigating factor on evidentiary 
grounds. The Appeals Chamber did, however, point out his situation as mitigating 
circumstances.
173
  
Many scholars have criticised the majority’s judgment concerning the non-
availability of duress as a complete defence harshly; one commentator argued that 
Erdemovic did not have free will for the commission of crimes and should not have 
stood on trial; his trial at the ICTY was described as ‘self-defeating’.174 Cryer noted 
that the rejection of duress as a defence in the Erdemovic case has been the subject of 
many negative remarks and did not embody the law, observing that this case rejected 
the defence of duress for killings only and not for all offences.
175
The above 
criticisms by scholars, are in fact similar to the minority opinion in the Appeals 
Chamber including Judge Cassese, believe that that duress could be a complete 
defence;
176according to Judge Newman, the minority’s decision was based on 
precedent in international law, while the majority’s decision was based on policy 
considerations: ‘including the fear that allowing such a defence may encourage 
heinous conduct committed by radical elements in the world.’177Although there are 
reasonable grounds for the above criticisms by scholars, it seems that the same policy 
consideration by the majority should be applicable for the ICC to combat impunity. 
The second argument concerning duress addresses the issue of whether duress 
should be adopted as defence for all crimes in the ICC, or should be excluded for 
some crimes. Scholars of one opinion hold that duress in circumstances such as 
                                               
171 Id, at 8 (b).  
172 Id. 
173 Id. This conflict of decisions by the Appeal Chamber would be justifiable if the plea of duress has 
been raised in several counts of crimes by the same defendant. 
174 Rua W. I. Supra note 26, at 724. 
175 Cryer R. (2001), Supra note 19, at 17, see footnote 94.  
176 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, supra note 24, Para 
11. 
177 Newman M.S.C. Supra note 23, at 168-169. 
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imminent physical threat to life or limb, reasonable acts to avoid that threat, and lack 
of intention to cause greater harm, should be accepted as a defence. Extreme duress 
such as an immediate coercive threat to body has been logically accepted as a 
complete defence in many national law systems,
178
 although rejected in others;
179
 as 
has been mentioned, however, in many national law systems where it is otherwise 
accepted, the plea of defence has been rejected for crimes such as murder, on the 
grounds of the potential danger to society which could otherwise result.
180
 Sharia law 
also does not recognise the defence of duress for serious crimes such as murder, if 
the threat is not coercive. However, duress is nevertheless justifiable as a mitigation 
factor. Professor Cryer has also raised the point that in many states the death penalty 
has been abolished, so that the refusal to obey an order in such countries does not 
have consequences which could enable one to consider a subordinate to be following 
an order under duress.
181
 It may thus be argued that the availability of duress as a 
defence for all crimes including murder could encourage some in the commission of 
crimes, in particular when it has been pleaded in conjunction with the defence of 
superior orders under Article 33 as complete defence; this would be an instance of 
impunity recognised by the Rome Statute. Although the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE) accepted duress in mitigation, which is compatible with customary 
international law, the main issue is the possible availability of the defence of duress 
for all crimes under Article 31 is a matter of concern. As Article 51 (5) of the Statute 
provides in case of conflict between the RPE and the Statute, the Statute ‘shall 
prevail’, thus, if duress is accepted as a complete defence for all crimes, may 
facilitate impunity and would clearly impinge upon the ability of the Rome Statute to 
act as a deterrent.  
Furthermore, if we bear in mind the Statute’s proclamation in the Preamble of its 
intention of ending impunity, the Statute should at least follow national law and 
adopt a restrictive approach to the availability of duress as defence for such heinous 
international crimes, often with large numbers of victims, as fall within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. It seems that Newman rightly stated that the decision of the majority in 
the Erdemovic case was a policy consideration,
182
 as the non-availability of such a 
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180 McDonald G. k. (1998), Supra note 27, at 49. 
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defence could indeed act as a deterrent to the commission of future heinous crimes. 
Although the majority referred to an absolute moral principle, McDonald has 
suggested that this principle derives from the Geneva Conventions: the absolute 
statement that ‘a soldier should die rather than kill innocent civilians.’183 As the 
majority held, ‘those who kill innocent persons will not be able to take advantage of 
duress as a defence and thus get away with impunity for their criminal acts in the 
taking of innocent lives.’184 
4.4.   Command and civilian superiors’ responsibility  
The Rome Statute has adopted a different standard and threshold of liability for 
military and non-military superiors under Article 28 (a) and (b) of the Statute. The 
main argument of this section is firstly to highlight such a distinction and to argue 
that it was unnecessary and problematic. I seek furthermore to discuss how the 
higher threshold of liability may facilitate impunity for civilian superiors.  
Command responsibility is based on the doctrine that commanders have a duty to 
control their subordinates.
185
 It has been defined ‘the liability of superiors for crimes 
committed by forces not ordered by that superior, but tolerated or ignored by him or 
her’.186Hence this doctrine implies, in other words, a form of ‘imputed liability. 187 
The significant of the superiors’ responsibility is that this notion has been explained 
as “an original creation of international criminal law” for which there are no 
paradigms in national legal system’.188 However, it is not always easy to establish 
indirect responsibility for superiors who did not participate in the commission of 
crimes, so the application of command responsibility may in practice be confined to 
a limited number of such cases.
189
  
                                               
183 McDonald G.K.  Supra note 27, at 48. 
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186 Cryer R. Prosecuting International Crimes, Selectivity and the International Criminal Law regime 
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    In the practice of the Leipzig Trials in Germany after World War I, military 
commanders were held criminally responsible for offences committed by their 
subordinates, where they had failed to prevent or punish the perpetrators; this 
occurred in the Llandovery Castle case.
190
Command responsibility was not explicitly 
mentioned in the Charters of Nuremberg and Tokyo, but in practice they dealt with 
command responsibility indirectly.
191
The notion of command responsibility was for 
the first time given specific recognition in treaty form in Article 86(2) of Additional 
Protocol 1 of 1977 for grave breaches of humanitarian law.
192
  
The first major modern case involving command responsibility was the General 
Yamashita case
193
in the US in the aftermath of World War II. General Yamashita 
was convicted for the actions of his troops in the killing of civilians in Philippines, 
because his failure to prevent them in fact allowed his soldiers to commit atrocities. 
Although there was no requisite finding made by the American military commission 
regarding the knowledge the General actually had concerning the crimes his troops 
committed, it was believed that ‘the crimes [were] so extensive and widespread, both 
as to time and area, that they must either have been wilfully permitted by the 
accused, or secretly ordered by the accused’.194 He was sentenced to execution by the 
US Court. 
                                               
190 In the Llandovery Castle case, the command of a German U-boat, Helmut Brümmer-Patzig, was 
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Second Instrument of Surrender Document, Instrument of Surrender of the Japanese and Japanese-
Controlled Armed Forces in the Philippine Islands to the Commanding General United States Army 
Forces, Western Pacific. (3 September 1945), See 327 US 1 Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of 
the United States at October (1945), see also Wilson R. J. ‘A History of the Role of Defense Counsel 
in International Criminal and War Crimes Tribunals’,  in Bohlander M, Boed, R, and Wilson R (eds), 
Defense in International Criminal Proceedings, Cases Materials and Commentary (2006), 31, at 50-
52; see also generally Smidt M.L. ‘Yamashita, Media, and Beyond Yamashita, Med Ina, and Beyond: 
Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operation,’  164  Military Law Review (2000), 
155. 
194 See US v. Yamashita (1946), the US Supreme Court 327 US 1. 
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The ICTY Statute in Article 7 (3) identically to Article 6 (3) of the ICTR 
Statute, deals with command responsibility for the acts of subordinates; it provides 
for the liability of a commander on the basis of failure to act ‘if he knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts and had done so 
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such 
acts or to punish perpetrators thereof’.195 The ‘reason to know’ clause stipulates that 
a commander who is in possession of information of enough quantity and quality as 
to be put on notice of subordinate criminal activity cannot escape from criminal 
responsibility by announcing his ignorance, even if such ignorance is amply 
established.  
In the practice of the ICTY tribunal, the Celebici case dealt with command 
responsibility; in it, three persons of different levels of authority over a prisoner of 
war in Celebici camp, namely the deputy warden, the warden and a civilian co-
ordinator of affairs of the camp, were charged with several offences against prisoners 
that had been perpetrated by personnel at the camp.
196
 The ICTY in the Celebici case 
compiled a threefold requirement for responsibility of superiors. The first is that 
there should exist a superior and subordinate relationship; the second that the 
defendant should know or have reason to know that their subordinates were about to 
commit, or had committed, such crimes; and finally, the defendant should have failed 
to take reasonable measures to prevent or punish such criminals.
197
 The point is that 
the Celebici case affirmed that the doctrine of superiors’ responsibility applied to all 
persons, ‘not only military commanders, but also civilians holding positions of 
authority’198 and not only the persons ‘on de jure (formal) authority’, but also those 
in a position of ‘de facto (informal) command and control, or a combination of 
both’.199 Thus, the superior and subordinate relationship may be established either by 
law, as in the case of de jure authority, or may on the basis of proof, as in de facto 
command situations. In the latter case, the evidence should show an effective (de 
facto) control over subordinates. The ICTY in the Celebici case held that:  
                                               
195 The ICTY Statute Art.7 (3), and the ICTR Statute Art. 6 (3). 
196 See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic and others, ICTY, Trial Chamber Judgment , IT-96-21-T (16 
November 1998), at 127-128, Para 345. In this case, for example, Zdravko Mucic, as commander of 
the Celebici prison-camp, was charged pursuant to Art. 7(3), with responsibility as a superior for the 
crimes alleged at the time and found guilty in violation of customs of war. See the above, count no. 
49. 
197 Celebici Case. Id, at 127- Para 344-400. 
198 Id, at 142, Para 363 
199 Id, at 137, Para 348.  
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Mr. Mucic was the de facto commander of the CelebiCi prison-camp. He exercised de facto 
authority over the prison-camp, the deputy commander and the guards. Mr. Mucic is 
accordingly criminally responsible for the acts of the personnel in the CelebiCi prison-camp, 
on the basis of the principle of superior responsibility.200 
 
According to Garraway, the ICTY extended the concept of control too far in 
the Celebici case, to included ‘substantial influence’.201The ICTY jurisprudence 
indicates that general knowledge (not knowledge of the details) of the base crime is 
enough to incur command responsibility. In the case of genocide, the superior needs 
to possess knowledge of the subordinate’s genocidal intent, but need not have a 
genocidal intent him- or herself.
202
  
The ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Bagilishema case confirmed that civilian 
superiors’ command responsibility required ‘a degree of control over [subordinates] 
which is similar to the degree of control of military commanders;’ it thus confirmed 
the same threshold of effective control for civilian superiors, but it clarified that 
effective control need not be employed or established in the same way by civilian 
superiors and military commanders.
203
 
At the Rome Conference the delegates in charge of drafting were divided into 
two groups; one group advocate similar thresholds of liability for command and 
civilian superiors, while the second group asserted that these should be different. The 
first approach was supported mainly by Mexico,
204
 while the second (conditional) 
approach was based on a draft proposal by the United States delegate Ms. Broek
205
 
and advocated by some other countries’ delegates such as Jordan,206 Russia,207 and 
South Africa.
208
The United States suggested that it is necessary to distinguish 
between de jure and de facto civilian superior responsibility (thus differentiating 
between military and civilian superior responsibility) and that a hierarchy of civilian 
                                               
200 Id, at 279, Para 775.          
201 Garraway C. (2009), Supra note 186, at 77. 
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superiors could reach as far as the head of state, who could not be made to answer for 
actions which he did not know of or have direct responsibility for. Accordingly, 
responsibility based upon what a person knew or should have known must be 
different in the case of civilian superiors and military ones. The latter should be 
responsible, and it is expected that a commander ‘should have known’ that his forces 
were about to commit criminal acts;
209 
whereas the former should not be responsible 
because this standard of negligence is not appropriate in a civilian context, being 
contrary to normal principles of responsibility under criminal law. Furthermore, 
civilian supervisors are responsible for their subordinates only while the latter are at 
work, and not for any acts committed outside the workplace in an individual 
capacity, whereas military commanders are responsible for forces under their control 
at all times.
210
  
According to Professor Garraway, who was a member of the UK delegation at 
the Rome Conference, Article 28, concerning command and superior responsibility, 
was one of the most difficult Articles and was the subject of very extensive 
discussion: ‘[a]lmost every word was fought over’.211 In the end, separate forms of 
liability were adopted for military commanders and civilian superiors in Article 28 (a) 
and (b). This new approach in this Article has proved controversial and has involved 
intricate issues which have been reflected in a vast academic literature.
212
 Article 
28(a) deals with ‘military commander[s]’ and individuals ‘effectively acting 
as...military commander[s];’ it thus includes de facto military command. Article 28 
(b) on the other hand, deals with civilian superiors and all superior-subordinate 
relationships not included in the compass of Article 28 (a).  
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Article 28 sets a different standard for military and civilian superiors mainly 
in two aspects. The first is the way in which the liability of civilian superiors under 
Article 28(b) (ii) only occurs where the ‘[t]he crimes concerned activities that were 
within the effective responsibility and control of the superior’.213According to 
Borden, this condition is a consequence of the fact that military superiors have the 
responsibility of controlling subordinates at all times, whereas in civilian settings 
superiority is temporally limited.
214
The second difference concerns mens rea; military 
commanders will held liable if they ‘knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, 
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes’,215 but the threshold for the mental element of civilian superiors is different. 
These latter will be held liable if they ‘either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about 
to commit such crimes’.216 An additional required element for civilian superiors is 
that they are liable if ‘the crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior;’217 there is no such requirement for military 
commanders in Article 28. The notion of the effective control of the civilian superiors 
is crucial for the recognition of the superior’s responsibility for the acts of their 
subordinates. In the ad hoc tribunals, although they applied a uniform standard of 
liability for military and non-military superiors, effective control was also a crucial 
factor in establishing liability.
218
 
This different standard and threshold for the mental element is one of the most 
controversial aspects of this Article. The level of knowledge required before they can 
                                               
213 Rome Statute Art.  28(b),(ii).  
214 Ronen Y. Ibid,  at 350. 
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be deemed criminally responsible is different for military commanders and civilian 
superiors. It is clear that Article 28 adopts a somewhat stricter standard for military 
commanders to the extent that responsibility also lies in cases in which they ‘should 
have known.’ The important advantage of this strict knowledge requirement for 
command liability is that it may be in harmony with customary international law.
219
 
In consequence of this requirement, both subordinates and commanders would be 
held liable; the subordinate is responsible for the commission of intentional crimes, 
while the military commanders are also liable for the criminal conduct and 
consequences of their subordinates’ wrongdoing (as well as their own criminal 
conduct) and the failure to prevent or repress the subordinates’ actions. Accordingly, 
this strict approach to command liability found in Article 28 (a) could serve as a 
deterrent to a commander and encourage him to be aware of what his subordinates are 
doing.
220
 A commentator has characterised this knowledge requirement for superiors 
as ‘responsibility before the fact.’221 The responsibilities of military commanders and 
civilian superiors after the fact (of the commission of crimes) are, however, equal and 
identical in Article 28 (a) and (b): to stop or suppress the wrongdoing or ‘to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution;’ 
furthermore, command and superior responsibility after the fact requires a causal link 
between the failure to prevent crimes and these crimes’ commission.222 As in the case 
of a military hierarchy, when there is either a de jure or a de facto hierarchy for a 
civilian superior, a similar standard of command liability would encourage civilian 
superiors to control their subordinates’ criminal activities and prevent the possibility 
of their own prosecution. The strict standard of command responsibility has been 
advocated by scholars; as one commentator has stated, a commander’s neglect of 
duty must be an absolutely ‘severe’ matter, as commanders have ‘effective control’ 
over their subordinates, and when soldiers are engaged in genocide or crimes against 
humanity and their commander fails to notice these taking place, grievous harms are 
likely to result from the commander’s breach of duty.223 
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By contrast, on the civilian side a superior’s responsibility in Article 28 
requires him or her to have ‘consciously disregarded information’, and therefore in 
terms of the degree of knowledge required the Article has adopted a lower standard of 
responsibility for civilian superiors.
224
 As such, a civilian superior’s unintentionally 
negligent disregard of information which indicates that his or her subordinates are 
about to commit a crime does not serve to impute responsibility onto the superior, 
which requires ‘conscious disregard’225 of such information. Accordingly, negligent 
complicity in subordinates’ crimes is not punishable, only complicity which is 
reckless and intentional.
226
One may argue that the Statute by this approach may 
diminish the efficiency of the Court.
227
  
It may be argued that the lower standard of responsibility apparent for civilian 
superiors is appropriate because military commanders are in the special case of being 
in charge of an inherently lethal, destructive force. This view urges that the strict 
standard is contrary to the usual principles of responsibility in criminal law, and is 
thus not appropriate for civilian supervisors.
228
 However, many scholars have harshly 
critiqued the different standards of liability and the distinctions made between 
commanders and civilians in this Article. Cryer, for instance, notes that ‘[a] clear and 
highly unfortunate retreat from requirements of customary law can be seen here.’229 
The ICC’s dichotomy of standards between military and non-military superiors was 
unnecessary and there are no convincing reasons lying behind this distinction.
230
 
Vetter has argued that ‘under this interpretation, article 28(2) (b) might be 
superfluous because the scope of the superior subordinate relationship is articulated 
in both article 28(1) and 28(2)’ he argued that this different standard of liability may 
not be consistent with customary international law.’231 Amnesty International also 
criticise this double standard and the different threshold of liability between 
commanders and civilian superiors; they encouraged the ICC’s working group not to 
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implement the dual standard of command and superior responsibility as specified in 
Article 28
232
 and called on all states ‘not to implement Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
directly as it departs from customary international law….’233 
The Statute makes it plausible that:  
a) civilian leaders who may be behind the organisation of heinous atrocities 
may escape from prosecution by the ICC through the application of the civilian 
standard of liability. As has been discussed, a civilian superior's neglect of her duty to 
control subordinates could be accept as complete defence before the ICC, whereas a 
military commander would responsible for the wrongdoing of her subordinates. 
While the stricter standard of liability can act as a deterrent for the latter, the more 
lenient standard can facilitate impunity for the civilian superior, who could rely on 
the defence of neglect, which would not happen if the military standard were applied. 
Thus, the civilian leaders’ standard of liability in the Statute may provide a possible 
situation that gives rise to impunity.   
b) there may be difficulties to draw a distinction between military and non-
military; given the differential standards applied in relation to civilian and military 
superiors, the question arises as to who, aside from a military commander, would 
qualify as a ‘person effectively acting as a military commander.’ The Bemba case234 
is the first case in the ICC which in practice has dealt with command responsibility 
under Article 28 (a) of the Statute. Bemba was a civilian superior; the Pre-Trial 
Chamber has provided that the ‘notion of a military commander under this provision 
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also captures those situations where the superior does not exclusively perform a 
military function.’235 The Pre-Trial Chamber interpreted the notion of a de jure 
‘military commander’ as referring to commanders ‘who are formally or legally 
appointed to carry out a military commanding function’, whereas de facto military 
commanders were interpreted as ‘persons effectively acting as military commanders’ 
as per Article 28 (a).
236
 In the Bemba case it provided that: 
        [T]he Chamber considers that this term is meant to cover a distinct as well as a broader 
category of commanders. This category refers to those who are not elected by law to carry 
out a military commander’s role, yet they perform it de facto by exercising effective 
control over a group of persons through a chain of command.... Article 28 of the Statute is 
drafted in a manner that distinguishes between two main categories of superiors and their 
relationships - namely, a military or military like commander (paragraph (a) and those 
who fall short of this category such as civilians occupying de jure and de facto positions 
of authority (paragraph (b). 237 
 
The Court did not clearly explicate what a ‘military like commander’ is and how this 
concept is different from that of a ‘military commander’, nor did it explicitly state 
whether Bemba qualifies as a de jure or de facto military commander;
238
 but it seems 
that, though Bemba did not have a military title or rank,
239
 he ‘qualifies’ as a military 
commander under the scope of Article 28(a) of the Statute.
240 The ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber appears in fact to be trying to limit the distinction between civilian and 
military command responsibility
241
 and has adopted the concept of a de facto 
‘commander’ similar to the ICTY:  
       [I]ndividuals in positions of authority, ... within military structures, may incur criminal 
responsibility under the doctrine of command responsibility on the basis of their de facto 
as well as de jure positions as superiors. The mere absence of formal legal authority to 
control the actions of subordinates should therefore not be understood to preclude the 
imposition of such responsibility.242 
 
Considering that the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, in contrast to that of the 
ICC, adopted a uniform standard of liability for military and non-military 
commanders, it is interesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber referenced the ICTY’s 
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Celebici case
243
 in connection with attributing the command doctrine of liability to 
an arguably civilian superior Bemba;
244
 this indicates the trend of the ICC to be one 
of limiting the differentiation of standards in practice. The practice of the ICC in 
Bemba case has also indicated the fact that the distinction between military and non-
military superiors is a very complicated issue; this is borne out by the considerable 
body of case law related to endeavouring to find a suitable distinction and the 
problems which arise in this context.
245
One may accordingly argue that the 
distinction between these two modes of liability in Article 28 has also a procedural 
impact and may be a cause of delay in prosecution and difficulties concerning the 
interpretation as to whether an accused is a de facto military commander or not. 
4.5. Conclusion  
During the Rome Conference for the establishment of the ICC, the negotiations in 
regard to inclusion of defences in the Statute, in particular, were very hard, and after 
protracted negotiations and compromises the Statute finally included defence 
provisions in more details and playing a greater role as compared with prior 
international tribunals.
246 
This Chapter has discussed the absolute defence of insanity 
and intoxication and other four types of defences under the Rome Statute which are 
the most controversial defences therein. These have included: the recognition of 
superior orders as a defence for war crimes and the non-manifest illegality approach 
to war crimes in Article 33(2) the absolute defence of ‘self-defence’ of property 
necessary for a military mission in Article 31(1)(c) duress; and the differences 
between military and non-military superiors’ responsibility. Defence of property 
needed for a military mission seems very hard to be justifiable as complete defence 
for war crimes. Article 33(2) has also departed from customary international law, and 
reverts to the approach used prior to the Nuremberg trials concerning the defence of 
superior orders.
 
It is argued that although it may be very difficult in practice to prove 
                                               
243 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo. Ibid,  Para 409. 
244 Id, Para 457, the Pre-trial Chamber II found him de jure military commander, but also provided 
that Bemba had ‘de facto ultimate control over MLC commanders’; in Para 409 the Chamber referred 
to him as a de facto commander, and in Para 410 to a ‘military-like’ commander; it provides that: ‘the 
category of military-like commanders may generally encompass superiors who have authority and 
control over regular government forces such as armed police units including, inter alia, armed 
resistance movements and militias that follow a structure of military hierarchy or a chain of 
command.’ 
245 Karsten N. Supra note 212, at 984. 
246 See the UN Diplomatic Conference on the 2nd of July 1998, supra note 3;  see also the Draft 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 31, UN Doc. A/ CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), 
at 57.  
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a claim made by subordinates that orders were not clearly illegal, Article 33(2) 
potentially provides a complete defence for military subordinates which could enable 
them to escape from liability and may act against the deterrent value of the Statute's 
provisions. Article 31 also goes beyond lex lata and the extension of the notion of 
self-defence to include protecting ‘property which is essential to accomplish a 
military mission’ is highly controversial and questionable. It provides a novel type of 
defence and thus another possibility of exclusion of liability for war crimes, which it 
is very hard to see as justifying the killing of individuals. These two Articles provide 
a situation which gives rise to impunity, through recognition of the plea of superior 
orders as complete defence, and of the plea of self defence of property which is 
essential for military purposes. In general, the war crimes provision in the Statute 
indicates the very soft approach towards the jurisdiction of these crimes in the ICC, 
whereas in a world of increasing, ongoing, and repeated conflicts an opposite 
approach would appear to be called for. 
It has been discussed that duress is usually combined with the defence of 
superior orders; duress in the ICC can be accepted either as a complete defence under 
the Statute
247
or as a mitigating circumstance via the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
248
 It has been argued that the availability of duress as a defence for all 
crimes may encourage the commission of crimes and thus impunity. By contrast, 
under the major legal systems of the world the defence of duress is excluded for 
crimes such as murder.
249
 However, it can act as a mitigating factor, or even as a 
defence when the degree of duress is an immediate and coercive threat to body or 
limb from which the defendant has no choice to escape from the commission of 
crimes.  
From the converse perspective – that of the responsibility of commanders and 
superiors for the wrongdoings of their subordinates – the Statute shows a dual 
standard of liability, distinguishing between military and non-military superiors in 
Article 28 (a) and (b). Strict approaches were adopted towards military commanders, 
whilst a higher threshold of liability was employed for the civilian side. It has been 
discussed that not only were these dual standards and thresholds of liability 
unnecessary; they also lead to theoretical and practical difficulties in assessing 
                                               
247 Rome Statute Art. 31. 
248 The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Art. 145 (2), (a), (i). 
249 E.g. in the Criminal Code of Canada, C 46, Art.17. In the UK see R v Howe (1987), AC 417, and 
for the Iranian Criminal Code, Art. 211. 
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whether or not a defendant is a de jure or de facto military commander, and 
accompanying procedural delays. This complicated issue has featured in the current 
Bemba case in the ICC; this Chapter has highlighted just some of the complexities 
which may arise as a result of Article 28. In the decision of the Trial Chamber in this 
case, despite arguably having a position as a civilian superior, Bemba was actually 
qualified as a de jure military superior, indicating that the ICC desires to diminish 
such unnecessary distinctions and different standards of liability in practice. 
Nevertheless, as the previous international tribunals recognised a uniform standard of 
liability for military and non-military superiors, the ICC's different thresholds of 
responsibility for different types of superiors is significant. In particular, the higher 
level of mens rea required of civilian superiors for liability according to Article 28 
(b) and the non-recognition of liability for civilian superiors when they neglect to 
control their subordinates’ criminal activities, may give rise to impunity for such 
superiors; this is opposite to the standard of liability enforced on military 
commanders, whose plea of neglect would not be accept pursuant to Article 28(a). 
Uniform and strict standards of liability for civilian superiors, on the other hand, 
could serve as a deterrent to such superiors and encourage them to be aware of what 
their subordinates are doing.  
The different types of defences and their possible relation to impunity, as 
discussed in this chapter, can also been concluded in the following table. 
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                                    Defences in national law and in the Statute                  Mansour-23-05-12 
                                   National law defences:  justification and excuse            (Table of defences) 
                       
                                                                Defences in the Rome Statute 
Excuse 
 
 Insanity, intoxication, duress, 
 
 
Justification        
Self defence, defence of others     
Unlawful conduct- unreliable  
 
Lack of mens rea 
 
 
Lawful conduct- not liable 
Mens rea 
Give rise to  impunity 
  but  morally acceptable  
 (Lack of ability to distinguish  
   between right and wrong)  
 
 
Generally no impunity  
   Morally and legally recognised   
  
Defences in the Rome  Statute 
 
 
                                    Insanity                  
   Absolute 
   Defences 
                                   Intoxication 
            
No distinction 
        
 
  Unreliable  
 
Excluding from criminal liability 
               Article 31       
         
 
Give rise to impunity, but morally 
acceptable, lack of  mens rea 
 
                                Coercive(excuse)                                                     
Defence of                   
 Duress                 (Mixed in Statute)  
                                  
                               Circumstances, 
                                       Threat   
                                         
 
Complete defence
 
 
Mitigation in the Rule of  
Procedure & 
If applies as complete defences  
for all crimes 
 
No impunity exempt 
  From responsibility 
 
No impunity- reduces the 
severity of a punishment 
Gives rise to impunity 
 
    Superior orders 
             &  
 Defence of property  
 for military mission 
 
 
                                   Military  
 
 Superior’s                               
responsibility 
   for acts of                  Civilian                                                                                                 
  subordinates 
 
   
War crimes 
     
 
 Stricter standard  of   
   liability Art. 28 (a) 
 
 
Lower standard of
liability Art. 28(b) 
 
 
Gives rise to impunity 
Departed from customary law 
 
Gives rise to impunity, never was a 
defence 
 
No impunity 
 
May give rise to impunity, they 
would not be responsible where they 
neglected to control subordinates 
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Chapter V: Internal Practical Problems within the ICC Statute: Impunity of    
     Perpetrators of International Crimes      
Introduction 
This Chapter aims to highlight the weakness of the ICC through an examination of 
some of the jurisdictional and procedural issues that concern its work. These matters 
will be divided into two categories: the generic and the particular. Concerning the 
generic problems, I will argue that, like any other international tribunal, when 
compared with a domestic court, it suffers from problems regarding the collection of 
evidence, protection of witnesses, etc. In addition to this, however, there are a 
number of specific issues that undermine it as an institution, and which are not 
endemic to all international criminal law regimes. These are five-fold. The first 
relates to the complementarity regime of the jurisdiction of the ICC, which may lend 
itself to abuse and offer a shield to those who wish to impede prosecution by the 
ICC; the second concerns the rules relating to the admissibility of cases and the high 
threshold of jurisdiction, including issues relating to the gravity of crimes; the third is 
the very weak cooperation-regime of the Statute; the fourth concerns the issue of 
enforcement power; and the final issue being the deficiencies concerning its lack of 
the universal jurisdiction,
 1
 its not countenancing trial in absentia, and the possibility 
of the postponement of its jurisdiction over war crimes by state parties.  
The characteristic response to these defects is to view them either as an 
inevitable, but nevertheless unsatisfactory, consequence of the various political 
compromises at the Rome Conference that were arrived at in order to enable states to 
ratify the Statute,
2
 or as an ultimately beneficial outcome given the level of possible 
non-cooperation with the ICC. My position is that such evaluations fall short insofar 
as they do not recognise the possibility that the deficiencies may be problematic, not 
because they fall short of what might otherwise be desirable or ‘possible’, but 
                                               
1 O’Callaghan D. ‘Is the International Criminal Court the Way Ahead?’  8 International Criminal Law 
Review (2008), 533, at 548;   For the Universal Jurisdiction see generally Abbas A. ‘The International 
Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction,’ 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), 349; Writ 
H.V. ‘Universal Jurisdiction under Attack,’  9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011),1043; 
Kaul  H. P. ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction’ in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, & J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds), The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002),583,Vol, I, B; 
Gallagher K. ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Practice,’ 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), 
1087. 
2 O’Callaghan D. Id, at 533, at 544, 551- 555. 
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because there is a generative link between the impunity to which they give rise and 
the idea that the interests of justice are best served by the criminalisation and 
prosecution of international crimes.  In the same way that Foucault described the 
emergence of prisons as sustaining the idea of criminality and the ‘slow rise of the 
project of reform’ despite their failure to diminish the crime rate,3 so it might be said, 
it was important for the ICC to remain weak in order to bolster demands for the 
criminalization and prosecution of international crimes. In that respect, one may note 
the way in which the Rome Statute has served not so much to empower the ICC, but 
to empower individual states and endow them with the right to exercise their power 
for prosecution of international crimes. To the extent that is the case, it is also 
plausible to suggest that some powerful states were keen to support the creation of 
the ICC at the Rome conference, but at the same time needed it to be weak not 
strong.
4
 The ICC had to allow impunity to flourish rather than be the vehicle for its 
elimination.  The reality is one of a court created after many years of effort, with no 
independent power, and without the various parties having adequate obligations to 
cooperate with the Court,
5
 and which is compounded by political difficulties.  Whilst 
it may suffer by comparison with the ad hoc tribunals, which can create binding 
obligations on all UN states members to cooperate with the courts,
6
 some of its 
weaknesses (vis the issue of non-cooperation and lack of enforcement power) are not 
unique.
7
   
Reflecting on the above considerations, this chapter is divided into five 
sections: the first is related to the generic problems of the ICC; the second is 
concerned with the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the Court; the third with the 
nature of complementarity and issues regarding the admissibility of cases; the fourth 
                                               
3 Foucault M. Discipline and Punish, in P. Rabinow (eds), (1986), at 226, 231-2. 
4 E.g. Sceffer C, the US delegation at the Rome Conference while strongly advocated the 
establishment of the ICC actively sought to eliminate its jurisdiction. He has argued constantly in 
support of a very strict concept of complementarity, see, The United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (15 June 17 July 1998), 
Vol, II, at 123, Para 28 and 297 Para 42. 
5 Cogan K J. ‘The Problem of Obtaining Evidence for International Criminal Courts’, 22 Human 
Rights Quarterly (2000), 404, at 411. 
6 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808(1993), UN Doc, S/25704 (3 May 1993), at 31, Para 125. 
7 E.g., concerning the non-cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY; see also Rastan R. ‘Testing Co-
Operation: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities’, 21 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2008), 431, at 438; see also the cooperation issues by the Rwandan government, 
the NATO, and the Belgrad authorities with the Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR; see Ponte D.C. 
Madame Prosecutor, Confrontations with Humanity’s Woest Criminal and the Culture of Impunity 
(2009), at 59-60, 84, 92-93, and 370.  
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with the issues of insufficient cooperation and enforcement encountered by the 
Court; and the fifth section with several significant deficiencies of the Court, such as 
its lack of universal jurisdiction. Each of these deficiencies point to the evident 
weakness of the ICC. 
5.1. Generic issues in the ICC’s procedural system; collecting evidence,   
            identification of witnesses, protection of victims, etc.  
The generic procedural problems faced by the ICC in practice are much greater than 
for a domestic court. Generally, there are two major domestic criminal traditional 
systems: the ‘accusatorial’ or ‘adversarial’ in common law and the ‘inquisitorial’ 
model in civil law systems.
8
 The aim of any domestic procedural system is to find 
the truth in a due process through one of these systems. However, the ICC’s criminal 
procedure is a mixture of both systems and may be understood sui generis.
9
 The 
ICTY and ICTR, like the ICC, have incorporated elements from both systems, but 
the adversarial procedural elements and more heavily were reflected in the ad hoc 
ICTY and ICTR.
10
 In prior international tribunals, the procedural law was left to the 
judges; the Statute, in contrast, ‘reserves’ the authority to create the Rule of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE).
11
However, the Statute gives power to the ICC’s 
judges to adopt regulations,
 12
 which includes procedural rules.
13
 As Cryer et al 
asserts, ‘the procedural law of the ICC has become voluminous, multi-layered and 
complex.’14 Some also argue that this hybrid system may lead to uncertainty, for 
instance for the ICC via  ‘the avoidance of ‘technical terms’ with a special meaning 
in domestic systems, creates uncertainties.’15 Another disadvantage of the sui generis 
character of the proceedings before the Court is that there is no common practice to 
                                               
8 Cryer R & et al.  An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2010), at 425. The 
main differences between these two systems is related to the role of the judges and parties during 
criminal procedure, for the adversarial or accusatorial system each party present the case to the court 
with their own investigations and the judge acts as a referee. In contrast, in the inquisitorial system, 
judges and the state administrative body are obliged to conduct criminal investigations, see at 426. 
9 Caianiello M. ‘First Decisions of the Admissibility of Evidence at ICC Trials’, 9 International 
Criminal Justice(2011),385,at 393; Ambos K & Miller D.‘Structure and Function of the Confirmation 
Procedure before the ICC from  a Comparative Perspective’, 7 International Criminal Law Review 
(2007), 335, at 356.   
10 Kress C. ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique 
compromise’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003),603, at 605; Cryer R & et al. (2010), 
Ibid, at 429. 
11 Rome Statute Art. 51; see also Cryer R & et al. Id. 
12 Id, Art. 52. 
13 Cryer R & et al. Ibid, at 429.  
14 Id.     
15 Id, at 429; Ambos K & Miller D.  Ibid, at 337-40. 
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rely on for the ICC’s judges.16 Regardless of its procedural system, there are some 
procedural issues which are not unique to the ICC, but common generic problems 
facing the ICC are those which are faced by any judicial system in terms of its 
criminal procedure. Such problems relate to the collection of evidence, identification 
and credibility of evidence and witnesses, assessment of the evidence, protection of 
victims and witnesses, and etc. 
5.1.1. Collecting evidence 
The prosecutor is charged in the collection of evidence, the questioning of 
perpetrators, victims, witness expertise and so on, and should take the necessary 
measures in the investigation stage.
17
 Due to the widespread nature of the 
international crimes, it may include an extensive collection of materials. Importantly, 
a different aspect of investigation of the ICC to the ICTY and ICTR is that, in 
contrast with these ad hoc tribunals, the scope of investigation and the collection of 
evidence by the ICC’s prosecutor is included by both sides, thus, he/she is  obliged to 
both collect evidence and investigate the ‘exonerating circumstances equally.’18 
Additionally, the prosecutor is responsible for the maintenance and the security of 
the collected materials and protection of victims and witnesses.
19
 Despite the fact that 
the Prosecutor has no police and is without independent executive power, in practice, 
his investigation mainly relies on the cooperation of states and other international 
organisations.
20
 Although the Prosecutor has authority to request the cooperation and 
compliance of states and intergovernmental organizations or enter into argument with 
them,
 21
obtaining the cooperation by state parties is complicated task. The Rome 
Statute has also recognized the denial of cooperation in practices such as broad range 
of ‘national security’,22 which states may rely on (this will discussed in the following 
section). In particular, with the exception of a referral by the SC, for other cases the 
Prosecutor has no power to compel states to cooperate in the collection of evidence, 
or other important aspects. 
                                               
16 Blattmann R & Bowman K. ‘Achievements and Problems of the International Criminal Court, A 
View from Within’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008),711, at 718.  
17 Rome Statute Art. 54(1), (b). 
18 Id.  Art. 54 (1), (a). 
19 See the ICC Rule of Procedure and evidence Art. 10, ICC ASP/1/3(09/09/2002), see also Ponte 
C.D. Supra note 7, at 290-304. 
20 E.g. Peace- keeping forces, Amnesty International, the  SC and etc. 
21 Rome Statute Art. 93, see also Caianiello M.  Supra note 9, at 387. 
22 See Rome Statute Art. 93 (4), and (5).  
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  As compared to the situation of domestic courts, collecting evidence is 
usually much more difficult in the case of an international tribunal. This is because of 
language barriers, the attendance of witnesses and distances that need to be covered. 
Translation for international courts takes a long time, and misunderstanding in such 
translation may cause difficulties in obtaining the truth. The significance of distance, 
timing, and cost are the reasons why local jurisdiction has been recognised among 
the different legal systems, making it easier and quicker for investigators to collect 
evidence and for victims and witnesses to access the court. The ICC, on the other 
hand, is located hundreds of miles away from where the crimes it has so far 
investigated were committed. The most significant, in practice, all of the situations
23
 
in the ICC so far has demonstrated that its scope of investigations is enormously 
broad. Compared to domestic crimes, the international crimes and procedures are 
generally ‘more complex’, in particular when concurrent crimes (for example, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes often happen simultaneously) need to be 
considered,24 and that despite such difficulties, the Prosecutor does not have at hand a 
state executive or judicial machinery to assist in the investigative stage, nor the 
ability to arraign witnesses or sift through relevant evidence.
25
   
As an illustration in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilon case,
26
 the Prosecution was 
forced to rely predominantly upon documents, reports from NGOs (e.g. from 
Amnesty International) a single live witness
27
  (Christine Peduto, a United Nations 
staff member, whose testimony appears to have been key to the Pre-Trial Chamber I 
decision) and a large number of written statements
28
 and summaries of mostly 
anonymous witness declarations. The Defence strongly criticised the investigative 
value of these last two sources: Lubanga’s lawyer argued persuasively that a written 
                                               
23 Since the ICC came into force in first July 2002 it has seven situations to date: the situation in 
Darfur, which was the first referral by the SC Res 1593(31 March 2005), the situation in  Libya, 
which was the second referral by the SC,  Res. 1970 (26 February 2011), Kenya in 2009, which was 
initiated by the Prosecutor under the authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09 (31 March 
2010),and three further referral situations by states, the DRC, ICC-OTP-20040419-50(2004), Uganda, 
ICC-20040129-44 (29 January 2004), the Central African Republic, ICC-OTP-20050107-86 (7 
January 2007), a situation which was brought through declaration to the ICC under Art.12(3), of the 
Statute by Cote d’Ivoire, ICC-02/011 (2011).  
24 Kerb C. ‘The Procedural Text of the International criminal Court’, 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2007), 537, at 543; Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 8, at 458. 
25 May R & Wierda M.  International Criminal Evidence (2002), at 51. 
26 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-CPI-20070129-196; see also 
generally, the Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-209 (14 July 2009).  
27 Id, although in the trial chamber the Court was heard many witnesses in this case. 
28 The written statement instead of the oral testimony has been allowed in the ICTY and ICTR, see 
RPE Art. 92 (A). 
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statement cannot be questioned effectively because there was no opportunity for 
cross-examination, and that the summaries of witnesses’ declarations were not 
reliable, as they represented only the Prosecutor’s view of the statements made. 
Although these remarks have a broad foundation, they were nevertheless not relevant 
to the confirmation hearing, and did not lead the Chamber to find the evidence given 
by the Prosecutor insufficient. As a commentator states, ‘[t]his is the procedural 
structure that the drafters of the Statute considered to be proper in order to avoid the 
transformation of the confirmation hearing into a ‘trial before trial.’29 Yet this was 
not to avoid the very real evidential problems that were disclosed. 
The ICC in practice continues to develop the rules for evidence designed to 
overcome some of these difficulties. For example in  the Lubanga case  Trial 
Chamber interpreted the words ‘testimony of a witness’ contained in Rule 68, in a 
broad sense:   
       Turning to Article 69(2) and Rule 68, in the judgment of the Chamber the latter 
provision is directed at the “testimony of a witness” in a broad sense, given that the 
various forms of testimony that are specifically included in the rule are audio- or 
video- records, transcripts or other documented evidence of “such” testimony 
(namely, the testimony of a witness). The Chamber highlights, particularly, that the 
“other documented evidence” ... is referred to separately, and in addition to, the 
audio- or video- records in the opening paragraph of Rule 68; moreover, in sub-rules 
a) and b) “previously recorded testimony” is referred to without limiting its scope to 
video or audio evidence.
 30
  
 
However, the above broad interpretation of the RPE does not mean that the 
prosecutor has been authorised to collect or request for all type of evidence, as there 
are strict limitations. The Court, for instance, cannot obtain evidence that may violate 
the Statute or ‘internationally recognised human rights’,31 where the violation leads 
to essential doubt on ‘the reliability of the evidence.’32 Additionally, there are 
limitations in relation to ‘national security’33 which may exclude or limit the 
cooperation by states for collection of evidence. The collecting of evidence and 
                                               
29 Miraglia M. ‘Admissibility of Evidence, Standard of Proof, and Nature of the Decision in the ICC 
Confirmation of Charges in Lubanga’, 6 Journal of international Criminal Justice (2008), 489, at 493. 
30 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,  Decision on the prosecution’s application for the 
admission of the prior recorded statements of two witnesses, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1603 (15 January 2009), at 9, Para 18. 
31 Rome Statute  Art. 96 (7), provides: “Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or 
internationally recognized human rights shall not be admissible if: (a),The violation casts substantial 
doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or  (b), The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to 
and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.” This Article partly based on ICTY Rule 
95, that clearly excludes such evidence that may obtain  via  the violation of internationally 
recognized human rights  and the Statute; see also Rastan R. Supra note 7, at 452.  
32 Rome Statute, Art 69 (7).   
33 Id.  Art. 72 and 93 (4), see also Rastan R. Ibid , at 536. 
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assessment of its reliability is much more complicated in practice for the ICC than 
domestic courts, as indicated in Lubanga Dyilo case Trial Chamber 1, in 2012, where 
such difficulties for the Prosecutor, i.e. delay of investigation, high expense, and 
reliability, were accounted for: 
      The Chamber spent a considerable period of time investigating the circumstances of 
a substantial number of individuals whose evidence was, at least in part, inaccurate 
or dishonest. The Prosecution’s negligence in failing to verify and scrutinise this 
material sufficiently before it was introduced led to significant expenditure on the 
part of the Court...
34
    
 
In addition to these everyday problems of evidence-gathering, it is also 
necessary to bear in mind that international crimes frequently relate to the acts of 
local authorities, their leaders, or of powerful individuals, who may frequently have 
power to interfere with an investigation in different ways, such as concealing 
evidence (either partially or completely) threatening the witnesses and victims who 
are to appear or participate in the court, or otherwise securing general non-
compliance with the evidence-gathering process.
35
 In Darfur, for instance, there are 
public reports that President al Bashir’s forces had attacked and tortured individuals 
who were under suspicion of having cooperated with the prosecution.
36
 Whilst these 
are serious obstacles, however, they are not entirely peculiar to the work of the ICC, 
as many such concerns would also affect the work of national criminal courts in their 
everyday operations. In addition, some international actors may withhold valuable 
evidences and obstruct investigation. 
37
  
However, it is nonetheless clear that it is generally more difficult for 
international tribunals due to the possibility of the frequent interference by national 
authorities as well as the associated difficulties in the collection of evidence and its 
link to authorities.
38
  It would not be stretching matters to suggest that both of these 
                                               
34 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,  Trial Chamber 1, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-359 -ENG ET WT 
14-03-2012 (14 March 2012), at 5. 
35 Ponte D.C. Supra note 7, at 41 and 84, the lack of cooperation by the Kigali government in 
Rwanda, they did not allow many witnesses to leave Rwanda. 
36 E.g. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan tries a man accused of spying for the ICC’ (23 December 2008), at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article29662. (Accessed 10/08/2012); see also Prosecution 
Document in Support of Appeal against the Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant 
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, ICC‐02/05‐01/09 OA (6 July 2009), at 4 Para 5. 
Also in DAR-OTP-0164-0398, BBC News, ‘Sudanese ‘war crimes spy’ jailed’, (28 January 2009), at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7856289.stm (Accessed 10/08/2012). 
37 Peskin V. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans, Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State 
Cooperation, (2008), at 30, he asserts that ‘[n]ot unlike the targeted states, international actors may 
also hamper investigations and block indictments by withholding valuable evidence in their 
possession.’  
38 E.g. see Ponte D.C. Supra note 7, at 124-125 and 374. 
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considerations may be such as to create a situation in which two equally undesirable 
consequences may ensue: in one, the court may be encouraged to loosen the 
evidential requirements for purposes of establishing proof of the offence (which will 
be examined below) in the other criminals may be allowed to escape from 
prosecution as a consequence of the insufficiency of available evidence. The result of 
these various forms of interference would be impunity of perpetrators.  
5.1.2. Identification and credibility of evidence and witnesses 
For the creation of any case before a tribunal, the identification of evidence,
39
 and its 
reliability is of paramount importance. In the first place the identification and 
evaluation of evidence, must be treated with great caution, because of the ‘many 
difficulties inherent in the identification process, resulting from the vagaries of 
human perception and recollection.’ 40 In fact, distance, lighting, and the amount of 
time that the witnesses observed the accused or the scene of a crime are equally 
important considerations for such an assessment.
41
 A witness can be easily mistaken 
about identification; hence, domestic criminal systems from around the world 
typically recognise that extreme caution is required before an accused person may be 
convicted based upon identification of a witness under difficult circumstances.
42
 The 
principles developed in various jurisdictions recognise the frailty of human 
perception and the risk that a miscarriage of justice could result from reliance on 
even the most confident witnesses asserting their identification of an accused without 
sufficient opportunity to confirm their observations.
43
 Due to such difficulties of 
reliability and identification, the Trial Chamber, I (2012) has also withdrawn the 
evidence from three victims of crimes:  
       [T]he Chamber has not relied on the testimony of the three victims who testified 
in Court because their accounts are unreliable. Given the material doubts that 
exist as to the identities of two of these individuals, which inevitably affect the 
evidence of the third, the Chamber decided to withdraw permission originally 
granted to them to participate as victims.
44
 
 
                                               
39 Rome Statute Art. 93 (a), (k), and 96 (2), (b). 
40 See the Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al, Judgment, IT-96-23&23/1(22 Feb. 2001), at 200, 
Para 561.  
41 May R. & Wierda M. Supra note 25, at 178. 
42 See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupre[ki] et al, Appeal Judgment, IT- 95-16-A (23 Oct 2001), at 11, Para 
34. 
43 Id, Para 34.   
44 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (14 March 2012), Supra note 34, at 5.         
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The second problem confronting the court is the reliability of evidence. The 
mere identification of the witnesses before the Court is not enough to complete the 
assessment of the witnesses and to determine whether the circumstances of the case 
means that an identification is reliable. ‘It is insufficient that the evidence of 
identification given by the witnesses has been honestly given; the true issue in 
relation to identification evidence is not only whether it has been honestly given but 
rather whether it is reliable.’45 The reliability of evidence in any case also depends on 
many other circumstances: for instance, ‘the origin, content, corroboration, 
truthfulness, voluntaries, and trustworthiness of the evidence.’46Due to such 
concerns, evidence may be excluded in the ICC,
47
 with the Statute expressing that ‘a 
fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness’48 as in practice in Lubanga case (2012): 
after significant expenditure and great length of trial, finally the Chamber has 
withdrawn ‘the right of six dual status witnesses to participate in the proceedings, as 
a result of the Chamber’s conclusions as to the reliability and accuracy of these 
witnesses.’49 This issue of reliability and identification may happen frequently at any 
court, but it is substantially more difficult for the ICC than for a domestic court, and 
may cause the delay of prosecution and lead to greater expense for the ICC. 
One may argue that the ICC could minimise the aforementioned procedural 
and practical problems. The Registry Office of the ICC has established, in addition to 
the ICC-UN liaison office in New York,
50
 field offices in the situation countries, with 
the purpose of supporting the Court’s offices in performing their respective mandates 
in these countries.
51
These field offices may well be in a position to facilitate some 
issues such as the identification of witnesses. Nevertheless, it is also clear that they 
                                               
45 See the Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al. (Feb, 2001), Supra note 40, at 200, Para 561. 
46 Cryer R & et al (2010), Supra note 8, at 465-6. 
47 See the Rome Statute Art. 69 (7). 
48 Id.  Art. 69 (4),    
49 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, (14 March 2012), Supra note 34, at 5. 
50 See the Liaison Office of the International Criminal Court to the UN, in the ICC’s website. 
51 These field offices are located in Kinshasa, Baudouin, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kampala in Uganda, Abeche Tchad, in Chad and, Bangui in the Central African Republic. See ICC-
ASP/5/2 (8 August 2006), at 40 (e), and ICC-ASP/6/3(30 MAY 2007), at 6. See also the report by 
Judge Philippe Kirsch President of the International Criminal Court Address to the UN GA (1 
November 2007), at 3. The field operations of the Court are targeted at facilitating victims’ 
applications for participation and reparations, protecting and relocating witnesses where necessary, 
supporting counsel for the defence and conducting outreach programmes to the affected communities, 
see the ICC- ASP/6/8, (Assembly of States Parties), Sixteen Section (30 November to 14 December 
2007), at 52, Para 188. 
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are not in a position to solve all of the procedural deficiencies, and will still face 
obstacles relating to state cooperation, funding and security.
52
  
5.2. Particular procedural jurisdictional issues, which may serve to facilitate  
             impunity 
The ICC also has some particular procedural problems, which may restrict and 
weaken the functioning of the Court in comparison with national courts and ad hoc 
international tribunals. One group of such problems concerns the scope and nature of 
complementary jurisdiction, the admissibility threshold, the issue of enforcement 
power, notification of investigation, and challenge of cooperation, with the latter 
being also common to ad hoc tribunals, which altogether makes the ICC an 
ineffective Court.  
5.2.1. The scope and the nature of the jurisdiction of the court  
The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to just some international crimes,53 and I argue that 
the exercising of this jurisdiction is exceptional. This would not be a problem on its 
own if other certain fundamental conditions were met. However, I maintain that 
those other conditions do not exist.  
Jurisdiction in the Rome Statute has two aspects: one is jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the crimes, the other is individual jurisdiction over the accused.
54
 
As regards the first the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and for the crimes of aggression in the future.
55
 Crimes within its 
jurisdiction have been excluded before the date that it came into force, July 1 2002, 
and the ICC does not have retroactive jurisdiction over such crimes.
56
 There are also 
                                               
52 Id, at 9, Para 48  (ASP) The Court concludes that the present organizational structure is not meeting 
the requirements resulting from the complex security challenges of its operations in the field and 
requests funds in the amount of €460,000. 
53 Cryer R & Bekou O. ‘International Crimes and ICC cooperation in England and Wales’, 5 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2007), 441, at 448.  
54 Kircher A. ‘Attack on the International Criminal Court:  A Policy of Impunity,’13 Michigan State 
Journal of International Law (2005), 263, at 266. 
55 See the Rome Statute Art. 5. The crime of aggression has recently been defined at the ICC’s first 
review conference in Kampala, Uganda, by the Assembly of States Parties, but the Court’s ability to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is ‘subject to a decision to be taken after 1 
January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment 
to the Statute, and one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments [relating to the 
crime of aggression] by 30 States Parties, whichever is later.’ The crime of aggression, ICC, RC/Res.6 
(11 June 2010). 
56 See the Rome Statute  Art. 11(1). The Statute came into force pursuant Art. 126; see also the ICC’s 
website. 
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several missing crimes in the Statute: significant ones include the crimes of 
terrorism, drug trafficking, and the use of nuclear weapons.
 
During the negotiation 
for the adoption of the Statute, a proposal was made that the crimes of terrorism and 
drug trafficking be considered in the review conference;
57
 and was, in fact, discussed 
in the ICC’s first review conference in 2010, 58 but their inclusion in the Statute was 
rejected. It seems unlikely that state parties would be able to reach consensus on this 
in future, particularly given the problems relating to the definition of terrorism.  
 Concerning the second aspect of jurisdiction, the Rome Statute has personal 
jurisdiction over individuals who are suspected of having committed any of the core 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in three contexts. The first is when the 
persons have committed crimes in the territory of a state that is party to the Rome 
Statute.
59
 The second is where the accused is a citizen of state party to the Rome 
Statute.
60
 The third is when the ICC has the power to exercise its jurisdiction over the 
territory of non-party states in which the crimes was committed. This may itself 
occur in two situations: firstly in the case where the state accepts the Court’s 
jurisdiction via declaration,
61
 and secondly in the case of a referral by the SC under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
62
 The ‘trigger mechanisms of jurisdiction’ of the ICC 
for the aforementioned perpetrators are: a) referral by state parties to the Statute, b) 
referral of a situation by the SC pursuant Chapter VII of the Charter, and c) initiating 
of cases by the Prosecutor proprio motu power.
63
 Further, for the commencement of 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, a mechanism of ‘checks and balances’ has been 
established between the Prosecutor and the Trial Chambers in the Statute.
64
 Hence, a 
commencement of investigation by the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power (non-
referral) is always subject to approval and control by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
65
 In 
contrast in a referral situation, the decision of the Prosecutor to investigate is not 
                                               
57 Robinson P. ‘The missing crimes’, in A Cassese, P Gaeta, and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds), (2002), 497, 
supra note 1, at 497.  
58 All of these crimes have also been suggested by states in the first review conference. The 
Netherlands suggested the inclusion of the terrorism in the Statute; Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago 
suggested the inclusion of the drug trafficking; and Mexico, the use of and threat to use nuclear 
weapons, see the Report on the first review conference on the Rome Statute, 31 May- 11 June 2010, 
Kampala Uganda, available at: http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RC_Report_finalweb.pdf  
(Accessed 29/05/2012), 
59 Rome Statute,  Art. 12(1). 
60 Id, Art. 12 (2), (b). 
61 Id, Art. 12  (2). 
62 Id, Art.13 (b). 
63 Id, Art. 15 (1).  
64 Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 8, at 444. 
65 Rome Statute Art. 15 (4). 
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subject to the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, when the decision of the 
prosecutor is not to investigate in the ‘interests of justice’, this decision may be 
reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
66
 This interplay between the ICC’s Prosecutor 
and Pre-Trial Chamber for the commencement of cases in the early stage has been 
known as the most pertinent example of the unique ICC’s procedural provision.67    
Concerning the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC, irrespective of its 
exclusion of some international crimes, two significant standpoints for the crime 
within its jurisdiction should to be considered. The first is that the Statute, in contrary 
to the two ad hoc tribunals, defines crimes against humanity and war crimes in 
greater detail.
68
 The second aspect is that the Statute not only codified existing 
customary law, but it codified new crimes and thus contributed to the development of 
future customary international law.
69
 However, one may argue that, despite the ICC’s 
declaration in the Preamble that it has ‘jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole,’70 the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the ICC is insufficient due to several significant missing crimes. The significance 
of this point is that, because the ICC’s claim to put an end to impunity, it may first of 
all be expected to have subject-matter jurisdiction overall the most serious 
international crimes, which it does not. The ICC also does not yet have the ability 
(and will not, at least for the next six years) to exercise jurisdiction over one of the 
core crimes of aggression within this jurisdiction.
71
   
In addition, there are still further limitations. The Court is unable to exercise 
its limited jurisdiction without other requirements, for the commencement of the 
jurisdiction the Prosecutor needs specific trigger mechanisms. The admissibility test 
of the ICC has two main branches, complementarity
72
 and gravity.
73
  In fact, since 
the implementation of the jurisdiction by the ICC happens in exceptional 
circumstances,
74
as a consequence of the inability, unwillingness, or inaction of 
national courts, its entire jurisdiction could be said to be exceptional, in the sense that 
                                               
66 Id,  Art .53 (3).     
67 Kress C. Supra note 10, at 606. 
68 Cryer R & et al. Ibid, at 150.   
69 Id, at 151; see also Rome Statute, e.g. enlisting children under fifteen years, Art. 6 (b), (xxvi), and 
(e), (vii), which seems new in the war crimes categories. 
70 Id, the Preamble, Para 9. 
71 See the crime of aggression, ICC. RC/Res.6 (11 June 2010), Statute first review Conference, supra 
not 58. 
72 Rome Statute Art. 17(1), (a), and (c). 
73 Id. Art. 17(1), (d). 
74 O’Callaghan D. Supra note 1, at 545.  
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it is subordinate to the normal jurisdiction exercised by national courts.
 
The rule is 
that states are usually able to prosecute, and the exception is where states are 
genuinely unable or unwilling to carry on investigations.   
5.2.2. The principle of complementarity and admissibility of cases  
The term ‘complementarity’ is new in the legal context of jurisdiction75 and in 
international criminal law.
76
 This crucial principle led to a vast literature among 
scholars.
77
 The complementarity concept plays a pivotal role in relation between a 
state’s domestic courts and the ICC, and reflects all of the substantive provisions of 
the ICC and its implementation of jurisdiction, which relies on this principle.
78
 
Despite the many advantages of the complementary principle, I will argue that it may 
potentially provide for the abuse of this principle, and may indeed weaken the Court 
and thus facilitate impunity. Further, it may also facilitate the possibility of the 
abuses of this principle and impunity in way that national jurisdiction may impede 
the exersise of the Court’s jurisdiction. First, I discuss the different discussions at the 
Rome conference for the adoption of this principle, its definition, then the different 
attitude among scholars concerning this principle. Finally, I discuss concerns around 
the admissibility of cases and how the notion of the complementarity and has worked 
in practice so far. 
The word complementarity first appears in ad hoc discussions of the 
Committee as a derivative of the term ‘complementary’, found in the preamble of the 
1994 ILC Draft Statute.
79
 The Draft Statute provides that the ICC is intended ‘to be 
complementary to national criminal justice systems.’ The delegations adopted the 
                                               
75 Miskowiak K. The International Criminal Court: Consent, Complementarity and Cooperation 
(2000), at 45.  
76 Razesberger F. The International Criminal Court, the Principle of Complementarity (2006), at 21. 
77 In addition to the above see, Newton M.A. ‘The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching 
Evolution or Evisceration?’8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law (2010),115;  Radosavljevic  
D. ‘An Overview on the ICC Complementarity Regime,’ I USAK Yearbook (2008), 125; Yang  L. ‘On 
the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ 4 Chinese 
Journal of International Law (2005),121; Benzing M. ‘The Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the  Fight  
against Impunity,’ 7 Max Blanck Year book of  United Nations Law (2003), 591; Sheng A. ‘Analizing 
the International Criminal Court Complementarity Principle Through a Federal Courts Lens,’ 13 ILSA 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (2006-7), 413; Kleffner J.K.‘The Impact of 
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law,’ 1 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2003), 86. 
78 The Rome Statute Art. 1 and17. 
79 See Report of the International law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session (1994), at 3, 
Para 3. It provides ‘…the international community could complement and assist national efforts.’ U 
N. Doc. A/49/355 (1994). 
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word quickly and it was defined in cursory fashion in the Preparatory Committee, in 
1996, as a phrase ‘to reflect the jurisdictional relationship between the International 
Criminal Court and national authorities, including national courts’.80 Later at the 
Rome Conference, discussion relating to this principle was a cause of difficult and 
intense arguments among state delegations. However, the majority of delegates’ 
statements were in favour of this principle in the Rome Statute;
81
 advocating it with 
respect for their national sovereignty. As one delegate observed, the Court should 
exercise jurisdiction only in the cases where national trial procedures are not 
available or ineffective, so as to preserve national sovereignty and avoid 
jurisdictional conflicts.
 82
  
The definition of complementarity, arises from an announcement by several 
countries’ delegations at the Rome Conference of the necessity for the definition of 
this principle.
83
 In the end, however, complementarity was not defined, and was left 
ambiguous in the Rome Statute.
84
 The preamble of the Statute states that the ICC 
‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction’85 and in Article 1 that it 
‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.’86 Therefore, the concept 
of complementarity in the Rome Statute must be understood through the related 
Articles and through delegates’ statements in the Rome Conference, that it means 
that the Court would complete the national jurisdiction as a last resort, where states 
are unwilling or unable genuinely to prosecute such grave international crimes. 
Accordingly, the States Parties of the Statute have priority and primacy of 
jurisdiction over the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Statute.
87
 
A difference in attitude concerning complementarity, maybe seen from 
discussions at the Rome Conference, although the majority supported this principle, a 
few countries raised concerns about the adoption of complementary jurisdiction. For 
                                               
80 See the Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, UN Doc. A/51/22, Supplement No.22 (March- April 1996), I, at 36, Para 153. 
81 See the UN Diplomatic Conference (1998),Vol, II. Supra note 4,  E.g. , Canada, at 68, Para 67, 
China at 75,Para 37, Japan at 67, Para 42,  Germany at 83, Para 20, U.K at 98, Para 22, France at 101, 
Para 70, Mexico at 107, Para 20, Denmark  at 114, Para 1,  and etc.  
82  Id,  Ayub Delegation from Pakistan. Id, at 78, Para 91; see also  AI Bunny Delegation from Syria, 
at 83, Para 19. 
83 Id, e.g. statements by Malawi from Indonesia and Nasr from Lebanon (20 November 1998), at 73, 
Para 10 and at 94, Para 42. 
84 El Zeidy M. The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, 
Development and Practice (2008), at 157.  
85 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute Para 10. 
86 Id, Art.1. 
87 Id, Art 17 (1), (a), and (b). 
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example, Telicka, from the Czech Republic, stated that the ICC should have inherent 
jurisdiction over crimes instead of mere complementary jurisdiction. He asserted that 
the complementarity principle would place severe constraints on the Court’s 
effectiveness; instead, the Court needed to be equipped with safeguards against sham 
investigations and show trials, and adding that: 
     His delegation could not accept the idea that, if a national justice system investigated 
or prosecuted a case, the Court should not be entitled to exercise jurisdiction, for that 
interpretation of the complementarity principle would seriously undermine the Court’s 
effectiveness. 
88
 
 
Moreover, Halonen of Finland at the Rome Conference noted that: 
    [T]he exercise of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court was limited by the 
principle of complementarity,... The role of the Court must not be marginalized 
through further restriction.
89
 
 
Similarly a commentator argued that the complementarity would significantly 
‘limit the jurisdiction, role and authority of the ICC that many fear it could 
become only a meaningless, residual institution.’90  While inherent jurisdiction of 
the ICC was recognized, it would enhance the ICC’s capability to prevent 
impunity for international crimes,
91
 the ILC has also suggested inherent 
jurisdiction of the ICC for some crimes.
92
 Brown accepted that the experience of 
the ICTY and ICTR concerning their practical enforcement of primacy led to the 
opinion that the primacy is not a feasible option for the ICC. He asserts ‘[i]nherent 
jurisdiction would allow the ICC to assert jurisdiction over cases involving core 
crimes without deferring to the jurisdiction of any interested state.’93 It seems 
even granting inherent jurisdiction to the Court, the ICC would face issues 
regarding enforcement and cooperation. 
                                               
88 See the UN Diplomatic Conference. Supra note 4, Vol, II, at 74 Para 21. 
89 Id, at 98 Para, 31.  
90 Brown B.S. ‘Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and 
International Criminal Tribunals.’ 23 Yale Journal of International Law (1998), 383, at 425. 
91 Id. 
92 In the ILC Draft Statute inherent jurisdiction was suggested for the crime of aggression, and this 
approach was supported by a great number of states at the Preparatory Committee in 1997; see 
Working Group 3 on Complementarity and Trigger Mechanisms: Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court (August 4-15, 1997), at 4, Art. 21 and 22. The Lawyers’ Committee 
for Human Rights also supported inherent jurisdiction ‘if the ICC is to operate as an independent and 
effective international judicial forum. In our view, both practical and legal reasons point to the need 
for expanding the court’s inherent jurisdiction to include not only genocide, but war crimes and crimes 
against humanity as well.’ See The International Criminal Court Trigger Mechanism and the Need for 
an Independent Prosecutor, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (July 1997), at 3; see also Press 
Release, Proposed International Court should have Inherent Criminal Jurisdiction, Legal Committee 
told,  UN. GA/L/2878( 1 November 1995). 
93 Brwon B.S. Ibid, at 426. 
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However, complementarity has been advocated extensively by scholars, with 
some insisting on positive complementarity,
94
 as it insists that the ICC is a ‘court of 
last resort’.95 Many account advantages of this principle. Cassese and Cryer & et al 
and Livada, discuss the practical advantages with respect to primary jurisdiction and 
efficiency of the Court, arguing that it would be inappropriate for the ICC ‘to be 
flooded with cases from all over the world.’96 Furthermore, it is likely to enhance 
national proceedings in an indirect way, and encourage states to comply with their 
primary liability to prosecute heinous international crimes.
97
 Others also argue 
philosophically that the complementarity principle is justified by the requirements of 
national sovereignty and the primacy of national jurisdiction.
98
 Although, the 
principle of complementarity seems to reflected state sovereignty, the Statute does 
not allow state parties to do nothing when confronted with a crime and may thus be 
seen to be a limitation of sovereignty of states.      
Due to the significance of complementarity the Assembly of States Parties 
(ASP) adopted a Resolution on complementarity in the ICC’s first review conference 
in Kampala, Uganda in 2010.
99
 Accordingly, the states adopted to assist the exchange 
of information between the ICC and state parties to the Statute, as well as and other 
international organizations such as civil society. Further, they ‘aimed at 
strengthening domestic jurisdictions, and requests the Secretariat of the [AS] Parties 
to report to the tenth session of the Assembly on progress in this regard.’100 The ASP 
adopted the establishment of a complementarity ‘Extranet’, in order to ‘provide 
information on events relating to complementarity, identify the main actors and their 
                                               
94 This idea of ‘positive complementarity’ did not appear in the Rome Statute; it is a concept due to 
interpretation by scholars and by the Prosecutor Policy Paper in ; see Sriram C. L & Brown S. ‘Kenya 
in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and Impact,’ 12 International Criminal Review 
(2012), 219, at 228 ; see the International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), Report on 
the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003-June 2006), (12 September 2006), 
Para, 95; and the OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012 (1 February 2010), Paras 16 and 17.  
95 O’Callaghan D. Supra note 1, at 545. 
96 Cassese A. International Criminal Law (2008), at 343; Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 8, at 
153; Livada P. D. ‘The Principle of Complementarity and Security Council Referrals’,  in M Politi & 
F Gioia (eds), The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdiction  (2008), 51, at 57. 
97 Stigen J. The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions the 
Principle of Complementarity (2008),at 477;  Rastan R. Supra note 7, at 453; Sriram C. L & Brown S. 
Supra note 94, at 229. 
98 Sriram C. L & Brown S. Id, at 228; Cassese A. (2008), Ibid, at 343; Livinda P.D. Ibid, at 57. 
99 ICC-ASP/2/Res.3. (2010) 
100 Id. 
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relevant activities.’101 Consequently, the Secretariat issued a press release in 2011 
and announced the Establishment of the Extranet.
102
  
 The most crucial aspect of the principle of complementarity relates to the 
question of admissibility. The rules of admissibility filter the types of situations or 
cases that can be put before the Court.
103
 The admissibility of a case has to be 
considered by the Prosecutor before the commencement of any case by the ICC,
104
 
and determines which cases will be admissible. There are several situations wherein 
cases are inadmissible in the ICC. The first is when a case ‘is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a state’ which has jurisdiction over such crimes, unless the state is 
genuinely unable or unwilling to prosecute, or such state decided not to prosecute.
105
 
The second situation is where  the ICC is subject to the ne bis in idem principle,  that 
the prosecution and trial has already been completed, unless the proceedings were 
conducted for purposes of shielding the individuals concerned from criminal 
responsibility, or the trial was not conducted with independence or impartiality.
106
 
The third situation is when the case ‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court’.107 In fact, from the above three situations it can be concluded 
that there is a primacy given to the exercise of jurisdiction to states.
108
  
There are some ambiguities in the rule of inadmissibility of cases in the above 
Article which may be problematic in practice. The most significant are related to the 
type of investigation, interpretation of the case, and the gravity of crimes. Firstly, the 
Article does not specify what kind of investigation it is referring to and whether it 
includes non-retributive investigations, such as those conducted by truth 
commissions, which in turn concerns the question of amnesty examined in the third 
chapter. Secondly, concerning how broad a ‘case’ should to be interpreted, the 
Article is again not clear although in practice of the ICC has consistently reflected 
that ‘case’ should be identical in both person and charges. For example, in Post-
election violence in Kenya, the Appeal Chamber, in Prosecutor v. William Sammoei 
Ruto & et al (2011) held that ‘Chambers have routinely adopted an interpretation of 
                                               
101 See ICC-ASP/10/2, (11 November 2011), at 2.  
102 See Press release, complementarity, ICC-ASP-20110802-PR707 (2 August 2011). 
103 El Zeidy M. Supra note 84, at 408. 
104 Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 8, at 154. 
105  Rome Statute. Art. 17 (1), (a), and (b). 
106 Id.  Art. 17 (2), (c), and Art. 20 (3), see generally Tallgren. I & Coracin A. R. ‘Article 20’ in in Otto 
Triffterer (eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Court (2008), 669.  
107 Id. Art. 17 
108 Jones J. R.W.D & Powles S. International Criminal Practice (2003),  at 392. 
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“case” consistent with the same person same conduct test….[t]he determination of 
admissibility vis‐à‐vis a “case” should be “understood narrowly to encompass both 
the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court”.109  This 
approach also has been held in the Pre Trial Chamber in Germain Katanga case.110 
The significance of such jurisprudence of the ICC has clarified what is meant by a 
“case” here, although it has not prevented the matter from being the subject of 
continues challenges.  
Thirdly, there is the question as to what is meant by the ‘gravity’ of a case, as 
this term has not been further defined in the Statute.
 111
  The idea of ‘gravity’ in fact 
is open to being interpreted in many different ways. The question is what constitutes 
the gravity - the number of victims, - quantitative- the kind of crimes- qualitative-, 
and so on. The practice of the Court in the Bemba case defined the gravity as 
pertaining to ‘the scope, scale, and nature of the crimes’, and the Chamber has 
rejected the Defence challenge for weak gravity of crimes in this case.
 112
 The Office 
of the Prosecutor has sought to extend the gravity criteria in greater detail, which, in 
addition to the above by the Chamber, includes the nature of the crimes, the manner 
of the commission of crimes, and its impact on victims.
113
 In the most important case 
which the ICC dealt with the question of the gravity, was in relation to Kenya.
114
 The 
situation in Kenya was the first situation initiated by the Prosecutor’s  proprio motu 
power, and the scale of crimes was very limited in comparison to the other contexts 
such as DRC and Darfur. The number of deaths in Kenya after the controversial 
election was around 1133;
115
 the Pre Trial Chamber authorised prosecution in 2010 
                                               
109 Prosecutor v. William Sammoei Ruto & et al, Appeal Chamber, ICC-01/09-01/11-183 (12  July 
2012), Para 95; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the Chamber also provides that in order to a case to be 
inadmissible before the ICC, the crimes and perpetrators should be identical in national court and in 
the ICC, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga , Pre-Trial Chamber 1.  
110 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the 
Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber 1, ICC-
01/04-01/07-4 12-02-2008, ICC-01/04-01/07(6 July 2007), Para 20. 
111 The RPE, however, in rule 145 (1), (c), and 2 (b) (iv), provides guidance for the examination of 
gravity, see also Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre -Trial Chamber II, 
ICC-01/09-19 31-03-2010 (31 March 2010), at 27 Para 67. 
112 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Response by the Legal Representative of Victims to the Defence’s 
Challenge on Admissibility of the Case pursuant to articles 17 et 19 (2), (a), of the Rome Statute, Trial 
Chamber III, ICC-01/05-01/08-742 (1 April 2010), Para 69.  
113 See Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 29(2), the OTP, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (23 
April 2009), see also Policy paper on the interests of justice, the ICC-OTP-2007, (September 2007), 
at 4-5.  
114 Sriram C. L & Brown S. Supra note 94, at 221. 
115 See Situation in Kenya (31 March 2010), Supra note, 111, at 58, Para 142 and 145.  
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without dealing with the complementarity principle. The Chamber otherwise 
provides that it is not necessary for the assessment of unwillingness or inability for 
Kenya to prosecute.
116
 However, the Pre-trial Chamber examined the gravity and in 
addition to the factors of gravity in Bambe case, the Chamber added the ‘manner of 
commission’ of crimes and confirmed the gravity.117 The Prosecutor in this situation 
also emphasised on the manner of organised crimes in the Kenya as a way of 
interpreting of gravity.
118
  
In general, a link may exist between the gravity threshold and impunity. To 
explain this, if a crime is committed which falls within the jurisdiction of the Statute, 
and if the state possessing jurisdiction takes inadequate steps in response, rather than 
simply assume jurisdiction the Court will examine the gravity of the crime for 
purposes of determining its admissibility.
119
 In such a situation, it is the gravity of the 
offence which will determine trial before the ICC, even in cases in which the state in 
question has no desire to prosecute. In such circumstances there is every prospect 
that neither domestic nor international proceedings will result from the commission 
of the crime, nor indeed any other form of accountability. 
Such a conclusion, of course, depends upon the two criteria of admissibility 
in Article 17 of the Statute, namely the unwillingness and inability of the state to 
exercise jurisdiction. In each case, it is clear that there are a variety of different 
circumstances that might fall under each heading.  
a) Unwillingness: Article 17 (2) defines what constitutes unwillingness and 
distinguishes between these different scenarios. The first is that a state may be 
considered as ‘unwilling’ when a prosecution was made in order to shield the person 
concerned from criminal liability.
120
 The second is when there was ‘unjustified 
delay’ in the proceedings,121 and the third when proceedings ‘were not or are not 
being conducted independently or impartially’, in a way which is incompatible with 
                                               
116  Id. Paras 52 and 53.  
117 Id, Para 188.   
118 Press release, ICC Prosecutor to Judges: Kenya crimes resulted from a policy by identifiable 
leaders, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP-20100303 (3 March 3 2010). 
119 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, Article 
58,  Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr, Para 41, it provides  ‘the fact that a case addresses 
one of the most serious crimes for the international community as a whole is not sufficient for it to be 
admissible before the Court.’ See also Situation in Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Supra note 111, Para 
57. 
120 The Rome Statute Art. 17 (2), (a), 
121 Id, Art. 17 (2), (b). 
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an intention to bring such individuals to justice.
122
 The Article is silent concerning 
inaction by state, but the Court in practice established that inaction can be an 
additional indication of unwillingness, as in the Lubanga  and
123
 Katanga  cases  in 
DRC.
 124
  Moreover, it seems that the above factors defining unwillingness are not 
exclusive; rather, unwillingness may be indicated by other factors, such as 
inadequate legislation by a state, wherein the case will fall under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.
125
 
b) Inability: A state is ‘unable’ to prosecute where its judicial system has 
entirely or partially collapsed, or it is not in a position to detain the accused, or to 
collect required evidence, or to carry out criminal proceedings.
126
 In a similar way to 
the case of unwillingness, which could be indicated by inaction, inaction could also 
be a consequence of the inability of a judiciary system to prosecute. While 
linguistically, inability is a broad term which could simply refer to the state without 
limitation and could cover any case of inability,
127
 the Statute in fact limits the scope 
of inability, and specifies certain kinds of inability: inability as a result of ‘total or 
substantial collapse’ or as the ‘unavailability of a judiciary system’.128 In practice, 
inability has been an important condition for the exercise of jurisdiction on the part 
of the Court as demonstrated in the Bemba,
129
 and Darfur cases.
130
   
The total collapse of the judicial system may happen rarely among states, but 
the situation in Rwanda after the genocide in 1994 is possibly illustrative of this 
                                               
122 Id, Art. 17 (2), (a). 
123 The OTP has interpreted the complementarity test as being fulfilled by inactivity, and not as 
requiring an obvious manifestation of the unwillingness or inability of a State to conduct a trial. This 
concept was recognised by Prosecutor v. Lubanga in Pre-Trial Chamber I. The case provides that: 
‘[t]he first part of the test relates to national investigations, prosecutions and trials concerning the case 
at hand insofar as such case would be admissible only if those States with jurisdiction over it have 
remained inactive in relation to that case or are unwilling or unable, within the meaning of article 
17(1), (a), to (c), 2 and 3 of the Statute’, see ICC-01-/04/-01/07- Pre-Trial Chamber I (10 February 
2006), Para 29. 
124 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui , Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-01/07-
1007 (30 March 2009), Para 47.  
125 E.g. the Lack of war crimes in Sudan in the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution (1564 of 18 
September 2004),( Geneva, 25 January 2005), at 5 and 148 Para 586.  
126 Id, Art. 17 (3).  
127 Stigen J. Supra note 97, at 314. 
128 See the Rome Statute Art. 17 (3). 
129 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber III. Supra note 112, Para 86. The Chamber held ‘the 
country’s [CAR] judicial system is lacking in sufficient number of judges, judicial assistants, work 
facilities, and even prisons, thereby rendering it an inefficient forum on which to hold such a complex 
prosecution.’  
130 See the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN. SG (18 September 
2004), Supra note 125, at 5. 
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condition. Of more significance than ‘total collapse’ is the idea of ‘substantial 
collapse’, which replaced the earlier terminology of ‘partial collapse’ found in the 
ILC draft in the Rome Conference.  Substantial collapse is clearly not total, but it is 
nevertheless essentially a collapse, in which a state is unable, for instance, to ‘obtain 
the accused’ or the ‘necessary evidence’.131  
The idea of ‘unavailability’, for its part, may encompass both the total and 
substantial collapse of a system, but is not confined to such a scenario.
132
 
Unavailability includes the lack of or inadequacy of relevant legislation, or the 
unavailability of procedures under national law for bringing the accused to justice.
133
 
When an action is not criminalised, the state would not be able to subsequently bring 
the perpetrators to justice. It seems clear that the idea of the ‘unavailability’ of a 
state’s judicial system should be construed in a broad enough manner for the ICC not 
to have to defer to national courts when the state is unable to carry out meaningful 
proceedings. Otherwise, impunity would effectively be created from the inadequacy 
of the national system, which is exactly what the Rome Statute was created to 
avoid.
134
  
In general there is obviously a very close relationship between unwillingness and 
inability;
135
 unwillingness may in fact be the result of inability in some situations.
136
  
In general there is less difficulty in reaching a decision that a state is unable to 
prosecute than that a state is unwilling to do so.
137
  The absence of any requirement 
to show intent, whether constructive or otherwise, is obviously an important 
consideration here, particularly in light of the lack of clarity as to the allocation of 
the burden of proof.
138
 
Aside from these general problems, it is unclear as to whether those states 
designated ‘unwilling or unable’ would include non-parties to the Rome Statute. The 
question is raised as to what happens when a state is not a member of the Statute, and 
                                               
131 Id, 17 (3). 
132 Stigen J. Supra not 97, at 317. 
133 See the Rome Statute Art. 88 and 56(1).  
134 Stigen J. Ibid, at 318.  
135 See International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ Side Event During ICC ASP Ninth Session, 
Making Complementarity Work: The Way Forward (9 December 2010),at 1. Available at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Events/2010/DiscussionPaper-Complementarity-9Dec2010-
ENG.PDF(Accessed  09/06/2012).  
136 Id, at 1. (ICTJ). 
137 Kleffner J.K. Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (2008), at 
153. 
138 Newton M.A. Supra note 77, at 148; Cryer R & et al. (2010), Supra note 8, at 442. 
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a situation in such a state is referred to the ICC by the SC or via self-referral by the 
state party. It seems that in case of a self-referral, it may be unnecessary for any 
assessment of unwillingness or inability, but at the same time, one may argue that 
nothing can prevent a sovereign state from reclaiming its jurisdiction.
139
 However, 
other criteria of admissibility, such as gravity of crimes, which is compulsory would 
remain to be examined.
 140
   
Finally, the notion of complementarity is that it is necessary in order to 
encourage genuine domestic procedure for international crimes and facilitate a 
‘consensual division of labour’ between the jurisdiction of the ICC and domestic 
jurisdiction where suitable.
141
 This is logically grounded in the idea that justice has to 
be rooted in the perception of the local people and victims,
142
 in addition to the fact 
that a court such as the ICC rationally and logistically cannot prosecute all 
international crimes. As Kleffner notes, such procedures, existing by reason of the 
complementarity principle, ‘contain elements of an interaction between the Court and 
national criminal Jurisdictions, which may serve to induce states to carry out 
investigation and prosecutions.’143The other rationale behind the principle of 
complementarity might be that national jurisdictions are, in fact, in a much better 
position to prosecute and to collect evidence.
144
 The practical advantages of national 
proceedings are clear: even with a large body and enough power, budget, and 
resources, a court is unable in practice to prosecute all international crimes.
145
 In 
some situations, the domestic court will be able to prosecute international crimes 
more effectively; however, this does not apply to all cases or all states. On the other 
hand, the ICC, in being complementary rather than supplementary to national 
                                               
139 Newton M.A Id, at 161-162.  
140 E.g. even in a referral situation by the Security Council, the complementarity principle has been 
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the Security Council, see the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. Supra note 
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jurisdictions, no doubt did provide a generally acceptable way of proceeding which 
gave due respect to state sovereignty. 
The criteria of admissibility outlined here do not, in themselves, entail the 
creation of a condition of impunity where none existed before, but may be said to 
foster and legitimise it on certain occasions. On the one hand, the test of gravity does 
seem to introduce an inexplicable gap in the jurisdictional system such that certain 
crimes are overtly determined not to be punishable.  On the other hand, the looseness 
of the determinations regarding the inability or unwillingness of the jurisdictional 
state to punish crimes may certainly enhance the possibility that certain perpetrators 
may effectively avoid processes of accountability.  Quite apart from this, the 
provisions will undoubtedly result in the delay of prosecution as a result of the 
challenges of jurisdiction and admissibility of cases either by the accused or states 
themselves.
146
 If justice delayed is justice denied, the spectre of impunity also casts a 
shadow over the procedural complexities of the Rome Statute.  
5.2.3. The fostering of impunity via the principle of complementarity and non-  
admissibility of cases 
As has been examined, the admissibility criteria in the Rome Statute establish a high 
threshold for interference by the ICC. The rules governing admissibility may ensure 
a case is deferred from the Court to a national criminal jurisdiction, and have the 
potential to foster impunity in several ways. 
a) Impunity via the recognition of a state’s decision not to prosecute, 
inadmissibility challenge, 
The Rome Statute, in Article 17 (1) (b) recognises as valid a decision not to 
prosecute a person by a state and it provides as one of the inadmissibility criteria for 
the Court that: ‘[t]he case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned’. The above 
Article recognises a decision not to prosecute by a state concerning such heinous 
crimes without offering other mechanisms of justice. As was pointed out in Chapter 
Three, it is sometimes argued that the prosecution of individuals may actually 
inflame a conflict and risk the perpetration of new atrocities, and that this is often 
used as an argument in favour of forms of non-retributive justice and local remedies. 
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Article 17(1) (b) might be said to reflect such a concern, but it does so in an absolute 
way in the sense that it offers no alternative to non-prosecution. One may say, in fact, 
that it recognises the impunity of individuals, when offered by a state who is able or 
willing to prosecute, but makes the decision not to prosecute.  
 In practice, in Bemba case, the Defence challenged the admissibility of cases 
and argued that because the Central African Republic (CAR) authorities previously 
investigated the same conduct concerning the current charge against Bemba, thus 
pursuance to Article 17 (1) (b) of the Statute, the case is inadmissible before the ICC. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber III held that since the decision by the CAR authority was not 
to prosecute the accused but to close the case, thus rejected the challenge of 
admissibility and referenced it to the Appeal Chamber in Katanga case that a 
‘decision not to prosecute’ in terms of article 17(1)(b) of the Statute does not cover 
the decision of a State to close judicial proceedings against a suspect because of his 
or her surrender to the ICC’.147It seems that the Chamber via such narrow 
interpretation in Bemba case attempted to eliminate the ‘not prosecution’ criteria as a 
bar to the admissibility of the above Article, as it may be in the interest of justice that 
some accused should be prosecuted in an international court rather than a domestic 
court. 
b) Impunity by shielding the perpetrators via complementarity 
Due to the complementarity principle, the Prosecutor, pursuant to Article 18 of the 
Statute and Rule 52 of the Procedure,
148
 should notify states of an initiation of 
investigations. Furthermore, a state may inform the Prosecutor within one month of 
having received the notification that it has initiated an investigation over the crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Statute.
 149
 In such a case the Prosecutor shall defer the 
situation to the state concerned, except if the Pre-Trial Chamber, under a request by 
the Prosecutor, decides to allow the prosecution. However, such a deferral to a state 
could be reviewed by the Prosecutor after six months of the deferral. 
150
  
  In general, the weaknesses with regard to complementarity is that it may lend 
itself to abuse of this principle as it can provide a shield to those who wish to evade 
                                               
147 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Trial  Chamber III (2010), Supra not 112, Para 61-64.    
148 See the Rule 52 of Evidence and Procedure, Adopted by the Assembly of State Parties, ICC-
ASP/1/3 (September 2002). It provides at 52(2), ‘[a] State may request additional information from 
the Prosecutor to assist it in the application of article 18, paragraph 2.’  
 149 Id, Art. 18(2), 
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the prosecution by the ICC.
151
 In practice there is considerable scope for states to 
shield perpetrators from prosecution either before or after a notification by the 
Prosecutor which would serve as an early warning for states. Firstly, before such 
declaration by the Prosecutor, states may await an investigation and only initiate it 
once the Prosecutor makes a notification under the above Article. Through this 
procedure, states could apply the complementarity principle as a shield for certain 
international crimes which have mainly happened through the support of the state 
authorities.
152
 Although such a notification of investigation by the Prosecutor could 
be limited in its scope,
153
 this notification may alert an accused and may cause 
misuse of the information.
154
 This may lead to the destruction of the evidence, and 
the result could be the impunity of perpetrators. 
Secondly, a state may, as a strategy, even initiate prosecution after the ICC’s 
Prosecutor has initiated an investigation, as long as the trial has not been started in 
the Court. In this situation, priority of jurisdiction is still with domestic courts. This 
priority of jurisdiction of national courts even after the beginning of an investigation 
by the Prosecutor is result of the lack of primacy and inherent jurisdiction of the ICC. 
An important point in such a case is how the ICC’s investigation in this situation 
could rightly deal with the commencement of a genuine prosecution in the national 
courts. When a state’s prosecution has only been started after an announcement, or 
an investigation by the Prosecutor, it is unlikely to be seeking a genuine prosecution 
and might rather be seen to be using it as a strategy in order to avoid prosecution by 
the ICC. In practice his has been exemplified in the Darfur situation currently before 
the ICC, where the Sudanese government has countered the Prosecutor’s arrest 
warrants by announcing that they are investigating the persons under arrest 
                                               
151 O’Callaghan D. Supra note 1, at 545. 
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warrant.
155
 Sudan has also established a Special Court for Darfur Crimes, in 2005 
and challenging the ICC’s prosecutions.156   
 Paradoxically, this kind of shielding of perpetrators may happen precisely 
because of the increasing influential attention of the international community, as a 
result of which a state may realise that it is difficult to remain passive. Instead, a trial 
may be held as a sham in order to shield such perpetrators partially or totally. The 
state authorities would be able to shield the perpetrators through a variety of different 
methods in such cases: via their acquittal or through the crime in question being 
prosecuted as an ordinary crime (e.g. genocide as murder) or by being given an 
inferior punishment, etc. This may occur, in particular, with regard to crimes against 
humanity, which are usually perpetrated with the assistance or at least acquiescence 
of national authorities. It is not easy for the Court to intervene in such cases, except 
when it is acting at the request of the Security Council;
157
 the particular problem 
being that it is difficult for the Prosecutor to amass sufficient evidence to prove such 
shielding is taking place. A commentator has noted that ‘[p]aradoxically, the 
establishment of the ICC will probably lead to more shams which in turn will be 
more difficult to identify than inaction.’158 
  5.3. The cooperation of states and enforcement issues of the ICC    
The most significant factor in the effectiveness of functioning of all international 
tribunals is the cooperation of states and other international organisations. In this 
section I argue that the cooperation regime of the ICC is weaker than that of the ad 
hoc tribunal and faces greater challenges of obtaining cooperation, which may foster 
impunity. As Peskin asserts, ‘[a] non-cooperative state does not usually remain 
passive in the face of the tribunal’s attempt to “prosecute” it by shaming’.159 The 
effectiveness of the international tribunal ‘depends ultimately on whether they can 
obtain and sustain the state cooperation needed to carry out investigations, locate 
                                               
155 See supra note, 36; see also generally,  Lack of Conviction - The Special Criminal Court on the 
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witnesses, and bring suspects to trial.’160 There are three categories of cooperation 
issues at the ICC which should be distinguish; namely, the cooperation regime within 
the Statute, cooperation by states and the Security Council.   
 a) The regime of cooperation in the ICC (de jure issue) is very weak in 
contrast to that in the ad hoc tribunals, and in general it is not obligatory.161 Indeed, 
the language of the Statute is ‘request for cooperation’ or ‘shall ...to cooperate’,162 
rather than ‘order’ or ‘obligation’.163 Moreover, the cooperation in the Statute is 
subject to many conditions, which may exclude or reduce the judicial assistance 
provided by state parties to the Court. These conditions include, national security 
interest, 164 third-party interests,165 competing requests for extradition from a non-
party state,166or a competing request for co-operation,167 a prohibition in domestic 
law,168 the immunity of state officials, ‘a pre-existing treaty obligation’169 and so 
forth. Many of the above qualifications seem to stem from the treaty nature of the 
ICC. As Rastan asserts, the majority of these provisions reflect the fact that ‘the 
Statute only regulates the relationship between states parties and the Court; 
consistent with the law of treaties, it does not intend to alter the existing relationship 
between states more generally.’170 
b) States non-party to the Statute, non-party states in general, and those with 
an exception to referral from the SC, have no obligation to cooperate with the Court. 
This derives from the Vienna Convention.
171
In this situation, the power of the 
Prosecutor to obtain cooperation from states is extremely weak, and is mainly based 
on the will of states. While the heinous nature of some international crimes produces 
both strong moral obligation and obligations under international conventions
172
 for 
states to prosecute such crimes, this does not mean that non-party states in general 
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could be compelled to cooperate with the Court. However, non-party states may 
cooperate with the ICC either by accepting ICC jurisdiction
173
 or by providing 
assistance on the basis of an agreement with the ICC.
174
  
In addition, non-party states are also obliged to cooperate with the Court in 
two particular cases.  The first concerns certain crimes generally considered to be 
against jus cogens norms, such as genocide, crimes against peace, torture, and war 
crimes. States are obliged to cooperate in the prosecution of these crimes regardless 
of their status under any particular national law.  Since many of these crimes are 
included within the Rome Statute, states are at least obligated to cooperate with the 
Court in the case of these kinds of crimes within its jurisdiction. The second case 
regards non-party states’ obligations when situations have been referred to the ICC 
by the SC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
175
 However, in practice the non-
cooperation of states parties and states not parties to the Statute has been clearly 
exemplified in the Al-Bashir case,
176
 in which despite the assurance of two arrest 
warrants against him, and despite the request by the Prosecutor, states refused to 
arrest or surrender him to the ICC.  
 c) The cooperation via the SC should be consider in three aspects: The first 
concerns the role of the SC in relation to the weak statutory cooperation in the 
Statute that has been discussed in section (a) above. In this case, one may raise the 
question whether the SC could enhance the Statuary cooperation of the ICC. As 
Rastan rightly argued, the SC cannot change the cooperation regime in the Statute 
and ask the ICC ‘to act beyond the powers conferred upon it under the Statute’.177 
The ICC is not a subsidiary organ of the SC, and is therefore not bound by the SC.  
In addition, ‘the principle of attribution holds that an international organization 
cannot act beyond the powers attributed to it by its constituent treaty.’178  
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The second aspect, here, is the status of a referral of a situation by state 
parties to the ICC,
 179
 or initiated by the Prosecutor proprio mot,
180
 power, the ICC 
can resort to cooperation by the SC and other international organizations to enhance  
cooperation.
181
 In practice the ICC has made several special agreements through/with 
international organizations on cooperation and assistance.
182
    
The third aspect related to the role of the SC is the status of a referral of a 
situation by the SC183 under Chapter VII. In this situation, which is similar to the state 
of affairs in the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC has power to bind UN member states, 
whether parties or non-parties to the Statute, to cooperate with the Court. The ICC 
may transmit requests to a state that is not party to the Statute to cooperate with the 
Court pursuant to the obligation imposed on states related to the SC resolution to 
cooperate fully with the Court. In fact, in such a situation the SC could impose any 
sanctions against a reluctant state, whether a state party or non-party to the Statute, 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. This is the reason why the Appeal Chamber in the 
Blaskic case held that the obligation to cooperate with the tribunal is binding, not 
only on those states of the former Yugoslavia, but also on all other states.184 The Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY in the Kordic and Cerkez case, for instance, issued a binding 
order for the purpose of the production of materials compelling third states such as 
the Netherlands.185  However, in the case of non-compliance, the ICC will report it to 
the SC. In practice, the Prosecutor of the ICC has reported the non-compliance 
several times,186 but the practice of the SC is not encouraging. In addition, the non 
execution of the arrest of warrant against Kony187 and Al-Bashir188 by the ICC were 
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mainly on the basis of insufficient cooperation by states and the SC. The ICTY also 
repeatedly reported the non-compliance of states of the former Yugoslavia, ‘has led 
to little more than verbal admonition’ by the SC.189 As the former ICTY and ICTR 
Prosecutor Ponte notes, whilst the SC has authority to impose sanctions, ‘[t]he 
imposition of such sanctions is unlikely, because the Security Council rarely takes 
significant action unless there is a crisis situation, ... [t]he best the tribunal can expect 
is a Security Council resolution.’190 She stated during her eight year office the most 
of time gather political pressure on states such as Serbia and Croatia to comply with 
their obligation to cooperate.
191
   
Nevertheless, this is true that some states welding the veto power has been 
blocked the SC’s ability to respond to international affairs in an appropriate time. A 
clear example of this is the current situation in Syria, where despite crimes that are 
more widespread than those of Libya, has not been referred to the ICC yet, due to the 
difficulty of reaching an appropriate consensus between the SC veto welding 
members. Success in international trials requires not only the cooperation of the 
domestic authority, but also active collaboration form the domestic authority and 
NGOs. The international community pressure and in particular, the powerful 
international actors, such as the US and the SC play a crucial role for targeting and 
surrendering of the  accused and enhancement of cooperation and effectiveness of 
the Court.
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In general the consequences of non co-operation would be the unavailability 
of the accused, evidences, and so forth, and thus impunity for perpetrators. In 
particular, the effects of non-cooperation are more complicated where a state is 
clearly able, but unwilling, to co-operate with the ICC. As discussed in this section, 
part of the problem inevitably lies in the limits to the complementarity regime of the 
ICC.
193
 Moreover, even within its procedural and jurisdictional authority, the ICC 
has no coercive power in the case of non-compliance by state parties. 
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5.3.1. The enforcement issue of the ICC 
In common with ad hoc trials, the ICC lacks independent enforcement powers of its 
own,
194
 and therefore, the Court cannot enforce its will on states when they do not 
desire to cooperate with its requests. States are not obliged to release evidence within 
their jurisdiction, and the Tribunal has no means of enforcing its will upon states.
195
 
A state could attempt to influence the result of a trial by giving the Court only partial 
access to evidence that it possesses, or could also release evidence at a time which 
suited its own purposes.
196
 The outstanding of many arrest warrants issued by the 
ICC demonstrates the fact that the surrender of suspect or accused is a serious 
obstacle in proceeding before the Court. Be that as it may, it is vitally important for 
the ICC -just as for any international tribunal- to arrest and prosecute alleged 
perpetrators in order to combat impunity for international crimes.
197
 Thus, in general 
there is a link between the enforcement power and the successful operation of the 
ICC.  
In practice, Serbia’s non-cooperation with the ICTY during the Milosevic 
period,198 the current situation in Darfur, and the Sudan’s Government non-
compliance are examples of the importance of enforcement for the ICC.199 Despite 
the referral of the situation in Darfur by the Security Council, insufficient 
cooperation by the Sudan’s Government has meant that the Court has not been able 
to collect all evidence or arrest the perpetrators in this case.200 Most importantly, the 
ICC does not have sufficient support of the SC, thus, the Court cannot exercise its 
arrest of warrants against president Al-Bashir. Similarly, there are still outstanding 
arrest warrants in the Uganda case. The most important arrest warrants against the 
Lords Resistance Army (LRA) leader, Joseph Kony who allegedly killed thousands 
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and abducted and enlisted hundreds of children, along with those of many other 
accused are still outstanding.201  
However, while the ICC can potentially access the SC’s enforcement powers in 
case of a referral by the SC, where the situation before the Court is a referral by state 
parties,202 or when it was initiated by the Prosecutor, the ICC faces even greater 
challenges.203 The question then becomes: where a state party of the Statute is 
reluctant to cooperate with the ICC, what kind of power does the ICC have? In this 
situation the limits to the sanction power of the ICC are one of the main concerns 
regarding the successful procedural process by the Court. However, where a state 
party to the Statute has failed to, or is reluctant to cooperate with the Court, the only 
existing remedy in the Statute is to refer it to the Assembly of States Parties. This 
provides: 
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court 
contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from 
exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a 
finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, 
where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security 
Council.
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It is unclear what benefit such referral might have given the somewhat opaque nature 
of the Assembly’s powers. It is also unclear what decision might be made against 
such states failing to cooperate in the Assembly of State Parties.  
However, in reality, the creation of an independent police for the ICC seems 
neither viable nor practical. What then, can be done to enhance the cooperation of 
states and to enforce the ICC’s demands? Despite some deficiencies in the structural 
complementarity regime of the ICC that are examined in the above sections, Peskin 
has argued that one solution could lie in the power of the legitimacy and moral 
authority of such international tribunals. Concerning the ICTY and ICTR, he asserts 
that although they lack independent enforcement power, these ‘tribunals posses a 
great deal of soft power because of their moral claim to being the ultimate judicial 
guardians of universal standards of human rights.’205 Additionally, he added that ‘to 
a significant degree, a tribunal shapes its reputation and in turn its soft power by the 
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efficacy of its policies and practices as well as by the skill with which it markets 
itself.’206 All of the above factors could be valid and practical for the ICC, especially 
since the ICC is a more truly international court than the UN ad hoc tribunals. 
Moreover, it can claim the universal moral standard of bringing justice for all and 
ending impunity as its objective. However, it seems that the ICC has not been very 
successful in the later area so far, and this has detracted from its moral and political 
authority.  
 One other significant factor that might raise levels of cooperation and 
address the enforcement issues of the ICC, I think, is public awareness via the media. 
As Rastin asserts ‘[i]n some situations, third states, civil society, or the media may be 
able to influence the incentive structures for domestic bodies in order to promote 
compliance.’207 Thus if the international community were to put pressure on 
governments and require them to cooperate with the Court, it would certainly 
enhance the accountability of such authorities and reduce their non compliance. This, 
however, is very much a matter for the future. 
Ultimately, in the absence or impracticality of effective enforcement powers 
to obtain state cooperation the ICC’s weak cooperation provisions places limits on its 
successful operation, thus creating conditions whereby the perpetrators of 
international crimes may in practice avoid prosecution.  For example, a state may 
attempt to ignore the Court’s requests for an Arrest Warrant, or may let the 
Prosecutor access only some of the documents he/she needs while concealing the 
rest, or may try to direct investigations in different ways, or may threaten witnesses, 
etc. If one of these situations happens, as has in fact happened in the Darfur case,208 
the claims of the ICC to be obviously hampered by its lack of enforcement powers 
would be fully justified. But at the same time, one may wonder on what basis it may 
claim to be able to dispense justice, or to combat impunity, when those imperfections 
or incapacities themselves appear to be the sine qua non of its own existence. Thus, 
the ICC should be judge in light of both the limitations and constrains it faces and the 
political environments in which it operates.   
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5.4. Deficiencies in the institutional mechanisms of the ICC 
Of all the procedural deficiencies of the ICC, three appear to stand out: the 
possibility of postponement of jurisdiction over war crimes, its lack of universal 
jurisdiction, and its non-recognition of trials in absentia.   
5.4.1. The postponement of jurisdiction over war crimes     
The Rome Statute provides the possibility of further limitation of the subject-matter 
jurisdiction over war crimes. The Statute provides, in Article 124, for the possibility 
for a state to suspend the jurisdiction of the ICC over war crimes for a period of 
seven years after the Statute’s ratification and entering into force for that state.209 The 
crucial question to be raised is what the logic and reasons were behind such a 
provision. It is plausible to suggest that this Article was initially included as a 
‘transitional’ provision, justified by the supposition that states currently experiencing 
internal conflicts or with military engagements abroad could be discouraged from 
signing and ratifying the Statute otherwise.210 The Article could thus facilitate the 
establishment of the ICC via encouraging states to join the Court. This was the 
reason why the Article clearly indicates a review after seven years of the creation of 
the ICC.211 Article 124 has been extended for a further seven years at the first review 
conference in Kampala, Uganda.212 It would seem, however, that now, after the 
establishment of the ICC, the retention of this Article is neither justifiable nor 
reasonable. 
At the ICC’s first review conference, interestingly, the states who sought to 
keep this Article in the Statute were non-members of the Statute themselves, such as 
Russia and the US. 213 Despite the fact that they have not ratified the Statute, they are 
nevertheless looking for a legal loophole to avoid any potential jurisdiction of the 
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ICC over their nationals, in case it becomes in their interest to join the ICC in the 
future.  
In practice only two states have implemented this Article, i.e. France and 
Colombia; in 2008, France withdrew its declaration, and Colombia’s declaration 
expired on the first of November 2009.214 One may argue that the Article has thus not 
had a significant effect on the jurisdiction of the ICC so far. However, the 
recognition of such opt-out provision provides a possibility that, when states want to 
join the ICC, they could be able to postpone its jurisdiction over their nationals.  
Moreover, the Statute prohibited such reservations under Article 120, but then 
recognised them again in Article 124. Hence, such hypocrisy toward war crimes has 
been characterised as a ‘license to kill’ by Amnesty International and is against the 
main objective of the ICC.215 This Article undoubtedly poses a further limitation to 
the already limited jurisdiction of the ICC over war crimes and may potentially 
impair the ICC’s jurisdiction and its function. 216 
5.4.2. Universal jurisdiction and the ICC   
 The standard grounds for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by national courts are 
as follows: when the conduct of the accused occurred within the territory of the state 
(principle of territoriality) when a crime was committed by the national of a state 
(active personality principle) when the crime was committed against the national of a 
state (passive personality principle) and/or the conduct in question was against the 
interest of a state, such as the national security or sovereignty of a state (the 
protective principle).217One of the most fundamental applications of state sovereignty 
is achieved by the above judicial criminal jurisdiction.
218
   
Occasionally, when a case is lacking any of the above characteristics and the 
crimes committed are international crimes, some states have sought to establish their 
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jurisdiction regardless of the alleged offender’s nationality or the place of the 
commission of the crimes, under the principle of universal jurisdiction.219 The 
universal justification usually relates to the important nature of international crimes, 
which might threaten the international community as a whole, or violate the shared 
values of all members of the community.220 The crime of piracy, which has long been 
accepted under customary international law;221 slave trading; crimes against peace; 
genocide; and arguably the serious case of the Eichmann trial, are examples of this 
kind of jurisdiction.222  
However, there is no common and accepted definition for universal jurisdiction 
among international conventions and the customary international law.223 Scholars 
have defined this principle in different ways.  Some have defined it negatively, such 
as Reydams, who states:  
Negatively defined, [universal jurisdiction] means that there is no link of territoriality 
or nationality between the State and the conduct or offender, nor is the State seeking to 
protect its security or credit. 
224
  
 
Meron similarly defines universal jurisdiction as one in which states that do not 
possess territoriality, personality (active or passive) or ‘protective principle’ links are 
permitted by international law to prosecute perpetrators of offences.225 O’Keefe, by 
contrast, defines universal jurisdiction in a more positive way as prescriptive 
jurisdiction: ‘universal jurisdiction- that is, prescriptive jurisdiction in the absence of 
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any other recognised jurisdictional nexus.’226 The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction go further in relating the character of universal jurisdiction to the crime 
in question: ‘universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature 
of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the 
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other 
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.’227 
Just as universal jurisdiction seems to have both negative and positive 
connotations, so also can it be divided into two categories: ‘absolute’ or pure 
jurisdiction and conditional jurisdiction.228 Pure jurisdiction is where a state seeks to 
institute jurisdiction over an international crime when there is no nexus between the 
crimes and the state seeking to exercise the universal jurisdiction. Conditional 
universal jurisdiction, by contrast, involves the exercise of jurisdiction when there is 
link between the crime and such states, e.g. the suspect is in the custody of a state 
which is asserting jurisdiction.229  
At the Rome Conference, some did suggest that the Court should have 
universal jurisdiction; for instance, the German and Belgian delegations suggested 
that it should have automatic universal jurisdiction over the core crimes.230 In 
contrast, some states, such the United States in particular, had significant 
apprehensions as to the scope of jurisdiction that would be afforded to the Court, and 
the US delegate clearly stated that he could not accept the universal jurisdiction.231  
This was very controversial issue, and in the end universal jurisdiction was not 
recognised in the Rome Statute.
232
  In fact, the Court’s jurisdictional base is far from 
universal due to the various constraints it operates under. This outcome has been 
heavily criticised.233As O’Callaghan, quoting Kaul,234 noted, the rejection of universal 
jurisdiction was a ‘painful weakness’ of the ICC system.235 
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Some scholars, by contrast, have argued that it was right decision for the 
drafters of the Statute not to adopt universal jurisdiction.236 Cryer and Bekou have 
argued that granting universal jurisdiction to the ICC could have increased the 
hostility of the US against the ICC, as well as that of two other permanent members 
of the SC, i.e. China and Russia, and that this could have substantially strengthened 
the opposition to the ICC at a time when it, as a new institution, is in need of all the 
support it can avail itself of.237 They have also discussed some of the practical 
difficulties for the ICC which could arise if it possessed universal jurisdiction, such 
as issues of trigger mechanisms, issues concerning cooperation of states and 
concerning the complementarity-based jurisdiction of the ICC, etc.238 Many of the 
problems which they have mentioned are genuine difficulties; however, with respect 
to these scholars, I believe that the lack of universal jurisdiction (not pure universal 
jurisdiction) is a weakness for the ICC for the following reasons. 
The first reason is that a practical alternative would exist in cases where it 
was not possible or practical for the ICC to exercise universal jurisdiction, i.e. the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction directly by state parties. It is important to realise 
that the majority of practical issues which have been discussed by the great scholars 
mentioned would appear only if the ICC were to exercise universal jurisdiction and 
not where state parties themselves sought to exercise such jurisdiction. The ICC’s 
issues due to complementarity would not arise when state parties wanted or were 
obliged to exercise universal jurisdiction, thus limiting the procedural and practical 
difficulties for them. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the rules of the 
admissibility of cases, in particular that concerning the gravity of crimes, would filter 
out many cases from being prosecuted before the ICC; and where there was a link 
between a crime and a state, e.g. the state had custody of the accused, and the crime 
was not of such gravity as to be prosecuted before the ICC (see section... on the 
gravity of crimes) such an accused could be prosecuted by the state party concerned.  
The second reason for ICC’s lack of universal jurisdiction being a weakness 
is that through the recognition of universal jurisdiction the ICC could promote the 
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idea of universal justice and would enhance the accountability of individuals and 
assist the maintenance of international peace and security. Universal jurisdiction, if it 
were to be adopted, would also make a red zone, comprising the territories of all state 
parties, into which international perpetrators could not enter; it would thus play a role 
as a deterrent. The third reason for the lack being a weakness is that states that have 
already practised universal jurisdiction have limited it due to certain pressures; they 
have amended the rules and provided some conditions for the exercising of the 
jurisdiction, such as the permission of the head of attorney of state, etc. Accordingly, 
due to the current demise of universal jurisdiction, it might be even more important 
for the ICC to have universal jurisdiction.
239
  
In general and regardless of the ICC’s limitations and practical issues that 
have been argued by Cryer and et al, it seems that lack of universal jurisdiction 
creates an unavoidable gap in the prosecutorial regime of the ICC. It should be 
considered that concerning such heinous international crimes, the commission of 
such crimes itself is more significant than their nexus to a state. As international 
crimes may threaten the entirety of the international community
240
  the goal should 
be that those crimes should not be unpunished.  It may be more practical if the state 
parties to the Statute recognized international jurisdiction of the ICC’s crimes. If it 
were adopted, where a state who has stronger nexus is unable or unwilling to 
prosecute, then the state parties to the Statute would be obliged to prosecute if there 
is a nexus between the commission of crimes (e.g. custody of accused). In that way, 
the state parties to the Statute could fill the gap resulting from the lack of the 
universal jurisdiction, or when the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction because of the 
insufficient gravity of crimes.
241
 As it is, the exclusion of universal jurisdiction in the 
Statute in the current situation means that the ICC is not in a position to prosecute 
perpetrators who only temporarily find themselves on the territory of a state party to 
the Statute – a point which substantially undermines their status as international 
crimes under customary international law (the one obvious exception here being the 
crime of aggression).242    
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5.4.3. The impossibility of trial in absentia in the Rome Statute                                                                                               
Trials in absentia, with certain conditions such as notification to the alleged 
offenders, are largely common in civil law systems.243 Some countries with common 
law systems also recognise trial in absentia, though the conditions for such a trial 
may be different in each legal system or state.244Among international tribunals, trials 
in absentia were recognised in the Nuremberg Charter.245 The European Court of 
Human Rights also, with some conditions such as the defendant needing to have 
notification of his or her impending trial, has recognised in absentia trials.246 The 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which has been created by the Security Council, has 
recognised trial in absentia.247 In addition to this, states instituting universal 
jurisdiction for international crimes have usually recognised trial in absentia for such 
crimes. In the Arrest Warrant case Judge Wyngaert asserted that ‘[t]he “universal 
jurisdiction” does not necessarily mean that the suspect should be present on the 
territory of the prosecuting State’,248 and universal jurisdiction in absentia is not 
forbidden by conventional or customary international law.249 The ICTY and ICTR 
have not recognised trials in absentia in their Statute. However, the judges of the 
ICTY Appeal Chamber, when faced with an accused who ignored a subpoena by the 
Court and who was subsequently held in contempt, held that ‘by contrast, in absentia 
proceedings may be exceptionally warranted in case involving contempt of the 
international where the person charged fails to appear in court, thus obstructing the 
administration of justice.’250  
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 At the Rome Conference some delegations were of the opinion that trials in 
absentia would degenerate into show trials that would rapidly discredit the ICC. 
They believed trials in absentia were of little practical utility since the accused may 
have the right to a new trial when he or she finally appeared before the Court. In 
contrast a group believed that, due to the nature of the crimes comprehended by the 
Statute, it might often not be possible to force the accused into a court appearance. In 
such a case, for the court to be able to promote peace, justice, and reconciliation, 
trials would need to be held in the defendants’ absence.251 In the event, the first view 
was the one which prevailed. In the final draft however the Rome Statute has not 
adopted trials in absentia. 252 
 It may be argued that recognition of such trial in absentia would not meet the 
legal standard for a fair and impartial trial. According to this view, it is necessary that 
the accused appear in the prosecution and trial stages in order to defend himself in 
such a significant indictment. Although this is a strong argument, I maintain that the 
lack of trials in absentia under some conditions could be a deficiency for the ICC, on 
at least three grounds. The first is that it must always be considered that the 
jurisdiction of the Court is over the most heinous international crimes with a 
widespread character. The second reason is that it is impossible for the Court to 
apply all of the procedural guarantees which exist in a domestic court in general. For 
example, the Rome Statute, in contrast to the common law system in which the jury 
is essential for a criminal procedure, makes no mention of a jury. Additionally, as has 
been mentioned, a warrant of arrest can be issued by the ICC in cases where there is 
sufficient evidence; and in a case where a state is failing to surrender the accused 
following the issuance of such a warrant of arrest, the question is raised as to how 
long the Court should remain open to such cases for prosecution. In a situation where 
the accused is in contumacy of the Court intentionally and without acceptable 
reasons, in fact she ought to lose her right of defence in the initial stage of 
prosecution or trial. The Court could, however, consider the accused for a right of re-
trial or a right to appeal a conviction obtained via an in absentia trial if she does 
finally appear in the Court, as is common in many national courts.  
The third ground on which the non-recognition of trial in absentia should be 
considered a deficiency for the ICC is that there are actually several advantages to 
                                               
251 See the United Nations Diplomatic Conference. Supra note, 4, Vol,  II, at 355 and 359. 
252 See the Rome Statute Arts. 63. 61 and rule 124 RPE. 
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making available the option of trial in absentia. These advantages, I believe, in 
opposition to some delegations’ view in the Rome Conference, could help the Court 
to obtain its goal and to combat impunity; they may be stated as follows: 
a) Allowing trial in absentia could encourage individuals to appear in the 
Court in order to defend themselves against the accusations made against them. It 
might also encourage some individuals to appear in the Court where they do not have 
all the responsibility for the committing of such crimes.  
b) Trial in absentia has some practical advantages as well; in a situation in 
which accused persons have declined to appear in the Court, this implies that they 
intend to escape from prosecution concerning the relevant indictments against them, 
which, if in absentia trials are not contemplated, means that such cases would remain 
open for a long time. On the other hand, the Court, by initiating prosecution, can save 
time and money; in particular, the collection of evidence is much easier if it is done 
close to the date of the commission of crimes. In addition, via trial in absentia, when 
a convicted accused has finally been arrested or surrendered to the Court, the latter 
would have a conviction already instead of the prosecution only being initiated at a 
stage at which some evidence might have been destroyed or not available. Although 
the Court may grant a right for appeal, the long process of trial before an 
international court, which many have criticised, would nevertheless be diminished in 
length.  
c) States would be more likely to cooperate with the Court in order to arrest 
and surrender individuals who have been convicted in absentia with enough 
evidence.  
d) It should be noted that part of the punishment recognised within the Rome 
Statute is the remedy to be provided to victims,253 and if trial in absentia were 
allowed the Court would be able to calculate the size of the property of convicted 
individuals in favour of victims, bearing in mind the usual relationships between the 
authorities, leaders, and powerful individuals and international crimes. Perpetrators 
would thus no longer be able to escape from of the entirety of conviction even if they 
were to remain at large.  
Given the potential significance of the possibility of convictions in absentia 
before an international, fair, and impartial tribunal, the absence of such a procedure 
                                               
253 See the Rome Statute Art. 75 (2), and (4), it provides that ’[t]he Court may make an order directly 
against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to,...’ 
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in the Rome Statute only emphasises the extent to which its terms provide ample 
opportunity for states to facilitate their own nationals in escaping prosecution by the 
ICC. 
  5. 5. Conclusion  
This Chapter sought to highlight some of the procedural weakness and difficulties of 
the ICC for the prosecution of the international crimes within its jurisdiction which 
may lead to impunity. In a general sense, such weaknesses may not appear 
remarkable – any international institution will have certain defects as a consequence 
of either the imperfections of the drafting process or the lack of political will on the 
part of the signatory states.  When viewed from this angle, such imperfections are 
merely to be lamented.  At the same time, it is often to question whether the 
procedural imperfections of the ICC were not purely accidental, or rather the result 
of deliberate design, and in that sense one may reflect upon the question whether its 
weakness as an institution was itself part of its rationale. Whilst the ICC in practice 
continues to develop the rules for evidence designed to overcome some of its 
procedural difficulties it is clear that a number of these issues are unlikely to be 
solved in the near future.  
The ICC has obviously not been designed to deal with all international 
crimes, and in that sense is not so much a Court of international justice, but merely a 
Court of last resort. The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute that 
underpins this idea appears to have many advantages – specifically to encourage 
domestic prosecution and to localise international justice. However, this principle 
and the rule of admissibility of cases in the Statute provide considerable scope for 
states to shield perpetrators from prosecution either before and abuse of this principle 
i.e. via shielding domestic show trials.    
Associated with this is the fact that the ICC, similar to the ad hoc 
international tribunals, lacks independent coercive power and in practice heavily 
relies on the cooperation of states and other international organisations. Although the 
ICC can assess the state’s refusal to provide assistance and take the relevant 
measures in the case of a state’s failure to cooperate, in general it lacks of power to 
impose on states or sanction them. It is clear that the lack or insufficient cooperation 
is not unique to the ICC, but the practice of the ad hoc tribunals indicates that to 
compel states to cooperate with an international courts, even through a binding order 
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of the SC under Chapter VII, is a very complex and problematic task, and may raise 
issues such as state sovereignty,
254
 ‘national security’,255 national interests, and so on. 
It is also clear that the creation of an independent police for the ICC seems neither 
viable nor practical. In practice of the Court will rely for its effectiveness upon public 
awareness via the media to influence states authorities and international institution to 
order to enhance the cooperation and the compliance of states. But here the relative 
weakness of the ICC - its absence of any guaranteed support from the Secutiry 
Council, its treaty nature - serves only to undermine the chances of it acquiring that 
moral and political reputation.   
 
                                               
254 Brown B.S. Supra note 90, at 387 and 393. 
255 Rome Statute Art. 72 and 93 (4), see also Rastan R. Supra note 7, at 536. 
215 
 
Chapter VI: External Obstacles for the ICC: Impunity of Perpetrators of   
International Crimes/External Political Issues                      
Introduction 
This Chapter examines some of the significant external complications and problems 
encountered by the ICC when attempting to exercise its jurisdiction. It seeks to 
examine the impact of the external environment in terms of undermining the 
effective functioning of the ICC in combating impunity. The subject of this Chapter 
is three of the most significant of the external issues confronting the Court: the role 
of the Security Council (SC) the role of certain powerful states, and their relation to 
the ICC; and issues related to the question of non-ratification of the Statute.  
The first of these external issues, the relationship between the SC and the 
ICC, was crucial in the Rome Conference, where there were controversial debates 
among the delegations.
 1
 The question was what role the SC should play in the ICC’s 
functioning. The traditional response is and was that the SC, as a political body, and 
the ICC as a judicial body, should be separated from each other; one group of 
delegations to the Rome Conference, known as the ‘like-minded group’, took this 
response and suggested that the ICC should be a completely independent body not 
subject to any intervention by the SC. They asserted that intervention by the SC via 
resolutions would be selective and follow a double standard, and would violate the 
state parties’ equality before the Court.2 In contrast, the other group of countries, 
which included powerful countries such as the US, demanded a significant role for 
the SC in the Rome Statute, whereby before initiating any cases the ICC should have 
the approval of the SC under Chapter VII of the Charter.
3
 The outcome of such 
                                               
1 See the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome (15 June 17 July 1998), Vol,  II,  Para 72 and 76 at 69, and Pare 96 at 70, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/2(14 April 1998), and UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/3, Corr. l (15- June 1998).  This is 
known as a heated debate by Mr.TeliCka, delegate from the Czech Republic, see UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 Corr.1 (26 May 1998), Para 23, at74, and Para 47 at 76; see also Cryer R. 
Prosecuting International Crimes, Selectivity and the International Crimes (2005), at 227. 
2 Id, see, for example, El Maraghy, delegate from Egypt, at 59, Para 75; Muladi from Indonesia, at 73, 
Para 10, who asserts that ’the Court must be independent of political influence of any kind, including 
that of the United Nations and in particular the Security Council, which must not direct or hinder its 
functioning’; Lahiri from India at 86, Para 47; Halonen from Finland at 98, Para 31; and Livada from 
Greece at 174, Para 68. 
3 Id, at 123, Para 28 and at 95, Para 57; see the US delegates Scheffer and Richardson’s official 
position at the Rome Conference, Id, at 123, Para 28 and at 95, Para 57.  
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sensitive debates was a compromise in the Rome Statute.
4
 Accordingly, the SC 
through resolutions can both refer situations and defer cases currently with the ICC 
under Chapter VII of the Charter.
5
 It is true that, due to difficulties in reaching a 
consensus among the veto-wielding powers of the SC, Article 16 may have a limited 
impact on the practice of the Court,
6
 but it is a very controversial issue and is 
significant. It may be argued that, despite the fact that these two organs are 
independent bodies
7
 and the ICC is not a UN member state, this Article has given 
supremacy over the ICC to the SC. However, it is also clear that without recognition 
of some kind of exceptional role for the SC, the ICC might never have been 
established.  
The fact that the ICC in practice mainly relies on the support of states and the 
SC is to place at centre stage an inevitable problem – whether to recognise that role 
and formalise it in the terms of the Statute, or insist rather that there should be no 
derogation from the principle of equality, but then accept that subsequent practice 
will be affected nevertheless by the conditions of inequality.
8
 Either way, it is 
probably too simplistic to criticise the ICC for having too much dependency on the 
world’s major powers simply as a consequence of the terms of Article 16. It may be 
argued, nevertheless, that Article 16, via potentially exempting some accused from 
prosecution, indicates the fact that the ICC cannot be an instrument of universal 
justice. 
The second external issue, to be considered in the following section of this 
chapter, is related to the role of influential states, in particular the US. This concern 
arises most sharply in the case of the ICC, as a consequence of the fact that the 
                                               
4 Cryer R & White N. ‘The ICC and the Security Council: An Uncomfortable Relationship The Legal 
Regime of the International Criminal Court,’ in  J. Doria, H.P Gasser & M.C. Bassiouni (eds),  The 
Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court (2009),455, at 457. 
5 Rome Statute Art. 13(b), and 16. 
6  Cryer R & White N. Ibid, at 456.   
7 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations, SP/3/ Rev.1.(04/10/2004), Article 2(1), it provides that ‘[t]he United Nations recognizes the 
Court as an independent permanent judicial institution which, in accordance with articles 1 and 4 of 
the Statute, has international legal personality ...’ 
8 See the UN Diplomatic Conference. Supra note 1, Para 32, at 74; Fehl C. ‘Explaining the 
International Criminal Court: A Practice Test for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches’, in 
Steven C. Roach (ed), Governance, Order, and the International Criminal Court, Between Realpolitik 
and Cosmopolitan Court (2009), at 98; he asserts that the dependency of the ICC on the SC is a 
legitimacy problem for the Court. 
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functioning of the Court is largely dependent upon the cooperation of states.
9
 The 
role of such states could have either of two opposing impacts; it could enhance the 
effectiveness of the Court or diminish it. Despite the example of the ICC indictment 
of the LRA leader Joseph Kony, in which the US has recently shown support for the 
ICC, in general the US has so far often shown opposition to the Court. The US 
Bilateral Agreements and the possibility of their resulting in non-extradition of 
accused persons to the ICC, and the question of the compatibility of the Bilateral 
Agreements with the Rome Statute, will be discussed in this section of the chapter. I 
will argue that alongside other reasons, such as the concern of the US regarding 
issues such as the role of the SC
10
 and the independent prosecutor,
11
 the main reason 
for the opposition of the US to the ICC is that the US does not support a system of 
universal justice; the fact is that universal justice as an idea is eliminated by the 
power of the US.  
The third external problem of the Court to be examined in the final section, is 
the question of the non-ratification of the Statute. The issue here is how non-
ratification may impact upon the ICC’s functioning and whether universal 
ratification of the Statute would make a difference to its effectiveness.  Generally, the 
ratification of the Statute by all states could enhance cooperation with the ICC, and 
non-ratification lead to a situation of criminals escaping from prosecution. 
Examining the main reasons for non-ratification of the Statute I will argue that, 
whereas some states have not ratified the Statute because they do not support 
universal justice, others have made the contrary assertion that it is precisely as a 
consequence of the lack of universal justice actually present in the structure of the 
ICC that they are reluctant to become party to the Rome Statute. With the latter 
contention in mind, it is arguable that even if universal ratification is desirable, it is 
not a sufficient condition to ensure the elimination of impunity. 
 
                                               
9 Minogue E.C. ‘Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security Council’s Chapter VII Authority in the 
Current Situations Before the International Criminal Court’, 61 Vand Law Review (2008), 647, at 649-
650. 
10 Schabas W. ‘United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all about the Security 
Council’, 15 The European Journal of International Law (2004),701, at 710. 
11 E.g. Richardson delegation from the US, at the UN Diplomatic Conference, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/SR. 5(20 November 1998), Supra note1, Para 60 at 95, he asserts ‘it would be unwise to 
grant the Prosecutor the right to initiate investigations’; see also UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C1/SR.9 (20 
November 1998), Para 125, at 202; for the Prosecutor’s authority to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu see the Rome Statute Art. 13 (c), and 15.  
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6.1. The position of the Security Council and its relationship with the ICC 
In a functional sense the SC and the ICC may be understood to have distinct roles. 
The SC is a definitively political body,
12
 while the ICC is a judicial body whose 
work should be independent, in theory at least, of political concerns. The main duty 
of the SC is the maintenance of international order, resolving disputes between 
states, while the main duty of the ICC, similarly to that of any court, is to bring 
justice for individuals.
13
   
Even if, in principle, the roles of the SC and the ICC are distinct, it is also 
clear that in the pursuit of their respective agendas, the two institutions may come 
into conflict. This may occur primarily in two different ways: the overlap of the 
mandates of the SC and the ICC; and the different demands of peace and justice. The 
first of these points, that of overlapping mandates, arises due to the fact that 
international crimes may threaten international peace and security; there is thus a 
close link between the breach of international peace and security and the commission 
of international crimes. Since the main duty of the SC is to maintain international 
peace and security, these two independent institutions thus have mandates which 
overlap in part.
14
 The conflict of these partially similar mandates has appeared, in 
particular, concerning the definition of the crime of aggression in the Statute, and the 
on-going issue of the jurisdiction of the Court over this core crime.
15
 The second 
source of conflict between the SC and the ICC relates to the fact that the pursuit of 
individual justice may, on occasion, contribute to the destabilisation of a delicate 
political situation; the pursuit of international peace may, in this sense, require the 
deferral of the pursuit of individual justice. Those wanting to maintain the distinction 
between individual justice and international peace and security, or between law and 
                                               
12 Koskenniemi M. ‘The Police in the Temple, Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View’, 6 The 
European Journal of International Law (1995),325, at 344-345; Birdsall A. The International Politics 
of Judicial Intervention: Creating a more just order (2009), at 125. 
13 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,  
UN GA, Fifty- first Session, No. 22, UN Doc.  A/51/22[Vol.1] (March-April and August 1996), Para 
130, at 30. 
14 Sarooshi D. ‘ The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN 
Security Council’, in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe & E. Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International 
Criminal Court Legal and Policy Issues (2004), 95, at 95-96 and 100;  Cryer R & White N. (2009), 
Supra note 4, at 456 and 461. 
15 In accordance with Art. 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression has finally 
been defined at the review Conference in Kampala (Uganda), but the Court will be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction over this crime only after 1 January 2017. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, Kampala, Annex 1, (3), (31 May-11 June 2010), Resolution 
RC/Res.6. Available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf 
(Accessed 06/07/2012).    
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politics, would argue that the ICC should be completely independent from any 
political intervention, and that it should be insulated from the actions of institutions 
such as the Security Council.
16
 Putting into practice the formalist idea that the law 
and politics are separate, this viewpoint argues that in this sense, the SC as a political 
body should be separated from the ICC. 
Drawing upon the theoretical standpoint presented in the introduction to this 
thesis I wish in this Chapter to apply two main ideas in the context of the ICC. The 
first concerns the relationship between law and politics, and specifically the idea that 
law is embedded in a social context. This is significant due to the fact that law does 
not exist simply as an abstract set of rules, but as a sort of practice that operates in a 
given social situation; we may observe that the ICC is a nascent legal structure 
embedded in a functional social context. It should be noted that legal realism is 
against the idea of a separation between law and politics, and differs on this point 
from straightforward formalism.
17
 Some legal realists believe that a specific part of 
the nature of the law extends beyond the normative core of the law into the political 
world.
18
 If international law promises the sovereign equality of all states, which 
constitutes ‘the linchpin of the whole body of international legal standards’19 it does 
so in a context of profound inequality in powers and capacities.  And this has 
obvious implications for the ICC, both as regards its operational effectiveness and its 
ability to dispense universal justice.  
The second idea I would like to apply to the case of the ICC concerns the 
definition of law used in legal realism – law as determined by practice rather than by 
the formalism of rules.
20
 Scholars working along these lines assert that the law is not 
a simple rule on paper, but a function of authoritative decision makers,
21
 and that the 
law accordingly operates differently in practice than on paper depending on the 
                                               
16 See the UN Diplomatic Conference, supra note 1. 
17 Horwitz. M. J. The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
(1994), at 193 he asserts: ‘[t]he most important legacy of Realism therefore was its challenge to the 
orthodox claim that legal thought was separate and autonomous from moral political discourse.’ 
18 Zamboni M. ‘Legal Realisms and the Dilemma of the Relationship of contemporary law and 
politics’, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law (1957-2010), 583, at 589-590. 
19 Cassese A. International law (2001),at 88; sovereign equality also has been defined, in Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations  (24 October 1970), UN G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UN 
GAOR, SUPP. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1971), it provides, ‘(a), States are judicially equal; 
(b), Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;...’  
20 Pound R. ‘Law in Books and Law in Action,’ 44 American Law Review (1910),12, at 34.  
21 Cohen F. ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’, 35  Columbia Law Review 
(1935), 809, at 842. 
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context in which it is operating. In this sense the paper rules in the Rome Statute are 
not what are actually applied: the Statute should apply equally over all states, but the 
reality, the actual practice of the ICC, is different. Hence, the Statute must be 
understood in a political environment, the environment which has unequal 
distribution of power internationally; and this is cognisable not only in the de facto 
unequal distribution of power but also in the law itself, de jure (the formalisation of 
the role of the SC in the Statute should be seen in this aspect). Regarding this point 
of the de jure formalisation of unequal distribution of power, it also has to be 
considered that although the SC has undoubtedly a political nature, it makes decision 
on the basis of the Charter of the UN and international law, and accordingly its 
decisions, and particularly those made under Chapter VII of the Charter, have a 
‘legal or political-legal’ character,22 thus further increasing the interweaving of law 
and politics.
23
 
In connection with the above points, it should be noted that legal realism 
emphasises that, in practice, legal decision-making is a complex phenomenon going 
beyond simple legal processes; the effects of personal interests and peripheral 
circumstances on judicial decisions by judges need to be borne in mind.
24
 The result 
of all these considerations is to affirm that international law and politics are 
intimately connected.
25
 Law is not autonomous but embedded in social practices; 
and, specifically, the ICC, in theory and in practice, is limited and constrained by 
surrounding political structures to the extent that, as will be investigated in the 
ensuing chapters, the potential exists for the ICC to function as an institution of 
domination (e.g. by the SC and powerful states).  
At the Rome Conference, in the end the controversial arguments concerning 
the role of the SC in the Statute between one group of states,
26
 who were insistent 
                                               
22 See the Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, UN General Assembly, Fifty- first Session, No. 22, UN Doc.  A/51/22[Vol.1] (March-April 
and August 1996), Para 131, at 31. 
23 Wheeler Cook W. ‘The  Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,’ 33 Yale Law Journal 
(1924),457, at 487; Llewellyn K.N. ‘On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law,’  9 University of 
Chicago Law  Review (1941-42), 224, at 264; Llewellyn K.N. ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence Next Step,’ 
30 Columbia Law Review (1930),431, at 453 and  ‘Some Realism about the Realism- Responding to 
Dean Pound, 44 Harvard Law Review (1931),1222 at 1242, Llewellyn asserted that realists believed 
in law as a vehicle to legitimise their decisions and wanted to improve legal certainty.   
24 Cohen F.  Supra note 21, at 842-3.   
25 Koskenniemi M. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law (2004), at 
428, he argues that if the law were separated from politics the law would become empty, devoid of 
meaning or substance. 
26 E.g. India, supra note 1, at 73. 
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upon the importance of the separation of powers, and another group,
27
 who regarded 
that as a hopeless dream, reached a compromise.
28
 Accordingly, the Statute has given 
power to the SC both of the referral of situations to the ICC, in Article 13(b) and of 
the deferral of cases and to prevent the commencement of the prosecution of the 
Court, in Article 16 of the Statute. The word ‘situation’ is not accidental, but it was 
intentionally selected so that the SC would not be able to refer a ‘single case or 
control the discretion of the prosecutor by issuing what amounted to an Act of 
attainder in Resolution form’.29 However, in contrast to the situation with the ad hoc 
tribunals, the independent Prosecutor of the Court, under the control of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber,
30
 has authority to make a final decision as to whether to initiate an 
investigation or not.
31
    
For the first group of states, those intent on the separation of politics and law, 
Article 16 represents an unwanted exception, allowing a measure of politics into the 
Statute and authorising the impunity of perpetrators of international crimes. For the 
second group of states, Article 16 was crucially important; not only was the delivery 
of justice critically dependent upon the enforcement powers of the Security Council, 
it was only realistic within the frame of global peace and security for which the SC 
was primarily responsible. In fact, neither of these two positions is entirely 
sustainable. 
As Koskenniemi noted, the arguments of those who press for a more forceful 
form of international governance by the SC are open to several serious objections. 
Important among these is the systemic objection that highlights the fundamental 
difference that exists between policies meant to maintain ‘security’ and those aimed 
at bringing about ‘the good life’ or justice.32 The make-up and methods of the SC are 
entirely unjustifiable if we consider its tasks to extend to weighing up and imposing 
the requirements of the good life, including rules of international law, between and 
internal to states.
33
 However, although the main duty of the SC is for maintenance of 
peace and security or order, this does not mean that the Council does not have any 
                                               
27 E.g. the US. 
28 Schabas W. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010), at 329; 
he described it as ‘a long and drawn-out compromise’; Cryer R & White N. Supra note 4,  at 457; 
Birdsall A. Supra note 12, at 124. 
29 Cryer R & White N. Id, at 461. 
30 Rome Statute Art. 15(3). 
31 Id, 53 (1), and (2). 
32 Koskenniemi M. Supra note 12, by ‘the good life’ he refers to the rule of the General Assembly. 
33 Id, at 344.  
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duty towards Justice or any legal character. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, it 
would not be possible to perceive the ICC as a pure body of law, just as it would not 
be possible in general to separate law and politics; accordingly, the ICC itself also 
has some political character. The fact is that the SC has the authority to effect 
significantly on the acting of the ICC if the veto-wielding powers can reach a 
consensus. The history of the SC indicates that due to certain difficulties, i.e 
difficulties in reaching such a consensus, the SC’s impact on the ICC may be 
limited,
34
 but it is nevertheless significant. Consequently, the SC’s failure and its 
practical constraints should be considered.  
The first of these issues is the record of the Security Council’s failure; here 
one need merely bring to attention that many atrocities and humanitarian crises have 
happened around the world, in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Iraq, Uganda, 
Central Africa, etc., during the time in which the SC and UN system have been in 
existence. However, the Council’s utilisation of power has been mainly a reactionary 
one in the above states. Or, as Koskenneimi observed, it may serve to recall that the 
Council enacted economic sanctions on several countries, such as Iraq,
35
 
Yugoslavia,
36
 Libya,
37
 and Somalia,
38
 with entirely insufficient clerical and financial 
help, and in some cases the related committee which consists of diplomats of the five 
permanent powers of the Council even failed to report the national implementation of 
such sanctions.
39
 It is also true that some permanent members such as Russia and 
China have blocked the role of the SC in international humanitarian affairs.
40
 All 
these prove the failure and inadequacy of the UN system to address international 
humanitarian crises within an appropriate timescale. Additionally, it should be noted 
that sometimes the conflict of interest- Realpolitik- among the veto-wielding powers 
in the Council creates many difficulties in responding to international crises and 
meeting the expectations of the international community. This kind of failure should 
not be justified; and indeed some have criticised the SC for providing insufficient 
support and funding of the two ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
                                               
34 Cryer R & White N. Supra note 4, at 455-6. 
35 The SC, imposed sanctions against Iraq via many resolutions between 1990 and 2003, such as Res. 
660 and 661 (1990), after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Res. 1284 (1999), Res.1302 (2000), and 
Res.1490 and1518 (2003).  
36 SC Res. 1160 (1998). 
37 SC Res. 748 (1992), and 1192  (1998). 
38 SC Res. 733, 751 and 794 (1992). 
39 Koskennemi M. Supra not 12, at 345. 
40 Chomsky N. Public Lecture titled at SOAS: Crises and the Unipolar Moment (27 October 2009).   
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Yugoslavia,
41
 the very late referral of the situation in Darfur,
42
 and more recently the 
failure of the SC or difficulties it has encountered in supporting the Prosecutor’s 
Arrest Warrant against al-Bashir.
43
 These are just some examples of the Security 
Council’s lack of concern regarding the practical implementation of its decisions, 
which is made possible by the fact that there is actually no accountability of the 
Council within the UN system.
44
 
The second issue which must be taken into account is that of practical 
constraints. There are many practical obstacles and problems which may limit the 
implementation of the SC’s enforcement power and its impact on the ICC. For 
example, it would not be possible, realistically, to use of force for all international 
humanitarian crises, and moreover, the use of force is generally unpalatable for most 
states.
45
 Another obstacle arises from conflicts of interest between the different veto-
wielding members of the Security Council, regarding, for instance, a referral of a 
situation to the ICC or support of the Court. This kind of conflict of interest may 
make it difficult to obtain a consensus between the permanent members, and the 
result may be the recognition of impunity. A further obstacle would be possible 
conflict between the SC and the ICC after a referral or prosecution. This could occur 
due to action on the part of either the ICC’s Prosecutor or the Security Council. 
Firstly, the ICC’s Prosecutor, under the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber, has 
authority to decide that a referral of a situation by the SC will not be prosecuted in 
the ICC.
46
 Secondly, it is even possible that a judgment or decision by the ICC could 
be disregarded by the Security Council. Such an action on the part of the SC would 
endanger the international system far more than any unresolved question concerning 
the lawfulness of the SC actions.
47
 These types of problems and obstacles may all 
                                               
41 Koskennemi M.  Ibid, at 346.    
42 The SC referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on 31 
March 2005 by Resolution 1539(2005). 
43 E.g. SC Res. 1828 (2008), at 2: the Security Council mentioned ‘concerns raised by members of the 
Council regarding potential developments subsequent to the application by the Prosecutor of the 
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44 Koskennemi M. Ibid, at 346. 
45 Craven M. ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions’, 13 The European Journal of 
international Law (2002), 43, at 44. 
46 This may happen by applying the principle of complementarity and non-admissibility of cases 
under the Rome Statute. 
47 Nolte G. ‘The Limits of the Security Council’s Powers and its Functions in the International Legal 
System: Some Reflections’, in M. Byers (eds), The Role of Law in International Politics, Essays in 
International Relations and International Law (2000),315, at 318. He here was discussing this issue 
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serve to produce impunity in particular cases. One could also argue that, despite the 
power of the Security Council, the exercising of power by the ICC may not be much 
different in a case of referral by the SC to the exercising of power in other cases 
before the Court. In the previous Chapter it has been discussed that, despite the 
creation of the ICTR and ICTY by the SC pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, these tribunals did not have the continuing support of the SC and could not 
solve the issue of the non-cooperation of states.
48
 
The final point to be examined is the ICC’s dependency on the cooperation of 
all states and international players such as the SC. In spite of the aforementioned 
problems, obstacles, and possible tensions between the two bodies, and despite the 
precautionary measures taken in this regard by the ‘like-minded countries’ from 
within the drafters of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s experience has indicated that, 
without the support of the Security Council, the Prosecutor faces many difficulties.  
This is mainly due to the fact that the ICC relies heavily on the cooperation of states; 
for instance, in a non-self-referred case, or a referral by the Security Council, in 
which the state concerned does not effectively cooperate with the ICC, the role of the 
SC in supporting the ICC becomes significant. In practice, issues have arisen 
concerning the enforcement of the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir (discussed in 
Chapter Three) although enforcement action on the part of the SC would actually be 
‘greatly facilitated by its invitation to the Prosecutor.’49 Concerning the Darfur 
situation, the impunity of the Sudanese authorities is as a result of the lack of support 
of the SC or its practical difficulties in intervening further in this country.   
Just as much as the SC will necessarily fall short in its capacity to deliver 
justice, so also is it impossible to separate it from the functioning of the ICC. Just as 
it is not possible and not desirable to remove the relationship between law and 
politics, law cannot be transferred into a condition of pure morality and humanity 
(normativity) without being entirely abstracted from the real conditions of the world. 
A world of law without politics is thus utopian and unattainable. Therefore, the role 
                                                                                                                                     
with regard to the ICJ and the Security Council, but a similar situation would obtain regarding the ICC 
and the Security Council. 
48 Rastan R. ‘Testing Co-Operation: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities’, 21 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2008),431, at 438; Ponte D.C. Madame Prosecutor, 
Confrontations with Humanity’s Woest Criminal and the Culture of Impunity (2009), at 59-60, 84, 92-
93, and 370; Peskin V. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans, Virtual Trials and the 
Struggle for State Cooperation (2008), at 30.  
49 Cassese A. ‘Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?’ 4 Journal of International Justice (2006), 
434, at 435. 
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of the SC in the Rome Statute should be accepted not simply as a practical necessity, 
but as an inevitable component of the Statute’s theoretical and normative vision. The 
‘exception’ of SC involvement, in other words, is one that fundamentally determines 
the character of the justice delivered by the ICC. 
6.1.1. Negotiations at the Rome Conference regarding the role of the Security 
Council during the drafting of Article 16  
It has been mentioned that the relationship between the ICC and the SC was a vital 
issue at the Rome Conference,
50
 and there were opposite opinions among states’ 
delegations on this topic. Several countries, including, notably, the US, while 
supporting the creation of the ICC, actively attempted to reduce the independence of 
the Court. They sought a greater and more legitimate role for the SC in the Statute; 
they preferred the concept of a ‘permanent ad hoc tribunal’, in which the SC would 
be able to control all of the cases before the ICC and have a veto right for all of the 
potential cases. Similarly, it was indicated in the draft ILC Statute that:   
    No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is 
being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act 
of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise 
decides.
51
 
 
The ILC Draft Statute thus met the demands of one group of countries.. 
However, this faced difficulty being accepted by other delegations in the Rome 
Conference, as the ILC provision would have effectively given the SC a veto 
concerning all potential prosecutions.
52
 
Opposed to the demands of the first group, the ‘like-minded’ countries gave 
overall support to the creation of the Court and were trying to establish a judicial 
Court independent of the Security Council. Consequently, at the Rome Conference 
there was a clash between those promoting their political concerns and those 
concerned with the judicial independence of the ICC.  
The Statute itself reflects neither of these two positions, and Article 16, which 
might be thought of as a ‘compromise’ position, was in fact not entirely acceptable to 
either group. For the like-minded group, it allows a political body into the scheme of 
                                               
50 See the UN Diplomatic Conference. Supra note 1. 
51 See the Draft Statute of the International Law Commission of 1994, text adopted by the 
Commission at its forty-sixth session, 1994, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
(1994),Vol, II (Part Two), UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add. l (Part 2). 
52 Schabas W. (2004), Supra not 10, at 715. 
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the Statute, an admission which would lend impurity to the justice of its decision-
making processes. For the first group, no doubt, the pretension that the ICC could 
ever dispense an even-handed justice was perhaps one of the most vexatious of its 
claims. Nevertheless, a proposal by Singapore,
53
  amended by Canada,
54
 as two of 
the like-minded group, struck a ‘compromise’ between these two opposing 
tendencies,
55
 and with slight changes was finally adopted by the Conference. The 
Rome Statute then provides that:    
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to 
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.
56
 
 
Although the above Article makes a request from the SC for a prosecution 
unnecessary, it gives a right of veto to the Council, which, by a resolution, could 
defer the Court’s prosecution.57 Accordingly, the five permanent members of the SC 
are potentially able to block the Court’s prosecution without any limitation as to how 
many times such a resolution could be renewed. Cryer asserts that, through Article 
16, ‘the Rome Statute has made it possible for politically motivated selectivity to 
occur.’58Similarly, some have also discussed that this Article arguably raises the 
question of the impartiality and independency of the Court, which appears to be 
applying a double standard.
59
  
6.1.2. The practice of the UN Security Council concerning Article 16 of the Statute 
The Security Council, through the influence of the US and under Article 16 of the 
Statute, adopted resolutions 1422 and 1487
60
 in order to exempt US citizens from 
being surrendered to the ICC. The US played a central role in the adoption of 
                                               
53 See the Rome Conference. Supra note 1, 33 meeting, A/CONF. 183/C. 1/SR.33, Para 16 at 321, and 
35 meeting, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, Para 11, at 335 and 7th meeting, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.7, Para 
36 at 183.  
54 Id, 10th meeting, A/CONF.183/2/Add.l and Corr. 1 and A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L.7. Speech delivered 
by Kessel, from Canada , Para 66, at 208 and Para 15 at 213, (15 June 17 July 1998). 
55 Birdsall A. Supra note 12, at 124; Schabas W. (2010), Supra note 28, at 329.  
56 See the Rome Statute Art. 16. 
57 Johanson S. Peace Without Justice, Hegemonic Instability or International Criminal Law? (2003), 
at 82-83. 
58 Cryer R. (2005), Supra note 1, at 226. 
59 Mokhtar A. ‘The fine art of arm-twisting: The US, Resolution 1422 and Security Council deferral 
power under the Rome Statute,’ 3 International Criminal Law Review (2003), 295, at 302. 
60 See the SC Res. 1422 (12 July 2002), and SC Res. 1487 (12 Jun 2003). 
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Resolutions 1422
61
 and 1487
62
 under the Rome Statute.
63
 In both these Resolutions 
the SC invokes Chapter VII and says that it is acting ‘consistent with the provisions 
of Article 16 of the Rome Statute’. The Council in Resolution 1422 ‘requests’ that:  
      [c]onsistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a 
case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing 
State not a party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United 
Nations established or authorized operation, [the Court] shall for a twelve-month 
period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or 
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise’.64  
 
In Resolution 1487, an identical request is made regarding the twelve-month 
period starting 1 July 2003.
65
These resolutions aimed at preventing all states 
concerned from surrendering US citizens to the ICC and express the Council 
intention to renew their ‘request’ every twelve months, for as long as may be 
necessary.
66
  
Regarding Resolution 1422 there are two significant points which need to be 
considered: the question of the consistency of this Resolution with Article 16, and 
the circumstances under which the Resolution was adopted. As to the first question, 
one may argue that, as Article 16 allowed the Council to block an investigation from 
commencing or being proceeded with, the Resolution is thus consistent with the 
Statute. It should be noted, however, that Resolution 1422 was adopted on 12 July 
2002 by the Security Council, just a few days after the Rome Statute entered into 
force on 1 July 2002, and that the ICC did not have any cases for investigation yet. 
Thus, some assert that Article 16 is limited to the use of deferral on a case-by-case 
basis by the Council.
67
 Some scholars also assert that the compatibility of this 
resolution with both Article 16 and the UN Charter is considerably doubtful.
68
 
Hence, one may argue that, because the resolution does not fall within the boundaries 
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of what is countenanced by the Statute, it cannot be binding on the ICC.
69
 This was 
the viewpoint adopted by a state delegation in the meeting for the drafting of the 
Resolution in the UN, who argued that the Resolution was not consistent with Article 
16 and suggested that ‘[t]he negotiating history makes clear that recourse to article 
16 is on a case-by-case basis only, where a particular situation - for example the 
dynamic of a peace negotiation - warrants a 12- month deferral.’70 Regarding the 
circumstances under which the Resolution was adopted, it must be pointed out that at 
this time thousands of US peacekeepers were deployed around the world, and in 
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The US, in fact, was threatening the Council 
that they might veto the continuation of the UN peacekeepers’ mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,
71
 or might withdraw all other US peacekeepers, because their forces 
were in the danger of falling under the possible jurisdiction of the ICC in those 
territories.
72
 As the US representative in the Security Council, Negroponte, asserted, 
‘[f]ailure to address concerns about placing peacekeepers in legal jeopardy before the 
ICC, however, can impede the provision of peacekeepers to the United Nations. It 
certainly will affect our ability to contribute peacekeepers.’73   
In addition, opposition during the drafting of the first Resolution by many 
states also needs to be considered; some asserted that the Resolution would send a 
message to the world that US peacekeepers were above the law and would establish a 
double standard in international law.
74
 Also, a letter was transmitted by the President 
of the SC when the Council met to vote on the resolution, that he had received that 
day from the permanent representatives of Canada, Brazil, New Zealand and South 
                                               
69 Sarooshi D. Id, at 118. 
70 Heinbecker P, the permanent representative from Canada; see UN Doc. S/PV.4568 (10 July 2002), 
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74 See the speech delivered by MacKay, UN Ambassador from New Zealand, in the meeting for 
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Africa; this letter expressed the view that the draft Resolution (1422) would damage 
the international criminal justice system and international endeavours to combat 
impunity, etc.
75
 Eventually, despite such opposition, Resolution 1422, after several 
meetings by the Council, was adopted unanimously, and it was renewed in 2003 for a 
further twelve-month period as Resolution 1487.
76
 Although the resolution was not 
renewed a second time, and it lacked any practical effect as there were no allegations 
of peacekeeper’s crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC,77 the adoption of 
Resolutions 1422 and 1487 prove the significant role of the US with regard to the 
ICC. The US in fact sought to renew the Resolution a second time; their failure may 
have reflected growing international pressure and opposition to such resolutions, as 
well as the after-effects of the exposure of the evidence and allegations of torture and 
abuse by the US forces in Abu Ghraib in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba in 
2004.
78
 The US was extremely embarrassed by the reports of such abuse,
79
 and hence 
it was difficult for the US to attain another renewal of the Resolution. These two 
highly controversial resolutions were also arguably incompatible with Article 16, as 
there was no determination of a threat to peace or act of aggression consistent with 
Article 39 of the UN Charter.
80
 As an author argued at that time, the threat to peace 
‘said to be involved is a mere figment and pretext’; thus, it was not justifiable 
‘granting immunity in advance,’ before a case was investigated in the Court.81 
However, and in contrast to these two Resolutions, in other cases the SC has 
applied this Article on a case-by-case basis; this has occurred on several occasions. 
For example, paragraph 7 of Resolution 1497, concerning peacekeepers in Liberia, 
expresses the exclusive jurisdiction of the US over their peacekeepers;
82
 this 
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Resolution may be more compatible with Article 16.
83
 In Resolution 1593, 
concerning the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the SC also recalled 
Article 16 of the Statute and requested that the ICC should not investigate nationals 
of non-party states outside of Sudan.
84
 Furthermore, in Resolution 1828, in 2008, 
after the African Union requested the Council to apply Article 16 concerning the 
Prosecutor’s Arrest Warrant against Al- Bashir, a few days later the SC Resolution 
took note of ‘their [i.e. certain members of the Council’s] intention to consider these 
matters further.’85 Although this Resolution did not explicitly block the prosecution, 
it sent an impunity signal to the Sudanese officials, which may undermine the efforts 
of the Prosecutor to bring them to justice.  
It is open to argument as to whether there is in fact a link between impunity 
and the exemption from prosecution which is stipulated in Article 16 and the above 
resolutions. Those arguing against such a link contend that states such as the US may 
genuinely and impartially prosecute perpetrators in their national courts with even a 
higher standard than the ICC. This may be the case, but then again it may not be. To 
answer the question of the existence of a link with impunity, we must first of all go 
back to the main reason for the creation of the ICC and all of the previous 
international tribunals. One of the main reasons for the creation of the ICC and 
international tribunals in general is based on the idea that states are usually reluctant 
to prosecute their own nationals where they have committed crimes over other 
nationals, or they may be unable to prosecute. The creation of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals, as well as the ICTY and ICTR, was based on this idea. More 
recently, some of the UK and US soldiers who have committed war crimes in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, have been prosecuted in national courts and have been convicted;
86
 
however, we have not yet seen an effective trial which includes their commanding 
officers.  
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In the second place such exemption from prosecution may affect the Court’s 
effectiveness and the universality of its performance, and seems also to violate the 
principle of the sovereign equality of states before the law (which implies that every 
state should be treated in the same way) since a group of people (i.e. US citizens) 
who might be prosecuted effectively before the Court will be immunised on the basis 
of nationality.
87
 Furthermore, such exemptions will increase the criticisms directed at 
the ICC, in particular by non-Western states, for instance that it is an African Court 
and not an international court, etc.
88
 Concerning Third World approaches to 
international law in general, it may be said that scholars argue that it is vital that a 
system of individual accountability must be created for all states and that the 
principle of accountability should apply to all international courts.
89
 In addition, it 
has been observed that resolutions 1422 and 1487, which were issued pursuant to 
Article 16, were a ‘denial of the value of justice’ and could damage the legitimacy of 
the SC itself.
90
   
The third concern is that the intervention of the Council by means of such 
resolutions could undermine the independence of function of the Court, and would 
also impose obstacles on its functions.
91
 Whatever the reasons, such resolutions have 
been adopted by the Security Council, and the Statute, via Article 16, in fact provides 
an exception to prosecution, which may lead to impunity of some perpetrators. 
Indeed, as one delegation argued in the Rome Conference: “[i]f investigation or 
prosecution could be postponed at the request of a State or of the Security Council, 
the Court’s effectiveness would be impaired.”92 Amnesty International has also 
strongly criticised the inclusion of this Article in the Rome Statute and argued that ‘it 
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subjected the Court to impermissible political pressure, overriding the Court’s 
independence, ...’93 
6.2. The possible creation of impunity via opposition of some powerful states and 
via non-ratification of the Statute: political dimensions and the ICC 
As was pointed out earlier, for greater effectiveness of the Court, the Statute’s 
ratification and the cooperation of all states, and in particular of the powerful 
countries, is extremely significant. This is due to the treaty-based establishment of 
the ICC and its lack of independent enforcement power, which mean that it 
ultimately relies on state cooperation.
94
 If ratification of the Statute by powerful 
states would plausibly enhance the effectiveness of the Court in combating impunity, 
then the opposition of these countries definitely has the opposite effect and may lead 
to the creation of impunity. Among the five permanent members of the SC, the US, 
Russia and China have not ratified the Statute. Other significant international players 
such as India and the majority of Islamic countries have not ratified the Statute 
either, and many of them do not even have any intention of signing the Statute. The 
position of the US and its influence on the functioning of the ICC, and its opposition 
to the ICC via the US bilateral agreements, are the central points of the following 
section. The section will seek to examine the consistency of such agreements with 
the Rome Statute, and how such opposition or lack of cooperation by the US and 
others may lead to impunity and may undermine the role and effectiveness of the 
ICC.
95
 The non-ratification of the Statute by other states is subject of the final 
section.   
6.2.1. The position of the US toward the establishment of the ICC  
The US played a significant role in open discussions and supported the idea of the 
creation of a permanent international criminal court; it actively participated in the 
Rome Conference for the adoption of the Statute and signed the Statute on December 
31, 2000, under President Clinton.
96
 However, the final draft of the ICC was not 
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what the US intended or expected. Thus, after Clinton the neo-Conservative 
government during President George W. Bush’s presidency initiated their strong 
hostility to the ICC by announcing in May 2002 to the UN that the US did not intend 
to ratify the Statute and resigned the signature of the US to the Statute.
97
 Since then, 
the US has enacted legislation prohibiting any kind of assistance to the ICC, 
including investigations, arrests, detentions, extraditions, and prosecutions of war 
crimes,
98
 and has concluded a range of bilateral agreements with many states in order 
to exclude the possibility of surrendering of US citizens to the ICC.  
Schabas and Mokhtar argued that the key reason for such hostility by the US 
administration concerned the inadequate role of the SC in the Rome Statute.
99
 
Schabas asserts that ‘[o]nly concerns about the role of the Security Council 
satisfactorily explain the increasingly hostile attitude of the United States towards the 
Court.’100 He provided several justifications for this argument, such as the paradox 
between the US support for the ad hoc criminal tribunals and its opposition to the 
ICC, and also the positive role of the US during the Rome Conference. In connection 
with the latter point, Schabas mentioned that the US contribution improved the 
ability of the Court to address impunity, via the extension of the concept of war 
crimes to deal with internal armed conflicts, through the guarantees of due process 
for defendants, the attention to gender issues, and meticulous qualifications for 
judges.
101
 In contrast, other scholars have identified other reasons behind the US 
opposition, such as the role of the Prosecutor’s independent power ex proprio motu 
to initiate an investigation, or the US demands for extraordinary rights for its 
citizens, or the US concerns surrounding the potential for the ICC to prosecute US 
nationals serving as peace-keepers around the world, and issues concerning Status of 
Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Other possible reasons include the US concerns about 
the applicability of the Statute to non-party states, or general sovereignty concerns, 
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and the US Constitution.
102
 Regarding the US Constitution as a possible constraint 
preventing the US from joining the ICC, a commentator has argued that ‘there is no 
forbidding constitutional obstacle to US participation in the treaty.’103 However, it 
remains a question as to whether or not the US Constitution would permit the 
extradition of defendants to a foreign national legal system.
104
 
The key issue here is whether we are to take the US opposition to the ICC as 
being ‘exceptionalist’ in the sense that it is prompted by a desire to enjoy certain 
privileges not enjoyed by other states (as seems to be implied by Schabas in his 
comments on the role of the Security Council) or whether the opposition is one it 
believes is capable of being shared by all other States. The question, in other words, 
is either an opposition to the very idea of universal justice,
105
 or an opposition to the 
idea that universal justice might be achievable within the framework of that 
particular institution. That it might be the former is suggested by the terms of the 
US’s official report to Congress, in which it was made clear that one of its crucial 
objections to the Court was ‘the ICC’s potentially chilling effect on America’s 
                                               
102 See the US Department of State Report for Congress: US Policy Regarding the International 
Criminal Court (Sept 3, 2002), at 3-6; Minogue E. C. Supra note 9, at 650 and 677, and Scheffer, 
delegation from the US, at the UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C1/SR.9(20 November 1998), Para 23-24 at 
195; Fehl C. Supra note 8, at 75;  Bogdan A. ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
Avoiding Jurisdiction Through Bilateral Agreements in Reliance on Article 98’, 8 International 
Criminal Law Review (2008),1 at 24-5; Scheffer D. ‘Articles-Article 98(2), of the Rome Statute: 
America’s Original Intent’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 333 at 338-9; Hass V. 
Supra note 72, at 165;  Birdsall A. Supra note 12, at 129-130;  Meyer E. M. ‘International Law: The 
Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with the US Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements Included in the American Service Members’ Protection Act’, 58 Oklahoma Law Review 
(2005),97 at 107; Goldsmith J. ‘The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court’, 70 The University 
of Chicago Law Review (2003),89, at 95, he asserts that the main reason for opposition by US ‘is the 
fear that its unique international policing responsibilities will expose it to politically motivated 
prosecutions before an unaccountable court’; Ferencz B. ‘Misguided Fears about the International 
Criminal Court’, 15 Pace International Law Review (2003), 223  at 231-233, he asserts three main 
objections for opposition of the US to the ICC, which are: the role of an uncontrolled Prosecutor, US 
nationals’ constitutional rights to a fair trial, and sovereignty concerns; Kircher A.R. ‘Attack on the 
International Criminal Court’, 13 Michigan State Journal of International Law (2005), 263 at 268, 
270, and 271; see also generally Pejic J. ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court: One 
Loophole Too Many,’ 78 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review (2001-2002), 267; Conso G. ‘The 
Basic Reasons for US Hostility to the ICC in Light of the Negotiating History of the Rome Statute’ 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 314; McGoldrick D. Supra note 96, at 402-407.   
103 Wedgwood R. ‘The Constitution and the ICC’, in S. B. Sewall & C. Kaysen (eds), Supra note, 96, 
at  121, he argued that the US has already used its  treaty power to participate other international 
courts, such as IMT and IMTFE, Iran- US Claims Tribunal established by the Algiers Accord, and etc, 
and ‘the ICC is carefully structured with procedural protections that closely follow the guarantees and 
safeguards of the American Bill of Rights and other liberal constitutional systems,...’ see also at 121-
130.  
104 Id, at 129-130.  
105 Chomsky N. Supra note 40, he asserts that neoconservatives in the US demand the control of the 
world via access to the main natural resources, and that this was the reason for the occupation in Iraq 
and intervention in the Middle East; see also generally Thompson-Flores T. Supra note 88. 
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willingness to project power in the defense of its interest.’106 On the other hand, 
under President Obama, according to Professor Scheffer, who was one of the US 
delegates to the Rome Conference, US support for the ICC has increased to the 
extent that the US may be considered as a de facto member of the ICC.
107
 For 
example, in October 2011 President Obama authorised sending approximately 100 
US troops to assist regional forces to arrest Joseph Kony of the LRA. It would seem 
that the US’s opposition to an effective ICC has decreased, and this may eventually 
affect other outstanding arrest warrants besides Kony’s. Even if the US position has 
changed, however, the account of US opposition is illuminating insofar as it 
demonstrates the extent to which the ICC was never contemplated as a mechanism 
for applying the idea of universal justice. It is open the question whether the 
appearance of current support, which was as a result of pressure from human rights 
NGOs on the US government, is anything more than a temporary policy. 
6.2.1.1. Article 98 (2) and its practice 
      The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to 
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
108
 
Pursuant to the above Article, the US concluded a series of bilateral agreements in 
2002
109
 with many states in order to exempt US citizens from being surrendered to 
the ICC or other member states of the Statute who have primary liability to prosecute 
such perpetrators. The US evidently referred to Article 98 in such agreements
110
 and 
even threatened states with waiving economic and military support funds if they did 
                                               
106 See the US Department of State. Supra note 96, at 4. 
107 Lecture presented by Professor David Scheffer at SOAS titled ‘The End Impunity’ (12 March 
2012), see also Thompson-Flores T. (2010), Supra note 88, at 69-90 and 82. 
108 See the Rome Statute Art. 98 (2). 
109 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), Proposed Text of Article 98 Agreements 
with the United States (July 2002 ), available at : 
http://coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=bia&idudctp=13&order=dateasc&show=all(Accessed 06/07/2012). 
110 See, e.g., Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 03-415, International Criminal Court 
Article 98, Agreement between the United States of America and the Gabon (April 15 2003), it 
provides: ’Bearing in mind Article 98 of the Rome Statute, … 1. For purposes of this agreement, 
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not, absent the express consent of the first Party, (a), be surrendered or transferred by any means to the 
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any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or 
transfer to the International Criminal Court.’ Available at:  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/165197.pdf (Accessed 12/07/2012). 
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not sign such an agreement.
111
 In total, over 100 states parties and non-parties to the 
Statute have each signed such a separate bilateral agreement with the US so far.
112
 
Although these agreements are known as impunity agreements, the US has claimed 
that the agreements meet the requirements of Article 98 of the Rome Statute. It is 
worth briefly examining this issue, in order to clarify the nature of the influence of 
the US over the ICC, either in opposition to it, as the current approach stands, or 
supporting it in a postulated future change of position.  
Regarding the question of the consistency of the bilateral agreements with 
Article 98, one may argue that the agreements are consistent with the Article, as the 
latter could be interpreted in a way that certainly could be applied to all of the 
agreements either before or after ratification by state parties and non-parties to the 
Statute. It may appear that from the above Article that the US found adequate leeway 
in it to conclude such bilateral agreements. As such, the US asserted that the Rome 
Statute in Article 98 (2) recognised that if a state party to the Statute had other 
international treaty obligations, the jurisdiction of the ICC should not interfere with 
these obligations, and so agreements such as the US bilateral agreements are 
countenanced by the Article.
113
  
An alternative argument, however, is that the bilateral agreements violate the 
Rome Statute and are not compatible with Article 98 (2).
114
 This argument relies on 
the fact that for an accurate interpretation of the Article, two important points need to 
be considered: firstly, the original intent of Article 98 (2) of the Statute, to ascertain 
which of the negotiations during the adoption of this Article must be examined; and 
secondly, the fact that this Article has to be interpreted in light of the main purpose 
and objective of the Statute.
115
 To examine the first point, which concerns the 
original intent of Article 98(2) some have argued that the Article’s intention was to 
                                               
111 E.g. Presidential Determination No. 2003-28 (29 July 2003). President Bush ordered that the 
prohibition of support be waived after Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zambia, etc. entered into the 
US bilateral agreements pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statute. Available at: 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/PD2003-28.pdf (accessed 18/06/2012). See also Meyer E. M. Supra note 
102, at 99; Birdsall A. Supra note 12, at 135; Hass V. Supra note 72, at 173; Meyer Eric M. Supra 
note 102, at 131; Ferencz B. Supra note 102, at 236. 
112 See CICC, Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs), Ibid.  
113 Meyer Eric M. Supra note 102, at 99. 
114 Condorelli L. Supra note 78, at 594. 
115 Kircher A.R. Supra note 102, at 276; Hass V. Supra note 72, at 171-172; Meyer Eric M. Ibid, at 
100 and 117.   
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include only SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements)
116
 which viewpoint finds support 
in the statements of the delegates themselves who were involved in the drafting of 
the Statute.
117
 The term ‘sending state’ which was used in Article 98(2) to refer to a 
third state was used for the first time in US SOFAs
118
 such as the agreement between 
the US and NATO in 1951. Thus, Article 98(2) intended to solve the potential 
conflict between the Rome Statute and SOFAs, which were existing agreements at 
the time of drafting the above Article.
119
 In the first draft of the Statute, the term 
‘third state’120 was used, but in the final draft this was changed to the ‘sending state’; 
and it should be considered that, as the adoption of the term ‘sending state’ in this 
Article resulted from the US delegation’s efforts prior to and during the Rome 
Conference, it appears that the first intention was to refer to the US SOFAs.
121
  
Additionally, the US head of delegation to the Rome Conference, Scheffer, 
has stated that when they conducted their successful negotiations for the inclusion of 
this Article in the Statute, their intention was to protect their SOFAs.
122
 Accordingly, 
with a very narrow interpretation it might be said that this Article only applies to 
SOFAs, while on a somewhat wider interpretation it could be viewed as applying to 
SOFAs and to diplomatic immunity under the Vienna convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.
123
 Another expert view is that the application of Article 98(2) is not 
confined only to bilateral extradition treaties and SOFAs, but that bilateral 
extradition treaties themselves are not necessarily consistent with the ‘sending State’ 
terminology used in Article 98(2).
124
 There is, however, wide agreement among 
                                               
116 A SOFA is a bilateral agreement between one state, which is sending troops and other nationals 
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119 Beattie P. Ibid, at 206. 
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analysts that Article 98(2) was intended to encompass SOFAs, extradition treaties, 
and diplomatic relations.
125
 
The second point that needs to be considered in the interpretation of Article 
98(2) is the fact that the Statute as a treaty must be interpreted in the light of the main 
objective and purpose of its establishment. As the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties stipulates, a party to a treaty must refrain from ‘acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty’.126 The main purpose of the Rome Statute is the 
prevention of impunity,
127
 as a commentator observes ‘[a]n agreement that does not 
provide any effective guarantees of investigation and prosecution undermines the 
purpose of the Rome Statute.’128 The European Union, for instance, has disputed the 
expansive US interpretation of the Article’s compass, legally evaluated it, and 
recommended guidelines for bilateral non-surrender agreements between EU 
member states and the US.
129
 Furthermore, the European Parliament has adopted a 
resolution asserting that such agreements (as the US bilateral agreements) are not 
compatible with the Rome Statute or with EU membership.
130
 
It seems therefore, that the US bilateral agreements may not be compatible 
with the Rome Statute.
131
Article 98(2) can only apply to the international agreements 
involving state parties to the Statute which were in existence at the time of the 
adoption of the Statute,
132
and any other interpretation of Article 98(2) is counter to 
the obligation of states to surrender criminals and to the main purpose of the Statute, 
which is to bring criminals to justice and hence to end impunity.
133
 It seems that in a 
situation in which a state party to the Statute has entered into such agreements after 
the Statute has been adopted, the Court should not respect such agreements (for what 
that might be worth). Clearly the States participating in the bilateral arrangements are 
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128 Jain N. Supra note 68, at 249.  
129 A complete collection of EU declarations, resolutions and other documents relating to Art. 98(2), 
and bilateral agreements see American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court  
AMICC, available at http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/reaction.html#EU (Accessed 07/07/2012 ).  
130 European Parliament Resolution on the International Criminal Court (ICC), P5_TA (2002),0521 
(September 2002). It states at Para. 9: “Recalls that it expects the governments and parliaments of the 
Member States to refrain from adopting any agreement which undermines the effective 
implementation of the Rome Statute; considers in consequence that ratifying such an agreement is 
incompatible with membership of the EU.” 
131 Zappala S. Supra note 68, at 114 and 133.  
132 Kircher A.R. Supra note 102, at 274. He asserts that it intended to cover existing Agreements, in 
order to prevent legal conflicts. 
133 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
239 
 
putting themselves in a difficult position: on the one hand a state that has ratified the 
Statute is obliged to cooperate and surrender or prosecute an accused,
134
 while on the 
other hand, by entering into a bilateral agreement, the same state is obliged not to 
surrender (e.g.) US citizens to the ICC. 
The interpretation of the Article preferred by the US government is revealing, 
of course. If taken to its logical conclusion, it would lead to the bizarre situation in 
which any state party with sufficient diplomatic power and influence could conclude 
bilateral agreements protecting its nationals from prosecution by the ICC with 
countries across the world, resulting in the creation of impunity for its nationals. 
Only those states without the power to succeed in such comprehensive bilateral 
agreement creation activities - i.e. weak, developing states - would have their 
nationals vulnerable to prosecution by the ICC for heinous crimes.
135
 However far 
this may seem to contradict the Rome Statute’s main purpose and objective, it is 
nevertheless plausibly descriptive of a view that might unconsciously be shared by 
many states participating in the ICC – namely that the idea of ‘universal justice’ that 
lies at its heart is, in fact, something to be delivered only in relation to nationals of 
other states. 
To shed further light on this point, it is worth considering the nature of the 
exception that Article 98 offers under the US interpretation. Many commentators 
have asserted that this Article represents an exception,
136
 but none of them have 
explained their reasons for referring to it as such. Guzman, on the other hand, 
characterised Article 98 as an ‘escape clause’, allowing a state to opt out of its 
obligations under the Rome Statute concerning the citizens of another state by means 
of a bilateral agreement with that state.
137
 He clarified that states often, when 
designing an international agreement, include a number of mechanisms by which 
parties are enabled to circumvent their obligations, on a temporary or permanent 
basis, under certain conditions.
138
 These mechanisms usually consist of ‘reservations, 
escape clauses, and exit clauses’.139 Accordingly, and because of the presence of the 
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above Article he considered the Rome Statute, as a whole, an ‘escape clause’ 
agreement.  
 However, to understand whether the term ‘escape clause’ is in fact an 
appropriate term for the kind of exception Article 98 comprises under the US 
government interpretation, it is worth stepping back to a more theoretical perspective 
and considering that an exception can be understood in either of two ways. Firstly, it 
can be regarded as something that carves out a space of discretion from the general 
rule, with its existence as an ‘exception’ confirming the parameters of the rule as 
initially articulated (e.g. ‘The use of force is prohibited except in case of self-
defence.’) Secondly, it can be understood as something which does not so much 
detract from the rule, but is fundamentally determinative of the rule, its existence 
being the key to understanding what the rule really means (thus being an 
‘unexceptional exception’). In this case, the general rule extends only as far as the 
exception (e.g. ‘States are free to use force in self-defence, but on other occasions it 
is prohibited.’) The significance of this change in perspective on the question of 
those expedients or provisions that appear as ‘exceptions’ to generic rules is that it 
focuses attention not only on the character of the exception, but also upon the context 
in which the exception is (or is likely to be) invoked.  
Guzman’s usage of the term ‘escape clause’ seems to invoke the first 
representation of the exception  as a route out of an otherwise enveloping rule. In 
actual fact, however, it is clear that Article 98 (under the US government 
interpretation) does not grant a universal entitlement to all states to escape from their 
obligations by securing the protection of their nationals by way of bilateral 
agreements, but only to those states that have the ability to procure such concessions 
from others. As such, it is not so much an ‘escape clause’ allowing states generally to 
avoid obligations, but a clause which makes it clear that only certain states (or 
nationals thereof) will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The ‘exception’ thus 
denotes the exceptional character of the justice that is to be delivered – exceptional in 
the sense that it will be geographically delimited by reference to the nationality of the 
perpetrators of the crimes in question. Accordingly, it may be considered to fall 
under the second representation of the exception – one whereby the general rule is 
determined by, and extends only so far as, the exception. It can clearly be seen that 
this results in the creation of impunity not merely in an accidental or unintended way, 
but systematic impunity for perpetrators who are nationals of states with the power to 
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procure, by means of bilateral agreements, protection for their citizens from 
prosecution by the ICC. 
6.3. States non-party to the Statute and their possible relation to impunity 
Among the five permanent members of the SC, aside from the US, Russia and China 
have not ratified the Statute. Other significant international players such as India and 
the majority of Islamic countries have not ratified the Statute either, and many of 
them do not even have any intention of signing the Statute. Consequently, regardless 
of the many difficulties internal to the Rome Statute, it is also extremely important to 
consider the Court’s lack of universality of jurisdiction as a result of the non-
ratification of the Statute by such states. It is clear that non-party states do not have a 
direct obligation to cooperate with the ICC (although an exception could be a referral 
by the SC).
140
 Thus, the non-ratification of the Statute has significance that goes 
beyond the mere limitation of jurisdiction in relation to crimes committed on that 
territory, but also may contribute to the problem of impunity mainly through the lack 
of cooperation in different ways, such as non-surrender and non-detention of an 
accused, non-cooperation in the collection and maintenance of evidence and 
protection of victims and witnesses, etc. In general, due to the treaty-based nature of 
the ICC, non-party states have no direct obligation to cooperate; thus, the extension 
of ratification of the Statute is significant as a consequence of the general proposition 
that the extension of the scope of a treaty would enhance its effectiveness.
141
 
It should be considered, however, that the mere non-ratification by states is 
not directly related to the incidence of impunity. This is because, firstly, as has been 
mentioned, the crimes within the Statute are mainly derived from customary 
international law;
142
 thus, a state failing to perform its duty to extradite or prosecute 
under customary international law would result in impunity whether or not it had 
ratified the Rome Statute. Secondly, in general impunity subsists in the Statute itself 
irrespective of universal ratification of the Statute; the main argument of this thesis 
has been that the Statute may not only serve as a means of combating impunity, it 
                                               
140 See the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties. Supra note 126; the Rome Statute Art. 13 (b), 
see also Gallaant K. ‘The International Criminal Court in the System of States and International 
Organization,’  16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), 553, at  583. 
See the Rome Statute Art. 13 (b). 
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may also in many different ways legitimise, facilitate or even create impunity. Clear 
examples in which the Statue appears to be working against its stated goal of 
combating impunity include Article 16, where impunity may result from resolutions 
by the SC, and Article 98(2) which may lead to impunity via the exemption of state 
parties from their obligations under separate bilateral agreements. Thirdly, the 
ratification of the Statute by itself will not solve the issues relating to problem of 
cooperation. Universal ratification in general might enhance the effectiveness of the 
Court, and non-ratification may contribute to the types of impunity which may derive 
from non-cooperation in a criminal procedure. Nevertheless, non-ratification and 
impunity have no automatic relationship with one another.  
6.3.1. The main reasons for non-ratification of the Statute 
If the Statute is rightly to be regarded as a codification of existing international 
customary norms,
143
 the question arises as to what reasons may be put forward for 
the non-ratification of the Statute. There are several reasons given by states for such 
non-ratification. The first reason is that the Rome Statute itself makes it impossible 
for some states to become party to it; this is particularly true for Islamic states, 
because of the perception of the incompatibility of Islamic law with certain terms of 
the Statute.
144
 Whilst in other circumstances this is an issue that might have been 
avoided by resort to reservations, the Rome Statute itself does not provide for that 
possibility. The Statute states very simply that ‘no reservations may be made to this 
Statute’.145 This, of course, reflects upon the longstanding debate on the question of 
reservations more generally, concerning the tension that exists between the ambition 
for universality and the desire to maintain the normative integrity of the 
agreement.
146
 The second reason for certain States’ non-participation is the 
perception that they would become targets of the ICC if they ratified the Statute, or at 
least make it easier for the ICC to prosecute their citizens; this is especially the case 
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144 See e.g. the definition of torture in the Rome Statute, Article 7(2),(e), as ‘intentional infliction of 
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for states which have extensive internal human rights issues, such as Russia, China 
and many Islamic countries.
147
 
The third reason given for non-ratification is the Court’s own deficiencies; 
whereas the US, for instance, has been concerned that the Statute as a treaty should 
not apply to non-party states,
148
 others, such as Islamic states, have criticised the 
influence of political bodies such as the SC in the Statute, and the inability of the 
Court to exercise power independently in the face of opposition from the great 
powers (e.g. the SC invoking Article 16 to defer proceedings) etc.
149
 The fourth, and 
related, reason for non-ratification is the perception that the powerful states would 
control the ICC. In other words, certain states have a concern that the ICC would not 
deliver universal justice, equally available to all, but partial, differentiated justice. 
Third World scholars in general seek to create an international law which serves ‘the 
cause of global justice.’150 This is one of the main reasons for opposition to the ICC 
among Islamic states in particular. Some of them have argued that the ICC would be 
a tool in the hands of the great powers, which would allow it to exercise its 
jurisdiction only in their own interests.
151
 On the other hand, it is plausible to argue 
that certain other states have the opposite concern: they do not wish to ratify the 
Statute because they do not support the idea of a system of universal justice. 
These explanations need to be treated with some caution. In the case of 
Islamic States for example, they may be divided into two main categories: those 
states that have ratified the Statute, such as Jordan, Azerbaijan, and more recently 
Turkey and Egypt, etc.; and other states such as Syria and Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
etc., which have still not ratified it. Saudi Arabia not only has not ratified the Rome 
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Statute, it has not even signed it, and there is little prospect of it  doing so. Iran, as 
another major Islamic country, is a signatory to the Rome Statute. There is strong 
support in Iran for joining the ICC among academic scholars and religious experts. 
For example, one of the well known religious scholars in Iran believes that there is 
no contradiction between Islamic Law and the Rome Statute; that all of the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Statute are also crimes under Islamic Law; that the 
existing Iranian criminal code should undergo any modifications necessary to make it 
consistent with the Statute; and that the Iranian government should, accordingly, 
ratify the Statute.
152
 Academics also mainly support the ICC, as a means of 
enhancing human rights and the government’s accountability. Others suggest that 
before any plan for ratification, the Iranian government should fill the gap of 
provision between the Statute and the national legislation via the criminalisation of 
all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Statute.
153
 It seems that the above two 
considerations – the support of academics and religious experts’ attitudes – might be 
considered the main reasons for the signature of the Statute by the Iranian 
government and the existing debate between scholars regarding a possible 
ratification of the Statute in the future. The simple claim that the ICC is inconsistent 
with Islamic law and hence would prevent ratification by Islamic states is clearly 
insufficient. 
The question remains, however, as to why powerful states are concerned 
about the jurisdiction of the ICC over their citizens, given the opportunities available 
within the statute to avoid prosecution by the ICC via applying the complementarity 
principle,
154
 or via obtaining special dispensation by resolution of the SC, or via 
securing immunity by means of bilateral agreements, etc. The answer, it seems, 
relates to the limitations of each of these modes of avoidance. In the first place, and 
as regards the principle of complementarity, the answer is related to the role of the 
independent Prosecutor of the Court. The significant point is that, due to the principle 
of complementarity and the fact that assessments of complementarity lie in the hands 
of the ICC's judges, the final decision on whether to prosecute is always made by the 
                                               
152 Damad M. Ayatollah. ‘The ICC and Islamic Republic of Iran, round table’, in Es-haag Alehabib 
(eds), International Criminal Court and Islamic Republic of Iran, the Institute for Political & 
International Studies, Tehran (2000), at 515; Malekian F. ‘The Homogeneity of International Criminal 
Court with Islamic Jurisprudence’, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009), 595, at 621.  
153 Alaei M. ‘The ICC, Human Rights, and the Assessment of Ratification.’ Id, at 399. 
154 This principle was examined in Chapter V, and stipulates that state parties have primary 
jurisdiction over crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
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Prosecutor. To clarify: according to the principle of complementarity, if a national 
court finds that an alleged crime is justifiable, the principle would still force a state to 
surrender a perpetrator to the ICC if the ICC’s Prosecutor held that the domestic 
court’s decision was not compatible with the fact or the trial was not a fair and just 
one.
155
 In other words, in a possible conflict between a state’s domestic court and the 
ICC, the final decision would be made by the ICC; thus, citizens of these states may 
not be fully protected even by their national courts undertaking such cases, because 
of the application of the complementarity principle.
156
 Accordingly, states, by virtue 
of their priority of jurisdiction, can avoid the ICC’s jurisdiction for many cases, but 
may be unable to avoid it for all of them even after a domestic prosecution.  
However, the Statute may also be applied to non-parties in the following 
several situations. The first is the case where a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Statute is committed in the territory of a state not party to the Statute and this state, 
by sending a declaration, has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.157 The second 
situation is via a referral by the SC under chapter VII of the Charter.
158
 In this case 
the ICC will operate on an ad hoc basis, but the difference between this situation and 
that obtaining in the case of an actual ad hoc tribunal is that the ICC’s independent 
Prosecutor, under the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber,
159
 has authority to decide 
whether to initiate an investigation or not.
160
 The third and the most controversial 
situation in which the Statute may be applied to state non-parties is one where a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed against a national of a 
state party
161
 (by nationals of state non-parties) or has been committed in the territory 
of a state party by a national of a state non-party.
162
 This third situation of 
jurisdiction by the ICC has been one of the main reasons for opposition to the Court 
on the part of states. They have argued that a treaty should not be applied to non-
parties without the latter’s consent, whereas the supporters of the Court assert that 
because of the nature of such heinous crimes as are within the jurisdiction of the 
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Statute, if one of these crimes is committed in the territory of a state party, it is 
obliged to prosecute the crime not only under the Rome Statute but also under 
general international law. Consequently, states who have so far avoided being a 
member of the Statute because of a fear that the ICC may target their citizens can not 
escape from the jurisdiction of the ICC in all situations in any case.  
Turning to the second means of avoiding prosecution by the ICC - special 
dispensations only available to certain states and regarding the possibility of states 
securing their nationals against the jurisdiction of the Court via SC resolution, it must 
be observed that fears exist that this would be insufficient protection from 
prosecution for states’ citizens. Even for powerful states, the experience of 
Resolution 1422 indicates that it is not always easy for a consensus to be found 
between the SC’s members for the adoption of such a resolution protecting their 
nationals.  
It may be seen that the Statute provides reasons for different states not to be 
members of it. In a situation in which a state non-party is reluctant to cooperate with 
the Court and which may therefore lead to impunity, the reason should first be sought 
in the Statute itself, the details of which remain as significant obstacles to ratification 
for some states. This is particularly the case for those states who are seeking a 
universal justice. It should be noted, however, that even with universal ratification of 
the Statute, the problem of impunity in the Statute itself would still exist. This is due 
to two main reasons. The first is that impunity has been partly recognised or 
legitimised in the Statute in general, as has been discussed in this chapter in the case 
of Articles 16 and 98(2) and may possibly be created via amnesties, immunities, etc. 
The second reason is that – as was mentioned earlier – the ICC has not been 
structured for universal justice but for partial justice, and in it justice has been 
differentiated by reference to the inequalities of power that exist in international 
society.  
6.4. Conclusion 
The relationship between the SC as a political body and the ICC as a judicial 
instrument should be seen in light of the relationship between law and politics. Just 
as law and politics cannot be separated, these two bodies cannot be detached from 
each other, either in theory or in practice. This results in various peripheral issues, 
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both de facto and de jure, which imply that the Statute can not apply equally to all 
states. 
The predominant way in which people have understood the operation of the 
ICC in relation to the SC is one in which the problems are associated with the 
influence of politics on the ICC; this influence is conceived of as being one through 
which the cause of justice is sadly undermined, particularly by the presence and 
attitude of the US. Hence, for the most part people have thought about the situation 
in terms of the legal institution of justice being subjected to the unwarranted 
intrusion of politics into the legal domain which should be concerned with justice 
alone. In my view, this response is partly right but insufficient. It is true that the role 
of the SC, and particularly the exemptions from prosecution offered via the Bilateral 
Agreements and immunity resolutions, have in effect given rise to a type of 
possibility of impunity, which would seem to run in a direction counter to the main 
objective of the ICC. However, the common attitude to this is incorrect on three 
major counts. Firstly, the assumption that the problem is about the introduction of 
politics into the legal domain assumes that these may be kept apart; even if one took 
away the SC, the ICC would still be a profoundly political institution in the sense 
that the conditions of power and inequality that condition international relations 
would still would have effect on the practice of the ICC. This fact may be seen 
demonstrated, for example, by the reluctance of some states to become parties to the 
Statute, or by the practice of the ICC to date, which demonstrates that the principal 
states who are the subject of the Court’s jurisdiction are African states. Secondly, the 
assumption that a reform of the SC’s involvement would remedy the problem is also 
incorrect. As has been said, without the SC the ICC would still have a set of 
problems to deal with whenever it operated. Thirdly, it is incorrect to suppose that 
the idea of universal justice is either uncontroversially desirable or achievable; the 
reality seems to be that universal justice is not universally desired, and as much as 
the ICC is concerned with the elimination of impunity as per its stated objective, this 
is not in practice what its objective appears to be, but rather to direct itself against 
impunity in certain situations while allowing it to flourish in others. This is simply a 
reflection of the differentials of power politics, and actually also, and perversely, a 
condition of the support of universal justice itself. In other words, in order to be in 
favour of universal justice one has to have impunity, and so far as that is the case the 
idea of achieving universal justice always undermines itself – the maintenance of 
impunity being a condition for the pursuit of universal justice. 
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Accordingly, it has also been argued that the SC resolutions under Article 16, 
which legally were inconsistent with both the Statute and the UN Charter, provide 
evidence that the ‘universal justice’ contemplated by the Statute in reality cannot 
apply equally to all states; thus, the Statute is different in practice than when 
considered out of context. One may say that, despite the marginal nature of the direct 
implications of such resolutions, the intention was that exemption from prosecution 
should be normalised for some states.
163
 Thus, it is true to state that the resolutions 
have to be seen as somehow symbolic of the recognition of the political reality of the 
unequal distribution of power. In this regard, the significant issue is that the impunity 
of one may encourage the impunity or unavailability for prosecution of others. The 
ICC, therefore, in theory and practice, is bound within its surrounding political 
structures and it should not be unrealistic to say that the ICC has become an 
institution of domination.  
 Powerful states clearly have the potential to exert great influence on the ICC. 
The opposition of the US to the Court, and its bilateral agreements under a misuse of 
Article 98 of the Statute, could undermine the effectiveness of the ICC and may 
provide impunity for US nationals.
164
 Article 98, then, through potentially providing 
room for the creation of such agreements, thus provides another possible means for 
the escaping of some perpetrators from justice. Although recently the US has 
supported the ICC in a selected case, this support may be temporary, as the US, for 
its part, does not support the idea of universal justice but that of exceptionalism. The 
fact is that the structure of the ICC has led to justice being differentiated according to 
the power of different states, and impunity may be recognised via this lack of 
universal justice. It seems that not only has the ICC not been capable of 
‘marshalling’ universal justice, it was not even able to ‘master’ it as endeavour 
alone.
165
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VII. Conclusion 
This study has sought to examine a paradox at the heart of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) especially in the context of its governing document, the Rome Statute. 
On the one hand, the ICC seeks, in the present and immediate future, to combat 
impunity through the innovation and development of legal means to criminal 
prosecution; and, in a longer-term hope, to ensure that these doctrines and techniques 
become established norms to bring justice without impunity, and facilitate peace and 
security within the global legal architecture. On the other hand, the ICC’s Statute and 
the scope of the mandate of the Court as delineated therein, as well as the actual 
practice of the ICC, all may contribute to the creation of the very impunity that the 
ICC was established to prevent.  
Consequently, in the course of this thesis I have argued that the ICC is not 
just a mechanism for bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice, but may 
also create impunity, create the potential for or facilitate impunity, recognise or 
legitimise existing impunity, and fail to address existing categories of impunity. The 
ways in which impunity may arise can be divided into two core groups. The first 
group covers matters internal to the Statute. New criminalisation, the Statute’s 
definition of crimes, the possibility of different interpretations and the associated 
flexibility, uncertainty, and departures from customary international law, may all 
lead to a situation of de jure impunity. The potential that the ICC may admit national 
amnesties and may respect state parties’ immunity agreements, thus accepting 
limitations which may bar the surrender of an accused to the Court, and the provision 
of defences are also included among these internal matters, along with issues related 
to the ICC’s complementarity of jurisdiction, its inadequate institutional mechanisms 
and various procedural problems. The ICC has faced many procedural issues similar 
to those faced by previous international tribunals, such as the lack of or insufficient 
cooperation, issues in exercising power and insufficient sanctions on non-compliant 
states, any of which may facilitate impunity. But the very fact that such weaknesses 
are unexceptional is not to suggest that the only conclusion we may draw is that the 
ICC is making slow headway in achieving its objectives.  After all, one must attend 
to the fact that its very weakness has itself a productive power: both justifying the 
exercise of extensive jurisdiction by individual states parties and securing popular 
support for its own activities.  Its acceptability as an institution coming only as a 
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consequence of the fact that it stands for something more than it delivers. This thesis 
has demonstrated that, despite the many advantages of the complementarity principle 
and its implications for the admissibility of cases, such as its encouraging states to 
prosecute international crimes in their domestic courts and its respect for their 
primacy of jurisdiction and sovereignty, in particular as in practice it would be 
impossible for the ICC to prosecute all international crimes, the complementarity 
principle also has a high capacity to create impunity in a number of ways, such as 
through the recognition of a state’s decision not to prosecute and the resulting 
inadmissibility of such cases, the shielding of perpetrators, etc. 
The second group of ways in which impunity may arise is through the 
peripheral problems and obstacles faced by the ICC, which are mainly concerned 
with its relationships with the SC and certain hegemonic states. These relationships 
are influenced by the nature of the Rome Statute itself and reflect the relation 
between law and politics in general; they are, it may be said, a reflection of the 
differentials of power politics, and are actually also, and perversely, a condition of 
the support of universal justice itself. Accordingly, I have argued that the relationship 
between the ICC and the SC, and particularly the exemptions from prosecution 
offered via the US Bilateral Agreements and immunity resolutions, have in effect 
given rise to a type of possible impunity. However, the assumption that the problem 
is about the introduction of politics into the legal domain assumes that these may in 
fact be kept apart; I have argued that this is incorrect, due to the fact that, even if one 
took away the SC, the ICC would still be a profoundly political institution in the 
sense that the conditions of power and inequality that condition international 
relations would still have effect on the ICC whenever it operated. Hence, the reality 
seems to be that the idea of universal justice is neither desirable nor achievable; as 
much as the ICC is concerned with the elimination of impunity as per its stated 
objective, this is not in practice what its objective appears to be, but rather to direct 
itself against impunity in certain situations while allowing it to flourish in others. 
Impunity, therefore, is not something extraneous to the Statute, but something 
generated within it, and the maintenance of impunity is a condition for the pursuit of 
universal justice. 
This then poses the question as to what one may draw from that conclusion. 
How are we to think about the notions of justice underpinning the Statute or the 
apparently seamless connection between law and politics/power? What, in particular, 
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might this critique demand us to think of the Rome Statute? Should we seek to 
abandon it, rejecting the offer of partial justice that it appears to offer? Or should we 
rather seek to eliminate the gaps that open up the possibility for impunity? In the first 
place, it seems to be the case that the latter choice will remain a faint or hopeless 
cause. Law, as the realists have taught us, is not merely that which is found in the 
text, but that revealed in practice. This will be the cause of a differentiation between 
that which is caught within the terms of the Statute and that which is kept outside in 
practice, and so far as any particular rubric of justice will always seek to differentiate 
between different forms of impunity (i.e. between those that are justified and those 
which are not) a categoric opposition to the possibility of impunity will remain 
beyond the reach of law. 
This, of course, leads to an important insight – that whilst it is through the 
legal categories that impunity itself is partly defined (through the determination of 
liability to punishment within a particular legal instrument such as the Rome Statute) 
the rationale for such categories of justice always stands outside the law itself. It is 
only through the lens of some extra-legal category of impunity that one is able to 
judge or assess the Rome Statute as being necessary, worthwhile or desirable, but 
from the standpoint of that same external category, the legal intervention will always 
be partial. The instrument in question, then, will always have an ambiguous 
relationship to these extra-legal forms of evaluation – on the one hand it will stand as 
a representation of those values, giving concrete expression to something which 
would otherwise remain intangible; yet on the other hand, it will demand to be read 
as imperfect, transmitting the sense that there is a form of perfect justice to which it 
is reaching, but yet unable to enact. 
If then, one cannot hope to satisfy the desire for universal justice through the 
rubric of an instrument such as the Rome Statute, are we better off without it? Before 
attempting to answer this question, we should once again remember that this would 
demand that we reconcile ourselves to the persistence of impunity for international 
crimes and accept the possibility that genocide, for example, might just as well go 
unpunished simply because we are not able to satisfy, in the purest sense, our 
demand for a form of justice that is truly universal. Two points in relation to this 
need to be borne in mind. First of all, the concept of justice is not absolute, but 
relative; it varies between different cultures, societies, and religions, so that a 
particular act may be known as a crime in one society but not in another, and hence 
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the punishment of an individual who perpetrates such an act may be viewed as just in 
one society but not in another. Although it can be argued that human beings may 
share certain core common values, in practice morality is always the product of a 
particular society, culture or religion. Secondly, justice in general – either based on 
consensus of common values or not – is not achievable entirely in any legal system, 
even with the highest possible standards of judicial precision. This is a consequence 
of the obvious procedural deficiencies, lack of political will, and political fears, etc., 
that are ever present. These issues, which may lead to criminals escaping justice, 
exist in all courts and legal systems, and even with a genuine prosecution for 
widespread international crimes, justice is limited. The amount of punishment for the 
perpetrators and the suffering undergone by the victims of their atrocities can never 
be equal.  
Yet these points should not be simply reminders of our human fallibility 
which we put to one side when imagining what an institution like the ICC might do 
or become. Rather, they should inform our evaluation of it: its place is there to 
deliver partial justice, allow for both the prosecution of those whose acts are 
criminalised but yet allow others also to go unpunished. This study has emphasised, 
in that respect, the significance of the intrinsic relationship between law and politics, 
in which the ICC as a legal institution is understood to be existing in a political 
environment – not just any political environment, but a particular one. Like its 
predecessors, we must understand the ICC as being constantly shaped by the 
particular political forces that act upon it. This clearly has implications for how we 
think about the prospect of international criminalisation and what we should be 
thinking about international crimes and tribunals. If international crimes only exist as 
defined by institutions such as the ICC and if they punish some people but not others, 
then this clearly says something about our commitment to justice for those crimes. 
International criminal law must therefore be understood as a kind of fragile peace, 
constantly shaped by the political environment in which it operates.  
Given that justice can never be applied universally, we return to the question 
of what our reaction ought to be to the partial justice offered by the Rome Statute: to 
abandon it or to seek to eliminate the features of it that foster impunity. Clearly the 
prosecution and bringing to justice of perpetrators should not be abandoned simply 
because we cannot do it perfectly. The Rome Statute no more deserves to be 
abandoned simply because it does not offer the impossible vision of perfect universal 
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justice and law ‘untainted’ by politics than a domestic justice system should be 
abandoned because of the latter’s own failure to meet this ideal. Rather, let justice be 
done as far as is possible. If, for whatever reason, it is not possible for the ICC to 
prosecute nationals of certain countries or perpetrators of certain crimes, this does 
not mean that it should not prosecute others. Accordingly, my conclusion is that the 
second of the two offered choices should be taken: though it may remain impossible 
to attain perfection, we ought to strive to the utmost to eliminate the features from 
the Statute – those exemptions, and gaps, which may lead to criminals escaping from 
prosecution – which may lead to impunity. Undoubtedly, some of these issues result 
from the power of the state parties that provide for the very existence of the Rome 
Statute, and may therefore be considered to be out of the reach of the law. Like the 
statutes of prior international tribunals, the Rome Statute is thus accompanied by a 
gesture of exclusion. In spite of this fundamental flaw, the fact remains that its 
establishment has been a step forward in the fields of individual criminal 
responsibility and of international criminal law. 
Impunity which arises via procedural problems and obstacles which are 
internal to the Statute could frequently be eliminated either via the Court’s course of 
practice or via amendment of the related criminal procedures. However, generally 
speaking, impunity via peripheral obstacles, difficulties and codifications, with some 
exceptions, could not be eliminated easily, if at all. Equally problematic is the 
situation when punishment is not in the interests of justice for a society. The 
emergence of impunity in cases such as these is inevitable, however unpalatable. 
This provides an understanding of why, in examining the practice and theoretical 
logic of the Rome Statute and the ICC, the thesis has focused specifically on the 
ubiquitous character of ‘impunity’, and how it functions in the creation and 
maintenance of a wide variety of legal scholarship, jurisprudence and policy-making. 
Moving on to more specific recommendations: firstly, it is apparent that for 
effective functioning of the Court, it is essential for it to have a greater power of 
sanctions over non-compliant state parties to the Statute; this could eliminate the core 
issue of the lack of cooperation. The extension of the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Court ought also to be undertaken, so that crimes such as terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and the use of nuclear weapons fall within the jurisdiction of the Statute; 
now that the crime of aggression has been defined at the ICC’s first review 
conference, the amendment to the Rome Statute expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction 
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over that crime needs to be ratified. In addition, the inclusion of the possibility of 
trial in absentia with some conditions, as is common in the vast majority of states, 
may help the effectiveness of the Court. Concerning defences, superior orders as a 
defence in cases of war crimes rather than as a mitigating factor, and the issue of the 
non-manifest unlawfulness of war crimes under Article 33, which thereby departs 
from customary international law, should be amended. On this issue of defences, as 
there are practical advantages to a distinction between defences as justifications and 
as excuses, and as there are fundamental differences between these two types of 
defences, the Statute should accordingly codify defences in such a way, which is 
widely utilised in both common and civil law systems. Furthermore, the dichotomy 
of jurisdiction between military commanders and civilian superiors is unnecessary 
and may cause issues of the delay of prosecution; thus, this too should be amended, 
especially as the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber appears in fact to be trying to limit the 
distinction between civilian and military command responsibility and has adopted the 
concept of a ‘de facto commander’. Finally, as combating impunity is not an easy 
task and the cooperation of all states and of the international community is 
significant, the state parties to the Statute should encourage other states to ratify the 
Statute, and should also work to utilise the media to raise the awareness of people, in 
particular regarding cases of non-compliant states or institutions; this would have the 
potential greatly to increase the cooperation of all states, as public opinion can 
change, if not all, then many things in this age of the global village. Moreover, the 
possibility of resolving several issues and concerns which have so far made it 
impossible for some states to join the Court should be considered. Overall, it may be 
said that progress towards shrinking the field of impunity (rather than ending it 
entirely) will be expedited by a greater awareness of the importance of the issue, 
among the public in general and among lawyers in particular. 
It is recommended that further research be undertaken about the causes and 
consequences of impunity, as this study has not been primarily concerned with these 
issues. Instead, this thesis has attempted to clarify how the ICC may have the 
opposite impact to its intended goals, via the possible creation and recognition of the 
very issue which it seeks to address, namely impunity. Additionally, it is important 
that case studies be undertaken by researchers in the future in order to understand the 
consequences of the ICC’s intervention in different countries. The question to be 
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answered will be whether the Court’s intervention was the right decision and how 
much it contributed to promoting the international criminal justice system. 
It is my hope ultimately that this thesis will contribute to a better 
understanding of the Statute and of the relationship between the law and politics of 
international criminalisation. I have endeavoured to develop the idea that the ICC 
affords an exact depiction of how that relationship may be conceived, and how the 
cause of justice is both enhanced and retarded in the process. 
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